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Abstract: 
The term ‘Europe’ was omnipresent in the ‘Third Reich’ during the Second World 
War. An abundance of primary sources attests to the German interest in a new Euro-
pean order. Nevertheless, historiography is in disagreement on the Europeanness of 
this New Order and on its actual relevance for National Socialist policies. This study 
argues that these differing appraisals are the result of a mistaken understanding of 
the National Socialist New Order. 
National Socialist Germany did not pursue a single, stable, and clear-cut notion of 
Europe-to-be, but constantly kept negotiating its war aims and the future of Europe 
under the heading ‘New Order’. By means of a discourse-analytical approach, this 
thesis reconstructs this New Order and shows that its defining dimensions were long-
standing and well-established knowledge and belief systems: the idea of European 
economic cooperation and völkisch beliefs. Depending on the military situation and 
the scope of the German sphere of influence, the discursive weight of these interpre-
tive frames varied during the war. Nevertheless, they produced temporarily stable 
visions of Europe-to-be. Contrasted with this development, an analysis of German 
policies clearly demonstrates that the New Order discourse did matter. A herme-
neutical approach which draws on discourse-analytical concepts of power relations 
makes clear that the New Order discourse was powerful. It defined the permissible 
ways of thinking and speaking about the future of Europe and it endowed the activi-
ties of German occupation authorities and private companies with meaning.  
Thus, this study and its innovative perspective shed new light on the New Order and 
broaden our understanding of National Socialist wartime policies. Its findings suggest 
that the National Socialist Europe must not be dismissed as anti-European. National 
Socialist Germany discursively constructed and realised its own ideals of Europe-to-
be. This völkisch and economic reorganisation not only guided the policies of Ger-
man occupation policies and informed the actions of private businesses, but it also 
fits well into the German tradition of European thinking. 
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1. A New Europe 
When the Europakränzchen met for the first time in the Hotel Esplanade in Berlin, on 
16 December 1943, Hans Kehrl, head of the planning office of the Ministry of Arma-
ments and War Production, opened the meeting with a recapitulation: he reminded 
the attendees of the “birth of the European idea [in the] summer of 1940”, but regret-
ted that cooperation within the “European economic community” still left a lot to be 
desired.1 Kehrl’s Europe-rhetoric is far from being an isolated case in the history of 
the ‘Third Reich’. In fact, the conquests of the National Socialist regime, occupation 
policies, crimes and atrocities, and even its downfall were accompanied by a con-
stant Europe-centred background noise. After the defeat of France, slogans about 
the ‘European Großraumwirtschaft’2, the ‘reorganisation of Europe’, and the ‘New 
European Order’ were omnipresent. With the attack on the Soviet Union in June 
1941, this vocabulary was complemented by phrases like ‘Europe’s crusade against 
Bolshevism’, the ‘Greater Germanic Empire’, and ‘Europe’s granary’. In the end, im-
pending defeat turned Europe into a ‘fortress’, a ‘community of destiny’, and a ‘soli-
daristic defensive front’ which was fighting for its very existence. 
Understandably, historical research has paid attention to the frequent use of the 
word Europe in its varying contexts.3 However, given the monstrous crimes that Na-
tional Socialist Germany committed all over the continent, many historians tended to 
see the regime’s promotion of a new Europe as little more than an empty propagan-
distic phrase. If anything, National Socialist concepts and policies were seen as anti-
European. Other historians, by contrast, argued that the National Socialist policy of 
extermination clearly reflected the vision of a völkisch reorganisation of Europe, just 
as German concepts for a European Großraumwirtschaft found their expression in 
the economic penetration of the occupied states. These contradictory views raise the 
question of what relevance National Socialist notions of Europe actually had. Since 
Europe-related terms did not solely appear in public discourse, but also featured 
                                            
1
 Kehrl’s manuscript for the Europakränzchen, 16 December 1943, BArch, R 3, 1940, pp. 173-177. 
2
 Throughout the text, the words ‘Großraumwirtschaft’ and ‘Großwirtschaftsraum’ will appear fre-
quently. The difference between the two expressions is marginal and a matter of emphasis: While 
‘Großraumwirtschaft’ puts the emphasis on the economy of a Großraum, the ‘Großwirtschaftsraum’ 
stresses the Großraum as an economic area of operation. 
3
 The following chapter (1.1) gives an overview of the historiography of the National Socialist notions 
of Europe.  
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prominently in internal documents, it seems unlikely that the National Socialist re-
gime tailored its European rhetoric exclusively to propagandistic purposes. On the 
other hand, if National Socialist concepts for Europe must have had a limited effect 
on German occupation policy, if research in one of the most studied periods of his-
tory has not yielded undisputed results yet. This gap is the starting-point of this study. 
The study argues that the National Socialist regime did indeed develop notions of a 
future Europe. Even though there was no single, stable, or clear-cut vision of what it 
would look like, National Socialist planning always rooted in long-standing and well-
established völkisch and economic knowledge and belief systems. In many in-
stances, German officials and companies worked towards realising them, but the 
result was hardly a coherent reorganisation of Europe. Internal differences, resis-
tance in the occupied territories, and the growing pressure of the war effort thwarted 
their efforts. Nevertheless, contrary to some historical research – some aspects of 
the National Socialist New Order did materialise. 
 
1.1 Historical Research and the National Socialist New Order 
Even though the National Socialist European rhetoric and policy have received 
scholarly attention, the state of research on this area is patchy. The following para-
graphs will sum up the existing research, explain their shortcomings, and discuss 
their possible causes, thereby leading to considerations on a possible solution. 
The first groundbreaking study on the National Socialist New Order was Paul Kluke’s 
1955 article ‘Nationalsozialistische Europaideologie’.4 Kluke shows that thr German 
New Order concepts underwent fundamental changes during the course of the war: 
While the victory over France triggered a planning euphoria and the attack on the 
Soviet Union was accompanied by anti-communist arguments, German European 
rhetoric climaxed in desperate attempts to mobilise solidarity against bolshevism af-
ter the turning-point of the war.5 Other historians have refined Kluke’s picture of the 
                                            
4
 See P. Kluke, ‘Nationalsozialistische Europaideologie’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 3, 
no. 3, 1955, pp. 240-275. Toynbee’s edition on Hitler’s Europe was published one year before, in 
1954. However, it does not primarily focus on the New Order but presents a general overview of de-
velopments in German occupied Europe. A. Toynbee and V. Toynbee, (eds.), Hitler's Europe, Lon-
don, Oxford University Press, 1954. 
5
 Kluke links the turning point to the defeat of the Sixth Army in Stalingrad. See Kluke, Europaideolo-
gie, p. 270. For other standpoints, see A. Tooze, Ökonomie der Zerstörung, Bonn, Bundeszentrale für 
Politische Bildung, 2007, p. 563; K. Roth, ‘“Neuordnung” und wirtschaftliche Nachkriegsplanungen’, in 
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New Order by giving more differentiated accounts of this development, but they ba-
sically confirm his findings.6 Unfortunately, they also suffer from the weaknesses of 
Kluke’s analysis: on the one hand, he understands Europe as a “home to a family of 
peoples that share a certain spiritual and political heritage, shaped by the ancient 
world, Christendom and Germanic-Romanic nature”7 and consequently concludes 
that National Socialist concepts were not at all borne by a sense of responsibility for 
this “old continent and its permanently threatened, but nevertheless everlasting val-
ues”8. By making his own implicit understanding of what Europe is supposed to be 
the benchmark, he can only perceive the National Socialist understanding of Europe 
as propaganda employed to conceal the true intentions of the National Socialist re-
gime, its claim to power and conquest.9 On the other hand, he argues that Hitler’s 
views ultimately determined German policy, but, for lack of supporting archival evi-
dence, his account relies on newspaper articles and on statements by high-ranking 
officials. By filling the gaps in Hitler’s notion of Europe with other National Socialist 
leaders’ views, he ends up with a coherent picture of the New Order, but cannot as-
sess its significance. Overall therefore, Kluke’s work reveals the two major problems 
which historical research on National Socialist notions of Europe has to cope with: 
Firstly, an underlying but usually only implicit normative understanding of Europe 
determines the perspective and influences the outcome,10 and, secondly, the poly-
cratic political system of the ‘Third Reich’ complicates the question of which Euro-
pean concepts actually mattered. 
Our views of National Socialist plans for Europe are blurred by normative under-
standings of what Europe is supposed to be. No matter what political camp one be-
longs to, nobody would argue the case for a European order along National Socialist 
lines: For Marxist historians, National Socialist Europe, its crimes, and its atrocities 
                                                                                                                                       
D. Eichholtz (ed.), Krieg und Wirtschaft. Studien zur deutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1939-1945, 
Berlin, Metropol Verlag, 1999, pp. 195-219, here pp. 211-216. 
6
 See e.g. M. Salewski, ‘Europa: Idee und Wirklichkeit in der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung 
und politischen Praxis’, in F. Otmar (ed.), Europas Mitte, Göttingen, Muster-Schmidt, 1987, pp. 85-
106. J. Hoensch, ‘Nationalsozialistische Europapläne im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Versuch einer Synthese’, 
in R. Plaschka et al. (eds.), Mitteleuropa-Konzeptionen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, 
Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1995, pp. 307-325. 
7
 My own translation of Kluke, ‘Europaideologie’, p. 260. Throughout the thesis, all translations are my 
own.  
8
 Ibid., p. 275. 
9
 See ibid., p. 274. 
10
 R. Bauer, ‘“Anti-Europa” oder die “Gesetzmäßigkeiten des Finanzkapitals”? Zur Darstellung der NS-
Europapläne in Quellensammlungen’, Zeithistorische Forschungen, vol. 9, no. 3, 2012, pp. 457-466. 
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were the logical result of the intrinsic trend of development of capitalism.11 On liberal 
and democratic assumptions, the National Socialist means and ends are considered 
to run contrary to the “spiritual essence” of Europe and its fundamental values of 
freedom and equality.12 Moreover, even right-wing historians bemoan the fact that 
plans for a nationalistic Europe were not able to stand up to the ideological stub-
bornness of high National Socialist officials who went over the top.13 Thus, National 
Socialist plans for Europe are in any case depicted as the antithesis to the respective 
author’s own ideal of Europe and therefore are categorically rejected. However, this 
consensus also creates historiographical problems because it leads to over-
categorical instead of differentiated verdicts: By defining their own ideal of Europe as 
standard and consequently concluding that National Socialist European policy was 
not a “real European policy”14 but a “perversion of the European idea”15 because it 
was not borne by a “real European concept”16, or by simply stating that this “kind of 
European philosophy”17 cannot be considered a part of the German European dis-
course, historians effectively turn their work into an act of self-assurance.18 Of course, 
one must not leave aside the inhumanity of National Socialist ideology and policy 
when dealing with the National Socialist notions of Europe, but, at the same time one 
                                            
11
 See G. Hass and W. Schumann (eds.), Anatomie der Aggression. Neue Dokumente zu den Kriegs-
zielen des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus im zweiten Weltkrieg, Berlin, VEB Deutscher Ver-
lag der Wissenschaften, 1972, p. 8. 
12
 See M. Salewski, ‘Ideas of the National Socialist Government and Party’, in Lipgens W. (ed.), Doc-
uments on the History of European Integration. Vol. 1: Continental Plans for European Union 1939-
1945, Berlin, de Gruyter, pp. 37-54, here p. 54. 
13
 See H. Neulen, ‘Nachwort’, in H. Neulen (ed.), Europa und das 3. Reich. Einigungsbestrebungen im 
deutschen Machtbereich 1939-1945, Munich, Universitas, 1987, pp. 393-398. 
14
 B. Kletzin, Europa aus Rasse und Raum. Die nationalsozialistische Idee der Neuen Ordnung, 
Münster, LIT Verlag, 2000, p. 216. 
15
 V. Schöberl, "Es gibt ein großes und herrliches Land, das sich selbst nicht kennt... Es heißt Euro-
pa." Die Diskussion um die Paneuropaidee in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien 1922-
1933, Münster, LIT Verlag, 2007, p. 336. 
16
 P. Krüger, ‘Hitlers Europapolitik’, in W. Benz, H. Buchheim and H. Mommsen (eds.), Der National-
sozialismus. Studien zur Ideologie und Herrschaft, Frankfurt a.M., Fischer, 1993, pp. 104-132, here p. 
120.  
17
 H. Duchhardt, ‘Der deutsche Europa-Diskurs des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts’, in H. Duchhardt 
(ed.), Option Europa. Deutsche, Polnische und Ungarische Europapläne des 19. und 20. Jahrhun-
derts, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005, pp. 15-42, here p. 38. 
18
 See Bauer, ‘Europapläne’, pp. 457-466. Other authors that either label the New Order as ‘Anti-
Europe’ or state a perversion of the European idea are for example: B. Schilmar, Der Europadiskurs 
im deutschen Exil 1933-1945, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2004, p. 140; Neulen, ‘Nachwort’, p. 397; M. 
Salewski, ‘Ideas’, p. 54; H. Loock, ‘Zur “Großgermanischen Politik” des Dritten Reiches‘, Viertel-
jahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte vol. 8, no. 1, 1960, pp. 37-63, here p. 40; G. Brunn, Die Europäische 
Einigung von 1945 bis heute, Bonn, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2004, p. 29; W. Schmale, 
Geschichte Europas, Vienna, Böhlau, 2001, p. 116; M. Smith, ‘Introduction: European Unity and the 
Second World War’, in M. Smith and P. Stirk (eds.), Making the New Europe. European Unity and the 
Second World War, London, Pinter, 1990, pp. 1-17. 
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must not – against better judgement – begin a search that is bound to fail.19 There is 
no point in looking for a Europe already defined as a community of free and equal 
people within an ideology that rested on beliefs of racial inequality and the right of 
the strong. Doing it anyway and arriving at the inevitable ‘Anti-Europe’ conclusion 
ultimately means rhetorically barring the possibility of a more differentiated view, thus 
blanking out an entire period of the history of Europe.20 The consequential dismissal 
of the New Order as mere propaganda and the refusal to see anything ‘European’ in 
National Socialist planning and policy, can easily lead to an interpretation of the 
‘Third Reich’ as an isolated aberration in a supposedly consistent success story that 
culminated in the ‘real European idea’ materialising in ‘real European policy’, namely 
the European Union.21 Hence, instead of contrasting the ‘right’ path Europe is cur-
rently treading with the National Socialist wrongdoings, a more constructivist ap-
proach22 could yield results that go beyond the moral condemnations that go without 
saying. Thus, this study therefore analyses the New Order as one out of many differ-
ent concepts for a new European order that did play some role in the complicated 
dynamics leading ultimately to the post-war European integration.23 
If one takes a closer look at what the labels “Anti-Europe” and “perversion of the 
European idea” stand for, one finds a broad spectrum of results. Some scholars ar-
                                            
19
 One of Salewski’s articles illustrates this problematic approach: Initially, he states that the idea of a 
voluntary and equal integration of Europe did not play a role in National Socialist ideology. In the end, 
he concludes that it was impossible for National Socialists to approve of a “truly European idea”. And 
by ‘truly European’ he means an allegedly consensual definition of Europe as a “geographical, cul-
tural, and religious but also [as] a political and an intellectual-historical concept.” Salewski, ‘Europa’, 
pp. 85, 88, 99, 106. 
20
 V. Conze, Das Europa der Deutschen. Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition 
und Westorientierung, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2005, pp. 1-4. 
21
 Kletzin claims that the entire debate about a ‘New Europe’ was meant to provide German propa-
ganda with a pseudo-scientifical backing. See Kletzin, Rasse und Raum, p. 212. Loth also empha-
sises the propagandistic aspect of the New Order. See W. Loth, ‘Rettungsanker Europa? Deutsche 
Europa-Konzeptionen vom Dritten Reich bis zur Bundesrepublik’, in H. Volkmann (ed.), Ende des 
Dritten Reiches - Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Eine Perspektivische Rückschau, Munich, Piper, 
1995, pp. 201-222, here p. 201. 
22
 Constructivist approaches assume that knowledge is based on symbolic orders constructed by 
societies. In discourses, these orders are produced, legitimised, and transformed. See R. Keller, Müll 
- Die Gesellschaftliche Konstruktion des Wertvollen, Wiesbaden, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998, p. 35. 
23
 Recently, many scholars have called for such an approach and published corresponding studies. 
See e.g. V. Conze, ‘Vielfalt ohne Einheit. Deutsche Europaideen im 20. Jahrhundert’, in U. Lappen-
küper and G. Thiemeyer (eds.), Europäische Einigung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Paderborn, Schö-
ningh, 2013, pp. 45-68, here p. 46; I. Schröder, ‘Europa im Zeichen des Hakenkreuzes: 
Historiographische Perspektiven im Wandel. Ein Kommentar’, Zeithistorische Forschungen, vol. 9, no. 
3, 2012, pp. 449-456, here p. 456; R. Gerwarth and S. Malinowski, ‘Europeanization through Vio-
lence? War Experiences and the Making of Modern Europe’, in M. Conway and K. Patel (eds.), Euro-
peanization in the Twentieth Century. Historical Approaches, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 
pp. 189-209, here p. 203; Conze, Ideen von Europa, p. 4. 
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gue that when National Socialists spoke about a new European order, they were 
merely seeking to conceal their true intentions under the cloak of the widely appeal-
ing European rhetoric.24 In Kletzin’s eyes, the purpose of the New Order was to cash 
in propagandistically on the widely shared understanding that Europe needed to 
unite. National Socialist occupation policy, however, ran contrary to a “truly Euro-
pean policy”.25 Until the autumn 1942, Salewski argues, National Socialists did not 
really care about Europe but intended to erect a ‘Germanic Reich’. Later on, however, 
there were indeed some isolated voices – belonging to Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goeb-
bels, and Funk amongst others – which seriously called for a common European ef-
fort against the Bolshevist menace.26 According to Elvert, these calls might have 
shown their true colours, but fell on deaf ears as long as imperialists like Hitler and 
the party bigwigs surrounding him dominated decision-making.27  For Krüger, the 
catch phrase ‘Europe’ had taken over the role that the term ‘peace’ had played in 
pre-war speeches; it was meant to allay the concerns of other nations. However, in 
his view there was no “truly European policy” behind this rhetoric. Even though plans 
for a New Order became more “reasonable” the more desperate the military situation 
became, Hitler was not willing to engage with them.28 In Hoensch’s eyes, these more 
moderate-sounding plans were nothing but a sham, intended to win over the subju-
gated people in order to realise Hitler’s vision of a racially defined ‘Greater Germanic 
Reich’.29 Overall, existing research paints the picture of a lively discussion on the 
New Order that led nowhere. Some participants might actually have been serious 
about their comparatively modest New Order plans, but for leading National Social-
ists, they amounted to nothing more than a welcome contribution to propaganda. All 
this talking left Hitler’s imperialist concept unaffected and all German officials did, 
was – as Herzstein puts it – use the New Order as a tool “to forge one more weapon 
in their struggle to win the war”.30  
                                            
24
 See Kluke, ‘Europaideologie’, p. 274. 
25
 Kletzin, Rasse und Raum, pp. 212, 216. 
26
 See Salewski, ‘Europa’, pp. 102-103. 
27
See e.g. J. Elvert, Mitteleuropa! Deutsche Pläne zur europäischen Neuordnung (1918-1945), Stutt-
gart, Steiner, 1999, pp. 369-372; H. Neulen, Eurofaschismus und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Europas ver-
ratene Söhne, Munich, Universitas, 1980, pp. 126-132. 
28
 See Krüger, ‘Europapolitik’, pp. 120-129. 
29
 See Hoensch, ‘Europapläne‘, pp. 322-324. 
30
 R. Herzstein, When Nazi Dreams Come True. The Horrifying Story of the Nazi Blueprint for Europe, 
London, Abacus, 1982, p. 3. Even though this book is one of the few monographs on the New Order, 
it will not be referenced frequently because its lack of references makes it scientifically questionable. 
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Unfortunately, it is hard to tell what kind of Europe Hitler himself had in mind. His 
often-quoted statement that “Europe is not a geographical but a blood-wise 
[blutsmäßig] determined concept”31 is perhaps the most explicit exposition of his no-
tion of Europe. Scholars have tried to circumvent this gap in three ways: firstly, by 
adopting a very Hitler-centric view, some scholars set out to deduce the details of 
National Socialist Europe-to-be from his more general beliefs.32 Thus, a combination 
of what he wrote in ‘Mein Kampf’ and several other isolated statements relating to 
Europe informs their idea of Hitler’s concept.  
A second approach also acts on the assumption that Hitler’s new Europe would have 
rested on racism and Lebensraum. Often with reference to the well-known notes of 
Bormann on a meeting in July 1941,33 scholars argue that Hitler had a clear-cut idea 
of Europe-to-be, but deemed it unwise to make any rhetorical commitments during 
the war because once the war was won, Germany could realise any plan anyway. 
Therefore, the concrete form of Hitler’s new European order necessarily stays indis-
tinct, as he himself considered this matter a ‘cura posterior’.34 This view is often ac-
companied by the conclusion mentioned above: a large part of the New Order dis-
cussion was irrelevant and futile. Most of the plans voiced were not hamstrung be-
cause of their propagandistic value, but they did not in the end stand a chance of 
being realised. High-ranking party and state officials held imperialist views that ran 
contrary to these concepts.35 However, they did not see the need to intervene or to 
                                            
31
 Cited in H. Picker (ed.), Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1942, Stuttgart, See-
wald, 1963, p. 144. Many works quote this sentence, e.g. M. Wildt, ‘Völkische Neuordnung Europas’, 
in Themenportal Europäische Geschichte, 2007, pp. 1-6, here p. 5, [http://www.europa.clio-online.de/ 
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justify their own intentions because they would set their policy in motion as soon as 
possible.36  
Finally, a third approach attempts to cope with the lack of primary sources about Hit-
ler’s notion of Europe by supplementing his views with those held by his satraps, one 
step down the ladder.37 The problem is that there was no single ladder. Beneath Hit-
ler, the undisputed head, the National Socialist regime was “no monolithic block, no 
strict hierarchy [...], in which power unhamperedly flowed top down, but a complex 
and complicated power structure with a coexistence and inconsistence of relatively 
autonomous, competing centres of power that tried to oust or to penetrate each 
other.”38 This ‘polycratic rule’ has been seen by some as intentionally created by Hit-
ler as a strategy of divide et impera, others see it as the result of his unwillingness or 
incompetence to create a clear cut political system.39 Regardless of this difference, 
this constellation makes it hard to pin down the power and authority of a person or 
institution. In 1936, for example, Hjalmar Schacht officially occupied a crucial role in 
the German corridors of power. He was president of the Reichsbank, Minister of 
Economics, and Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. However, his opposition to 
the policy of increasing autarky and funding the German armament with debts did 
not lead to his dismissal, but to Hitler putting Göring in charge of preparing Germany 
for a war within four years. Authorised directly by the Führer, Göring used his new 
roles as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and head of the Vierjahresplanbe-
hörde to expand his competences. In the end, they cut across those of many others 
ministries.40 This pattern of appointing particular individuals or creating new organi-
sations for special tasks and of legitimising their authority through their accountability 
to Hitler, while the existing institutions were left untouched, characterises the power 
structure of the NS regime within and outside of the Reich. The formal responsibili-
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ties and authorities of an office or institution do not signify its factual influence and 
power.41 
In the occupied territories the local authorities – be it the Chefs der Zivilverwaltung 
(Heads of Civil Administrations), Reichskommissare, the Reichsprotektor in Bohemia 
and Moravia, or the Governor General of the occupied Polish territories – were also 
appointed by Hitler.42 Nevertheless, they faced plenipotentiaries who enjoyed the 
same kind of legitimacy and who deduced certain responsibilities from the special 
task they had been assigned. Göring as the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, 
for example, claimed authority over economic policies in the occupied territories. 
Himmler, since 1939 Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nation-
hood, acted on his responsibility for all matters concerning Volkstum and settlement 
policies in the entire German sphere of influence.43 As Reichsführer SS and chief of 
the German police, Himmler also commanded the Higher SS and Police leaders that 
headed the local SS and policed many occupied territories.44 And from 1942 on-
wards, Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary for Labour Deployment, repeatedly clashed 
with Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production, who had superseded 
Göring as the centre of power in German economic policy despite the Vier-
jahresplanbehörde officially still existing. Both Sauckel and Speer pursued a Europe-
wide policy, but while Speer wanted to export work, Sauckel forcefully imported 
workers.45 Thus, apart from Hitler, no single person or institution had the authority to 
set clear policy guidelines in the occupied territories. This absence of clearly defined 
and generally binding objectives in certain policy fields unleashed a dynamic as sin-
gle protagonists sought to gain the prerogative of interpretation by either enlisting 
broad support or by winning Hitler’s favour.46  
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The New Order was also subject to this polycratic “Zuständigkeitswirrwarr”47 (confu-
sion of responsibilities). Beneath Hitler, numerous high-ranking officials took part in 
the construal of Europe-to-be and tried to establish their notion of Europe as German 
war aim. And beneath them a large number of experts and functionaries did the 
same. Rosenberg authored many memoranda on German long-term goals; Göring 
ordered Funk to prepare an economic order for post-war Europe; Funk himself gave 
a number of speeches on the New Order; Goebbels briefed his staff as well as the 
press on how to speak about Europe; and Ribbentrop’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
drafted treaties for a European Federation.48 In addition to the already unanswerable 
question of which one of these well-known National Socialists had the more impor-
tant say in European matters, the different layers and facets of the National Socialist 
power structure kept changing: Göring’s influence diminished until his functions ulti-
mately became obsolete because of Speer’s Ministry of Armaments and War Pro-
duction. Alfred Rosenberg, who officially was in charge of the Newly Occupied East-
ern Territories, in fact found himself presiding over an institution that Mazower calls 
“something of a joke”49, while Ribbentrop’s standing was increasingly impaired by the 
fact that most European issues were no longer foreign affairs. Moreover, the general 
priorities of German policy partly shifted during the war. While in the aftermath of the 
initial victories the debate revolved around the means and ends of German domi-
nance, the military setbacks in the East gave rise to a mentality of all-out war, in 
which keeping the war machine going as smoothly as possible became paramount.50 
So, even if one assumes that Hitler’s principles left big enough a margin for a Euro-
pean planning of some significance at lower political levels,51 research dealing with 
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the New Order still faces a fundamental problem that the polycratic architecture of 
the National Socialist regime raises. As Orlow puts it:  
[T]he historian who sets out to write a study of the National Socialist New Order plans […] will 
not be embarrassed by a lack of documentary material; a vast array of articles, books, memo-
randa, and conference minutes attest to the interest in postwar planning of virtually every ma-
jor component of the National Socialist power structure. He soon discovers, however, that the 
very abundance of historical raw material presents him with pressing methodological prob-
lems. The documentary evidence abounds with internal inconsistencies and incompatibilities 
that reflect the constant friction and infighting of the offices and agencies that produced it.
52
 
Some responses to this methodological challenge have been problematic. Inspired 
by the History of Ideas, scholars stick to opinions they deem important, or they re-
construct an allegedly shared vision of a New Order. However, trying to determine 
the relevance of an idea by the power of its holder is bound to fail in the polycratic 
National Socialist regime, and filling the void left by Hitler’s scarce statements with 
selected views seems arbitrary. In consequence, neither studies picking up a selec-
tion of statements on the New Order and arranging them in a more or less consistent 
picture of a National Socialist Europe, nor a restriction to the concepts developed by 
single persons or institutions, can ensure that the chosen people and ideas actually 
did matter.53 Hence, the ‘blueprint’ of the National Socialist Europe-to-be that histori-
cal research presented so far is either a patchwork, remains indistinct, or is only 
roughly reconstructed on the basis of Hitler’s general statements. This problematic 
reconstruction of the New Order is why every attempt to analyse its impact on actual 
German policies must produce arguable results. 
Since Hitler’s views on Europe-to-be cannot be pinpointed exactly and the polycratic 
power structure makes it hard to pin down the actual influence of other high-ranking 
National Socialists, assessing the factual impact of the shifting priorities within the 
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New Order discussion is complicated, to say the least. Accordingly, historians have 
arrived at very different conclusions.  
Firstly, there are those who see the New Order merely as a means of concealing the 
true intentions of National Socialism. They limit its potential effects to the field of 
propaganda. While some of these proponents point out its appeal to the subjugated 
peoples and consider it one of the reasons why National Socialism found willing col-
laborators in nearly every European country, others see its prime effect in uniting 
Europe in the rejection of any form of European hegemony, thus promoting the idea 
of pluralism and tolerance.54 However, both agree that these New Order concepts 
represented mere lip-services to something that never materialised.  
Secondly, many scholars who analysed the Holocaust, the war of extermination in 
the East, or the ruthless measures of Germanisation and resettlement in many parts 
of the German sphere of influence, oppose that view. They argue that the perpetra-
tors acted in accordance with their worldview and a new European order was a cen-
tral part of it. Aly and Heim, for example, demonstrate that a well-educated functional 
elite pushed on with its vision of a New Order. They would stop at nothing to create a 
‘better’ Europe by easing the alleged pressure of overpopulation in the occupied 
Eastern territories with the help of what they regarded as tough but necessary 
measures. Thus, the economic marginalisation of the Jewish population, expulsion, 
resettlement, the policy of starvation, and mass killings are to be considered their 
contribution to a New Order.55 According to Heinemann, the staff of the Rasse- und 
Siedlungshauptamt of the SS shared Himmler’s post-war vision of a racially defined 
and ‘Jew-free’ Germanic Europe and acted accordingly. Even though the resettle-
ment schemes were not implemented on a large scale, this vision cannot be dis-
missed as an “escapist model,”56 because the policy of racial selection and Ger-
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manisation was actually sustained by this conviction. The staff of the Reichs-
sicherheitshauptamt staff also determinedly stuck to their aim of a racial new Euro-
pean Order free of Jews. In Wildt’s eyes, obstacles and setbacks did not stop their 
ideologically shaped actions, but triggered further radicalisation.57 Mai also diagno-
ses a process of radicalisation in Himmler’s policy of settlement and Germanisation. 
The bigger the scale of his planning became and the more transnational it had to be, 
the more important the racial aspects became. However, according to Mai, while 
Himmler’s vision of a ‘Germanic Reich’ did guide actions, it was an unspecified uto-
pia rather than a concrete programme.58 Hence, while historiography can clearly 
prove that German policy during the war partly reflected two of the main pillars of 
National Socialist ideology, racism and Lebensraum, it is still unclear what influence 
the medium-level protagonists, who drove this policy, exerted, to what extent their 
convictions were linked to a particular vision of a New Order, and whose model of a 
new Europe would have prevailed in the end.  
Thirdly, some historians argue that Hitler’s views were not particularly clear-cut in the 
field of economics, so that individuals and institutions in this area enjoyed enough 
leeway to put some of their own ideas into effect.59 While in Mazower’s eyes, the 
“Nazi vision for Europe, […] belonged to the sphere of economics, not politics” but 
did have “little impact upon policy”60, Salewski identifies “a move towards a new 
European order”61 in the field of economics. By naming the concrete policies that 
they regard as steps towards the propagated economic New Order, others are more 
specific. Overy, for example, argues that the New Order was more than an empty 
phrase because calls for economic integration after the defeat of France fell on fertile 
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ground and “a great deal was done under the shadow of war”.62 Even though large 
parts of German private business may not have cherished the central clearing sys-
tem that was set up, they did appreciate that the foundation of international cartels 
was officially encouraged, and gladly welcomed the leverage that the support of the 
Ministry of Economics and of the Vierjahresplanbehörde provided for expanding their 
business.63 For Buggeln the central clearing system was indeed the “centrepiece of 
the National Socialist New Order”. However, he considers it primarily a means of 
exploiting the participating countries that happened to have the convenient side ef-
fect of facilitating peaceful cooperation as well.64 By pointing out that the economic 
measures of the National Socialist regime were predominantly tailored to the needs 
of the war economy, Boldorf refuses to see an act of Europeanization or the genesis 
of a Großraumwirtschaft in Europe during World War II.65 Other historians take the 
same line, but suggest a more differentiated picture: While some argue that the 
German policy of exploitation differed geographically, others emphasise the changes 
caused by the course of the war.66 Even though Germany might initially have tried to 
realise the vision “of a New Order in Europe, a large-scale, pan-European economy 
that would mobilize the Continent as a single block to pit against the giant economies 
of the USA and the British Empire”67, from 1941 onwards, the war effort took priority 
over it.68 According to Milward, National Socialist Germany had to “abandon its ear-
lier concepts. The pressure of economic necessity distorted the New Order until it 
became that quite different thing, ‘the European war economy’.”69 Barkai, by contrast, 
argues that this European war economy was the antedated realisation of post-war 
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plans for a European Großraumwirtschaft.70 A different and much criticised – inter-
pretation was penned by Aly. In his eyes, the National Socialists exploited the Euro-
pean economies for the sake of the material prosperity of the German population, 
bribing them into consent.71  
In light of the broad spectrum of these appraisals, one might agree with Overy that 
the perspective of the respective author explains the differing conclusions. While 
scholars holding ‘structuralist’ views tend to depict the New Order as a series of in-
consistent and improvised measures geared towards the war effort, ‘intentionalists’ 
interpret certain steps as being part of a master plan.72 Even though this diagnosis 
does not directly contribute to ascertaining the factual impact of the New Order, it 
highlights two critical points. Firstly, if the New Order had any significance at all, it 
had to comply or to compete with the war effort. Some political measures that were 
actually taken might have brought the regime closer to both, while others were 
clearly tailored to foster the latter. Secondly, as long as the ‘master plan’ for a New 
Order is unknown, it will be impossible to tell one from the other, rendering an as-
sessment of the factual policies pointless.  
Overall, historiography reveals fundamental differences in the appraisal of the factual 
ramifications of the New Order. Politically, it is, on the one hand, primarily seen as an 
appealing sham. On the other hand, the SS and the Wehrmacht expelled, resettled, 
and killed millions in the name of a new European Order. Economically, the New Or-
der apparently did not leave such a clear mark: While some historians depict it as a 
war aim that was partly realised already during the war, for others it is nothing but a 
retrospective projection onto measures that were supposed to advance the war effort. 
Not least because the master plan for a National Socialist Europe appears to be 
more of a blurry picture than a precise blueprint, some scholars try to deduce the 
New Order from actual occupation policies.73 Based upon the numerous existing 
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studies of German occupation policy during World War II, historians created typolo-
gies which are not only supposed to provide an analytical framework for research but 
also claim to illustrate what a National Socialist Europe would have looked like, had 
the ‘Third Reich’ won the war. Unfortunately, these attempts yield differing results as 
well.74 While Child, Umbreit, and Benz make out patterns behind the occupied territo-
ries’ administrative status, Dlugoborski built his typology around the effects and in-
tentions of German rule.75 Madajczyk takes a similar line and organises his catego-
ries along the aims of the occupiers, their means, their treatment of the population, 
and the respective level of interference.76 As a result, these approaches lead to dif-
ferent groupings. Being designated as German Lebensraum, parts of Poland and the 
Soviet Union are a distinct group if German aims are taken into account, while they 
find themselves among countries like Norway and the Netherlands if formal criteria 
are decisive. The intentions and effects of German occupation, however, are not as 
objectively ascertainable as formal features. So all typologies have their pros and 
cons and their value depends on the research context, in which they are used. With 
regard to the New Order, the existing typologies are problematic. Since the status of 
the occupied territories was determined right after they had fallen into German hands, 
typologies sticking to formal criteria offer all but a snapshot of National Socialist rule. 
Even though Umbreit assumes that his focus on the first years of the war would not 
diminish the value of his typology, its static nature prevents it from taking into ac-
count informal changes, potential learning processes, or shifting priorities.77 Typolo-
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gies created along informal lines, on the other hand, paint a more differentiated pic-
ture of National Socialist Europe – unfortunately at the expense of objectivity. By re-
lying on informal criteria, like the aims and effects of German occupation policy, the 
classification not only depends on the author’s assessment but also implicitly as-
sumes that the aims were clear, did not change, and that the outcomes of policies 
had always been intended.78 Overall, typologies tend to understate not only the gen-
eral commonalities in German occupation policy but also its economic dimension.79 
Furthermore, both approaches implicitly assume that decisions on how to administer 
and reshape the respective country were based upon a concrete and stable vision. 
Thus, despite their undeniable value in other respects, the typologies of German oc-
cupation policy have to be regarded with suspicion as far as the New Order is con-
cerned. 
Business history is a second perspective that has its starting-point in factual policies 
and could also shed light on the nature and the impact of the National Socialist New 
Order. This view of National Socialist European policy has been a domain of Marxist 
historians for decades. Even though they failed to prove that “the imperialistic appa-
ratus of state and the Wehrmacht were merely the executing institutions for what the 
Konzernherren [heads of firms] decided”80, their attempts to explain the German sub-
jugation of Europe with the intrinsic logic of capitalism proved highly valuable in two 
respects: Firstly, the interest of the German Democratic Republic in discrediting the 
capitalist system of its Western neighbour manifested itself in the publication of nu-
merous editions of primary sources, which – despite their biased introductions – pro-
vide scholars with an excellent overview of National Socialist policy in general, its 
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regional differences, and country-specific developments.81 Secondly, although Marx-
ist historiography clearly overestimates the influence of companies on National So-
cialist policy, they – after what seems to be a period of outright rejection by their 
Western counterparts – raised the awareness not only for the economic aspect of 
German rule but also for the role private companies played in the New Order.  
Western historiography has not ignored economic matters, but its focus rested on 
the macro level and the general means of exploitation until the 1980s brought about 
analyses of the activities of private companies and their links to state policies.82 In 
the 1990s, business-historical research in general started to boom and spurred nu-
merous studies either covering or focusing on National Socialist Germany.83 Unfor-
tunately, not all of them attend to the European dimension of business policies, but 
those that do suggest a lively interest for the New Order among German companies: 
They took part in the specification of Europe-to-be and seized the opportunities the 
Wehrmacht had opened up and the National Socialist regime was promoting.84 The 
greedy behaviour of the big German banks, which often paved the way for expand-
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ing the reach of both private businesses and the constantly growing Reichswerke 
Hermann Göring concern,85 even produced a saying among German contemporaries: 
“Who is walking behind the first tank? It’s Dr. Rasche from the Dresdner Bank!”86 
However, even though the factual European expansion of several German compa-
nies is beyond doubt, the role of the New Order in this process is unclear. Most his-
torians agree in rejecting the Marxist view that private companies were the driving 
force behind the reorganisation of Europe, but there are studies suggesting that they 
actually had a major stake in it. Without having a concrete concept, the regime, ac-
cording to Herbst, merely set the goal, watched the discussion unfold, and chose the 
pieces that suited its own ideas.87 And the different branches of the German econ-
omy did readily contribute to the formulation of aims when it fitted their interests. 
Within the IG Farben corporation numerous memoranda on the future of the Euro-
pean chemical industry were authored; Carl Zeiss agitated for a tariff-free European 
post-war order without any subsidies in the field of precision mechanics and optics; 
and German heavy industry tried to influence the allocation of the works in the occu-
pied and annexed territories. Obviously, German companies expected something 
from the New Order. Exactly what remains controversial: According to Hayes, the IG 
Farben was not keen on expanding into other countries, but simply tried to protect its 
interests. The IG used the New Order “to clothe its objectives in appeals to military 
necessity or the Party's goals”88. Christian Marx claims that the Gutehoffnungshütte 
expanded into Ukraine because its directors deemed it necessary for the European 
post-war market.89 Hallgarten also stresses that German companies were not merely 
the executive bodies of the regime’s interests, but followed their own agenda. Even 
though they might not have shared its ideological premises, they contributed to the 
overall dynamic of National Socialist expansion in this way.90 Wixforth’s work on the 
Dresdner Bank underscores this view. The bank was not driven by ideological mo-
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tives, nevertheless it willingly participated in the regime’s policy in order to secure a 
leading role in Europe-to-be.91 Bähr et al., by contrast, argue that German authorities 
held the reigns tightly and that political considerations trumped private economic in-
terests. German heavy industry, for instance, was only able to expand if the privi-
leged Reichswerke Herman Göring and the political objectives allowed for an in-
volvement of private businesses.92  
Unfortunately, a synthesis of historical findings on German businesses does not exist, 
and the exact role companies played in framing and implementing National Socialist 
Europe has yet to be further explored. For now, it seems that companies were nei-
ther the driving force behind the New Order nor mere instruments to realise it. By 
seizing opportunities that fitted into their agenda where politics let them, they appar-
ently contributed to the planning as well as the realisation of the New Order. Given 
the weight of economic arguments within the debate, a study of the National Socialist 
reorganisation of Europe will benefit from looking into the interdependence between 
private business and politics. 
Overall, research on the New Order and its factual impact is flawed by two funda-
mental problems. While the biased view that makes do with stating a ‘perversion of 
the European idea’ is self-imposed, the lack of documents about Hitler’s opinion and 
the polycratic nature of the NS regime are not. In consequence, existing research 
either does not even bother to look into potential ramifications, or analyses them 
against problematic backgrounds. Th e resulting assessments therefore differ. Fur-
thermore, attempts to reconstruct the National Socialist vision of a New Order on the 
basis of the factual German occupation policy does not yield consistent results and, 
with regard to business history, an attempt to synthesise the insights of the many 
existing case studies has not yet been undertaken. Therefore, we do not know what 
impact the New Order had on German policies during the Second World War and 
whose standpoints really mattered. What we do know is that its construction and 
perception were diverse, that they underwent several changes, and that they were 
borne by a range of persons and institutions. Thus, if the factual relevance of the 
New Order is to be assessed, we have to find a way to reconstruct the National So-
cialist notions of Europe-to-be within a heterogeneous and polyvalent discussion. 
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Against this background, we should be able to evaluate the ramifications of the New 
Order. 
1.2 A New Perspective on the New Order – Methodological Considerations 
The previous sections have highlighted the importance of methodology for this study: 
If we want to assess the relevance of the New Order, we have to find out what it 
meant to contemporary decision makers. It seems to have been many things to dif-
ferent people and at different points in time. Unfortunately, the polycratic nature of 
the National Socialist regime makes it almost impossible to deduce the significance 
of certain ideas from the power of those who held them, and the attempts to use the 
factual German occupation policies as indicators for the underlying ideas does not 
yield consistent results. This suggests that the most appropriate methodical ap-
proach should be capable of two things: firstly, weighing arguments within a hetero-
geneous and changing debate and thereby identifying the crucial ones, and, sec-
ondly, providing a way of plausibly relating ideas and actions. This section proposes 
such an approach. After some brief considerations on the ‘classical’ History of Ideas, 
it focusses on more recent developments, namely the Cambridge School, the History 
of Concepts, and Foucauldian discourse analysis. A discourse-analytic approach 
proved to fit our needs best and will be adopted as the methodical framework for this 
thesis. 
 
The Significance of Ideas and Their History 
Even though the proposition that ‘soft’ cultural factors like ideas have somehow 
shaped the course of history is generally accepted, the merits of the History of Ideas 
are far from uncontroversial. Apart from some scholars deprecating ideas in general 
as unspecific and rather insignificant entities,93 sceptics have raised several justifi-
able objections: The most common criticism is that focusing solely on the canonical 
works of famous thinkers leads to an overestimation of their importance.94 Consulting 
their works in order to gain insights for current debates is as misleading as criticising 
them for not taking into account contemporary ideas. Furthermore, the tendency to 
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construct ideal types of ideas and to subsequently search for their predecessors 
leads to fallacies: Scholars are primarily praised for anticipating later thoughts, tradi-
tions are created that might not have existed at all, and altogether history ends up 
being written as a success story of the particular idea finally prevailing.95 Additionally, 
there is the key issue of a history of ideas that neglects society and a social history 
that does not take contemporary thought into account.96  
In recent decades, several attempts have been made, in different ways, to overcome 
these shortcomings. One of the most important, the Cambridge School of the History 
of Ideas opposes the interpretation of ideas as timeless entities and accentuates the 
importance of their (linguistic) context. At the same time, in an attempt to bridge the 
gap between ideas and social reality, the History of Concepts approach focuses on 
the process of convergence between these two dimensions. Last not least, in France, 
poststructuralist considerations on how reality is constructed was shaped by Fou-
cault’s focus on statements in what he called ‘discourse’. What all three approaches 
have in common is that they are not only interested in language as the medium in 
which thoughts are formed and expressed but also in how ideas become potentially 
effective.  
 
The Cambridge School 
The so-called Cambridge School of the History of Ideas was founded by and named 
after the Cambridge University professors John Pocock and Quentin Skinner. Criti-
cising the classical History of Ideas approach for analysing ideas as timeless entities, 
they argue that even the most famous works are products of their time.97 That does 
not mean that they should be read as mere reflections of the socio-economic cir-
cumstances in which they were created, but that understanding the contemporary 
language is a necessary precondition for an astute understanding of the meaning 
and significance of certain thoughts. These considerations refer to Ludwig Wittgen-
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stein’s philosophy of language and conclude that contemporary language limits the 
form and content of statements.98 Thus, contemporary language and its conventions 
– that is the sum of all possible and reasonable statements in a certain culture at a 
certain time99 – have to be understood before the interpretation of a text can claim to 
be reasonable. After this common starting-point, Pocock and Skinner take slightly 
different routes: Pocock distinguishes – following Ferdinand de Saussure – between 
the language as a whole (‘la langue’) and single speech acts (‘la parole’). The limits 
for possible statements are set by ‘la langue’, but at the same time ‘paroles’ are in 
principle capable of challenging those boundaries.100 Whether or not an historical 
text sticks to the rules or tries to change them can thus only be assessed when it is 
analysed within the conventions of contemporary language. Skinner on the other 
hand is inspired by John Austin and John Searle. In their theory of speech acts, the 
conventions of a language are the result of many single speech acts that either sus-
tain or undermine those conventions. 101  Thus, the intention behind an historical 
statement or text and its degree of innovation can only be assessed when it is seen 
against the backdrop of common language. Hence, despite taking different paths, 
Pocock and Skinner arrive at a similar conclusion: The contemporary linguistic con-
text is essential in order to understand historical texts or statements. 
Pocock and Skinner establish the link between speech acts and actions with a fur-
ther reference to Wittgenstein: “Words are also deeds.”102 Because of the different 
speech act theories they apply, their explanations of the relationship of words and 
deeds have a slightly different emphasis. Skinner refers to Searle and Austin and 
their distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. Whereas the 
former, for example in the form of a promise, is in itself already a deed, the latter, for 
instance the attempt to persuade someone, necessitates further actions to result in a 
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deed.103 But the effect of words on deeds, the perlocutionary dimension of a state-
ment, will only become apparent – as we have seen – when the intentions of the 
speaker can be clarified by contrasting his speech acts with contemporary language. 
If the perlocutionary force of normative vocabulary is successfully changed, it may 
gain historical relevance: 
Not only is our moral and social world held in place by the manner in which we choose to ap-
ply our inherited normative vocabularies, but one of the ways in which we are capable of re-
appraising and changing our world is by changing the ways in which these vocabularies are 
applied.
104
 
In the long run, changes in vocabulary are stabilized by socialization and common 
practice. If that does not happen, practices will stay within the limits of what is justifi-
able.105 Pocock argues very similarly. What can be said is determined by language, 
but at the same time language can be modified by what is said.106 The task for histo-
rians is therefore to acquaint themselves with the contemporary language in order to 
be able to recognize the innovative potential of certain speech acts.107 However, Po-
cock is sceptical about the possibility of tracing the effects that words have on deeds: 
There is no doubt that language influences people and that texts have an impact on 
readers, but those effects are partly synchronic, partly diachronic. Thus, the outcome 
of such a long-term process will be heterogeneous and blurred. Even though linguis-
tic developments should be analysed with regard to their factual ramifications, Po-
cock sees no possibility of linking them directly.108 Overall, in Pocock’s and Skinner’s 
view, social reality and social action are constructed and limited by language. Thus, 
if language is changing, society is too, provided innovative thinking expressed in 
speech acts and actions become the norm and thus the new limit of social reality.  
Seeking to apply the Cambridge School approach to the New Order, we face several 
problems: Pocock and Skinner worked in the field of political sciences and accord-
ingly used their methodical framework primarily in order to contextualize the canoni-
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cal works of political theory. By means of contemporary language and thinking, they 
were able to reinterpret and -evaluate the ideas promoted in those writings. But 
whose statements are to be contrasted with the wider debate on what a German 
Europe should look like? In our case, we might be able to reconstruct the contempo-
rary linguistic conventions of how to speak about the New Order, but – in their terms 
– we cannot identify the crucial parole within ‘la langue’. Thus, the decisive analytical 
advantage of the Cambridge School over the classical History of Ideas approach is 
lost.109 Furthermore, Pocock and Skinner conceptualize the link between an altered 
language and actions changing accordingly as a process of socializations, whereas 
the Second World War and the construction of a National Socialist New Europe 
lasted for six years; which is too short a time span for a socialization process to be 
completed. This deficit could be mitigated by choosing a broad and diachronic per-
spective, but this would run the risk of repeating the flaws identified in existing re-
search. 
All in all, the Cambridge School of the History of Ideas is perfectly suited for an 
analysis of a single work within its contemporary linguistic context. For our purpose, 
however, Pocock’s and Skinner’s approach has two regrettable shortcomings: Firstly, 
the connection between words and deeds stays vague as long as the observed time 
span is short. Secondly, the Cambridge School does not provide a means of identify-
ing significant speech acts within a language because its purpose is the evaluation of 
speech acts that have already been chosen beforehand. 
 
The History of Concepts 
The History of Concepts emerged with the first volumes of ‘Geschichtliche Grundbe-
griffe’, edited by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck. All contribu-
tions in these volumes revolve around the changing meaning of concepts during the 
transition period from the early modern to the modern age (Sattelzeit).110 Just like the 
Cambridge School, the History of Concepts does not interpret ideas as timeless enti-
ties. Acknowledging that the meanings of ideas might have changed with time, the 
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History of Concepts focuses on the time-dependent use of expressed ideas.111 The 
starting-point of Koselleck’s considerations – he is the main theorist of the History of 
Concepts – is the analytical distinction between language and social reality. Follow-
ing Wittgenstein, he confirms that words are also deeds; however, the converse 
does not hold true: not every deed is a speech act.112 Thus – according to Koselleck 
– history cannot be narrowed down to a merely linguistic perspective. Even though 
historical developments never take place without language, they must not be re-
duced to it: “Linguistic understanding never catches up with what happens or was 
actually the case, nor does anything happen that has not already been altered by its 
linguistic processing.”113 Thus, language and social reality are interdependent, but 
never completely congruent “metahistorical facts”114 that have to be equally taken 
into account. As historians reconstruct the past primarily on the basis of written 
documents and sources, they need to be aware of the importance of linguistic and 
semantic matters. The History of Concepts tries to live up to this postulate by con-
centrating on concepts – defined as words that are loaded with experiences and ex-
pectations, thus being ambiguous – and their changing meaning and use in the 
course of time.115 Trying to gain a better understanding of central concepts is essen-
tial. They were not only the weapons that social and political conflicts of the past 
were fought with, but contemporary language has also to be read as a metaphor for 
the time in question.116 Hence, concepts are factors and at the same time indicators 
of historical developments that have to be understood in their contemporary meaning, 
otherwise historical sources cannot be interpreted adequately. 
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The core of the History of Concepts is, however, the interdependence between 
words and the extra-linguistic world, or in our case, between verbalised ideas and 
their connection to actions. If social action is – as Koselleck argues – motivated by 
experiences and expectations, the analysis of concepts is worthwhile because con-
cepts are loaded with views of the past or the future.117 Particularly concepts that are 
of a primarily normative nature serve “less as statements about the world than as 
tools and weapons of ideological debate.”118 Thus, changing concepts do not merely 
reflect changing realities, but are a result of controversies that point beyond the 
status quo:  
In the contested words there are the programmatic identities of social groups, there is the 
self-assessment of their social perspectives, there is the resistance against the conditions or 
symbolic compliance to them.
119
 
In this understanding, the analytical distinction between language and the non-
linguistic world as separate entities reveals a tension between expressed demands 
and social reality that can never be completely resolved. However, both spheres 
might converge. The History of Concepts focuses on this process of convergence.120 
On the one hand, concepts are used in a primarily descriptive manner; on the other 
hand, they shape the course of history by opening up new possibilities of social ac-
tion due to their normative dimension. Thus, concepts become a driving force of his-
torical developments and gain relevance for social history: 
Beliefs and language through which they are expressed do not merely reflect facets of our 
social world. Rather they inform the very actions by which we establish, maintain, and trans-
form that world. The history of ideas should form an integral part of any attempt to understand 
or to explain any feature of human life.
121
 
Because language is needed to justify actions, linguistic changes modify the limits of 
acceptable behaviour. If a newly created or fundamentally reinterpreted concept be-
comes widely known and is ideologically utilizable, future-oriented, and loaded with 
political expectations, it has to be taken into account as an influential element of his-
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torical developments:122 “We can indeed kill kings with swords or axes, but it is only 
with words that we can abolish monarchies.“123 
The History of Concepts approach seems to be very well suited to the needs of this 
study. The New Order, understood as a contested normative concept, would form 
the backdrop against which the potential process of convergence could be analysed. 
If social-historical developments have been in accordance with the respective current 
ideal of a Europe-to-be, we could conclude that National Socialist European ideas 
shaped reality. However, the question arises to which concept the actual develop-
ment should be contrasted: the heterogeneous discussion on the New Order yielded 
numerous keywords. Whereas some dreamt of a ‘Greater German Empire’ or a 
‘Greater Germanic Empire’, others argued for Mitteleuropa, a Großraum or a 
Großraumwirtschaft led by Germany. Unfortunately, Koselleck’s theoretical frame-
work provides no means to choose the ‘right’ or most important of the many different 
concepts.124 Of course, it would be possible to analyse all the prevalent ones, but the 
History of Concepts offers no way of weighing the different concepts. Even if we tried 
to deduce the significance of certain concepts by having a closer look at the actual 
social-historical developments, we would fail because some of the concepts are 
closely related or overlapping. The History of Concepts approach thus manifests the 
same deficiencies as the ‘classical’ History of Ideas approach: It calls for an essential 
a priori decision, but offers no adequate guidelines for reaching it. 
Overall, the History of Concepts is not capable of meeting our requirements, due to 
two deficiencies: Even though its connection between ideas and actions seems to be 
more helpful for historians than the one established by the Cambridge School, it 
cannot clear the hurdle set by a polycentric and heterogeneous debate. Neither does 
the History of Concepts provide a means to guide the initial choice it calls for, nor 
does it include a justifiable way to evaluate the significance of rival concepts. 
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Discourse Analysis  
Discourse Analysis was largely shaped by Michel Foucault. In his works The Birth of 
the Clinic and The Order of Things he already practised a discourse-analytical ap-
proach, before then refining the theoretical foundations of these works in The Ar-
chaeology of Knowledge. The starting-point of his considerations is a fundamental 
criticism of traditional historiography put forward in the introduction of the Archae-
ology: The attempt to reconstruct the past on the basis of critically perceived primary 
sources inevitably leads to a teleological historiography because the historian is a 
product of his time and his perspective on the past is influenced by it. Since the 
status quo not only shapes the questions posed but also sets the standards against 
which the findings are measured, the present is perceived as the temporary ‘happy 
end’ to a success story, the current climax of a sequence of advancements.125 Histo-
riography thus becomes a mere instrument legitimising the here and now.126 Fou-
cault’s discourse-analytic approach, in contrast, avoids the bias caused by today’s 
views by not asking the classical hermeneutic questions of who, what, where, and 
why: 
we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurence; determine its conditions 
of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlation with other statements that may be 
connected with it, and show what other forms of statements it excludes. We do not seek be-
low what is manifest the half silent murmur of another discourse; we must show why it could 
not be other than it was […] The question proper to such an analysis might be formulated in 
this way: what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else?
127
 
Foucault, therefore, does not care about the tensions linguists see emerging from 
the interdependent but never congruent signifier and the signified, but focuses on the 
fact that certain statements were made:128 Why, out of all in principle grammatically 
and logically correct statements, is there always only a specific subset actually made 
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and why is it exactly this one?129 According to Foucault, the answer lies in the “condi-
tions of emergence of statements”130: 
For Foucault they are wholly culturally and historically specific: what is humanly possible in 
one epoch simply may not be in another. Our ability to think in a certain way – to reason, to 
question, to analyse – is not essential to us as intelligent beings, but contingent on our loca-
tion in time and space.
131
 
Thus, an analysis of what has actually been voiced is worthwhile, or more precisely, 
the underlying set of rules structuring the sum of all statements made on a specific 
topic is to be found because it is telling. Analytically two different sets of rules can be 
distinguished: On the one hand, the ‘discursive practice’ that is defined as a 
body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have de-
fined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the 
conditions of operation of the enunciative function.
132
 
The specific dispersion of the statements made, on the other hand, attests to the 
characteristic principles of the discourse that are called ‘discursive formation’.133 
Hence, the analysis of the characteristics the discourse reveals that the discourse 
itself follows certain rules. The discursive formation shapes the discourse, on the one 
hand, by framing the spectrum all statements have to fit in and, on the other hand, by 
accounting for the specific dispersion and direction of statements. The discursive 
practices, in contrast, determine the value of statements within the discourse by set-
ting the conditions that have to be met in order to be able to make an acknowledge-
able statement. They define which people, in which positions, and which roles can 
legitimately contribute to which topic.  
The link between these regulated statements and deeds is rather unclear in Fou-
cault’s early works:  
‘Words and Things’
134
 is the entirely serious title of a problem; it is the ironic title of a work that 
modifies its own form, displaces its own data, and reveals, at the end of the day, a quite dif-
ferent task. A task that consists of not – of no longer – treating discourses as groups of signs 
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[...] but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, dis-
courses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate 
things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech. It 
is this ‘more’ that we must reveal and describe.
135
 
By understanding discourses as power relations in his later works, Foucault ad-
dresses this ‘more’. The observation that discourses – expressed on a linguistic level 
– somehow manifest themselves in the extra-linguistic world, leads to a conceptuali-
sation in which discourses are understood as an overarching third instance between 
words and deeds.136 The link between these spheres is power. Discourses exercise 
power over subjects by restraining statements, actions, and thoughts, whereas sub-
jects aspire to exercise power over the discourse:137 
It does not matter that discourse appears to be of little account because the prohibitions that 
surround it very soon reveal its link with desire and with power. There is nothing surprising 
about that, since […] discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of 
domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power 
which is to be seized.
138
 
Being the “object of a struggle”139 as well as the power that sets the rules that “guide, 
restrict, and decentre”140 the subject, the discourse shapes actions in two ways: The 
knowledge and truth it produces provide subjects with a meaning for their practices, 
while there are binding rules for the participation in this production process. In the 
first case ideas would shape actions – from a top-down perspective – as an effect of 
the ‘discursive formation’, in the latter, actions are – from a bottom-up view – guided 
by ideas because the ‘discursive practices’ have set the preconditions that are to be 
met in order to be able to participate in the argument on knowledge, truth, and social 
reality.141 Thus, at the macro level, discursive power leads to the production of social 
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reality, whereas at the micro level discursive power becomes apparent in acts of self-
disciplining through ‘voluntary subordination’.142 
If we apply these abstract considerations to the New Order, the upsides and down-
sides of the discourse-analytical approach become clearer. In contrast to the Cam-
bridge School and the History of Concepts, no a priori decision on the relevance of 
source materials has to be made because – in principle – every statement on the 
New Order can and should be taken into account: The more opinions are included, 
the clearer the picture will be. By assembling as many primary sources as possible, 
the analysis will reveal a pattern in which the single dots add up to a large picture 
that depicts the New Order discourse, its mainstream, its participants, its limits, its 
turns, and its inherent logic. From the discourse, reconstructed in this way, we can 
derive the set of rules that structured the statements on the New Order, the ‘discur-
sive formation’ and the ‘discursive practice’. These rules, in turn, will provide the 
means for a further analysis of the actions factually taken and their connection to the 
ideas voiced in the discourse. Finally, a closer look at the participants will reveal 
whether or not the New Order ideas indeed guided actions and to what extent the 
New Order rhetoric was adopted willingly as a means to exert influence. So overall, a 
discourse analysis circumvents the main weaknesses of the other two approaches 
because a heterogeneous and varying discussion can be traced without problems, 
while actions and deeds can convincingly be linked. Unfortunately, tackling the New 
Order in this way also raises problems of its own: The wartime New Order discourse 
lasted for only six years, freedom of speech and press were abolished pretty soon 
after the National Socialists seized power in Germany, and in order to establish the 
links between actions and deeds a micro level analysis is necessary. However, since 
the approach does meet our needs best, it seems advisable to try to minimise its 
weaknesses instead of dismissing it. 
Overall therefore, a discourse-analytical approach that additionally takes into ac-
count power relations suits our needs best. Because the reconstruction of a dis-
course rests on as many statements on a specific topic as possible, it easily captures 
a changing and heterogeneous debate without any major a priori decision. Further-
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more, it offers a theoretical framework that incorporates words and deeds as well as 
their interdependence. Unfortunately, this perspective is not an complete solution 
and raises its own problems. In the following section, ways to mitigate them will be 
discussed. 
 
The New Order Discourse – Minimizing the Deficits 
As we saw above, discourse analysis has important advantages over the other two 
approaches taken into consideration, but raises its own problems: Firstly, discourse-
analytical works usually rely on newspaper and journal articles because the public 
sphere is supposedly the main and decisive stage for debate and deliberation. How-
ever, in National Socialist Germany there was no freedom of speech or press and 
thus no free public sphere. Secondly, discourse-analytical works often cover centu-
ries or at least decades, whereas the actual New Order discourse took place during 
the six years the Second World War lasted. Thirdly, discourses are primarily recon-
structed as macro level developments as are their effects. Previous research, how-
ever, found no evidence of the National Socialist New Order being realised on a 
large-scale. Moreover, existing objections to a discourse-analytical perspective on 
the ‘Third Reich’ have to be addressed.  
In general, approaching the ‘Third Reich’ discourse-analytically is not common be-
cause of a fundamental scepticism which Richard Evans has put in a nutshell: 
“Auschwitz was not a discourse”143. Due to the concern that the relativism of post-
modernist methods might downplay the severest crime in history, he calls for a self-
restriction of historiography.144 Others, by contrast, argue that a discourse-analytical 
approach might give deeper insights.145 Given that the National Socialist state nei-
ther complied fully nor always with establish norms, but partly replaced the rule of 
law with a state of instrumental measures, it seems very likely that informal guide-
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lines gained in importance.146 In discourses these non-codified and informal norms 
are negotiated and construed that might have served as points of reference. There-
fore, a discourse analysis might contribute to our understanding of National Socialist 
Germany and its European concepts, just as new perspectives do in general, while it 
is hard to see how it could play down the atrocities and crimes committed by Na-
tional Socialist Germany. Thus, our primary concern should be whether this theoreti-
cally promising approach turns out to be practicable. 
In Germany, the freedom of press was already severely constrained in 1933. With 
the help of emergency decrees, the National Socialist regime forbade opposition 
newspapers and magazines shortly after the takeover of power. The Schriftleiterge-
setz from October 1933 prohibited Jews and politically non-compliant persons from 
being editors and allowed National Socialist officials to exert influence on all publica-
tions. In the following years, the regime tightened its control over the press further.147 
Thus the most common course of action, namely using newspaper and journal arti-
cles as primary sources for a discourse analysis is problematic.148 Even though the 
largest part of the German people received their information on the New Order from 
the gleichgeschalteten (politically aligned) media, the decisive debates took place 
elsewhere.149 Apart from articles in scientific journals, the debate on what Europe 
should look like in the future took place mostly within and between political and eco-
nomic institutions.150 In discourse-analytical terms we would have to take account of 
a strict restriction of the ‘discursive practice’: The number of positions from which 
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one could have legitimately contributed to the discourse declined, but the statements 
made out of these positions gained in influence on the discourse and in their claim 
for truth. Hence, instead of focussing solely on the public sphere, a discourse-
analytic perspective on the New Order should focus on internal struggle for interpre-
tational sovereignty. 
Relying predominantly on primary sources originating from within the participating 
institutions, has three major advantages: Firstly, the institutions the discourse analy-
sis revolves around were not concerned with the New Europe on a merely theoretical 
level, but ministries, occupation authorities and enterprises were capable of imple-
menting the appropriate measures. Secondly, by restraining the underlying sources 
the workload can be narrowed down without losing explanatory power because all 
the important standpoints have been developed within, or at least adopted by one of, 
these institutions. Finally, this focus seems to be an appropriate answer to the ab-
sence of a free public sphere in National Socialist Germany. The discourse might not 
have represented large parts of the population, but this fact does not diminish the 
potential insights.  
The decision to choose a discourse-analytical perspective on National Socialist 
Germany raises another problem that becomes even more pressing if we solely con-
centrate on the wartime: Silke Schneider, for example, doubts that something like a 
genuinely National Socialist discourse exists at all. In her eyes, it is more accurate to 
speak of National Socialist versions of on-going discourses.151 This primarily seman-
tic question is not a cause for concern here, but the fact that a discourse analysis – 
designed to trace the discontinuities of thoughts and actions for decades or even 
centuries – might be able to encompass the smaller changes that might have taken 
place within a few years definitely is. However, Schneider’s conclusion offers a first 
hint of a possible solution: If the period we are primarily interested in just features 
variations of discourses from a longer tradition, our analysis could benefit by taking 
those predecessors into account. Thus, an examination of the National Socialist New 
Order discourse against the backdrop of previous thoughts on Europe would make it 
possible to identify the specifics of the National Socialist Europe-to-be, as reminis-
cences and innovations can be identified, just as re-emerging arguments and 
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thought patterns can. Furthermore, concepts that lost ground or vanished completely 
will become evident. If, in so doing, the nuances of National Socialist discourse can 
be highlighted, this downside of the discourse-analytical approach is viably mini-
mised – at least theoretically. Practically, the question then arises which concepts of 
and thoughts on Europe from the interwar period do qualify as predecessors of the 
National Socialist New Order. In principle, every pitfall described in the chapter on 
methodology also holds true in this respect: Our perspective on the interwar period 
should not be confined to certain concepts or specific ideas, for this would call for a 
priori decisions that might shut out crucial aspects. Therefore, we will give a concise 
overview covering the entire political spectrum and incorporating the main concepts. 
By gaining a better understanding of the voiced notions of the future of Europe dur-
ing the interwar years, we virtually prolong our observation period from six to 27 
years and can put the National Socialist plans for Europe into context more accu-
rately. 
The third downside of the discourse-analytical approach that has to be mitigated is 
its macro level nature. To focus on what was actually said and to reconstruct the sets 
of rules governing these statements is remote from the origins of these statements. 
However, in the long run the effects of discursively set standards or aims will lead to 
corresponding actions – or not – that will become apparent on the macro level. Fou-
cault for example showed that the reorganization of medical knowledge was accom-
panied by the emergence of clinics, and the changing understanding of madness 
manifested itself in the building of ‘madhouses’152. The New Order discourse, how-
ever, did not result in comparable macro level phenomena. There was no consistent 
European policy, no supranational institutions were created, and no other widely 
visible measures on a European scale were introduced. Nevertheless, at the micro 
level numerous primary sources show that the New Order was an important point of 
reference for many individuals, networks, political institutions, and companies. Con-
sidering the short period of time during which the New Order seemed the most likely 
future scenario, it seems plausible to assume that the New Order discourse did have 
an effect, but it did not yet become apparent at the macro level. Thus, this study 
cannot restrict itself to adding up the used primary sources to a reconstruction of the 
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discourse; it also has to trace the inverted process and the impact of the discourse 
on micro level developments. By referring to the power relations inevitably linked to 
discourses and by emphasising the relationship between words and deeds in our 
discussion of the different methodical approaches, we have already laid the theoreti-
cal ground for such an analysis: As has been stated above, restrictions are a key 
characteristic for discourses. On the one hand, they restrict what can be said and 
done. On the other hand, access to the discourse is restricted to those who meet 
their criteria. Thus, the power relations inherent to the discourse become apparent in 
two respects: An effect of the New Order discourse has to be affirmed if either its 
changing tenor succeeded in changing the rhetoric, thinking, or even actions on the 
micro level, or if the micro level development reveals what has been called a ‘volun-
tary subordination’. More precisely, after having reconstructed the discourse, this 
study has to analyse micro level actors, their reasoning, and their actions in order to 
assess whether their words and deeds were – or changed – in accordance with the 
discursively altered New Order, thereby probing the significance of the discourse. 
Overall therefore, a discourse analysis promises insights that clearly outweigh the 
fears about applying it to the ‘Third Reich’. Furthermore, the three problems this ap-
proach faces in this study can be mitigated by relying primarily on internal sources, 
by prolonging the observation period, and by conceptualising the effects of dis-
courses as being a two-way process: What individuals and institutions said and did 
constituted the discourse, but the discourse in turn set the limits for what could be 
said and done. This interdependence lies at the core of assessing the relevance of 
the New Order. 
 
1.3 Analysing the New Order – Outline 
The purpose of this study – assessing the factual relevance of the New Order – and 
the methodological answer to the shortcomings of previous research determine the 
structure of this work.  
The first chapter ‘Dreaming of a New Order’ (chapter 2) will briefly outline German 
concepts for Europe in the interwar period. This section covers the entire political 
spectrum and was added to mitigate the methodical problems that arose out of the 
relatively short time span that the study covers. Apart from embedding the National 
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Socialist thought patterns, motives, arguments, and concepts into the tradition of 
European thinking in Germany before 1933 (chapter 2.1), the chapter will argue that 
several aspects of the German discourse on the future of Europe survived the Na-
tional Socialist seizure of power (chapter 2.2) and later on found their way into the 
New Order discourse. While before 1933 the völkisch knowledge and belief system 
and its narrative of Europe had been championed only in conservative and right wing 
circles, aspects of the economic interpretive frame can be found in all political camps. 
A combination of both dominated the German discourse of Europe on the eve of the 
Second World War (chapter 2.3). 
Against the background of these two dominant and long-standing interpretive 
frames,153 the centrepiece of the study analyses the National Socialist New Order 
discourse under the heading “Planning of a New Order” (chapter 3). Even though 
this chapter is organised chronologically around the turning-points (1941 and 1943) 
which have been adopted from existing research, this chapter will hardly refer to 
secondary literature. As a reconstruction of contemporary thought, this section can-
not rely on hermeneutic ex-post interpretations. Instead, as many primary sources as 
possible inform this chapter on National Socialist notions of Europe. While the 
‘Unlimited Possibilities Made Feasible by the Sword’ (chapter 3.1) primarily exhibit 
German economic interests in Europe together with its völkisch desire to unite eve-
ryone of German blood in one Reich, ‘The Rise of Racism and the Growing Needs of 
All-Out War’ (chapter 3.2) characterise the discourse after the German assault on 
the Soviet Union. The National Socialist claim to Lebensraum, the racist ideology, 
and dreams of colonising the East engendered criticism as early as 1941, but these 
warnings fell on deaf ears until the military situation deteriorated dramatically. Never-
theless, despite the ‘Impending Defeat’ (chapter 3.3) the discursive mainstream was 
still marked by the same vision of a Europe graded by the racial value and the eco-
nomic predisposition that National Socialists ascribed to them. Under the growing 
pressure of the war effort, however, the New Order disintegrated more and more: All 
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the different notions that had amalgamated into a temporarily stable vision of 
Europe-to-be now re-emerged as potential alternatives. 
Chapter 4, ‘Creating the New Order’, analyses the significance of the New Order. 
Subdivided into three periods, analogous to the discourse analysis, this chapter 
traces the influence of the New Order discourse on micro level protagonists. By con-
trasting the motives, aims, and actions of occupation regimes (chapter 4.1.1, 4.2.1, 
4.3.1) and German businesses (chapter 4.1.2, 4.2.2, 4.3.2) with the changes that the 
notions of Europe underwent, it will become clear to what extent the thought patterns 
and arguments that dominated the discourse shaped their words and deeds. Unfor-
tunately, it is impossible to cover German businesses and the multitude of German 
occupation authorities in their entirety. Thus, this chapter has to content itself with 
highlighting specific examples of related developments in order to shed light on their 
role in the discursive construction and the realisation of the New Order. 
The last chapter, finally, revisits the label of National Socialist ‘Anti-Europe’ (chapter 
5). By summing up the findings and correlating them to existing research - which had 
to be left aside in chapter 3 –, the advantages of analysing the New Order as a dis-
course should emerge clearly. Even though National Socialist notions of Europe 
were constantly rooted in völkisch and economic knowledge and belief systems, they 
also maintained traditional German notions of Europe in many respects. Furthermore, 
occupation authorities and private companies played their part in realising this vision, 
until private businesses defected in the wake of the disintegrating effects of the war 
effort. Finally, the study will conclude with a few indications of the persistence of 
several thought patterns and arguments that survived the ‘Third Reich’ to play a role 
in West Germany’s post-war European policy. 
 
1.4 Evidencing the New Order – Sources 
As large parts of this study are based on primary sources, there is a need to provide 
a short overview of the primary sources and their role.  
Unfortunately, an exhaustive overview of German notions of Europe during the 
interwar period does not yet exist. The spiritual forerunners of National Socialism154 
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and specific concepts like ‘Paneuropa’155, ‘Mitteleuropa’156, the ‘Abendland’157 (Occi-
dent), and the ‘Reich’158 (Empire) have provided deeper insights into the European 
dimension of contemporary thinking. More recently, monographs on Christian- and 
Social-democratic concepts for Europe and the ideas of the working class159 have 
been published. However, due to their different focuses, these studies do not add up 
to a general overview of German notions of Europe between 1918 and 1939. There-
fore, several periodicals and contemporary monographs have been consulted. The 
Sozialistische Monatshefte are crucial for outlining the leftist standpoints, while lib-
eral and democratic views are reconstructed mainly on the basis of contemporary 
monographs. For conservative notions of Europe, the periodicals Das Neue Reich, 
Hochland, Die Tat, and the Europäische Revue proved to be useful. The chapter on 
extreme right-wing concepts mainly draws on the Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte 
and several monographs. All of the periodicals mentioned inform the chapter on 
German notions of Europe between 1933 and 1939, as far as they were still allowed 
to be published. 
The reconstruction of the wartime discourse on the future of Europe will – as men-
tioned above – almost exclusively rely on primary sources. For this purpose, I have 
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gathered as many documents as possible that attest to a concept for Europe or to an 
interest in any form of European post-war order. Despite actually having a different 
focus, several editions of sources are a major help in this respect (see chapter 1.1). 
Additonally, a lot of work went into additional research in different archives. In the 
Bundesarchiv-Lichterfelde, the documents of several Nazi party (BArch NS 6, NS 51, 
NS 10) and SS-institutions (NS 19, NS 2), the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (R 3101), 
the Reichsfinanzministerium (R 2), the Deutsche Reichsbank (R 2501), the Reichs-
ministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (R 55), the Reichsministerium für 
Rüstungs- und Kriegsproduktion (R 3), Reichsverkehrsministerium (R 5), the 
Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete (R 6), the Auswärtiges Amt (R 901) 
proved relevant. For documents related to the role of private companies within the 
New Order, I worked through the documents of the Reichsgruppe Industrie (R 12 I) 
and the numerous Wirtschaftsgruppen (R 13 I-XXXIV), whereas the standpoints of 
central army institutions (BArch MA RW 19, 45, 46) was analysed in the military his-
torical branch of the Bundesarchiv in Freiburg. Furthermore, a short-term research 
fellowship from the German Historical Institute in Moscow allowed for research in the 
Russian State Military Archives in Moscow. Unfortunately, four weeks did not suffice 
to work through all of its promising holdings.160 Nevertheless, the valuable additional 
primary sources from the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (RGVA 1458) and the Vier-
jahresplanbehörde (700) alone justified the journey. Thus, the reconstruction of the 
discourse can rely on a broad basis of primary sources originating from various insti-
tutions. 
The penultimate chapter, which explores the impact of the New Order on the micro 
level, can heavily draw on existing research. Numerous case studies extensively 
cover German occupation policies and their leading figures, while the recent boom in 
business history has yielded plenty of studies that shed light on business policies 
during the ‘Third Reich’. Nevertheless, additional archival work was necessary for 
this chapter because business-historical case studies occasionally neglect the Euro-
pean dimension or do not address it in as much depth as is necessary for our pur-
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pose. Since the exact wordings of statements and motives for actions matter in this 
context, the internal documents of several businesses from different branches were 
analysed. Visits to the Carl Zeiss archive (CZA) and the historical archive of Daimler-
Benz AG (DBA) as well as the Dresdner Bank’s documents in the historical archive 
of the Commerzbank (HAC) and Mannesmann AG’s records (M) in the company ar-
chive of Salzgitter AG, provided valuable material. Even though the findings were not 
on their own extensive enough to sustain an argument based on a single case study, 
they substantiate the exemplary cases that highlight the significance of the New Or-
der for the policies of German private businesses. 
Overall, the broad basis of secondary literature and primary sources that inform this 
study form a sound basis for the reconstruction of National Socialist notions of 
Europe and for the analysis of their implementation.  
 2. Dreaming of a New Order 
Something sinister has descended on the world. It hangs heavily over the killing fields and the 
ruins of Russia; it is astir in Germany’s starving, disillusioned and helpless masses. Is it the 
twilight of an ageing, exhausted Europe which is enveloping the continent after a long, mo-
mentous and world-changing history, ushering it into the night of soulless barbarism? Or can 
we observe the dawning of a better future?
1
 (Walter Vogel, 1921)
  
The First World War dramatically changed global power relations: The United States 
of America emerged from the worldwide conflict as the leading industrial and finan-
cial power in the world and experienced growth and prosperity in the following dec-
ade. The European states, by contrast, were deeply in debt and shaken by the politi-
cal and economic consequences of the war. In contrast to the U.S. and other aspir-
ing large areas of the world like Asia and the Soviet Union, Europe, once the political, 
economic, and cultural centre of the world, found itself fragmented and at risk of be-
ing marginalised.2 In Germany the feeling of crisis and decline was even more in-
tense than elsewhere in Europe: After having lost the war that was supposed to re-
sult in its supremacy on the continent, Germany was held responsible for its out-
break and lost important parts of its territory, its traditional political system, most of 
its military power, and was forced to pay reparations to the victors. In addition to the 
wounded ‘national pride’, the lost war and the peace treaties brought about a political 
and economic instability that undermined support for the newly formed Weimar Re-
public and the status quo in general. Accordingly, the mood amongst Germans was 
full of gloom. Edgar Jung for example stated in 1927 that what was nowadays la-
belled progress was in fact decline, and the title of Oswald Spengler’s very influential 
book The Decline of the West seemed to have put the generally bleak prospects in a 
nutshell.3 
This chapter deals with the interwar period and reconstructs how Germans perceived 
Europe, what shortcomings they ascribed to it, and what measures they proposed to 
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remedy these. In order to cover the multitude of notions of Europe voiced across the 
political spectrum, the overview is structured along broad political affiliations, ranging 
from socialist and social democratic standpoints, subsumed under ‘leftist’, to authori-
tarian and ‘völkisch’ conceptions on the ‘extreme right’ (chapter 2.1). These catego-
ries are not strictly distinct,4 but they are broad enough to encompass all the existing 
positions and, at the same time, they are narrow enough to illustrate shared thought 
patterns, motives, objectives, expectations and approaches. Whilst the following 
chapter cannot claim to be an exhaustive overview, its findings make clear what im-
pact the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933 had on the German discourse on 
Europe (chapter 2.2). By 1939, the discourse was dominated by notions of Europe 
that were rooted in two long-standing and well-established knowledge and belief sys-
tems: Europe was discursively constructed along widely accepted economic thought 
patterns and along a völkisch interpretive frame, which owed its discursive domi-
nance to the National Socialist seizure of power (chapter 2.3) 
 
2.1 Germany Prescribing Cures for Moribund Europe (1918-1933) 
Even though most contemporary German diagnoses of the state of affairs in Europe 
sounded fatalistic and bleak, they also held out hope. Claiming to have identified the 
causes of Europe’s current misery, these appraisals usually prescribed a supposedly 
efficacious remedy. The comparison of Europe’s currently moribund state with its 
glorious past or with its healthier competitors suggested different causes – and thus 
the potential cures varied. A look abroad, on the one hand, suggested that the US-
American formula of success – creating a vast territorial entity under a common po-
litical roof – might be the silver bullet for achieving power and prosperity.5 Many be-
lieved that if Europe did not want to go under between the economic dominance of 
the U.S. and the military power of Russia, it had to follow suit.6 A look back in history, 
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on the other hand, offered different ways out of contemporary problems: a German-
dominated Mitteleuropa for which World War I had been fought, the Greater German 
Empire Bismarck had failed to erect, the Hanseatic League constituting a mutually 
beneficial Europe-wide trade association, and the Holy Roman Empire of the 
German Nation loosely uniting Europe under the Christian faith, all taught different 
lessons and led to varying conclusions.7 Furthermore, for some, Europe’s decline 
was not a matter of organisation or political systems but of a process of racial and 
spiritual degeneration that had to be reversed. 8  Hence, the discussion on how 
Europe could recover and reclaim its due status provoked heterogeneous thoughts 
and a broad spectrum of potential options that oscillated between all these points of 
reference. 
 
2.1.1 Capitalist Means for a Socialist Future – Leftist Concepts for Europe 
The direction of the development is decisive: Towards peace, towards prosperity, towards the so-
cial advancement of the masses, towards the integration of Europe!
9
 (Wladimir Woytinski, 1930) 
German socialists were in favour of a unified Europe. They considered it a means to 
secure peace and prosperity and to eventually overcome capitalism. Largely sharing 
the same beliefs and being driven by the same motives, the socialist left did not differ 
very much in its opinions on how such a European order could be realised. 
From a working class point of view, Europe’s decay had to be stopped not because 
political power and cultural influence were values as such and worth preserving, but 
because Europe’s current state endangered its economic well-being.10 The rise of 
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the United States, the formation of the Soviet Union, the advancing integration in the 
Asian-Pacific area and the cooperation within the British Commonwealth were cause 
for concern, but economic growth and increasing prosperity were considered to be 
the key to improving Europe’s standing.11 Therefore, anything which hampered the 
European economies had to be overcome.  
One of the most serious obstacles to economic well-being was the fragmentation of 
Europe created by the treaty of Versailles:12 Not being able to compete with the larg-
est industrial nations, the smaller states tried to shield their own industries with tariff 
walls. This resulted in reduced market access for exporting countries and in the 
emergence of inefficient, non-competitive industries.13 In the eyes of German social-
ists, Europe would be better off if tariffs were reduced or abolished and a European 
division of labour was established.14 The creation of a large common market would 
not only be in the interest of the industrial nations but would also be beneficial to 
agrarian states. 15  Complementing one another perfectly, all European countries 
would be able to focus on their respective comparative advantages, thus allowing 
them to benefit from a customs union: For German industrial output a large market 
would emerge and the rising living standards – brought about by economies of scale 
– would increase demand for quality foodstuffs. This demand could then be met by 
the exports of agrarian states, enabling them to intensify farming and to invest in 
processing industries.16 By putting to work its capital surplus, France was supposed 
to play the role of a catalyst for investments, thereby becoming Europe’s prime 
banker.17 The creation of such a ‘win-win-win situation’ promised economic growth 
and prosperity because intensifying the given natural linkages was supposed to 
unleash synergy effects.18  
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German socialists expected that bringing the European economies back on track 
would facilitate their work. Instead of having to fight over the fair redistribution of ex-
isting prosperity, economic growth meant that the wealth increase could be distrib-
uted, thus rendering the socialist struggle easier. Furthermore, the creation of a large 
common market was expected to change the nature of companies and the way they 
operated. In order to stay competitive, businesses had to grow accordingly, or had to 
seek other arrangements to secure their vital interests. German socialists endorsed 
both. European cartels, syndicates, and price agreements would not only steady 
capitalist business cycles but were also considered as an essential part of a Euro-
pean social policy as working conditions and living standards were expected to 
align.19 Additionally, the growth of economic organisations and companies were ex-
pected to have another convenient side effect: Highly integrated businesses with 
long production chains were deemed more vulnerable. Like giants on clay feet, their 
weak spots could be exploited in times of labour disputes.20 At the same time, the 
labour movement was expected to gain in number and strength – just as it did after 
the German unification – because if borders lost their significance not only would 
capital internationalise but socialist cooperation would as well.21 Thus, German so-
cialists recommended coming to terms with the capitalist system and forming a tem-
porary alliance with bourgeois forces in order ultimately to overcome both.22 
The key issue of this socialist Europe-to-be was the question of how it could be real-
ised. Given the atmosphere of animosity and mistrust, which centuries of rivalry and 
wars had created, European unification faced severe obstacles. From this perspec-
tive, Europe’s glorious history had evolved into a burden: Whereas the United States 
– a country with no history23 – could rely on a feeling of togetherness, the European 
peoples were focused on the differences between them, thereby reinforcing envy 
and hate. Even though German socialists were convinced that the European nations 
had far more in common than they realised, most of them feared that their blood re-
lationship, their shared way of thinking, their common culture, and their actual eco-
nomic interdependence would not be enough to sustain a process of European Inte-
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gration.24  Thus, the feeling of community could not serve as a starting-point for 
European unification but was rather seen as one of the hoped-for results. However, 
a decisive first step towards a “European fatherland”25 could already be taken: eco-
nomic cooperation. By demonstrating the extent to which European countries de-
pended on each other and by increasing international understanding through coop-
eration, a customs union would pave the way for further “political, legal, mental, and 
cultural”26 integration.  
In contrast to German conservatives and right-wing politicians, socialists did not look 
eastwards or cling to Mitteleuropa but advocated a French-German agreement. In 
the eyes of German socialists, France’s quest for European supremacy was nothing 
more than a conservative spectre; in fact, France pursued its European policy in 
good faith and honestly wished for reconciliation and agreement. 27  Furthermore, 
Germany’s defeat of 1918 had cleared the way for cooperation between the erst-
while arch-enemies, as it had abolished absolutism and cleared the way for socialist 
work in parliament.28 Thus, the conditions were supposedly ideal and mere reason 
alone would suffice to initiate a process of European integration.29 Once France and 
Germany had started to cooperate economically, the smaller countries would not be 
able to withstand them. Being attractive to all European states, the area of economic 
cooperation would expand and ultimately unite all of Europe – except for Great Brit-
ain and the Soviet Union: The former was itself an empire and mainly concerned with 
the Commonwealth; the latter’s interests and better part of its territory lay outside of 
Europe. 30  Nevertheless, Europe would be able to become largely self-sufficient 
thanks to its colonies. German socialists argued for the inclusion of Africa, since it 
could provide Europe with exotic foodstuffs and raw materials.31 In exchange, France 
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and Germany could assist in modernising Africa.32 Thus, the ultimate aim of French-
German cooperation was to unleash a dynamic of integration that would eventually 
create an unnamed33 economic union comprising the European continent and Africa.  
Overall, German socialists had no doubts that Europe’s future lay in its unification. In 
this way, Europe could reclaim its place among the leading economic powers in the 
world. Socialism would benefit as well and get closer to achieving its goals. Since a 
European sense of community did not exist, economic cooperation was supposed to 
initiate the process of unification and constituted the backbone of most socialist con-
cepts. Ultimately, a European Union was seen as a means to overcome capitalism 
and as a step towards the long-term objective: a worldwide federation of socialist 
nations. 
 
2.1.2 The ‘Good Europeans’ – Liberal and Democratic Concepts for Europe 
Only the unification of all European states to an organic whole [...] can turn Europe into an equal 
participant and factor in human development on earth once again. Only this unification is capable 
of breathing new life into Europe’s individual states, which are otherwise destined to insignificance, 
of wrenching them out of the hopelessness of their current situation ... to save the Abendland 
[Occident].
34
 (Franz Carl Endres, 1925) 
German liberals and democrats, who are usually considered to be the ‘good Europe-
ans’35 of the interwar period, wished for a European Unification, not least because 
they deemed it vital: Not to pool Europe’s potential would inevitably lead further 
down the road to ruin. The creation of a European Community, on the contrary, 
promised peace, wealth, and the preservation of European culture and its role in the 
world. Being aware of the many difficulties such a project faced, liberals and democ-
rats discussed several ways to realise a united Europe. 
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In their eyes, Europe’s strength had to be rebuilt in order to avoid its decay. On the 
one hand, the rise of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan entailed the risk of 
being economically marginalized.36  The Communist Revolution in Russia and its 
claim to world revolution, on the other hand, posed an abstract ideational and a con-
crete military threat.37 Since no country would stand a chance on its own, the Euro-
pean states had to cooperate: economically in order to prevent Communism from 
gaining further ground by raising European living standards; and politically in order to 
deter the Soviet Union from expansionist ambitions by displaying Europe’s solidarity. 
Only a united Europe would be powerful enough to avert the “misery and barba-
rism”38 of a “new thousand-year medieval period” 39.  
According to most German liberals and democrats, the creation of Paneuropa40, or 
the ‘United States of Europe’41 was essential and the only adequate response to the 
fundamental changes the world had been undergoing in the past decades. Economic 
competition had become fiercer in a world that was getting smaller and smaller due 
to technological progress, faster transport, and more efficient means of communica-
tion.42 Having to match rivals on a global level, companies operating in small states 
were handicapped. Compared to the domestic market in the United States, the vari-
ous shielded European markets were tiny. If Europe wanted to stay competitive, cus-
toms barriers had to make way for a large common market that would render highly 
efficient mass production profitable.43 Being protected by tariff walls on the outer 
borders, such a Großraumwirtschaft44 would increase Europe’s wealth and the living 
standards of its inhabitants. 45  
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Some liberals, however, rejected the idea of a European common market because 
its external tariffs would reinforce protectionist tendencies elsewhere without offering 
advantages over a general free trade policy.46 Both scenarios, intra-European free 
trade and worldwide free trade, fanned fears in smaller countries that had to be al-
layed. Most of the industries that had developed since the beginning of World War I 
would not survive the end of protectionism. However, bearing in mind the overall wel-
fare gains, German liberals and democrats emphasised that this price was not too 
high to pay.47 Of course, Germany’s overwhelming industrial potential made it easy 
to take this stance. But apart from the economic well-being of Europe as a whole, a 
second hope was pinned on the expansion of European cooperation. The fight “for 
the reduction of tariffs, for the European customs union, for a rapprochement of the 
peoples today” was also considered “a matter of a higher aim: Securing peace.”48 
After all, the nationalisms within Europe had culminated in the First World War and 
had brought the continent to the brink. Therefore, another war had to be avoided by 
putting the nation into perspective.49 But since European cooperation was the only 
way to save the nation, such a step would not be betrayal but patriotism.50 Together 
with economic dependence, cultural similarities, and shared beliefs, this insight was 
to form the basis for a European sense of community. 
Since the outcome of World War I had put an end to many monarchies in Europe, 
the supranational order was envisaged as democratic. However, given existing scep-
ticism, it seemed advisable to limit the political process of unification at the beginning. 
By avoiding majority decisions and by still granting the member states a high degree 
of sovereignty, this new polity was meant to be acceptable for every nation.51 Never-
theless, some decision-making powers had to be delegated: Richard Riedl, for ex-
ample, envisaged an arbitrating body that should bindingly settle disputes between 
the states. Furthermore, a bicameral parliament – consisting of one chamber com-
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prising delegates of the parliaments and one consisting of the governments – should 
represent Europe abroad and watch over the adherence of the economic basic rules, 
such as the free movement of persons, freedom of trade, and the equal status of all 
enterprises and persons.52 Later on, when the ‘United States of Europe’ had proven 
successful, it could expand into other policy fields. “One tariff, one currency, one 
market, one will, one friendship, one fate, that is Europe as it ought to be and as it 
can be.”53 
The question of how to reach the goal of a united Europe, however, split liberals and 
democrats into different fractions. In principle, they discussed four different starting-
points. As a prime example for a peaceful cooperation between states, the League of 
Nations was a role model for a European polity for some and a means to realize 
Europe’s unification for others.54 Due to its conciliatory nature, it would help to allay 
the fears of smaller countries, meet France’s need for safety, and demonstrate Ger-
many’s good will.55 Others objected that European issues should be dealt with by 
European states, not an “inorganic” organisation comprising most countries of the 
world. Demanding a European Monroe Doctrine, they postulated “Europe for the 
Europeans”56. Thus, for other liberals and democrats, Europe itself was to take the 
initiative and to advance its political efforts. Ideally, a meeting of all European nations 
should be summoned to elaborate a first treaty laying the groundwork for further in-
tegration.57 However, even optimists regarded it as unlikely that any treaty could at-
tract the support of all European states. A French-German treaty, as the nucleus for 
enlargement, therefore seemed a more realistic option.58 Those German liberals and 
democrats who considered this approach too ambitious still advocated economic 
cooperation as a first step: revitalising the economy was one of Europe’s most press-
ing problems, and a thriving large common market would appeal to industries in 
many countries.59 Having to clear the lowest hurdles, such a step would then require 
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Europe-wide regulations and agreements thus leading to political cooperation as well. 
Nevertheless, sceptics argued that the only thing all European countries shared was 
a “solidarity of poverty”60. And without a solid ideological foundation, a European 
sense of community, every attempt to create a European polity or even measures of 
economic integration were bound to fail.61 
Overall, German liberals and democrats considered the unification of Europe a ne-
cessity. Even though they disagreed on the means by which their vision of Europe 
could be realized, they all shared the belief that, without economic cooperation, 
Europe would not be able meet to the needs of the modern world, and that security 
and peace were essential preconditions if Europe wanted to regain its former political 
significance. Both objectives were partly ends in themselves and partly driven by the 
fear that communist Russia might exploit Europe’s weakness. 
 
2.1.3 Going Forward, Looking Backwards – Conservative Concepts for Europe 
The Reich is the great and tragic destiny of the Germans, for it prevents them from contenting 
themselves with just a state, and commits them to wanting a territorial and spiritual union which is 
not to be found among themselves, but which transcends them. They bear the destiny of Europe 
on their shoulders and Europe’s discord in their hearts – from the very outset.
62
 (Fritz Büchner, 
1932) 
German conservatives argued for a reorganisation of Europe. In order to preserve its 
values and its culture, the Treaty of Versailles had to be revised. Claiming that the 
condition of Europe had always depended on Germany’s well-being, they advocated 
the restoration of Germany’s power and glory. After all, the Reich was entitled to it 
and Europe needed it. Even though conservatives shared a Germany-centred per-
spective, they put forward a broad variety of motives, objectives, and hopes. The 
designated means to realize these differed accordingly. 
In the eyes of many German conservatives, the political decay of Europe was a mere 
allegory of an underlying, more substantial spiritual decline.63 Due to the dominance 
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of France and its political principles, Europe had lost its unifying idea and had de-
scended into individualism and separation. 64  Being threatened by the Bolshevik 
menace in the East and the economic dominance of the United States in the West, 
Europe had become a Schicksalsgemeinschaft (community of destiny) that would 
either counter this situation together or was bound to perish.65 Only a genuinely 
European idea, a third way between the misguided liberalism of the West and the 
destructive communism of the East, could unify Europe and enable it to hold its 
ground within a world shaped by different Großräume and their ideologies. Giving 
Europe this idea was deemed Germany’s calling.66  
Germany was the central point of reference for this conservative Europe-to-be: Just 
as the life of any organism depended on a healthy heart, Europe needed the sound 
beating of the “heart of Europe”67 : Germany. However, since the dominance of 
France and the Treaty of Versailles it supported so vigorously, had crippled Germany, 
both had to be overcome if Europe was ever to prosper again.68 The existing “me-
chanical” order, inspired by the supposedly universal principles of freedom and 
equality, had to make way for a system that complied with Europe’s character.69 
Having given Europe a long-lasting order before and being the geographical and 
spiritual middle ground of Europe, Germany was destined to spearhead this process. 
Depending on what values they cherished, German conservatives took their cues 
either from the notion of the Holy Roman Empire or from Mitteleuropa as envisaged 
by List and Naumann.70  
For advocates of Mitteleuropa, Europe’s fragmentation stood in the way of economic 
recovery. The only way out of the current misery was a German reorientation east-
wards,71 which promised to bring together two spheres that complemented each 
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other: the agrarian countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and Germany’s 
industrial potential.72 Uniting several of these states under German leadership was 
partly seen as an end in itself, partly as a potential starting-point for Europe’s recov-
ery and eventually its unification.73 Conservatives who were primarily concerned with 
the spiritual and cultural decay of Europe strove for a ‘Third Reich’.74 In contrast to 
the relatively clear-cut economic concept of Mitteleuropa, the idea of a new Reich 
probably had as many different meanings as it had supporters.75 The numerous di-
verse answers Fritz Büchner received and published after asking the question “What 
is the Reich?”76 have been cited as emblematic examples of this:77 While some 
wanted to reunite the Occident (Abendland) under the Christian faith, for others the 
goal was a federalist entity.78 Some stressed the difference between Reich and the 
nation-state, others saw it as a means for responsible leadership inter pares.79 For 
some it was a distinct hierarchical order, whereas for others the Reich was bound to 
remain an unreachable utopia. 80  One thing was clear to conservative thinkers, 
though: Germany was destined to bring the Reich into being and to preside over it.81  
The hopes that German conservatives pinned on Europe-to-be depended on the re-
spective order they envisaged: By bringing together the industries of Germany and 
Austria with the agrarian countries of the Southeast, Mitteleuropa was supposed to 
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“organically” strengthen naturally given linkages.82 In this non-capitalist international 
division of labour, every country could focus on its respective advantages and benefit 
from the growing demand increasing living standards would bring.83 For Germany, 
this constellation promised even more than these mutual benefits. As Mitteleuropa 
was to comprise Großdeutschland (Greater Germany) – including Austria and the 
German minorities abroad – it would not only subvert the Treaty of Versailles but 
also lend political substance to the economic weight of the Reich.84 German conser-
vatives who wished for a ‘Third Reich’, in contrast, deemed all attempts at resolving 
Europe’s political and economic problems futile as long as the fundamental spiritual 
aberration that caused them existed:85 individualism, liberalism and nationalism, the 
predominant principles of the French Revolution, had evolved into mere egoism on 
the societal, political, and economic level.86 These conservatives hoped that Ger-
many could restore the vital sense of community by giving Europe a new unifying 
idea. In Jung’s words: “As champions of a higher morality, the Germans will then 
become the prophets of a better Europe that will once again be able to give some-
thing to the world”87. However, in order to tread this ‘third way’88 between the two 
dominant ideologies, the stabilising geographical and spiritual centre of the continent, 
Germany, had to reclaim its leading role. Accordingly, the envisaged European order 
was neither a democratic nor equal, but sometimes a Christian,89 federation of peo-
ples, led but not ruled by the Germans. 
Even though the advocates of both a new Reich and Mitteleuropa assigned the lead-
ing role for its realisation to Germany, their approaches differed. The road to Mit-
teleuropa was clear: Together with other nations that refused the current order, 
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Germany had to overcome the Treaty of Versailles.90 After having healed the “bleed-
ing wounds at the German borderlines”91 by reclaiming the lost territories and realis-
ing the Anschluss, Germany would inevitably again become the economic and cul-
tural centre of gravity of Europe.92 Using Austria as a gateway, the complementary 
markets of Germany and the agrarian Southeast-European states would naturally 
merge.93 If national egoisms were put aside in favour of a “solidaristic community of 
nations”,94 Mitteleuropa could be united in a customs union that would make up for 
Germany’s loss of colonies and give back Austria its traditional markets.95 Creating 
the Reich, in contrast, was primarily a spiritual task. The starting-point was the 
emergence of a new kind of thinking.96 Before Europe would abandon the disastrous 
values of the French Revolution in favour of a higher “life form” that would bring 
about an “organically structured cooperative unity in diversity”97, the Reich and its 
ideational foundation had to come to life within the German people.98 While this vi-
sion necessarily seemed wishful thinking to some conservatives, others were more 
resolute:  
Nobody knows whether the road to German freedom emerges from Europe’s reorganisation 
or whether only a free Germany can rebuild Europe. It is beyond doubt, however, that the 
German Volk has to be mentally forearmed. It has to be determined to establish German 
freedom and European reorganisation with its blood if necessary.
99 
Overall, conservatives wanted to see the French dominance of Europe broken. Ger-
many was to spearhead the renunciation of the political and spiritual aberrations that 
had caused Europe’s bleak situation. A German-led Mitteleuropa or a ‘Third Reich’, 
as European ways out of this impasse, would strengthen Europe’s economy as well 
as its sense of community, thus enabling it to stand its ground in a world shaped by 
large and powerful political entities. 
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2.1.4 ‘Deutschland über Alles’ – Extreme Right-Wing100 Concepts for Europe 
Young people have to know that we live in a world of enemies. Whoever talks to them about 
Paneuropa [Paneuropean Union], about world peace etc, consigns them to misfortune. Because 
everywhere there is struggle; our young people, however, are being artificially made into sheep 
for the wolf to eat. There is only one kind of peace, the peace of one’s soul which comes from the 
consciousness of a duty fulfilled. Your duty, however, is to be a German in thought and in deed. 
Remember that you are a German. Why? Because everything creative is of Nordic and thus of 
Germanic origin.
101
 (Reinhold Wulle, 1931) 
For the extreme right in Germany, the Volk lay at the core of all convictions. There-
fore, their concepts primarily revolved around Germany, not Europe. However, real-
ising their völkisch102 convictions would inevitably change the face of Europe as well: 
either by uniting all Germans in one state or by deriving the right to expansion from 
such a nation-state. The concrete shape of this new European order, however, re-
mained vague.  
German right-wing thinkers saw a war raging, a “very big, final decision, a global 
struggle, a last battle between idealism and materialism, blood and money, labour 
and capital, light and darkness”103. Just as in the World War, Germany upheld true 
virtues facing the mere interests of the Western powers. In order to survive this battle, 
Germany needed to recollect the source of its strength, its Volk. Only a völkisch re-
definition of politics, society, and economics would allow Germany to recover, thus 
enabling it to regain its strength and freedom.104 This spiritual renewal would not only 
save Germany, Europe, and the white race, but also reorder Europe. 
Their völkisch convictions defined the objectives which the extreme right in Germany 
pursued. They strove for a state comprising all people of German blood and for a 
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Europe shaped by such a new Germany.105 By preventing Germany from uniting all 
the members of its Volk in one state and by wreaking havoc through defying 
Europe’s intrinsic differences, the Versailles system had become the basic problem. 
Its foundation, “the corrosive western idea of the nation-state with its firm central-
ism”106, had no regard for the different personalities of each Volk.107 By contrast, the 
Reich – allegedly the epitome of Germany’s character108 – was a national as well as 
a supranational concept that transcended nations and borders, but accommodated 
the geographical and economic unity of Europe.109 Hence, casting this idea in a con-
crete political form that complied with the “laws of our existence and its historical re-
gion”110 was not only an act of German self-determination but also the solution to 
Europe’s disorder. In this way, the political right translated a German political, eco-
nomic, and spiritual dominance into a common European interest, while Germany’s 
völkisch awakening provided the necessary power, and history allegedly proved the 
Reich’s capability in this respect.111 Accordingly, the supranational dimension of a 
völkisch Reich justified many different objectives: Some strove for autarky either 
through an exchange of manufactured goods for agricultural products from the 
East,112 or through a “völkisch imperialism”, which was to “ensure a healthy and 
powerful existence of the German Volk.”113 Others envisaged a German-led federa-
tion of autonomous states in Mitteleuropa, or wanted to unite all blood-related na-
tions in a “Pan-Germanic League”114 or a Großgermanenland (Greater Germanic 
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Land)115. However, since borders in Central Europe were stable and Germany had 
dropped out of the race for territories overseas, the extreme right in Germany largely 
projected the achievement of its aims onto the East.116 
The hopes and expectations the German extreme right cherished were not pinned 
on a particular concept of Europe but more diffusely on a fundamentally different 
mind-set, on which a new European order should rest. Its starting-point was the 
German Volk, which had to become aware of its blood ties that constituted its com-
munity. The necessary precondition for this breakthrough of a new, völkisch thinking 
was the marginalisation of the Jewish population.117 As an allegedly racially and 
spiritually alien people, they were not only excluded from the Volk but also blamed 
for the imposition of liberalism and materialism onto Europe as well as for the crisis-
ridden order these ideas inspired.118 Thus, a völkisch renewal would become the 
long overdue historical watershed:119  
Europe as an essence hitherto only existed as an empty construct of ideas for theoretical and 
material wishes, it even evolved into a mere appendix of a bigger global construct […]. These 
wishes have been washed away now and a more original, more powerful essence from the 
well of human creativity and culture takes possession of Europe in order to reorganise it.
120
 
This thinking rejected the existing “anti-European”121 system, which ignored the dif-
ferent völkisch worldviews that were deeply rooted in blood and soil.122 Instead, a 
Europe in diversity – the result of all Völker recollecting their nature, their “harmonic 
entity”123 – promised a brighter and more peaceful future.124 In principle, every nation 
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was to develop its very own political, social, and economic forms in accordance with 
the nature of its Volk and race.125 However, due to its population size, its economic 
weight, its cultural development, and its political experience, Germany was to take 
the leading role.126 A Europe reorganised in this way would gear its policy towards 
true values: Volk, race, and nation. By eradicating everything weak and alien – par-
ticularly the allegedly corrosive influence of Jewry –, and by attracting the positive 
and healthy parts of Europe, the “primacy of blood over the life-endangering emanci-
pation of money”127 would strengthen Europe.128 This turnround would not only stop 
the process of degeneration and initiate a process of invigoration but also turn 
Europe into a stronghold against Western arbitrary egalitarianism and the communist 
menace lurking in the East.129 However, for some right-wing activists this stronghold 
did not serve solely defensive purposes. They advocated a thrust eastwards – as an 
“expression of a völkisch will to power and to future”130 – which was to satisfy the 
alleged need for Lebensraum and to accomplish the presumed mission to civilise the 
East.131  
All the hopes and aims the German extreme right pursued depended on meeting one 
necessary requirement: the creation of a new Germany.  
We all talk about the coming Third Reich. We long for it and we fight for it, and in addition we 
völkisch activists believe that the precondition for the Third Reich is not the overthrow of the 
state, but the overthrow of the soul.
132  
Only if Germany found its way back “to German spirit, German nature”133 could it 
regain its strength and thus secure its future.134 Again, this genuinely German think-
ing was defined in clear contrast to the corrosive ideas allegedly brought into the 
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world by the Jews: the spiritual aberrations of individualism and egoism as well as 
communism’s unnatural affront to every form of European culture.135 Instead, it val-
ued togetherness and community:  
We National Socialists strive for the Third Reich, that very Reich of the Germans, in which all 
kinsmen of German blood find their home. It shall become a Reich in which the German Volk 
amalgamates into a sensible and lively unity and thus combines the multiplicity of the single 
Volksgenossen [comrades of the Volk] into one living body.
136 
If this body wanted to stand its ground, it had to be steeled. Accordingly, the German 
extreme right not only called for an extermination of all alien elements but also for 
racial purification.137 Defined by blood and improved by racial selection, such a Ger-
many would constitute a monolithic community that understood being German as a 
duty, a privilege, and an authority.138 This combination of all forces in a ‘Jew-free’ 
Volksgemeinschaft would automatically spawn a leader that embodied and executed 
its will, thus enabling it to fulfil its global mission the misguided world was awaiting.139 
Thus, “the entire cultured world”, the Abendland, and the “good and the future of 
Europe” depended on the “reinvigoration of Germany through the enormous forces 
of its revolution”140. 
Overall, for the extreme right in Germany, the Volk was paramount. Their objectives, 
their hopes, and the ways to realise both, revolved around the Volk and entailed the 
rejection of Western values and their alleged spiritual fathers, the Jews. Their termi-
nology, however, is unspecific and their arguments were rather felt than logically de-
veloped, so that what constituted an objective to some was for others merely a step 
on the way. Nevertheless, they found a common ground. The German extreme right 
hoped for Germany’s rebirth through a new thinking which would inspire and create a 
new organic European order. This Europe was to channel its ambitions eastwards 
and to subject all economic, societal, and political interests to the one paramount 
value, the German Volk. 
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2.2 Germany’s ‘Rebirth’ and ‘Adolescence’ in Europe (1933-1939) 
That we Germans are scattered across the world, but unlike the Jews always remain firmly rooted 
in the soil, makes the awakening of the community of blood in our Volk a revolutionary event 
which is relevant for every state and every nation individually. We are not appearing in Geneva as 
a minority plaintiff, but as the historic bearer of a new development among alien territorial states; 
the initiative is in our hands, even if the truncheon is in the hands of others. It is the newly shaped 
Reichsauftrag [imperial mission] of the Germans; its inexorability has not changed – to live and to 
fight from within ourselves, from the depths of our Volkstum; now it is not solely for us.
141
 
(Anonymous author, 1933) 
After the 30th January 1933, Germany changed fast and dramatically. Within a few 
weeks after Hitler became chancellor, the National Socialist regime deprived parlia-
ment of its power, banned other parties, smashed the trade unions, and imprisoned 
dissidents. National Socialist control became more extensive the more the so-called 
‘National Revolution’ was pushed on. One aspect of this increasing Gleichschaltung 
was the tightened grip on the press. Newspapers and magazines were shut down 
right away, or kept in check through the Schriftleitergesetz. This silencing of oppos-
ing opinions contributed to a different tenor in the German discourse on the future of 
Europe.  
The National Socialist ‘seizure of power’ sparked enough enthusiasm among many 
Germans for them to abandon the gloomy depictions of the status quo:  
The victorious German freedom movement is a new form of nationalism that bursts out from 
the deepest instinct of our blood, from the experience of our native soil, and from the aware-
ness of the Volksgemeinschaft. It will reorganise our völkisch life under the leadership of a 
consistent national idea, the idea of the community (therefore socialist), and free it from the 
pressure that is weighing on it. Against liberalism, which has been the companion of the idea 
of the nation in the 19
th
 century, the National Socialist renewal movement takes up the same 
fighting stance as against Marxism.
142
 
Thus, at a time in which the only alternatives had been “sinking into bolshevist night 
or rebirth from its own nature”143, Germany had made the right decision by uniting its 
Volk along a third way between the misleading and divisive ideas of both the East 
and the West.144 National Socialism had brought the fundamental truth, the biological 
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foundation of the German Volk, to the fore again, breathed new life into it, and was 
about to ‘organically’145 forge it into a Volksgemeinschaft.146 Understood as a racially, 
socially and ideationally homogeneous community sworn to a higher cause, its con-
stitution produced outsiders.147 Particularly for the Jews, widely perceived not only as 
a different race but also as the spiritual fathers of the two dominant alien ideologies – 
Jewish Bolshevism and Jewish Plutocracy –, there was no room in the German 
Volksgemeinschaft.148 In Goebbels’ words, it was the Jewish influence that had “cor-
rupted our race, caused our ethics to begin to rot, undermined our morals, and bro-
ken our power.”149 Thus, separating them from the ‘truly German’ Volk was a crucial 
part of aligning Germany politically and essential to reaping the rewards this reor-
ganisation seemed to promise. In this way, the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft 
unleashed a dynamic of exclusion and made a Germany without Jews imaginable, 
desirable, and ultimately necessary if the German nation wanted to restore its power 
and glory.150 Only a racially sound, spiritually renewed, and united Germany – that is 
a Germany without Jews – would be able to stand “before Europe, not as the un-
known giant anymore, but as a grim will raised to safeguard its clear-cut rights.”151  
However, Germany’s ‘rebirth’ was not only an internal matter, it was to be the prel-
ude for a new Europe. Amidst a world shaped by Großräume, it was essential to 
consolidate the European Schicksalsgemeinschaft (community of destiny) politically 
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and economically.152 Just as Germany had developed its middle ground between 
Western capitalism and Eastern communism out of its very nature, Europe had to 
recollect its character and to shape its unification and cooperation accordingly.153 
Since diversity was one of the most characteristic features of Europe, most publica-
tions aimed for a coexistence of the European states, in which every nation enjoyed 
freedom and cultural autonomy without being patronised by another state.154  
In the consciousness of a National Socialist, national freedom and development of the 
Volkstum and its culture are fundamental demands from which he cannot deviate without 
abandoning himself. When talking about the Reich as a higher aggregation, he means safe-
guarding the nations and ethnic groups in their natural sphere of life.
155 
While the Anschluss of Austria was considered to be in accordance with this call for 
national self-determination, further imperialist ambitions were not – National Social-
ism was after all no a export article.156 However, the Völker of Europe would only be 
equal in metaphysical terms because the “difference in numbers, historical develop-
ment, geographical position, blood-wise strength, and mental qualities presuppose 
an earthly hierarchy which is not arbitrary.”157 According to the German press, Ger-
many, the land of the middle, was to keep Europe balanced as its geographical, 
economic, and cultural superiority destined it to lead, not to rule, Europe.158 
Economically, different variations of Mitteleuropa and of a Großraumwirtschaft domi-
nated the voiced visions of Europe-to-be. Intensifying cooperation was deemed im-
perative if Europe did not want to find itself crushed between the “ashlars of the new 
global economic organisation”159. Luckily, Europe was perfectly suited for a ‘Groß-
wirtschaftsraum’: Central Europe’s industry and the agrarian Southeast were com-
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plements by nature. 160  Deepening this exchange pattern instead of battling for 
shares on the world market would benefit all participants.161 Europe would increase 
agricultural output and align it to its needs, while the agrarian states would develop 
into ready markets for manufactured goods.162 Allegedly, this constellation had noth-
ing to do with the international division of labour practised within the “inorganic global 
exchange of goods”163 because it naturally accrued from the respective country’s 
very own potential and “Lebensgesetzlichkeit” (law of life)164. Furthermore, the reli-
ance on secure and nearby markets had another convenient side effect: autarky. By 
limiting the effects of a potential naval blockade, it safeguarded the independent ex-
isence of Europe.165 For many, the scenario of being cut off from overseas trade 
once again was not a far-fetched spectre, but a legitimate fear: “Autarky and settle-
ment […] are not ends in themselves but means of the Volk and the state in the bat-
tle to maintain and expand its own Lebensraum. German Socialism is, as long as the 
Reich is struggling for its grandeur, a battle order, not an order of peace.”166 
The National Socialist revolution and all it could stand for fanned the hopes many 
Germans pinned on the Reich and Großraumwirtschaft that they envisaged. Since 
Germany had already leveraged a new thinking between liberalism and communism, 
these first steps promised to evolve into an historical turning-point. Germany would 
finally live up to its calling by assuming the leading role in Europe, to which it was 
entitled, and provide Europe with a sound basis for peaceful agreement.167 A Europe 
resting on the ‘organic’ pillars of Volk and Raum could settle even highly controver-
sial matters amicably.168 Furthermore, such an order would not only ensure peace 
and security by bringing the European peoples together.169 It would also restore 
Europe’s former greatness by remedying the causes for its decline. While some 
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hoped for the fascist movements in Germany and Italy to revive Europe’s “genetic 
material”, Christian faith,170 others argued that Europe’s degeneration was a racial 
issue:  
The ideologically justified breeding and preservation of lunatics, idiots, Jewish bastards or 
mulattoes is threatening the cultural strength of all nations […]. But Europe has always devel-
oped defensive forces against assaults on the roots of its strength.
171 
By linking racial purity not only to the cultural value and to the power of a Volk but 
also the threat of both to a racial degeneration resulting from misguided ideals, this 
statement by Alfred Rosenberg gets to the heart of the German tradition of völkisch 
racism and expands it, including its anti-Semitic stance, to a European level. 172 
Analogous to the alleged German ‘rebirth’ through the creation of a Volksgemein-
schaft, the Nordic and Germanic elements in Europe were to be strengthened.173 
The inferior residue, by contrast, was declared a societal burden, a threat to a thriv-
ing culture, and an impairment of the superior racial substance, hence an obstacle 
standing in the way of the reinvigoration of Europe.174 In this reading, the National 
Socialist practice of forced sterilisation of mentally and physically handicapped peo-
ple evolved into a role model for Europe.175 Yet again, however, curbing the spiritual 
and biological influence of the Jewish population was of more importance to leading 
Nation Socialists. According to Goebbels, Hitler was determined to expel them not 
just from Germany, but from Europe entirely.176 In this way, the National Revolution 
with its anti-Jewish legislation and discrimination figured as a trailblazer for the over-
due völkisch renewal of Europe. After all, the Germanic essence of the continent, in 
a biological and spiritual sense, had to reclaim its due status if Europe – just as 
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Germany – wanted to stand its ground against “culture-destroying bolshevism”177 as 
well as against the onslaught of corrosive Western ideas.178 Immunised in this way, 
Europe would have a future once more: It would be able to live up to its global mis-
sion and would become the world’s heart and mind again.179 
Germany had to take the first essential step towards this new European order. As 
long as it was unarmed, separated from parts of its Volk, politically divided, and cri-
sis-ridden, it was impossible to remedy Europe’s shortcomings.180 It seemed that the 
National Revolution had brought Germany back on track because everyone started 
to put their heart and soul into this Geisteskampf (spiritual fight).181 Together with a 
National Socialist upbringing, this development would invigorate the German-Nordic 
racial core of the Volk, reveal its intrinsic nature, and, ultimately, evoke “the eternal 
strengths of the German Volk’s past and enable it to new sacrifices and services.”182 
The more all Germans acted in concert domestically, the more weight their united 
voice would carry internationally.183 Therefore, the so-called National Revolution was 
a step towards two ends: a new Germany and a new Europe. 
The European repercussions of the German development were envisaged in two 
different ways. For some, the spirit of the German revolution would automatically win 
the upper hand because it would prove superior. Fascist Italy and Kemalist Turkey 
were following the same path and had already reorganised their völkisch life in ac-
cordance with their Lebensgesetzlichkeit (laws of life).184 Others, however, called for 
a more proactive approach. They saw no need to confine the effects of the national 
revolution to the persuasive power of its success, but wanted to give the German 
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Volk the Lebensraum it supposedly needed – peacefully through cooperation or by 
force.185 
Accordingly, the Anschluss of Austria in 1938 sparked enthusiasm because 
Großdeutschland had been a persistent dream among many nationalists and the 
imaginary centrepiece of a new Europe. It solidified Germany’s intermediate position 
between East and West and could become the “magnetic field and Ordnungszelle 
[cell of order] of a thriving Mitteleuropa”186. After Germany had annexed the Sude-
tenland and established the ‘Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia’, some Germans 
were convinced that a new age was dawning:187 
So today the treason of Versailles is getting what it deserves, as its europawidrig [anti-
European] constructs vanish, as the inflicted wounds are partly starting to heal, and the Ger-
many body, after shaking off the coercion of a remorseless imperialism, now starts to stretch in 
its former strength; fully aware that only thereby a true pacification of the European continent is 
made possible in cooperation with all those who likewise realise today’s fate within their Le-
bensraum and started to carpenter a new Europe after the downfall of the Abendland.
188
 
Overall, the ‘Third Reich’ and the National Revolution were hailed as the break-
through of a new thinking. As a renunciation of the allegedly misguided values of the 
French Revolution and its aftermath, including the Treaty of Versailles and democ-
racy as such, it was to become the starting-point of a new European Order. The 
völkisch knowledge and belief system, which lay at the core of this new thinking, 
called for the reorganisation of all aspects of life along the lines of a racial under-
standing of Germandom. As a structuring principle on the European level, this 
völkisch thinking went hand in hand with well-established economic thought patterns 
that envisaged an allegedly natural division of labour in which the exchange of Cen-
tral Europe’s manufactured goods for raw materials and foodstuffs from Southeast-
ern Europe figured prominently. This constellation still promised peace, prosperity, 
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and enough political power to stand up to the other large integrated Großräume. 
Even though these two lines of reasoning did not produce a clear-cut vision of 
Europe-to-be, it was undisputed that the ‘Jew-free’ German Volksgemeinschaft, as 
the champion of this new thinking, was to spearhead the reorganisation of Europe 
along these economic and völkisch lines and to preside over the result. 
 
2.3 The Dream Takes Shape – German Notions of Europe on the Eve of the War 
This time, we will establish the order in the new Europe.
189
 (Karl Hermann Frank, 1939) 
When Germans spoke of Europe before 1933, they spoke of an economic unity, of a 
natural geographical affiliation, a political entity, a cultural identity, a racial commu-
nity, a spiritual singularity, or a common destiny. Depending on the respective politi-
cal standpoint, the need to remodel Europe and its prospective organisation were 
justified differently, but all these concepts for a new European order had in common 
that they expected their idea of Europe to vouch for peace, power, and prosperity.  
German socialists and social democrats advocated a unified Europe because they 
considered prosperity key to successful socialist policies. Overcoming the fragmen-
tation of Europe by bringing together industrial and agrarian economies in a customs 
union, promised economic growth. Socialists expected that this peaceful economic 
cooperation would strengthen socialism, facilitate a redistribution of wealth, and pave 
the way for a deeper European integration. A democratic reconciliation between 
Germany and France was supposed to kick-start this project (see chapter 2.1.1). 
German liberals and democrats supported the idea of a European Unification out of 
concern for the position of Europe within a world increasingly shaped by large politi-
cal and economic entities. In order to stay competitive and prosperous, the current 
fragmentation and nationalist egoisms had to make way for a large common market 
and peaceful cooperation. The means to reach such a Europe were disputed, but the 
end, a democratic and supranational polity, became widely accepted in this political 
camp (see chapter 2.1.2). 
Among German conservatives there was much more disagreement. Their calls for a 
reorganisation of Europe put Germany at the heart of any prospect of reversing the 
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current decline. If Europe, threatened from the Bolshevist East and the economically 
dominant West, wanted to stand its ground, French spiritual and political dominance 
had to be replaced by a German hegemony. Economically, a German-dominated 
Mitteleuropa, uniting German industrial potential and the agrarian economies in the 
East and Southeast, promised prosperity by strengthening ‘natural’ linkages. Politi-
cally, Germany, the ‘heart of Europe’, was supposed to produce a new genuinely 
European thinking and – in this new unifying and pacifying spirit – unite Europe in a 
‘Third Reich’. Since a powerful Germany was the key element of this development, 
overcoming the Treaty of Versailles and accomplishing the Anschluss of Austria 
were to be the prelude (see chapter 2.1.3). 
The extreme right in Germany also demanded a spiritual renewal. For them, how-
ever, the decisive point of reference was the racially defined German Volk. Since the 
Treaty of Versailles stood in the way of politically uniting all people of German blood, 
the current European order had to make way for a Reich that transcended nations 
and accommodated the different personalities of each Volk as well as the geographi-
cal and economic unity of Europe. Regardless of whether its proponents expected 
this Reich to provide the basis for an exchange of manufactured goods for agricul-
tural products or to become a ‘Pan-Germanic League’, its realisation depended on a 
Europe-wide völkisch redefinition of politics, society, and economics. This new 
Europe would gear its policies towards values – Volk, race, and nation – not profits. 
Germany, as the champion of this rethinking, had to initiate and to spearhead this 
development (see chapter 2.1.4).  
After the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933, the limits of what could be said 
about Europe-to-be narrowed. When Germans spoke about Europe now, they still 
spoke of an economic unity, of a natural geographical affiliation, a political entity, a 
cultural identity, a racial community, a spiritual singularity, and a common destiny. 
And Europe still figured as a promise of peace, power, and prosperity. However, 
many of these categories and expectations were now bound by völkisch thinking and 
were stripped of their roots in democratic values. 
The so-called National Revolution, revolving around the convictions that a Volk is 
defined by blood and that there existed a hierarchy of races, contrasted liberal indi-
vidualism and communist levelling down with the idea of a Volksgemeinschaft. By 
uniting all people of German blood in a homogenous community sworn to a higher 
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cause, Germany had led by example. Other European Völker were supposed to fol-
low suit and should also put their very own nature at the heart of their spiritual and 
political renewal. This vision of Europe and its völkisch diversity supposedly provided 
the ideal basis for economic cooperation. The agrarian states complemented the 
industry of Europe by nature and the völkisch qualities of the European peoples as-
signed the matching roles in this ‘organic’ division of labour. As an autarkic Groß-
wirtschaftsraum and a peaceful coexistence of the various Völker, Europe would 
have taken a big step towards restoring its former greatness by remedying the 
causes for its decline. However, in the völkisch reading, racial degeneration had con-
tributed greatly to the recent loss of significance. Thus, the Nordic and Germanic 
elements in Europe were to be strengthened, while the rest, particularly the Jewish 
population, stood in the way of a European reinvigoration. So the German promotion 
of racial purity and the actual enlargement of the Reich, through the Anschluss and 
the creation of the ‘Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia’, substantiated the German 
claim for the leading role in the envisaged new Europe (chapter 2.2). 
Overall, the National Socialist seizure of power made völkisch thinking and its racism 
the raison d’état. This advent of a new doctrine at the highest level of German poli-
tics marks a watershed in the European discourse in many respects. The discursive 
dominance of the völkisch knowledge and belief system, guaranteed by physical vio-
lence, terror, and censorship, made it impossible to voice certain notions of Europe. 
A German reconciliation with France became unthinkable and unjustifiable because 
France was regarded as the country of origin of the previously dominant but mis-
guided ideas that had led to racial degeneration, spiritual aberration, and Europe’s 
decline. One epitome of France leading Europe astray was the spread of democracy; 
a political concept that National Socialists suspected to be a Jewish plot and against 
the nature of the European Völker. Accordingly, notions of Europe-to-be as a democ-
ratically legitimised supranational polity above equal states could not be expressed 
anymore. Instead, the ‘Third Reich’ and the National Revolution were hailed as the 
breakthrough of a new thinking, and the Volksgemeinschaft, which excluded all al-
leged non-Germans, was to become the structuring principle on European level as 
well. In this way, the National Socialist seizure of power silenced several previously 
important elements of the European discourse in Germany and amplified völkisch 
thought patterns and arguments.  
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Naturally, this thought pattern of the Volk having to become the pivotal element of all 
spheres of life did not grow out of thin air. It could tie in with a long-standing and 
well-established knowledge and belief system. Initially, the Romantic period had 
spawned a völkisch thinking in which Paul de Lagarde’s dictum that “Germanism lies 
not within the blood but in the character”190 was the decisive factor. In this under-
standing a Volk “signified the union of a group of people with a transcendental ‘es-
sence’”. And this essence was “fused to man’s innermost nature”, “represented the 
source of his creativity, his depth of feeling, his individuality, and his unity with other 
members of the Volk.”191 In the second half of the 19th century the rediscovery of the 
allegedly most pure and most noble, thus superior, Aryan or Nordic race, specified 
and substantiated this essence by redefining the Volk along racial lines.192 The theo-
ries of Arthur de Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who had set out to 
prove scientifically that races were the driving forces of history and that their purity 
was a decisive factor for their success, translated this völkisch thinking into a possi-
ble utopia or a gloom and doom scenario.193 Racial degeneration spelled decline, 
while racial purification and selection promised to improve mental faculties, perform-
ance, and virtuousness of the individual and thus the Volk. The social implications of 
this notion gained ground not only in Germany but internationally. Eugenic societies 
all over the world strove to better their societies.194 However, this “phantasm of pu-
rity”195 and its biologistic conception produced the idea of alien elements poisoning 
or infesting the Volkskörper.196 With regard to the Jewish population – often blamed 
for all unpopular developments of modernity like liberalism, democracy, capitalism, 
and communism197 – this logic culminated in a Manichean view of the world in Ger-
many. Realising the ‘good’ was only possible by annihilating the ‘bad’.198 From a 
völkisch perspective, the ‘good’ was ingrained in the Germanic soul and had to be 
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brought to the fore by a national revolution which would unite the Volk in the political, 
societal, and economic expression of its shared intrinsic qualities.199 Thus, the Na-
tional Socialist promise of creating a Volksgemeinschaft aroused enthusiasm among 
proponents of this thinking and initiated a process of exclusion.200 As a consequence, 
this knowledge and believe system, for which the racially defined Volk and its as-
cribed qualities were the basic principles, shifted the focus on the great Germanic 
achievements of the past and rejected most modern developments due to their al-
legedly non-Germanic origin.  
In this way, National Socialism and the völkisch thinking it promoted, rendered im-
possible any affirmative reference to the French Revolution and its repercussions. 
Stripped of all aspects that touched on the political principles of freedom and equality, 
several German notions of Europe lost some of their features but one broadly shared 
core element was far from being changed beyond recognition. Already before 1933, 
the demand to intensify European cooperation as well as the imagined functioning 
principles of this common market constituted a common ground of all political camps. 
The economic consolidation of Europe as the necessary precondition for political 
power was deemed inevitable in a world increasingly dominated by several Groß-
räume.201 In this line of thought, a united and prosperous Europe was imagined to be 
on par with the economically threatening United States in the West and the widely 
feared communist Soviet Union in the East. In this mixture of survival instinct and 
self-defence mechanism, the adversaries also became role models which compelled 
Europe to deepen integration. The economic backbone that was envisaged for this 
European economy was an supposedly natural division of labour, in which the ex-
change of Central Europe’s manufactured goods for raw materials and foodstuffs 
from Southeastern Europe figured prominently.202 Before and after 1933, this basic 
constellation promised to provide a stable basis for European economic cooperation, 
which would bring about a more prosperous, peaceful, and powerful continent that 
could take on the other global powers. 
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This thought pattern of an inherently complementary European economy consisted 
of variations and reiterations of well-established and thus validated concepts. On the 
one hand, the demands for an economic reorganisation could rely on arguments with 
a long tradition in German Mitteleuropa concepts.203 Already in the first half of the 
19th century, Friedrich List, a liberal who is usually considered the most important 
spiritual father of the Mitteleuropa idea,204 argued for a mitteleuropäisch Wirtschafts-
zone (Central European Economic Zone).205 It was supposed to act as a counterbal-
ance to other large economic areas by uniting complementary agricultural and indus-
trial regions into a balanced economic structure with a single market.206 This ration-
ale of a European self-assertion through cooperation and prosperity resonated with 
Konstantin Frantz’s plans for a European federation207 as well as with Paul de La-
garde’s reinterpretation of Mitteleuropa from a strongly nationalist and anti-Semitic 
standpoint.208 It substantiated Walther Rathenau’s call for a customs union in Mit-
teleuropa as an alternative way to secure essential resources in a world that had 
already been divided up,209 and it co-authored Friedrich Naumann’s best-seller titled 
Mitteleuropa, in which he argued for a confederation of Central European states as a 
counterbalance to the rise of the United States and of Russia.210 On the other hand, 
a relatively young field of scholarship validated this thinking in continents and em-
phasised the interdependence of politics and soil.211 Political geography or geopoli-
tics – usually associated with Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, and in Germany with 
Karl Haushofer and his son Albrecht, started to combine geography and political sci-
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ences during the heyday of imperialism. This doctrine established a thinking, in 
which states and their geographical space were interpreted in a biologistical manner. 
Very much like plants, states were considered organisms that were rooted in a cer-
tain soil and were striving to grow.212 Given this analogy, it is no wonder that Dar-
win’s reading of the evolution as the survival of the fittest found its way into geopoliti-
cal thinking.213 This imagery could not only easily be coupled with völkisch convic-
tions but also translated politics into a constant struggle for space.214 This worldview 
shifted the focus onto global developments and urged states to expand their Lebens-
raum [living space]; according to Haushofer that is the land available to a country.215 
Thus, geopolitical thinking could lend weight to the rejection of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, underpin demands for colonies, make the case for economic expansion in 
the Mitteleuropa tradition, or justify the unification of all people of Germanic blood. 
Not least because of its versatility, it became a “hegemonic discursive formation”216 
in interwar Germany.217 
This discursive congruence of geopolitical thinking and Mitteleuropa ideas makes 
clear why the basic economic principles of the latter found its way into most German 
interwar notions of Europe. The promise of peace, power and prosperity – and in 
many cases of a German dominance – was not bound to a certain political system or 
a specific geographical scope, but to a large-scale economic conception. And this 
conception could be loaded with different hopes and expectations.218 Thus, the im-
age of Europe as an economic entity based on a division of labour between industrial 
and agrarian countries tied in with long-standing and widespread ideas, fears, plans, 
and intentions. In discourse-analytical terms, the historical depth and the acceptabil-
ity of these conceptions set the “conditions of emergence of statements”.219 They 
enabled Germans to speak and think of Europe in a certain way and made this kind 
of statements legitimate and valuable contributions to the discursive construction of 
Europe.  
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At the same time, however, the political and geographical openness of this economic 
concept made it adaptable and susceptible to reinterpretation. The National Socialist 
exclusion of socialist and democratic meanings went hand in hand with the en-
trenchment of a völkisch rationale (see above). The economic cooperation of Europe 
was now supposed to benefit the people of valuable blood and to safeguard their 
political, economic, and spiritual independence from other global powers. Even 
though far less people subscribed to this reading than to the envisaged economic 
core of Europe, it offered links that accommodated ideas from other political camps. 
The German claim to a leading role in Europe could not only be justified by racial 
superiority but could also be deduced from its economic weight, its cultural achieve-
ments, its historical merits, or some metaphysical calling. The racially grounded re-
jection of communism and capitalism as Jewish plots was partly congruent with the 
vilification of these ideologies as unnatural, anti-cultural, devoid of values, or morally 
reprehensible. The exclusion of the Jewish population first from the German Volks-
gemeinschaft and ultimately from Europe could not only be vindicated in racial terms 
but also by means of religion-fed resentments, perceptions of otherness, and ascrip-
tions of responsibility for the evils of modernity.220 From a völkisch point of view, the 
call for autarky, finally, was a necessity for a Volk fighting for Lebensraum. For oth-
ers it was a reaction to growing protectionism, a lesson learned from the First World 
War, a European alternative to overseas colonies, or the pertinent reaction to the 
rise of other large economic entities.221 Thus, the inscription of völkisch convictions 
into the European discourse under the auspices of National Socialism did not neces-
sarily exclude all other notions of Europe. In fact, the völkisch line of reasoning pro-
duced aims that were congruent with several core elements of other knowledge and 
belief systems. 
Overall, the German notions of Europe during the interwar period drew upon a rich 
discursive reservoir that offered knowledge about and interpretations of the world, 
the state, the nation, the Volk, race, culture, politics, and economics. Two of these 
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interpretative frames222 particularly gained in importance after the National Socialist 
seizure of power.  
On the one hand, a widely held basic interpretive pattern construed Europe as a 
Großraum primarily along economic lines of reasoning. The ideal-typical European 
narrative of this frame had its starting-point in the economic fragmentation of Europe 
which was perceived as highly problematic. It argued that Europe had to overcome 
its disunity. Only a large integrated economic area would enable Europe to stand its 
ground in a world increasingly shaped by Großräume. Due to its natural structure, 
Europe was ideally suited to form its own economic Großraum; a Großwirtschafts-
raum. Bringing together the agrarian states with industrialised countries would create 
an international division of labour in which every nation could easily market its core 
products to the benefit of all. The industrialised countries would win a sales market 
for their manufactured goods and a secure supply of foodstuffs and raw materials, 
while the agrarian states would be able to import machinery, so that they could pro-
duce and sell more foodstuffs and raw materials thus increasing their own wealth. 
Constituting the backbone of political power and cultural influence, an independent, 
thriving, and prosperous European economy would help Europe to reclaim its former 
status. In a Europe reorganised in this way, Germany would automatically assume a 
leading role because of its economic weight. 
On the other hand, völkisch convictions told a different story. An ideal-typical 
völkisch perspective had its starting-point in a racial understanding of Volk and the 
conviction that Völker were not equally valuable. It analysed and problematised 
Europe on racial grounds. The argument that emanated from this interpretive frame 
saw the cause for the recent decline of Europe in the divergence between the natural 
intrinsic qualities of the European Völker and the current economic, political, and 
spiritual paradigms; particularly in Germany, where the most valuable race consti-
tuted the Volk. Because of the racial degeneration and the subversive effects of alien 
elements – like the Jews – the European Völker had become too weak to defy the 
unnatural ways of life that had been imposed on them. Thus, the European Völker 
had to free themselves from these shackles, to rediscover and to nurture their true 
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nature, and to reorganise all spheres of life accordingly. In this way, Europe would 
consist of racially and spiritually homogeneous and thus strong Völker. Headed by its 
most noble people, the purified, reinvigorated, and strong Germanic Volk, this 
Europe could not only reclaim its due global status but was also entitled to an ade-
quate Lebensraum. 
These two interpretive frames, one emanating from völkisch convictions and one 
based on economic considerations, shaped the German discourse on Europe shortly 
before and during the Second World War. They provided the interpretive repertoires 
and semantic fields to speak about Europe in a certain way and, due to their roots in 
long-standing and well-established discourses, they lent substance to certain argu-
ments, motives, thoughts, and images. At the same time, these underlying knowl-
edge and belief systems defined what was ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘true’, ‘sensible’, and ‘logi-
cal’, thus disqualifying a wide range of competing views and opinions that took 
equality, diversity, and nation-states for granted. 
 
 
 3. Planning a New Order 
In this struggle, Germany is fighting primarily for itself, for safeguarding and improving the lives of 
its people, for its future, but also for a new Europe and a just world order. The point of this strug-
gle cannot be that in a few years further shocks and violent conflicts occur, that this continent’s 
restlessness perpetuates itself in favour of non-European powers. Europe must finally find a per-
manent form of unity. The time has come to establish a stable order that guarantees our part of 
the world continuous prosperity.
1
 (Hauptschulungsamt of the NSDAP, 1940) 
After unleashing war in September 1939, National Socialist Germany conquered 
large parts of Europe within less than a year. Since the Reich already informally con-
trolled the countries in Southeastern Europe, it now in effect ruled most of continen-
tal Europe. This newly gained dominance gave rise to considerations on the conti-
nent’s future. Before long, the heterogeneous interwar struggle for interpretational 
sovereignty over the new European order that was to replace the Versailles system 
rekindled and – given the realistic prospect of being able to implement it – was con-
tinued more vigorously than ever. These calls for a ‘New Order’, a ‘New Europe’, or a 
reorganisation of Europe never fell silent during the course of the war, but they 
metamorphosed. Depending on the prospects of military victory, on the extent of the 
Germany sphere of influence, and on political priorities, planning for a post-war order 
oscillated between megalomaniac concepts of domination and a European system 
based on autonomy and voluntary cooperation.  
This chapter reconstructs German plans for a European post-war order and traces 
the changes they underwent. It is structured by two caesuras: the attack on the So-
viet Union in June 1941 and the defeat of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad in January 
1943. Even though the second turning-point is not as clear-cut and as decisive as is 
widely assumed, the discourse on the future of Europe was closely linked to the 
course of the war. While the initial victories seemed to open up “Unlimited Possibili-
ties Made Feasible by the Sword” (chapter 3.1) and unleashed a planning euphoria,2 
the attack on the Soviet Union widened the geographical and ideological scope of 
the voiced thought patterns and arguments. The discourse was now marked by “The 
Rise of Racism and the Growing Needs of All-Out War” (chapter 3.2). The section 
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“The Impending Defeat Curtailing Nazi Dreams” (chapter 3.3), finally shows that not 
until the prospects of winning the war dwindled did German officials resort to more 
moderate concepts and started to trim back – or at least cloak – their ambitions. 
 
3.1 Unlimited Possibilities Made Feasible by the Sword (1939-1941) 
Now that the Führer has freed Europe from its outdated universalistic bonds through the 
sharpness of the German sword, the European family of peoples can reshape itself into a 
more productive, crisis-proof and free order, within its common Lebensraum [living space] and 
in accordance with the natural weightings of its Völker [peoples]. A new continental European 
spirit of community will arise –not from persuasive-sounding theories, but primarily out of the 
practical economic cooperation of European peoples which is necessary if in future they wish 
to survive independently from territorially and racially alien powers.
3
 (Werner Daitz, 1941) 
By the summer of 1940, the ‘German sword’ had brought large parts of Europe un-
der its direct control. Additionally, many countries had allied themselves with the 
Reich or officially kept a neutral stance. Thus, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact left the 
United Kingdom as the only remaining obstacle to Germany enjoying absolute om-
nipotence in Europe. Trying to get rid of this last remnant of the old European power 
system, the German Luftwaffe fought the ‘Battle of Britain’ to prepare the ground for 
an invasion, while German institutions, officials, and companies pondered over the 
New Order that was to succeed the one that was dying. 
However, Germany’s long tradition of striving for hegemony over the continent had 
never produced a widely accepted solution. By 1939, the National Socialist seizure 
of power had narrowed down the scope of what could be said about Europe, but the 
two dominant interpretive frames (see chapter 2.3) still left enough argumentative 
leeway for the German discourse on Europe to produce competing visions of what 
Europe should look like once Germany had won the war. Three aspects of Europe-
to-be became the focal points of the resulting frictions: The problem of “Defining 
Europe” (chapter 3.1.1) revolved around borders and peoples and can be seen as an 
attempt to discursively establish an answer the fundamental questions of where 
Europe ended, where Germany’s borders lay, and who was supposed to be a part of 
what. Within this newly defined Europe, German officials saw the Reich “Pulling the 
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Strings” (chapter 3.1.2). However, depending on the rationale that substantiated the 
German claim for leadership, the degree of German control envisaged varied: The 
apprehension that too much coercion could put off some states clashed with the fear 
that being too lax would jeopardise Germany’s leading role. A German economic 
dominance, by contrast, was unsuspicious of both. German companies, which Na-
tional Socialist officials called on to perpetuate Germany’s supremacy, picked up this 
essential part of almost all German notions of Europe during the interwar period. 
They jumped on the bandwagon and started “Preparing for the Post-War Market” 
(chapter 3.1.3). 
 
3.1.1 Borders and Peoples – Defining Europe 
The consequences of Versailles have been eliminated. Thus, the Greater German Reich has 
the opportunity to integrate and to settle German people in its space that hitherto had to live in 
foreign lands, and also within its spheres of interest to shape the settlement of Volksgruppen 
[racial groups], so that better demarcation lines can be achieved between them.
4
 (Adolf Hitler, 
October 1939) 
Shortly after the attack on Poland, National Socialist völkisch beliefs came to the fore 
and shaped German notions of Europe-to-be. However, since its military and political 
supremacy made it possible for Germany to redraw the European map as it saw fit, 
there was an abundance of options available. In addition to the völkisch line of ar-
gument, an economic interpretive frame informed the German perspective on the 
defeated and dominated territories (see chapter 2.3). What kind of reasoning pre-
vailed in the end depended on the economic importance, the population, and the 
history of the region in question. 
A central demand that emanated from völkisch convictions was to leave no part of 
the German Volkstum outside of the Reich.5 Heinrich Himmler, in his role as Com-
missioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood,6 was charged with uniting all 
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people of German blood in the Reich and eliminating the influence of all parts of the 
population that posed a threat to the Volksgemeinschaft and the Reich.7 While these 
concerns for the German Volk left some room for interpretation regarding the racial 
value of many people, they produced one clearly identifiable obstacle to a racial ho-
mogenisation: the Jewish population.8 In search for an answer to this ‘Jewish Ques-
tion’, National Socialist officials initially targeted a territorial solution. In this respect, 
many of them pinned their hopes on the idea of turning the General Government into 
a dump for all people standing in the way of the creation of a racially and spiritually 
consistent German population.9 While Heydrich wanted to create a kind of reserva-
tion for Jews under German administration, Göring expected the General Govern-
ment to become home not only to the Jewish population of Poland but also to all 
Jews from Germany.10 A few months later, however, Germany’s military success in 
the West opened up new territorial options. The Jews within the German sphere of 
influence could now be deported to “Africa or some colony”.11 This vague geographi-
cal idea was soon specified. Madagascar, a destination suggested by Paul de La-
garde in the 19th century and already picked up by many National Socialists before 
the war, became the concrete yet unrealistic focal point of the German considera-
tions.12 In a memorandum, Franz Rademacher, a diplomat and SS-Obersturmführer 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,13 for example, weighed several options. One of 
them was deporting “all Jews from Europe” to a Madagascar mandated by Ger-
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many.14 This potential Europe-wide solution found Hitler’s support. To a Hungarian 
diplomat, he emphasised the need to get rid of the Jews in all of Europe, and to 
Mussolini, he considered Madagascar a viable option.15 However, as long as Great 
Britain dominated the seas, shipping the Jewish population of Europe to Madagascar 
was out of the question. Nevertheless, these plans not only underline how the Ger-
man tradition of völkisch thinking developed a European dimension (see chapter 2.2) 
which structured German notions of Europe-to-be but they also demonstrate that the 
vision of a Europe free of Jews became an imaginable and essential part of the New 
Order.16  
However, from these völkisch principles German officials deduced additional Europe-
wide demands: Not only should all European states reorganise their life in accor-
dance with their respective völkisch nature, but the emerging Volksgemeinschaften 
also were to become loyal parts of this new “European community of peoples”. Ac-
cording to Werner Daitz,17 this demanded “from each of its people the same disci-
pline that the national community imposes on each of its citizens.”18 By reorganising 
Europe along völkisch lines, Germany – in this reading of the latest events – had 
rendered the political ideas of the 19th century obsolete.19 Under the umbrella of a 
powerful Germany that united all people of German blood, the European Völker 
could rediscover and nurture their true nature and live together in freedom.20 Free-
dom, however, did not mean equality in a völkisch vision of Europe. The 
Reichsgruppe Industrie, an association representing the entire German industry, for 
example, translated the völkisch hierarchy into an economic one, when it wanted to 
see “the multitude of simple, inferior, and apparently primitive work” outsourced to 
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“so-called Hilfsvölker [assistant peoples] (predominantly Slavs etc.)”21 in the new 
European order. In the eyes of Hans Kehrl,22 this völkisch hierarchy was in accor-
dance with the idea of a Großwirtschaftsraum, in which the industrial centre engaged 
in division of labour with its agrarian periphery.23  
The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, however, did not fit this bill. From a 
völkisch perspective, its population ranked low on the hierarchy of races, but eco-
nomically it was home to a highly developed industry. When Hitler had established 
the Protectorate, he had set a völkisch tone for German notions of its future. He de-
clared Bohemia and Moravia to be German Lebensraum and ascribed its previous 
problems to the “arbitrarily united Völkergruppen [groups of Völker]”. Thus, the Reich 
would re-establish “the foundations of a sensible central European order” and foster 
peace and social welfare.24 Accordingly, many considered the Protectorate to be a 
role model for “the political reorganisation of the entire land mass between Reval and 
Constantinople”25. Its heterogeneous völkisch structure was a problem that had to be 
rectified. For Karl Hermann Frank26 and many others the Protectorate was indeed a 
part of the German “völkischen Lebensraum”27, but its population was only partly fit 
for Germanisation. Thus, Bohemia and Moravia were regarded important battlefields 
in Germany’s Volkstumskampf.28 However, for the other ongoing Kampf, the war, the 
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economic output of the protectorate promised considerable contributions.29 Thus, 
German officials were willing to abstain from carrying out resettlement measures for 
the time being, but they started preparatory planning.30 Nevertheless, the head of the 
Protectorate, Konstantin von Neurath,31 opposed the erection of an aircraft factory 
near Budweis as well as plans to integrate the Protectorate into neighbouring Ger-
man Gaue with the argument of Volkstumspolitik.32 Hitler also held on to the idea of 
germanising the Protectorate. To speed up this process, he opted for an assimilation 
of suitable Czechs.33 Thus, the two dominant interpretive frames clashed with regard 
to the Protectorate without producing a clear victor. The vision of a völkisch reor-
ganisation dominated the envisaged future but economic interests kept the discur-
sive dominance of these consideration at bay. 
In Poland, by contrast, German economic interests were minor, while the völkisch 
interpretive frame identified the local population as inferior and as a problem. Hence, 
Poland soon became the spotlight of German Lebensraum fantasies. In view of the 
former Polish territories, the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) Of-
fice of Racial Policy, an institution which propagated population policy and racial hy-
giene,34 declared that the objective of German policy  
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Lüdicke, Constantin von Neurath. Eine politische Biographie, Paderborn, Schöningh, 2014. 
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must be the creation of a racial and thus mental-spiritual and völkisch-political consistent 
German population. From this follows that all elements not fit for Germanisation have to be 
ruthlessly eliminated.
35
 
In this memorandum, elimination meant the expulsion of over 5 million Poles and 
Jews to those parts of Poland that neither Germany nor the Soviet Union had an-
nexed, the General Government.36  Arthur Greiser,37  Gauleiter in the Warthegau, 
spoke for many when he picked up the theme of safeguarding racial purity and de-
manded to erect a “German east-wall of flesh and blood”38 to shield the German Volk 
from this collecting basin of all unwanted and non-German people.39 Moreover, all 
the potential threats to the expansion of the Volksgemeinschaft40 into the annexed 
parts of Poland were to be weakened by killing or deporting their ruling class. The 
Jewish population was to be separated by concentrating them in ghettos.41 The rest 
of the population in the General Government was in for a life with low living stan-
dards, without education, and slave labour for the German Herrenmenschen. Ac-
cording to Himmler, it would be enough if they learned “simple maths up to 500, writ-
ing their name, the doctrine that it is divine law to obey Germans and to be honest, 
hard-working, and well-behaved.”42 The desired result would be a leaderless, cul-
tureless, and largely inferior Arbeitsvolk (working people) at Germany’s disposal.  
The region’s economic structure was supposed to reflect this strict völkisch distinc-
tion between German lands and the General Government. On the one hand, eco-
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nomic policy was considered an instrument for strengthening the German race;43 on 
the other hand, Göring wanted it employed as a means to organise the races hierar-
chically:  
While in the former regions the building up and development of the economy, the preservation 
of its production capacity and stocks and the fastest, most complete incorporation into the 
German economy possible is to be pursued, all raw materials, secondary materials, machines 
et cetera have to be taken out of the territories of the General Government for the German 
war economy. All firms which are not absolutely essential for the makeshift bare survival of 
the inhabitants are to be transferred to Germany […].
44
  
However, at the turn of the year 1939/1940 there was a rehtink. In the words of Hans 
Frank,45 the General Government, which he ruled, was now to be regarded as a Ne-
benreich (auxiliary Reich).46 By becoming a part of the Reich in this way,47 its face 
would change:  
The General Government, as we know it and as we developed it, will be considerably richer, 
happier and will receive more support and, first of all, it will be entjudet [‘dejewified’]. However, 
it will also lose its sight of a still predominant Polish life; because together with the Jews, the 
Poles will leave this territory. The Führer is determined to turn this territory into a purely Ger-
man land in the course of 15 to 20 years.
48 
Hand in hand with this reorientation – made possible not least because Madagascar 
had succeeded the General Government as the territorial solution to the ‘Jewish 
Problem’ – went a new economic course: Whilst the Poles were still regarded as in-
ferior and cheap “workers of an alien race”49 serving the German Herrenmenschen, 
investments were announced in order to contribute “to strengthening the German 
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war potential”.50 Thus, the future of former Poland in a German New Order was con-
stantly defined by both interpretive frames. As long as its völkisch composition was 
considered problematic, its economy was to reflect the inferiority of its population. As 
soon as the General Government was earmarked for germanisation, like the an-
nexed territories before, its economic prospects changed accordingly. 
In the West, völkisch beliefs prefigured a different line of thought. It revolved less 
about concerns and more about the “good Nordic-Germanic imprint”51 that, accord-
ing to an anonymous memorandum, large parts of the population exhibited. Accord-
ingly, these people were to be won over, while all “racially, genetically, and socially 
unfit” people were to be expelled into what would be left of France.52 And a lengthy 
memorandum for Hitler, authored by the völkisch journalist Reismann-Grone, 
deemed the Dutch racially sound and saw potential in the Flemish, but no possibility 
for Wallonia except Germanisation.53 Others advised wiping the ‘racially disparate’ 
Belgian state off the map entirely.54 The prime focus of German Volkstumspolitik in 
the West, however, rested on Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine. The former should 
be “regained for the German Volkstum”55 by incorporating it into the Reich, while the 
latter – being former German land – was to become “kerndeutsch [German to the 
core] forever”56. Accordingly, the economic line was to treat these regions as if they 
were parts of the Reich.57 For Belgium and the Netherlands, German planning stipu-
lated close cooperation (see chapter 3.1.2). In the Dutch case, the aim was to “get 
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on with the Dutch on good terms”58 but simultaneously to strengthen German influ-
ence “by all possible means”.59 After all, it was to “stay dependent on Germany for-
ever.”60 Thus, German visions of the West reflected the völkisch interpretive frame. 
The idea of creating racially homogeneous populations shaped the German consid-
erations on where to set the borders, on which areas to annex, and even on Bel-
gium’s right to exist.  
As the Danes and Norwegians also ranked high in the National Socialist racial hier-
archy, the völkisch repertoire of arguments and thoughts entitled them to a privileged 
position in Europe-to-be. This becomes apparent, for example, in a speech by Alfred 
Rosenberg.61 To him, they were part of the Greater Germanic space that was to play 
a special role in the “gesamtkontinentalen Schicksalsgemeinschaft [pan-European 
community of destiny]”62. Himmler also tapped the völkisch knowledge and belief 
system, when he saw commonalities in the Germanic “blood that flows through our 
veins and that enables us to stand our ground in Europe, to develop a culture, to 
demonstrate strength.”63 Thus, instead of fighting a Volkstumskampf, National So-
cialist officials like Reichskommissar Josef Terboven in Norway focussed on winning 
over the local population for the New Order.64 Again, the economic conceptions re-
flected the alleged racial value. Norway and Denmark – and possibly Sweden – were 
not considered inferior suppliers of labour and raw materials, but were to form an 
integral part of the Großraumwirtschaft.65 Norway’s prospective role in Europe’s or-
ganic division of labour, for example, was assigned in accordance with its Lebens-
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raum. It was to supply fish, hydroelectric power, and aluminium.66 However, being 
Germanic did not mean being free. Germany’s claim to orchestrate European coop-
eration also included Denmark and Norway.67 Possible means to this end were bind-
ing these countries contractually and giving German companies the opportunity to 
gain a foothold in the North through the expropriation of the Jewish population.68 
Thus, the two dominant German traditions of imagining Europe ascribed clear-cut 
roles to the Nordic countries in the New Order. Their allegedly valuable blood deter-
mined their belonging, while their völkisch qualities, their Lebensraum, and their 
economic strengths defined their role in the envisaged organic division of labour. 
However, the defining elements of the National Socialist discourse on Europe did not 
produce clear-cut prospects for all countries in the German sphere of influence. 
France, for example, was neither racially nor economically an essential part of the 
New Order. Here, the prime concern of German officials was marginalising France. 
For decades, Germans had blamed France for inventing and promoting the allegedly 
unnatural ideas that had led to racial degeneration, spiritual aberration, and thus 
Europe’s decline.69 Hence, it seemed sensible to prohibit “[e]very form of govern-
ment that seems suitable to restore France’s strengths [...]. In Europe, Germany is in 
charge.”70  Apart from this principle, the future of France remained vague.71  The 
ideas voiced extended from annexing large – primarily the economically valuable – 
parts to splitting it up into several autonomous states.72 Other officials eyed its eco-
nomic potential. According to Hermann Göring, the Plenipotentiary for the Vier-
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jahresplan and as such the most powerful German Official in the field of econom-
ics,73 France could provide cheap imports due to its undervalued currency.74 For the 
Wirtschaftsgruppen, the sector-specific organisations of the German economy, 
France was a promising export market in the prospective Großraumwirtschaft and a 
competitor that could now be tamed.75  Others demanded the harnessing of the 
French potential for the war effort as a part of “the systematic utilisation of the entire 
European space.”76 Thus, France, held responsible for most ills of modernity, was 
excluded from Europe-to-be due to its un-völkisch spirit. However, its economic po-
tential, which had previously often been imagined as a part of the potential economic 
nucleus of European integration, still aroused interest.77 
For Germany’s perspective on Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria the long 
tradition of German Mitteleuropa ideas and their well-established focus on this region 
provided far more thought patterns and arguments than the völkisch knowledge and 
belief system. Max Illgner, a management board member of IG Farben, considered 
Southeastern Europe German Lebensraum, but in his reading, the term Lebensraum 
denoted “a sphere of mutual economic supplementation”.78 Anton Reithinger, head 
of the economic department of the IG Farben, took the same line. In his eyes, there 
were völkisch problems to solve in the region – its frontiers disregarded its racial 
composition –, but his primary concern was the economy. Accordingly, he called for 
investments into local agriculture to intensify the exchange of manufactured goods 
for their foodstuffs and raw materials. In this way, the Southeast would contribute its 
share to freeing the European Großraumwirtschaft from its dependence on the world 
market.79 Two organisations institutionalised these arguments and thought patterns: 
the Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag, founded in 1931 as an interest group of Ger-
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man industry, and the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, founded in 1940 in order to 
coordinate economic policy towards the Southeastern Europe. 80  However, even 
though this trade pattern promised to make the European Großraumwirtschaft “as 
autarkic as possible”,81 it carried a risk in Göring’s eyes: In accordance with the For-
schungsstelle Wehrwirtschaft, a subdivision of his Four Year Plan Organisation 
(Vierjahresplanbehörde), he argued that by developing agriculture and industry, 
Germany ultimately thwarted its own efforts to intensify the desired exchange be-
cause the necessary rise in living standards would also increase prices.82 Thus, the 
way Germans talked about Southeastern Europe was largely predefined by catego-
ries, arguments, and thoughts that stemmed from German Mitteleuropa ideas and 
their imagined basic economic pattern.83 The völkisch composition of the region was 
perceived as problematic but not as a pressing issue. 
Africa was another area that was to fulfil the primarily economic function of supple-
menting Germany and its Großraumwirtschaft. For many German officials acquiring 
colonies and aligning them with German needs was crucial, or even “an uncondi-
tional necessity” if Germany wanted “to safeguard the future of the German Volk”.84 
By reclaiming its former colonies and adding the Dutch, the Belgian, and parts of the 
French and British possessions in Africa, Germany could create a huge colonial em-
pire.85 The Wehrmacht, for example, expected that the exports of these colonies 
would not only benefit nutrition and industry in Germany but also serve the purpose 
of  
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exporting colonial goods to the German-ruled European Großwirtschaftsraum, of expanding 
Germany’s share in world trade, of improving Germany’s status as a world power, the prestige 
of German people, and their gentlemanly experience.
86
 
Instead of integrating them into the world market, however, the Reichsbank wanted 
to turn the German colonies into a “methodically developed Ergänzungsraum [sup-
plemental area] for the mother country.”87 And as long as it did not run contrary to 
German interests the local population would be allowed to keep their customs and 
practices.88 In this respect, the German dominance in Europe widened the scope of 
what could be said. Overseas colonies, a dream that many Germans had already 
given up, were not only an option again, but an economic ‘necessity’. However, this 
notion still fitted into the economic pattern of supplementing industry with sources of 
foodstuffs and raw materials. 
Overall, the National Socialist discursive construction of Europe and its boundaries 
was not shaped by political conceptions or cultural categories. These dimensions 
had largely already been silenced before the war. 89  Now, they only served as 
grounds for exclusion – as in the case of France and its allegedly anti-European 
spirit – or as second-order indicators that suggested racial kinship. The völkisch no-
tion that racial similarities expressed themselves in appearance, mentality, and cul-
tural traditions, strengthened National Socialists in their conviction that the Nordic 
states and parts of the populations in the West belonged to the racially valuable core 
of the New Order. Thus, the two interpretive frames that had become dominant after 
1933 determined the discursive construction of Europe-to-be. Giving meaning to the 
incorporation of states and regions in which ‘valuable blood’ could be found or for 
which some historical claim as German Lebensraum could be construed, the 
völkisch knowledge and belief system created a limited geographical scope with a 
racially homogeneous and ‘Jew-free’ population. The established patterns of eco-
nomic thinking, however, transcended these limits. For the sake of autarky, prosper-
ity, and power the geographical scope of an industrialised European core area and 
its Ergänzungsraum (supplemental area) could be widened at will. Thus, the two 
dominant rationales produced two concentric circles within the German discourse on 
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a new European order. Both had their centre in Germany. Europe-to-be consisted of 
a Germanic core90 and a primarily economically defined periphery. Within these lim-
its, the congruence of aims and the relativity of certain basic principles allowed ar-
guments that varied the size and the form of these circles, but all concepts had to be 
rooted in one of these basic patterns.91 This leeway made it possible to voice ideas 
of the Reich, as they substantiated the German claim to leadership and promised to 
accomodate different Völker under one umbrella, Mitteleuropa ideas because they 
destined Germany to lead Europe and promoted the same economic pattern, and 
Großraum concepts, which picked up geopolitical arguments and coupled them with 
economic prosperity and political independence. 
All these different geographical visions of Europe-to-be were informed by long-
standing and well-established knowledge and belief systems. Decades of wishful 
thinking and some ‘scientific’ underpinning had validated them, and National Social-
ist terror and oppression had narrowed down the limits of what could be said. As a 
result, two dominant systems, a völkisch and an economic one, defined what could 
be voiced legitimately; they determined how ‘good’, ‘true’, ‘right’, or ‘sensible’ certain 
notions were. Every notion touching on concepts like equality, freedom, democracy, 
diversity, or free trade had been dismissed as aberration running contrary to the true 
nature of the European Völker (see chapter 2.3). In this way, the valid repertoire of 
arguments and motives shrank but repetition stabilised its dominant elements. So 
when Germany actually ruled large parts of Europe, the völkisch and the economic 
interpretive frame shaped the envisaged prospects of all countries in the German 
New Order. In cases in which both rationales coincided or in which only one proved 
valid, the future seemed clear and could hardly be contested: The Southeast formed 
an integral part of Europe, despite being irrelevant from a völkisch point of view. As 
an Ergänzungsraum (supplemental area), however, it was economically indispensa-
ble. The territories Germany had lost to Poland after the First World War, in contrast, 
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were annexed as German Lebensraum right away. Even though their economic rele-
vance was confined to Upper Silesia’s industry, these areas were to be won back 
entirely for the German Volk by getting rid of its Polish and Jewish population. The 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway combined ‘valuable blood’ and a relevant econ-
omy, so that no fundamental völkisch or economic interventions seemed necessary. 
They were to be a part of the racial and economic core of the new Europe led by 
Germany.  
Controversies were possible, however, where both kinds of arguments pointed into 
different directions: with the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the National So-
cialist regime had conquered lands they considered German Lebensraum. However, 
the Protectorate was also home to a modern and potent industry and its skilled work-
force. Hence, the economically grounded fear of potentially obstructing German eco-
nomic interests faced the völkisch justification for a policy of Germanisation and re-
settlement. This conflict of aims created a discursive leeway for debate, just as the 
lack of any compelling line of reasoning did. In the case of France, Germany’s 
völkisch interests were confined to Alsace-Lorraine, and the economic ones to the 
iron ore deposits there. Accordingly, France’s future borders and its status within the 
New Order were subject to a different set of arguments: military considerations, his-
torical memories, or the wish to render Germany’s hegemony incontestable. 
Thus, the New Order discourse before the attack on the Soviet Union allowed for a 
certain variety of concepts, but no single geographical version of Europe-to-be won 
the upper hand. The völkisch and the economic interpretive frames set discursive 
limits and produced two different but vague mainstreams within the discourse on 
Europe: The vision of a racially and spiritually homogeneous Europe ‘free of Jews’ 
was not always congruent with the economically construed vision of a specialized 
and autarkic Großraumwirtschaft. The two interpretive frames either reinforced or 
contradicted each other and thus either discursively stabilised the status of a country 
in the National Socialist New Order, or put it up for interpretation. 
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3.1.2 Currency and Trade – Pulling the Strings in Europe 
National Socialism had solved the problems of unemployment, of raw material procurement, 
of raising living standards, of excluding Jewry and of pricing and social policy in its own way. 
Those sensible economic principles that had been developed by National Socialism would 
from now on have to radiate out into the European space.
92
 (Notes on a speech by Schlotterer, 
June 1940) 
Gustav Schlotterer – as head of the department of Vorbereitung und Ordnung 
(preparation and ordering) in the Ministry of Economics in charge of key issues con-
cerning the Großraum – was one of many who believed that Germany’s successes 
since 1933, including the marginalisation of its Jewish population, proved that the 
‘sensible’ National Socialist principles could serve as a role model for a new Euro-
pean order. Geared towards and led by Germany, Europe could finally stand up to 
the other great global powers. This long-standing and well-established theme of 
German economic concepts for Europe (see chapter 2.3) prompted considerations 
on how best to perpetuate the current state of affairs beyond the end of the war. The 
völkisch and the economic interpretive frame left room for a discourse that oscillated 
between oppression, voluntary cooperation, and informal domination.  
One central motive, that had already shaped many Mitteleuropa ideas and to which 
geopolitics had lent additional credence, shaped the considerations of many German 
officials: the apparent trend towards larger but walled-off markets would, according 
to leading Reichsbank employees for example, surely culminate in a world divided 
into several “economic empires”, Großraumwirtschaften.93 Germany’s sphere of in-
fluence had to become one of them.94 For this purpose, “the German-dominated 
parts of Europe will have to be merged into an economic unity”95 as existed in Russia, 
Japan, the United States, and Great Britain. Although Hans Kehrl saw Europe well 
on its way to this goal, he also pointed out the pending organisational problems.96 
Joseph Goebbels, Reich Minister of Propaganda, also thought in global categories. 
He believed that the European Völker were beginning to understand that their reser-
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vations were “basically family quarrels, compared to the major questions the conti-
nents have to solve.”97 Given “German organisational talent and German commercial 
diligence”, the Ministry of Economics was confident that the Reich would succeed in 
“developing the natural powers and natural resources of Europe in a way that it will 
be a match for every other economic constellation of powers.”98 Thus, National So-
cialist officials considered the creation of a Großraumwirtschaft not only feasible but 
also, just like Daitz, “absolutely essential”99 if Europe wanted to be able to stand up 
to the other major powers in the modern world. This thinking tied in with a long Ger-
man tradition of economic notions of Europe that attached value to the interdepend-
ence of geographical scope, economic prosperity, and political power. 
However, German experiences during the First World War and the Great Depression 
had added another requirement to this line of reasoning. If the German-led 
Großwirtschaftsraum wanted to be on a par with the other economic great powers, it 
had to be able to survive without them. Thus, the objective of becoming economically 
self-sufficient had gained additional weight and now shaped much of Germany’s 
economic perspective on its new sphere of influence.100 Reports analysed Luxem-
bourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands from this perspective, whereas the Wehrmacht 
Office of Military Economics and Armaments emphasised the gaps that Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden would fill.101 Overall, the Forschungsstelle für Wehrwirtschaft 
asserted, Germany was able to cover large parts of its war-economic needs in Mit-
teleuropa.102 However, wrenching these economies from their previous trade net-
works was expected to create problems.103 Nonetheless, Karl Ritter, a German dip-
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lomat, advocated their integration into German “Großraum policy”. Ultimately, after 
“systematic work for decades”, this would pay off. 104  Even though a European 
Großraumwirtschaft with its African colonies would still not result in complete au-
tarky,105 the idea of securing the continent’s vital supply and the “German raw mate-
rial and foodstuffs base in Europe”106 by systematically developing certain regions 
and adjusting their economies played a crucial role in National Socialist plans for a 
New Europe. Thus, the dominant economic knowledge and belief system not only 
prefigured the demands for a European Großraumwirtschaft as a means to more 
economic and political influence but also specified one of its key elements: autarky. 
Additionally, the New Order promised to solve a more recent German economic 
problem. Its problematic position on the world market.107  Due to the overvalued 
Reichsmark, Germany lacked the foreign currency to pay for imports, while its ex-
ports were too expensive to find buyers without subsidies. Within a German-led 
Großwirtschaftsraum relying on fixed exchange rates, however, the Reichsmark 
would not only regain its function as a medium of exchange but would become the 
centre of gravity for the European monetary system.108 In this way, Schlotterer, for 
example, expected a reorganised Europe to free Germany from its “enormous eco-
nomic constriction” by opening up “a larger sphere of activity on the economic and 
financial side” for the Reich.109 According to him, this lack of economic Lebensraum 
had caused the war, but he was sure that “Germany has to and will outgrow its cur-
rent borders”110. Albert Pietzsch, head of the Reich Chamber of Commerce, voiced a 
similar expectation. In his eyes, the abolition of Europe’s internal trade restrictions 
would not only unleash Germany’s economic potential but all of Europe’s.111 Thus, 
Germany’s current problems contributed to solidifying the predominant economic 
interpretive frame. Instead of searching for a solution in free trade or new trade part-
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ners outside of Europe, the already appealing vision of Großwirtschaftsraum evolved 
into a panacea for long-standing aspirations and recent problems alike.  
One of the core features of this vision of economic integration, however, was the 
German claim to assume the leading role at the heart of this autarkic and thriving 
Großwirtschaftraum. For decades, many German Mitteleuropa and Reich ideas for a 
reorganisation of Europe had found different reasons why Germany was to preside 
formally or informally over any new European order.112 Accordingly, the words of 
Walther Funk, the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs and head of the Reichsbank, in 
a meeting at the Ministry of Economics sound bold but fit in seamlessly into the es-
tablished discourse on Europe.  
Germany now possesses the political power in Europe to reorganise the economy according 
to its needs. The political will to exercise this power exists. This means that the countries have 
to align themselves with us. The economies of the other European countries have to adapt to 
our needs.
113
 
Funk was by no means the only one who measured the success of the New Order 
by its benefits for Germany. While Karl Ritter hoped for a German economic su-
premacy, Anthon Reithinger wanted to cement Germany’s “military, defence-
economically, and ethically” predominant role.114 Göring found that it was “imperative 
to expand the German sphere of influence in Europe and the rest of the world as far 
as possible and to give the German Volk [...] the highest possible living standard.”115 
And in Schlotterer’s vision of a New Order, Germany was the economic master, the 
rest of Europe “Germany’s front yard”116. Thus, the discourses that shaped the way 
German officials spoke about the economic future of Europe produced a narrow ‘dis-
cursive formation’. Europe had to become a powerful, autarkic, and German-led 
Großwirtschaftsraum to remedy its minor and its global shortcomings.  
Nevertheless, this general notion of Europe-to-be still left room for debate about its 
realisation and its specifics. Schlotterer, for example, opposed views that imagined a 
                                            
112
 See e.g. S. Breuer, Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft, 1995, p. 104; H. Hecker, Die Tat und ihr Osteuropa-Bild 1909-1939, Cologne, Verlag 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 1974, p. 145; Elvert, Mitteleuropa, p. 70; chapter 2.3. 
113
 Note on a meeting in the Ministry of Economics, 22 July 1940, RGVA, 1458, 29, 8. 
114
 Notes on Reithinger’s memorandum on ‘The Foundations of Europe’s Economic Reconstruction’, 
30 August 1940, BArch, R 2501, 7017, pp. 211-218. See also note on a meeting concering the Euro-
pean Großwirtschaftraum, 25 May 1940, RGVA, 1458, 29, 10. 
115
 Letter by Göring to Funk concerning the continental- and Großraumwirtschaft, 17 August 1940, 
RGVA, 1458, 29, 9, or BArch R 2501, 1017, p. 210. 
116
 Note on a speech by Schlotterer, 29 July 1940, RGVA, 1458, 29, 8. 
 102 
 
Europe in which “we simply dictate what has to be done; that means that we see 
things solely from the angle of a one-sided German interest.”117 Instead, he favoured 
European cooperation on the basis of mutual agreements and shared interests.118 
Nonetheless, many National Socialist officials insisted on “keeping an advisable dis-
tance between the Reich and other protected states”119: “The general aim that Ger-
many has to achieve in post-war Europe is to accomplish a large degree of eco-
nomic independence while simultaneously increasing the living standard by boosting 
the supply.” 120  Max Kretschmann, a Reichsbank manager, expressed the same 
thought pattern, when he admitted that such a use of the occupied territories “is in 
the first place supposed to serve self-interests [...]. In the second place, however, it 
helps the occupied territories at the same time.”121 Thus, for German officials the 
creation of a New Europe was – to a differing degree – a matter of potential benefits 
for the Reich; or in Walther Funk’s words:  
The decisive factor has to be to intertwine the European economies and the Greater German 
economy as completely and closely as possible. In doing so, all measures improving the ful-
filment of German demand and resulting in an increased influence of the German economy in 
the different countries have to be prioritised, while conversely all measures being irrelevant 
from the point of view of our own Greater German interests, can preferably remain undone or 
can be postponed.
122
 
In order to meet all the German expectations, Europe had to be reorganised:  
Europe’s unbearable economic atomisation and chaos has to be ended. It is economic mad-
ness if every country, no matter how small, tries to produce everything from trouser buttons to 
locomotives and if it fosters dwarf-industries for this purpose that have no right to exist and 
can only be kept alive with subsidies, import restrictions, or excessive tariffs. For everyone’s 
sake, a sound division of labour between the countries of the European space, which are – by 
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location and structure – bound to an economic Schicksalsgemeinschaft [community of des-
tiny], has to replace this exaggerated autarkism.
123
 
For the Reich Chancellery, a Europe unimpeded by tariffs and subsidies provided 
the opportunity to “produce more efficiently and to concentrate highly productive 
firms at favourable locations to get rid of inefficient businesses”124. A memorandum 
from the Ministry of Economics expressed similar arguments, when it held that the 
creation of “a mitteleuropäische economic union is not only possible but also benefi-
cial, even necessary for Greater Germany and the countries involved in order to ar-
rive at an organic economic reorganisation of Europe.”125 Thus, the general principle 
of a powerful, autarkic, and German-led Großwirtschaftsraum turned the current 
economic structure of Europe into a pressing problem. For its solution, German offi-
cials fell back on the well-established and allegedly natural concept of an intra-
European dvision of labour that divided Europe up into regions with competitive in-
dustries worthy of preservation and countries that were to act as suppliers of food-
stuffs and raw materials.126 
The idea of an ‘organic’ division of labour, gave significance to what Germans attrib-
uted to a certain region or Volk. The economic as well as the völkisch knowledge 
and belief system shaped the German perspective and helped to assign the roles in 
the envisaged New Order. The participants of a meeting in the Ministry of Economics, 
for example, agreed that the industrialised and allegedly racially sound Western 
countries were to keep their economies, except for “inefficient or superfluous indus-
tries”,127 which had to vanish. Applying the same logic, Emil Wiehl, head of the de-
partment of economic policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasised Norway’s 
huge potential for hydroelectric power and energy-intensive industries and expected 
the Netherlands to supply its trade navy and to play a bridging role to India.128 The 
Dutch industry should keep working, just as the Belgian one. After all, according to 
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Schlotterer, Germany did not aspire to monopolise European industries.129 Friedrich 
Landfried, state secretary in the Ministry of Economics, similarly assumed that “a 
mutual give and take should lead to an economically sound balance”130 between the 
economies. However, there was one problem. Due to the war, many European 
states had lost access to vital supplies and Germany was not able to fill this void.131 
Most of them needed goods that were also in short supply in the Reich: foodstuffs, 
animal fodder, raw materials, and machinery. In this respect, many German officials 
shared the hope of Carl Clodius in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that trade with Rus-
sia, but primarily with the Southeast, would provide a remedy.132  
The economies in the Southeast, the traditional projection surface for German eco-
nomic hopes, promised to supplement the German and Central European economy 
perfectly. According to Reithinger, there were many who considered them a “cure-all 
for Germany’s foreign trade”133. However, if these states were to nourish the rest of 
Europe, one had to get the most out of them by increasing their output through in-
vestments and opening up their markets for manufactured goods.134 For this purpose, 
as Tilo Freiherr von Wilmowsky, chairman of the Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftstag, 
pointed out, German commitment was necessary: “The marriage between chimney 
and plough can only be a happy one if it is contracted to last. In Germany, too, we 
are still in the state of engagement.”135 Thus, the vision of a division of labour along 
racial lines and locational advantages created an industrial core area which de-
pended on external supplies. Confining potential solutions to the continent, the de-
mand for autarky and well-established thought patterns shifted the German view and 
the discourse on Europe towards the East and Southeast. These regions had con-
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stantly figured as a projection surface of German economic hopes and aspirations 
for decades.136 
Even though the idea of bringing European industry together with agrarian countries 
had been a long-standing constant in German notions of Europe, the loss of vital 
overseas imports posed a practical problem for the autarkic Großraumwirtschaft: 
balancing supply and demand without relying on principles of an ‘unnatural’ free 
market economy. The National Socialist solution to this problem was systematic 
planning. According to the economic department of the Reichsbank, the Großraum-
wirtschaft would  
be much more than a mere community of economic interests. It will be a consistent political 
economy in which the rhythm of the economy, the direction of production and the organisation 
of the economy will be determined by the German executive.
137
  
In this way, German officials wanted to stop the “free play of market forces” to avoid 
“unnecessary competition”. Instead, every country should get its “natural and sensi-
ble share”138 in an “economic area which will, due to generous planning, work with-
out business cycles”139. Thus, the National Socialist rejection of capitalism, which 
was at least partly driven by anti-Semitism,140 ruled out the possibility to speak out in 
favour of a free market system within the European Großraumwirtschaft. Its internal 
division of labour had to be modelled on the proven National Socialist state-
orchestrated role model, as practiced in Germany.  
However, the status quo left a lot to be desired. The shortage of foreign currencies 
hampered intra-European trade and bilateral clearing accounts were nothing but 
makeshift.141 Hence, German institutions discussed several options intended to in-
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tensify Europe’s internal trade under the auspices of Germany. In this debate, the 
general principle of a powerful, autarkic, and German-led Großwirtschaftsraum 
based on a state-orchestrated division of labour, which included the Eastern and 
Southeastern, set the aims but also the boundaries of valid arguments, thoughts, 
and concepts. The German claim to leadership and its economic interests, in particu-
lar, proved pivotal. According to the Ministry of Economics, any solution had to priori-
tise German needs: “For now, it is essential that the single countries increase their 
supplies for Germany instead of supporting each other.”142 
This discursively constructed objective and the redrawing of discursive boundaries 
that went hand in hand with its solidification becomes apparent, for example, in May 
1940, when several leading National Socialist officials discussed the future of Europe. 
They all agreed that the current customs, price, and trade policies were not enough 
to create a Großraumwirtschaft. Ultimately, Germany had to become the centrepiece 
of a European customs and monetary union.143 Thus, Schlotterer expressed a widely 
accepted thought when he declared that the “most important future task for German 
trade policy was to unite Europe in an economic union under German leadership and 
to eliminate all constraints like tariffs, currency differences, and varying economic 
policies.”144 As the war offered the opportunity to dismiss the reservations of other 
countries and to install the Reichsmark as leading currency, he was convinced that 
now was the time for action.145 However, a customs and currency union carried one 
crucial risk:  
the creation of a common European market under German leadership [...] shall and must not 
lead to an alignment of social living standards. For some highly developed and racially related 
Völker, like the Scandinavians and the Dutch, an adjustment to German norms might be pos-
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sible. An alignment of socially and racially inferior Völker, like those of the Balkans, to the 
German living standard would be politically unbearable and economically unreasonable.
146 
Thus, the undisputed ultimate goal of a German-led European market had to be 
brought in line with Germany’s wish for cheap labour, foodstuffs, raw materials, and 
the racial appraisal of the European Völker.147 The Reichsbank suggested introduc-
ing fixed exchange rates as a first step on the long way to a currency and customs 
union. Until then, trade agreements should help to plan and coordinate Europe’s 
production and demand.148 An unsigned memorandum in the files of the Ministry of 
Economics, however, still argued for the abolition of all internal tariffs as soon as 
possible: “a customs union still is a means, and a necessary and elemental means at 
that, to create a common economic area.”149 Price controls and industrial agree-
ments could cushion eventual initial disruptions. Even though several expert reports 
Schlotterer received saw no legal or economic obstacles barring this way, 150 
Europe’s disparate financial and economic policies as well as the racial inequality led 
to a rethinking: “the debate about a reorganisation of Europe must not be confined to 
a currency and customs union.”151 Thus, the well-established concept that Mitteleu-
ropa ideas had suggested for decades as the solution to Germany’s economic con-
striction, a currency and customs union, was discarded in the discourse due to its 
tendency to align the living standards in all participating countries. Such a develop-
ment ran contrary to the German claim to leadership, the desired priorisation of 
German interests, and the envisaged congruence between the alleged racial value of 
a Volk and the prospective economic role it was supposed to play in the Großraum-
wirtschaft. 
Accordingly, German officials pondered alternatives that would live up to the stan-
dards that have discursively been established. Egon Wagemann, director of the 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, pointed to a possible solution: By redes-
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igning the clearing system, Germany could “more efficiently combine the foreign 
trade needs of its war economy with the needs of the countries in its sphere of influ-
ence and with the preparations for a European Großwirtschaftsraum.” 152  Even 
though his version of a multilateral European clearing system was rejected because 
it would give rise to trade relations between smaller states instead of fostering Ger-
man imports,153 the principal idea attracted attention. For the economic department 
of the Reichsbank, a multilateral European central clearing154 system promised to 
ensure “smooth monetary transactions within the Großraum and to pave the way for 
a future merging of currencies at the same time.”155 Additionally, all European trade 
would be billed in Berlin and in Reichsmark. In this way, a multilateral European cen-
tral clearing system would not only turn Berlin into the financial and commercial con-
trol room but also increase the willingness of European exporters to supply Germany. 
Furthermore, this system would underpin the dominant position of the Reichsmark 
and “organically prepare the European Großwirtschaftsraum”156  by fostering and 
deepening the interlocking of the economies. At the end of July 1940, Funk an-
nounced his decision on Europe’s future payment system in a letter to Göring.157 He 
dismissed the idea of creating a customs or currency union:158 
I assume that the integration of the occupied territories into the Greater German economy and 
the construction of a European continental economy under German leadership will not hap-
pen with a single political act, by signing a treaty for customs or currency union for example, 
but that the objective has to be reached by means of a series of single measures which shall 
immediately be, and partly already have been, initiated.
159
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Thus, the vision of an autarkic, German-led Großwirtschaftsraum had an important 
impact on the decision-making process. The hopes and expectations of German offi-
cials, which were pinned on it, defined the objective and the völkisch dimension to-
gether with the supremacy of German interests confined the potential options. This 
constellation disqualified the concept of uniting large parts of Europe in a customs 
and currency union, so that the more recent idea of a central clearing system over-
turned a constant that had occupied centre stage in Mitteleuropa concepts for dec-
ades. 
The decision for a system that guaranteed smooth intra-European monetary transac-
tions, however, did not yet ensure that Europe’s output could be steered in accor-
dance with the wishes of the Reich.160 While Kehrl, for example, was confident that 
“this problem, just like all other difficult problems, will be solved by the Führer order-
ing a solution”161, the Reichsbank trusted in political agreements “to co-ordinate the 
output of the single national economies”162. Funk officially pinned his hopes on the 
convincing effects of mutual benefits: Germany would gain “a maximum of consump-
tion to increase prosperity”163, whereas the other states would win a long-term se-
cure sales market if they attuned their output to German needs. Internally, however, 
Funk was more outspoken and demanded  
control over cross-national European trade and of European goods traffic with non-European 
states by means of government agreements reached by using the German instruments of 
power.
164 
In Schlotterer’s statements, both thought patterns resurfaced. On the one hand, he 
insisted that “it cannot be tolerated that individual countries act at will. They have to 
be told that they belong to the European community at German (and Italian) disposi-
tion.”165 On the other hand, Schlotterer warned of “threatening and violating others”. 
Europe’s cooperation had to be the result of conviction and single systematic meas-
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ures.166 An anonymous document entitled ‘Guidelines for a continental European 
economic block’ illustrates these German efforts. Unless Germany benefitted in 
some way, there should be no exchange of goods between third countries. By proc-
essing payments in Berlin, by signing trade agreements, and by operating trade us-
ing German merchants, carriers, financing, and insurances, Germany could exercise 
control over both the intra- and extra-European exchange of goods.167 Thus, the 
imaginations of the prospective intra-European trade that was to accompany the new 
monetary order resorted to more traditional thought patterns within the German dis-
course on Europe: informal control and formal treaties should guarantee that Euro-
pean production lived up to German expectations.  
For Hermann Göring, by contrast, the future Großraumwirtschaft was not the only 
valid point of reference. He pointed out the current necessities and wanted to “get as 
many goods as possible to Germany during the war.”168 Thus, tariffs – impeding 
trade and raising the costs of imports – had to go. However, there was a third reason 
why tariffs were to be abolished: “Abstaining from tariffs practically paves the way for 
a customs union and thus creates a situation to which we aspire for the future 
greater European economy.”169 Göring’s political power turned these considerations 
into directives. A committee of representatives from National Socialist Germany’s 
leading economic institutions was formed which was supposed to elaborate solutions 
for “those difficulties concerning tariffs” that hampered “the intensification of the ex-
change of goods and the preparation of a Großraumwirtschaft.”170  Hence, even 
though Göring’s wish to abolish tariffs might have stemmed primarily from his con-
cerns for the war ecnomy, there was no way around the discursive hegemony of the 
envisaged Großraumwirtschaft. This becomes apparent in his statements as well as 
in the documents of the committee he initiated. However, as long as both rationales 
shared the aim of monopolising European trade, their reconciliation was unproblem-
atic and discursively stabilised the objective itself. 
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Overall, the idea of a Großraumwirtschaft that had gained ground in the 1930s be-
came the economic model for the future of Europe in 1940. Heavily drawing on well-
established aspects of geopolitics, Mitteleuropa ideas, and völkisch convictions,171 it 
evolved into the discursively dominant point of reference. Now speaking of a new 
economic European order meant speaking of a powerful, autarkic, prosperous, Ger-
man-led Großwirtschaftsraum whose internal division of labour was based on natural 
circumstances and an ascribed völkisch aptitude. This specification of the New Order 
discarded several lines of reasoning, set a clear-cut objective, turned the unsatisfac-
tory status quo into a pressing problem, and narrowed down the available options for 
a solution. These effects of the vision of a Großraumwirtschaft on the discourse on 
Europe become apparent in the National Socialist debate about how to intensify the 
exchange of goods in Europe. While the discussion of the topic at the highest levels 
of the regime already attests to the importance of the Großraumwirtschaft as an ob-
jective, the course of the debate exhibits its constraining impact. Instead of realising 
a decades-old demand of generations of Mitteleuropa proponents, German officials 
abandoned the idea of a European customs and currency union. They opted for a 
central clearing system because it promised to invigorate European cooperation and 
to put German wartime and post-war needs first. Moreover, this solution won the up-
per hand because it also constituted an actual renunciation of the liberal economic 
system and perpetuated an economic hierarchy that supposedly reflected the un-
equal racial values of the participating Völker. Having deeper roots in the two discur-
sively dominating economic and völkisch knowledge and belief systems, the concept 
of a European Großraumwirtschaft and its core, the central clearing system, became 
the incontestable economic leitmotif of the New Order. 
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3.1.3 Interlocking172 and Takeovers – Preparing for the Post-War Market 
Gentlemen! You can see from the remarks that I have made on this problem that we envisage 
the European Großraumwirtschaft being developed essentially as a result of the initiative of 
private business. As a state, we can of course make economic agreements. We can establish 
a customs and a currency union or implement a transfer agreement. However, this can only 
involve a general regulation and will remain in abeyance if not supported by private business 
itself.
173
 (Gustav Schlotterer, October 1940) 
National Socialist concepts for a new European order were designed to secure Ger-
man influence beyond the end of the war. However, German officials such as Schlot-
terer feared that the Reich might fall short of completely controlling the European 
economy if German businesses did not animate the political measures enacted. The 
central clearing system was supposed to establish the Reichsmark as the leading 
currency in Europe, to monopolise trade in Berlin, and to perpetuate the desired 
economic hierarchy. However, having to rely on steady political coercion in order to 
align the economies of Europe and to intensify their trade relations could be the ba-
sis neither for permanent cooperation nor for persistent German domination. Thus, 
German political institutions tried to get private companies on board for the New Or-
der. Since most German businesses were discontented with the European economic 
system anyway, they seized the opportunity to participate in the discursive construc-
tion of the future of Europe and readily voiced their concepts of Europe-to-be. In this 
way, the discourse started to revolve around the questions of how, when, and where 
German companies should underpin the New Order. Its arguments, thought patterns, 
and limits were future-oriented and stemmed from the well-established economic 
and völkisch knowledge and belief systems. They attest to the significance of the 
discursively constructed Großwirtschaftsraum. 
The more confident German officials were of a quick German victory, the more sig-
nificance they gave to considerations on the future. In December 1939, General 
Thomas, head of the Wehrmacht Office for Military Economics and Armaments, 
spoke to the Reichsgruppe Industrie. He called upon them to “turn Germany into one 
big and mighty armament plant” because “now it is a matter of life and death for the 
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German Volk. But we want to live and thus we have to win.”174 A few months later, in 
June 1940, the political expectations sounded different; less martial, more like the 
promise of a land of milk and honey for German businesses. It seemed that the Min-
istry of Economics wanted to reorganise Europe in cooperation with industry. Schlot-
terer asked the foreign trade committee of the Reichsgruppe Industrie to gather in-
formation on all obstacles “that have impeded their [German businesses’] expansion 
in Europe. A lack of cooperation with foreign countries, annoying competitors, unsat-
isfactory positions in international federations, troubling international patents, li-
cences etc.” could be a thing of the past. In the future, “a truly European industrial 
policy is possible and necessary.”175 Thus, the future, as a point of reference, started 
to outweigh the present. The war was no longer a matter of life and death but the 
prelude to a future that was to be shaped right now. 
However, the objective of a German-led Großraumwirtschaft, as an essential ele-
ment of this future, created concrete problems that triggered a search for solutions. 
The initial eagerness of German companies to expand, for example, threatened to 
thwart German planning. Göring, who, in principle, promoted the expansion of Ger-
many’s economic influence, opposed uncoordinated acquisitions: “German industry’s 
attempts to take over companies in the occupied territories now have to be quashed 
harshly.”176 Everywhere in the occupied Western territories,177 Germany faced the 
dilemma described in a report on the Netherlands:  
for the time being one cannot expect private negotiations about buying shares or taking over 
Dutch firms to be successful; and if these negotiations are supposed to be carried out under 
pressure of German offices, it is to be feared that the Dutch side might initiate measures that 
will obstruct the achievement of German objectives. As long as the Dutch do not see clearly 
that a close interlocking with the German industry is necessary and also beneficial for them, 
they cannot be converted to voluntary agreements.
178
  
Since the confiscation of shares and expropriations violated international law and the 
Hague Convention, the Ministry of Economics suggested issuing a decree that re-
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stricted the transfer of shares, prohibited any relocation of company headquarters, 
and obliged shareholders to report.179 However, these measures did not expand 
German influence beyond companies that could legally be confiscated as enemy 
property.180 The founding of European cartels and syndicates, on the other hand, 
offered a legal and hardly intrusive way to align production with the Reich’s de-
mands.181 Explicitly referring to Göring’s directive that “the foundations for a close 
economic cooperation and interlocking have to be created already at this stage”, 
Funk also expected “the creation of an organisation of the economy modelled on 
German principles”182 to bring German politics closer to the sought-for influence. 
Thus, the German claim to economic dominance in the European Großwirtschafts-
raum posed concrete problems. In search for a formally legal and permanent solu-
tion to them, German officials resorted to National Socialist principles and the under-
lying knowledge and belief systems. 
One aspect of the alleged German role model in particular got the hopes of German 
officials up: ‘Aryanisation’183. By expropriating Jewish businesses in the occupied 
territories and by transferring them into German hands, National Socialist Germany 
expected to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, depriving the Jewish 
population of their means of existence would accelerate their emigration and thus 
contribute to a territorial solution to the ‘Jewish Question’ (see chapter 3.1.1).184 On 
the other hand, these businesses offered the opportunity for Germany to gain a foot-
hold in the occupied territories, and in third countries, in spite of the widespread re-
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luctance to comply with the German wish for economic integration.185 Reconciling 
aspects from both dominant interpretive frames, völkisch thinking and economic 
considerations, this approach constitutes an important point of contact between the 
vision of a ‘Jew-free’ Europe and the economic reorganisation of the continent.186 
This congruence gave universal meaning to anti-Jewish policies in the occupied terri-
tories and immunised these steps against any objections: The völkisch vision of a 
Europe free of Jews as well as the German claim to leadership were beyond dispute: 
‘Aryanisation’ made sense to German officials as it promised to bring the Reich 
closer to both.  
However, transferring Jewish businesses into German hands did not suffice to estab-
lish the desired degree of German dominance. Thus, German officials searched for 
further options and called on private businesses to get active in the name of the 
sought-for Großraumwirtschaft. In a speech on its basic principles, Schlotterer 
picked up Göring’s and Funk’s claim to German leadership and made them an issue 
of private business.  
Just like England we have to ensure that the smaller states cannot get out of the economic in-
terlocking with Germany without severe crises. It is the Reichsmarschall’s [Göring’s] wish that 
Germany firmly uses its influence on the most important European companies. Possibilities to 
do so are acquisition of shares, interlocking through staffing policy, founding new companies, 
and cartel policy. It is essential to install Germans or German-friendly persons into the man-
agement of big businesses [...]. But one also has to be anxious to transfer large stocks 
smoothly.
187
 
Schlotterer emphasised that there was no time to lose: “these are not questions of 
tomorrow but of today”.188 Göring apparently shared this objective. He informed the 
Reichskommissar in Norway, Josef Terboven, and the Military Governor in Belgium, 
Alexander von Falkenhausen, that measures had to be taken immediately to “con-
solidate German economic supremacy in Europe”.189 By freeing the necessary capi-
tal transactions from all restrictions and by constraining the rights of disposal of the 
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current owners, he intended to enable German private business to take over impor-
tant local companies and to acquire shares of businesses in third countries.190 Hence, 
the Ministry of Economics and the Vierjahresplanbehörde pursued similar goals. In a 
letter to Funk, Göring emphasised again that 
already before the end of the war the Dutch and the Belgian, and in the second instance the 
Norwegian and Danish, economies have to be penetrated by German capital as intensively as 
possible. And vice versa, the Dutch and Danish interests have to be offered the opportunity 
for economic operation and investment in Germany in order that before long a mutual eco-
nomic interconnection and an alignment of interests is created. [...] Furthermore, I ask you to 
foster the acquisition of dominating economic positions in third countries which are in French, 
Dutch, Belgian, Danish, or Norwegian possession by all means and already during the war.
191
 
Thus, the general principle of a German-led Großraumwirtschaft initiated and framed 
considerations on how to convert the current German military dominance into a per-
manent economic hegemony. By August 1940, they had yielded results. The Ger-
man line in regards to “interlocking the European economies with the Greater Ger-
man economy under German leadership”192 consisted of several measures: The or-
ganisation of European private business should be modelled on the German system, 
foreign companies were to be included in German cartels and syndicates, the trans-
fer of Jewish property into German hands, the most important European businesses 
should be controlled by German shareholders, and Germans were to hold crucial 
economic positions.193 Obviously, all these potential solutions were not only intended 
to expand German economic influence but were also based on one role model: 
Germany. What Schlotterer had called the “sensible economic principles” of National 
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Socialism were indeed supposed to “radiate out into the European space”194. Ger-
many set out to make its economic system and its völkisch rationale standard prac-
tice in the New Order.  
The activities and statements of the Reichsgruppe Industrie reflected the future-
oriented general principle of a German-led Großwirtschaftsraum and the limits it im-
posed. Schlotterer’s thoughts and arguments, for example, reverberated in its inter-
nal documents: 
The economic reorganisation of Europe cannot be carried out on the basis of the bayonet and 
the army boot, but [only] on the basis of private agreements. The military success created the 
background for generous but purposeful negotiations. The sword of Damocles is dangling 
over the other countries now in form of peace negotiations.
195 
Furthermore, the Reichsgruppe gathered information on Europe’s industries and car-
tels “in order to prepare a European industry policy and a Großraumwirtschaft”,196 
and sent a delegation to the Netherlands to explore the willingness to adopt the 
German organisational model.197 Thus, it was not only fully aware of the regime’s 
aims and expectations but also willing to live up to them:  
Particularly for the future, it is essential to energetically and determinedly tackle the upcoming 
major tasks as service to Volk and state [...] in the National Socialist spirit. The state cannot 
refrain from leading. However, it will have less reason to interfere the more businessmen and 
the institutions of economic self-governance are recognising and meeting the needs of the 
National Socialist state leadership.
198
 
However, the Reichs- and Wirtschaftsgruppen did not just hand down instructions 
and wishes from above. They also voiced their own concerns and objectives. Al-
ready in June 1940, the Reichsgruppe Industrie had sent a circular to the 
Wirtschaftsgruppen, its sector-specific sub-chapters, in which it prompted them to 
analyse the economies of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and France, before carrying on with Hungary, Switzerland, Finland, and England. 
The circular pointed out that the Ministry of Economics was particularly interested in  
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matters of fact that have impeded the sale of our goods in these countries, and in suggestions 
of how – after all political questions have been cleared up – a systematic and beneficial co-
operation with the relevant industries in these territories could be made possible in the fu-
ture.
199
 
In these reports, the Wirtschaftsgruppen were supposed to point out the interests of 
German industry; they responded promptly and their answers lay within the discur-
sively established boundaries and picked up central themes from the dominant inter-
pretive repertoires.  
The Wirtschaftsgruppe Feinmechanik und Optik, for example, emphasised that Ger-
many’s precision engineering and optical industry was unrivalled. Thus, all they 
asked for was free access to all European markets and influence on local business 
organisations.200 Fully aware that many smaller competitors would not survive the 
end of subsidies and tariff walls, the Wirtschaftsgruppe brought forward two argu-
ments to pre-empt any concerns. Firstly, if these countries were not supposed to 
pursue an independent military policy, there was no need for them to sustain their 
own precision engineering and optical industry anyway.201 And, secondly, 
[i]f through this supremacy of the German precision engineering and optical industry a regres-
sion of the other precision engineering and optical industries in the European area occurs, 
such a development is consistent with a desirable division of labour among European indus-
try.
202
 
This was not the only instance in which the proposals of the Wirtschaftsgruppe 
picked up central themes and arguments of the New Order discourse. Its sugges-
tions promised to underpin the German claim for leadership in Europe, to harmonise 
regulations and norms, and to grant Germany control over Europe’s output. Addi-
tionally, the German precision engineering and optical industry even aligned its wish 
for exports with the need for autarky: “Civil production for the domestic market and 
for exports must have the highest extent possible in order to have enough capacity 
for armaments production in every case of emergency.”203 In one respect, however, 
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the Wirtschaftsgruppe opposed the discursively established notion of the economic 
future of Europe. It refused to buy shares and to take over companies abroad be-
cause of their inferiority.204 Overall, the German precision engineering and optical 
industry was not eager to expand, but its arguments, demands, and thoughts fitted in 
seamlessly with the discursive mainstream. By redefining its own aims as contribu-
tions to realising the general principle of German-led European Großraumwirtschaft, 
instead of arguing with profits, markets, or competitors, its demands could claim to 
be sensible and legitimate. 
German heavy industry found itself in a different position as it faced serious competi-
tion. Accordingly, it relied on a different line of argument. After the German military 
victory in the West, the Reich ruled over a region with huge iron ore deposits of high 
quality; a perfect supplement for the rich coal deposits in Germany. Thus, the 
Wirtschaftsgruppe of the Iron and Steel Producing Industry wanted to see both com-
bined within Germany. Besides increasing autarky by freeing Germany from the 
need for imports by ship, this step promised additional benefits: 
By uniting the iron ore and coal deposits, Germany can secure peace and prevent France 
from rearmament. Economically, Germany can strengthen its international standing by export-
ing not only coal but also iron in large quantities to foreign Völker. Politically, the European 
states have to come to terms with this reorganisation.
205
 
However, in a joint letter to Walther Funk, the Gutehoffnungshütte, Hoesch, Klöckner, 
Krupp, Mannesmann, and the Vereinigte Stahlwerke announced that during the war 
they would refrain from any claims to iron works in Luxembourg or iron ore mines in 
Lorraine, as long as nobody else was allowed to take them over and as long as they 
would get their share of the output. After the war, dispossessed owners were to get 
their former property back, while the leftover iron ore mines should form a pool, ac-
cessible to the entire Germany industry.206 The Wirtschaftsgruppe of the Iron and 
Steel Producing Industry took a similar line. It intended to “incorporate the iron ore 
deposits into the Greater German economic area” and pointed out that, in this re-
spect, national economic considerations clearly had priority over matters of owner-
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ship. Accordingly, it suggested grouping the iron works in the Saar region, in 
Lorraine, and in Luxembourg for the sake of cost-effectiveness, and assigning them 
iron ore deposits which would ensure 75 years of supplies. If the works were to be 
distributed among German industry, however, the former owners and the Reich-
swerke Hermann Göring should have the prior claim. 207  Thus, although the 
Großraumwirtschaft was not the expressed leitmotif in the heavy industrial sector, its 
arguments and thoughts reveal the significance of the discursive requirements. 
Europe-to-be featured a German dominance, autarky, and a marginalised France. 
By uniting Lorraine’s iron ores and German coal, France would be sidelined, while 
German heavy industry would become self-sufficient and unrivalled – provided the 
Reichswerke left something over for private businesses. 
The Wirtschaftsgruppe Automobile Industry also tackled the new economic order 
immediately. Apart from passing on the enquiries about hindrances for German sales 
in Europe, the Wirtschaftsgruppe pushed for a reorganisation of the French automo-
bile industry modelled on the German system and promoted the idea of co-operation 
between French, Italian, and German manufacturers.208 For Rudolf Egger, head of 
the Wirtschaftsgruppe, it was “natural that Germany claimed the leading role in this 
cooperation.”209 However, all manufacturers would benefit from the emerging market 
of the “future Greater-European economic area”210, as it offered a unique chance: 
Today we have an opportunity which will rarely, maybe never recur. Let us seize this advan-
tageous moment to make the necessary preparations. I am convinced that this will be benefi-
cial not only for the fatherland but also for the entire Großraumwirtschaft.
211
 
Because one could not “afford to have different countries following different princi-
ples and guidelines in the field of motorisation”, the Wirtschaftsgruppe founded, with 
Hitler’s approval, a “preliminary commission for the cooperation of the European 
automobile industry”.212 Consisting of industrialists from Germany, France, and Italy, 
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this commission was intended one day to become a permanent Europa-Auto-
Komitee and part of a larger organisation that would deal with every aspect of Euro-
pean motorisation. Until then, its efforts focussed on a common nomenclature and 
common standards of production.213 General von Schell, Plenipotentiary for Motor 
Transport, shared this view but emphasised German dominance: 
After the war, we will have a completely different economic area; we will have a completely 
different political and thus economic standing than before the war. [...] We will have an enor-
mous economic area, which we will have to supply, but which also obligates us. We will not 
think German in these matters anymore, but European. [...] We will not become European po-
litically, but we will have to embrace and to penetrate Europe from a German point of view.
214
 
Thus, the organisational body of the German automobile industry was in line with the 
discursively established cornerstones of the prospective European Großraum-
wirtschaft. For the Wirtschaftsgruppe the future spelled European cooperation in a 
harmonised market modelled on the German organisational system and under Ger-
man leadership, so that European industry could defy competitors from the United 
States.215  
Overall, the concept of a German-led Großwirtschaftsraum had created pressure to 
increase German economic influence in Europe (see chapter 3.1.2). With the end of 
the war seemingly within reach, this pressure grew and it shifted the focus onto 
preparations for the future. In their search for solutions, German officials were dis-
cursively bound to the Großraumwirtschaft in two ways: Its features set the objec-
tives and its underlying knowledge and belief systems limited the available options. 
In this way, the expropriation of Jewish property became an obvious and sensible 
solution to expand the German influence. The other measures that were officially 
promoted were also taken from the repertoire of tools that had been tried and trusted 
in National Socialist Germany. Thus, the intention to advance German economic in-
fluence in Europe by introducing the German organisational system of the economy, 
by including foreign companies in German-led cartels and syndicates, by installing 
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Germans in economic key positions, and by taking over foreign enterprises, also 
contributed to transferring the dominant German knowledge and belief systems onto 
the New Order.  
German private businesses contributed to this development. By using the same 
rhetoric, deploying the same arguments, and by seemingly striving for the same 
ends, their umbrella organisations accepted the rules of the discourse and stabilised 
them. They tailored their concepts to an internationally competitive, widely autarkic 
German-dominated European economic area, a Großwirtschaftsraum. Furthermore, 
the Wirtschaftsgruppen were willing to make use of the toolbox offered by politics. 
Depending on the market position of the respective branch, they favoured a different 
set of instruments, but ultimately the new European order for which they wanted to 
deploy it was very much in line with the discursively hegemonic concept: a larger 
market in a more German Europe. 
 
3.2 The Rise of Racism and the Growing Needs of All-Out War (1941-1943) 
Overall, here in these Eastern spaces the old colonial idea applies. However, in contrast to 
the earlier colonisation by the Teutonic Knights and the Baltic Barons this colonisation is 
borne by us, by blood [...].
216
 (Reinhard Heydrich, October 1941) 
The German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 had a major impact on the 
New Order discourse. Until then, National Socialist Germany had mostly conquered 
countries with developed industries and people that seemed racially sound to Na-
tional Socialist officials. Accordingly, völkisch considerations did not seem to be a 
pressing issue compared to ensuring the smooth economic integration and domina-
tion of these territories.  
With parts of the Soviet Union, however, Germany conquered what National Socialist 
officials deemed vast agricultural territories inhabited by inferior people and ruled by 
a Jewish-Bolshevist elite. Here, the National Socialist völkisch dream of “creating 
Lebensraum” (chapter 3.2.1) for Europe’s Germanic people came into its own. De-
spite the völkisch interpretive repertoire gaining momentum, Europe-to-be was still 
conceptualised as a völkisch as well as an economic New Order. Economically, the 
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integration of the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories into Europe-to-be was driven 
by imaginations of “colonisation and exploitation” (chapter 3.2.2). However, the 
longer the war went on and the less likely a quick military victory became, the more 
German officials refrained from viewing the East solely as a source of foodstuffs, raw 
materials and cheap labour. The war and its necessities inspired and legitimised dif-
ferent concepts of Europe that also referred to the two dominant interpretive frames. 
In these “appeals and warnings” (chapter 3.2.3), appeasing and winning over the 
population took priority over ruthless völkisch and economic policies.  
 
3.2.1 Extermination and Starvation – Creating Lebensraum 
The essential aim of this military campaign against the Judaeo-Bolshevist system is the com-
plete annihiliation of Asiatic influence and its instruments of power in the European cultural 
sphere. This creates tasks for the troops that go beyond traditional one-sided soldiery. In the 
East the soldier is not just a fighter according to the rules of warfare, but also the bearer of an 
implacable völkisch idea and the avenger of all the bestialities that have been inflicted on the 
German and racially similar Volkstum.
217
 (Walter von Reichenau, October 1941) 
In the eyes of leading National Socialists, the German attack on the Soviet Union 
was not only a clash of two ideologies but also the enforcement of the Germanic 
peoples’ righteous claim for adequate Lebensraum; a concept that combined as-
pects of the well-established geopolitical and völkisch knowledge and belief sys-
tems.218 The countless atrocities National Socialist Germany committed in the “newly 
Occupied Eastern Territories” were driven by this völkisch aspect of the envisaged 
New Order and the conviction that Jews and Slavs were racially inferior. Accordingly, 
in German planning the local population amounted to nothing more than being part 
of the Jewish-Bolshevist threat, an obstacle occupying Germanic Lebensraum, and 
inconvenient additional mouths to feed. Thus, the völkisch interpretive frame gave 
meaning to killing them, letting them starve to death, expelling or resettling them.  
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In the European territories Germany had occupied before June 1941, the völkisch 
knowledge and belief system had produced notions of a völkisch reorganisation of 
Europe, which did not change after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Still, 
the territories that were declared German Lebensraum were to be germanised, while 
the allegedly Germanic states should be won over for a common future. This stabili-
sation and internalisation of völkisch meaning, produced statements like the one in 
this letter by an unknown member of the SS:  
one thing is certain already today, namely that, for primarily racial and secondarily territorial 
reasons, in a new Europe the Germanic states will be bound closely to us; i.e. that in a new 
Europe a Greater Germanic power bloc, centred in the Reich, will be the core of the east-
wardly enlarged continent. This notion necessarily arises from the fundamental idea of Na-
tional Socialism, the idea of blood and race.
219
 
Reinhard Heydrich – SS-Obergruppenführer, chief of the Reich Security Main Office, 
since September 1941 head of the Protetorate, and since 31 July 1941 in charge of 
the solution to the “Jewish Question in the German sphere of influence in Europe”220 
– expressed similar beliefs and pursued the same vision of Europe-to-be. In his eyes, 
Norway, the Netherlands, Flanders, Denmark, and Sweden had been deformed “by 
bad political leadership and the influence of Jewry”221, but ultimately they belonged 
to Germany and would merge into the Reich. Thus, the völkisch idea of a Germanic 
European core still defined the German notions of a New Order (see chapter 3.1.1). 
This general principle called for more specific planning for the regions in the German 
sphere of influence. In Alsace-Lorraine, Josef Bürckel, head of the civil administra-
tion in Lorraine and Gauleiter of the Westmark,222 considered “the increase and the 
stabilisation of the German Volkstum”223 the paramount targets. Wilhelm Stuckart, a 
jurist and SS-Standartenführer who had helped shape the Nuremberg Laws, 224 
wanted to see the population of Alsace-Lorraine treated like “fully-fledged members 
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of the German Volksgemeinschaft” in the interest of a “smooth Germanisation”.225 
Karl Hermann Frank, state secretary of the Reichsprotektor, and Reinhard Heydrich, 
who had succeeded Neurath in this Position, emphasised that the Protectorate be-
longed to the Reich now.226 Thus, it had to be germanised.227 As part of German ef-
forts to get rid of most Poles in the annexed parts of former Poland, the Sicherheits-
dienst, a department of the Reich Security Main Office, suggested several measures 
of “völkisch annihilation” to “break the biological power of the Polish Volk”.228 In the 
General Government, SS-Hauptsturmführer and Oberregierungsrat in Gdansk, 
Helmut Müller,229 supported the idea of “smothering the Polish people economically 
and racially” by creating pressure from two sides through German settlements in the 
West and East.230 All these concepts were in accordance with Himmler’s thoughts 
and beliefs. For him, the “strengthening of a blutlich [blood-wise] superior German 
Volkstum” was the primary objective in “the new German East.”231  
Getting rid of all Jews in the General Government was an integral part of this “ethnic 
parting of races and Völker which is necessary for the reorganisation of Europe”.232 
Not only for Himmler this vision of a völkisch New Order was inextricably linked with 
the ‘Jewish Question’. Picking up the well-established theme of Jews as fire-
brands,233 Hitler blamed the Jews for the inner conflicts of Europe: “If there were no 
more Jews in Europe, nothing would hamper the unity of the European states any-
more.”234 Heydrich also perceived them as troublemakers “who definitely had to dis-
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appear from Europe.” 235  On the European level, the alleged racial and spiritual 
otherness of Europe’s Jewish population, which had already informed their exclusion 
from the Volksgemeinschaft (see chapter 2.2), translated into a very concrete objec-
tive: the “complete Entjudung [‘dejewification’] of Europe.”236 Thus, inspired by the 
völkisch knowledge and belief system, National Socialist Germany kept pursuing the 
plan of creating homogenous nations within a European Reich. And this Europe-to-
be would be ‘free of Jews’.  
In the allegedly Germanic countries, the völkisch concept of winning the ‘blood 
brothers’ of the German people over for the common cause still prevailed, even 
though this hope had been repeatedly dashed. In Norway, the German attack on the 
Soviet Union had led to strikes reportedly initiated by “Marxist elements”, while ef-
forts “to demonstrate the brutality of Bolshevism” had not yielded the desired effect. 
On the contrary, the number of acts of sabotage rose and a newly created legion of 
the SS could hardly find volunteers.237 In Denmark, Hitler complained, the democ-
ratically elected government had “shown nothing but bad faith” and the population 
had “insulted and mistreated volunteers” for a Danish Free Corps.238 Sweden, as an 
allegedly racially valuable Volk also a potential member of the Germanic community, 
did not even bother to outlaw its Communist Party.239 And in the Netherlands, Reich-
skommissar Arthur Seyß-Inquart was at the end of his tether:  
With the beginning of this year, it has become clear that the Dutch Volk now also has to 
choose sides in the fight of National Socialist Germany for a reorganisation of Europe. [...] 
Those who still do not see, or do not want to see, have forfeited their right to have a say in the 
political sphere.
240
  
Nevertheless, Seyß-Inquart and other German officials did not abandon all hope. 
Having put the Dutch National Socialists in power, Seyß-Inquart expected them to 
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become the nucleus of a Dutch rethinking.241 Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed Renthe-Fink’s successor as Plenipotentiary for 
the Reich in Denmark, Werner Best,242 that the “German objective towards Denmark 
is the conquest of the country from within”.243 And Josef Terboven promised the 
Norwegians a rosy future if they finally embraced the idea of becoming members of a 
Germanic community.244 Thus, the völkisch conviction that the true nature of the 
common blood that all Germanic people shared would ultimately assert itself in a 
Greater Germanic Reich proved strong enough to maintain its discursive dominance 
despite being repeatedly frustrated by several major setbacks.  
In several other respects, however, the attack on the Soviet Union had a major im-
pact on the German New Order discourse. The widening geographical scope also 
redrew the discursive boundaries as it opened up new fields of application for the 
two dominant interpretive frames. Anti-Communist creeds mixed with anti-Semitism, 
expectations of foodstuffs and raw material supplies, the sense of racial superiority, 
dreams of additional Lebensraum, and plans for future settlement areas for the Ger-
man ‘Volk ohne Raum’245 took up considerably more room than before. All these 
hopes, plans, and expectations were informed by the established völkisch or 
economic knowledge and beliefs and they converged in the identification of one seri-
ous obstacle: the local population. This congruence specified an alleged problem, 
rendered it hardly contestable, and gave meaning to searching for definitive solutions. 
In the eyes of many National Socialists, the Jewish population in the Newly Occupied 
Eastern Territories was the most pressing problem. Jews were not only considered 
notorious incendiaries but the German tradition of blaming Jews for the ills of moder-
nity also had produced the notion of Jewish-Bolshevism and an understanding of the 
Soviet Union as system in which a Jewish-Bolshevist elite dominated the inferior 
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Slavic population.246 This notion not only allowed for a distinction between commu-
nism as a political doctrine and the people it had oppressed but it also fused two 
powerful elements of the dominating knowledge and belief systems, anti-Semitism 
and anti-communism. Accordingly, the guidelines for the behaviour of German troops 
in the Soviet Union issued by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht in May 1941 al-
ready indicated that the army would not be squeamish: 
Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of the National Socialist German Volk. Germany’s fight is di-
rected against this ideology and its bearers. [...] This fight demands a ruthless and energetic 
crackdown on bolshevist agitators, franctireurs, Jews, and the complete elimination of every 
active or passive resistance.
247
 
Field Marshal General Walter von Reichenau voiced similar convictions when he 
declared the German soldiers bearers of an “implacable völkisch idea”, who fought 
for the “extermination of all Asian influences on the culture of Europe” and for “the 
hard but just atonement of the Jewish Untermenschen”.248 General Hermann Hoth 
ordered the “merciless extermination” of “Bolshevist-Jewish agitators” because they 
were “the intellectual kingpins of Bolshevism” and “hostile to Volk and culture”.249 For 
General Erich Hoepner this war was not only part of the old fight of Germanics 
against Slavs but also a defence against Jewish-Bolshevism. Accordingly, he de-
manded that “every combat operation, in its conception and execution, has to be 
guided by the iron will to annihilate the enemy remorselessly and completely. In par-
ticular, there is no mercy for the bearers of the current Russian-Bolshevist sys-
tem.”250 In this way, the notion of Bolshevism being the rule of Jews over the Slavic 
masses and the image of Jews as hostile agitators trickled down through the army 
hierarchy and translated into mass murder. Millions of soldiers were now encouraged 
to fight the Bolshevist threat by cracking down on the allegedly racially alien and 
spiritually corrosive Jewish population of the Soviet Union.  
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However, the German distinction between a Jewish-Bolshevist ruling class and the 
population it oppressed did not translate into a mission to liberate the rest of the local 
population. In the völkisch interpretive frame the Slavic population counted as inferior 
and in the economic interpretive frame it stood in the way of meeting the needs of 
the superior German Volk. Accordingly, it was not only military personnel which 
called for drastic measures. The agriculture department of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost251, 
headed by Hans-Joachim Riecke, demanded that despite the negative effects of the 
war on agricultural output, two thirds of the food supply for the army had to come out 
of the newly occupied territories right away: “Since Germany and Europe need these 
surpluses by all means, as a consequence the consumption [of the local population] 
has to be reduced.” As a result, “[m]any tens of millions of people will become super-
fluous in this area and will die or have to migrate to Siberia.”252 During the following 
months, Göring repeatedly upheld this line of reasoning and its “tough but unavoid-
able consequences”.253 In the eyes of Himmler, this remorseless course of action 
was justified because “this war was, for the first time, a really brutal war of Völker. A 
race-war”, in which there were only two options: “Russia’s extermination, or ours”. 
Consequently, Germany could not afford to show mercy in its fight against “this 
commissar, leading this material, this mass, these Rohstoffmenschen [raw material 
people] or better Untermenschen [subhumans]”.254 Erich Koch, Reichskommissar in 
Ukraine, spelled out how völkisch beliefs justified every measure: “For the mindset of 
the Germans in the Reichskommissariat the point of view is essential that we are 
dealing with a Volk that is inferior in every respect.”255 Thus, the German perception 
of and perspective onto the East was shaped by the völkisch degradation of the local 
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population as well as an idealisation of the German Volk and the nature of the war it 
was fighting. In this way, German needs and interests unfettered the imaginable and 
justifiable options. In the discourse on the future of Europe, now even the death of 
millions seemed sensible and expedient if it furthered the German purposes.  
In addition to supporting the German war for a New Order, the Newly Occupied 
Eastern Territories also were supposed to become a part of it. As such, they were 
subject to German considerations on how to harmonise the Völker in Europe and 
thus to German population policy. Since most people in the East ranked low in the 
National Socialist racial hierarchy, many German plans advocated measures to mar-
ginalise or to get rid of the local population. For the Baltic States, for example, Er-
hard Wetzel, special department head for racial policy in the Ministry for the Occu-
pied Eastern Territories,256 recommended “scrapping the racially unwanted parts of 
the population”257 by means of industrial work. In all of the Eastern territories, he 
reckoned that around 46 to 51 million people would have to be expelled. In former 
Poland alone, he wanted to get rid of 16 to 31 million people, and expressed disap-
pointment that one could “not solve the Polish question by liquidating the Poles like 
the Jews”.258 Accordingly, he, like many others, came out in favour of Germanising 
what he considered the racially valuable parts of the population and advocated de-
bilitating measures for the rest: Propaganda in the former Soviet Union should point 
out the benefits of fewer children and birth control, while abortions should go unpun-
ished and measures against infant mortality were to remain undone.259 In addition to 
curbing the “biological power” of the population, Koch wanted to restrict the access 
to education for Ukrainians.260 The idea of slowing down the reproduction of the al-
legedly inferior Slavs and to keep them on a low level also becomes apparent in 
statements of Hitler and Himmler: 261 “That would be the task: to exploit them for 
Germany, to keep them down so that they will never be able to harm us; and then 
expel them at some point so we can settle Germans there.”262 Thus, German popula-
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tion policy was inspired by arguments and visions from the völkisch interpretive 
frame. In the New Order, the East was to be home to flourishing racially valuable 
Germanic blood. For this purpose, it had to be safeguarded from the harmful influ-
ence of inferior people through spatial separation and their debilitation.  
The same arguments and visions prompted considerations on how to deal with the 
allegedly valuable blood that could be found in the East. Since the völkisch knowl-
edge and belief system did not provide a clear definition, racial value lay in the eye of 
the beholder, so that there was some leeway for different opinions. While there was 
a broad consensus on the racial value of Estonians and Latvians, who seemed over-
all fit for Germanisation, only Rosenberg took up the stance that the “Ukrainians be-
longed to the European family of nations and are strongly interspersed with Ger-
manic blood.”263 Koch, in contrast, took a different view: “It is nonsensical to apply 
the nationality principle and to absorb the Ukraine into the European family of na-
tions. The Ukraine has never belonged to Europe.”264 According to Konrad Meyer’s 
calculations – Meyer was a SS-Oberführer and an agronomist who, as the head of 
the planning office at the Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood, 
played a leading role in devising the Generalplan Ost – there were about 2.5 million 
people of German blood in the East, so that approximately 4.85 million German set-
tlers were needed.265  Wetzel, on the other hand, put forward a different line of 
völkisch reasoning. He spoke for generally lower standards in relation to Germanisa-
tion because losing this many Germans would hollow out the Reich itself, increase 
its need for foreign labour, and thus open the floodgates for “European racial misce-
genation”.266 For an anonymous memorandum, the völkisch interpretive repertoire 
led to yet another conclusion. It emphasised that Germany’s focus in the East had to 
be the Germanisation of “the soil, not of fremdvölkisch people”267. And in Himmler’s 
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concept of a “Germanic Reich of German Nation”, the “lost Nordic-Germanic-Aryan 
blood particles” within the population of the East “either had to be won over, or to be 
beaten to death.”268 Thus, the völkisch interpretative frame suggested a vaguely de-
fined problem: To some extent, there was racially valuable blood in the East that had 
to be strengthened. This consensus, together with the incontestable precedence of 
German needs and the paradigm of völkisch segregation, put the problem itself be-
yond dispute thus shifting the German considerations on the future of the East in the 
New Order towards the specifics of potential solutions.  
Most of these proposals for a solution stipulated a völkisch Flurbereinigung269(ethnic 
consolidation) consisting of large-scale settlement and resettlement schemes that 
were supposed to create Lebensraum for supposedly racially valuable people at the 
expense of the allegedly inferior rest. Alfred Rosenberg, the Minister for the Occu-
pied Eastern Territories, for example, had a clear-cut notion of Germany’s policy in 
the East. The Ostland – this “new frontier between Germany and Slavdom”270 – was 
to become a part of the Greater German Reich because “700 years of history have 
largely aligned the local population with Europe and [...] integrated this region into 
the Greater Germanic Lebensraum.”271 With this well-established reference to the 
history of Teutonic Knights and the Hanseatic League, he called for the Germanisa-
tion of the racially suitable parts of the population in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Belorussia and the resettlement of unwanted elements.272 Ukraine, in contrast, was 
to become a free state and a close ally of the Greater German Reich, whereas he 
envisaged the allegedly formerly German Crimea as a German Riviera, densely set-
tled with Germans.273 However, it was Himmler, bestowed with “special tasks on be-
                                            
268
 Himmler’s speech on a meeting of SS- and police force leaders, 16 September 1942, printed in 
Opitz, Europastrategien, pp. 921-930. 
269
 Hitler used the word Flubereinigung [land consolidation] in a speech in September 1939, shortly 
after the attack on Poland. See Wildt, ‘Völkische Neuordnung’, p. 1. 
270
 Note on a meeting in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 30 October 1941, BArch, R 
6, 107, pp. 2-17. 
271
 Rosenberg’s instructions for a Reichskommissar in Ostland, 8 May 1941, printed in Schumann and 
Nestler, Okkupationspolitik Sowjetunion, pp. 131-132. 
272
 See ibid. Similar historical references can be found in: draft by the economic department of the 
Reichsbank for a speech by Funk on the occasion of the East fair in Königsberg, 12 October 1941, 
BArch, R 2501, 7018, pp. 236-261; Reinhard Heydrich on the basic principles of the National Socialist 
reorganisation of Europe, 2 October 1941, printed in Madajczyk, Generalplan Ost, pp. 20-22.  
273
 See note on a meeting in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 30 October 1941, 
BArch, R 6, 107, pp. 2-17; Rosenberg’s instructions for a Reichskommissar in Ukraine, 7 May 1941, 
printed in Schumann and Nestler, Okkupationspolitik Sowjetunion, pp. 128-131. 
 133 
 
half of the Führer that follow from the final fight between two contrary political sys-
tems”274, who enjoyed Hitler’s confidence in regard to questions of future settlements:  
I know exactly how far I have to go, but after this the entire East will be Germanic – primarily 
Germanic. [...] We do not have to worry about that now. I will not talk about it. I have dele-
gated that to my Himmler and he will take care of it.
275
 
Indeed, he did: Under his auspices, several experts pondered on the questions of 
how, when, and where Germanic people should settle in the East.276 The Gener-
alplan Ost reflected the results of these considerations. According to Konrad Meyer, 
German settlement policy would focus on Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, Lower Sty-
ria, and Upper Carniola, in the West and South, while the former Polish territories, 
Western Lithuania, Ingria, and the Crimea would take precedence in the East.277 Fur-
thermore, he adopted Hans Joachim Riecke’s idea of subordinating several former 
Kolkhozes to a German-led agricultural centre along the projected transport axes 
towards the Crimea and Ingria. 278  In this way, he wanted to “ingrain German 
Volkstum with the soil and to secure its biological existence for good amidst an alien 
environment”.279 These “pearls of settlement” – as Himmler called them – should 
become the nucleus for “Germanic people to proliferate, to thrive, and to grow 
strong”.280 Thus, just like before the invasion of the Soviet Union, the völkisch knowl-
edge and belief system and its ambiguous but incontestable distinction between 
valuable and inferior blood turned every region in the East in which Germans were 
living or had ever lived into German Lebensraum. For National Socialist officials, this 
– discursively established – appraisal justified and necessitated a völkisch reorgani-
sation of the territories in question as part of the overarching reorganisation of 
Europe. For this purpose, Germany was willing to spend 55 billion Reichsmark on 
the settlement of five million Germanic people in the occupied Eastern territories 
within the next 25 years.281 
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As designated German Lebensraum, these areas were also subject to the völkisch 
imperative requirement of racial and spiritual homogeneity. That meant that not only 
large parts of the local but also all the Jewish population had to go.282 Initially, Ger-
man officials pinned their hopes in this respect on a yet-to-be-conquered region east 
of the Urals, which succeeded Madagascar as a possible territorial solution to the 
‘Jewish Question’. In September 1941, for example, the Einsatzgruppe C welcomed 
the flight of many Ukrainians from the advancing Wehrmacht as a “costless deporta-
tion of houndreds of thousands of Jews” which constituted a “considerable contribu-
tion to towards solving the ‘Jewish Question’ in Europe.”283 Given the large number 
of Jews in its area, the Einsatzgruppe B, which was also operating behind the front-
line to kill the Soviet ruling class and its alleged Jewish kingpins, likewise assumed 
that deportation was the only viable solution to the ‘Jewish Question’.284 However, by 
the end of the year, a quick military victory had become unlikely, so German officials 
pondered alternatives. In November 1941, Alfred Rosenberg, for example, spoke of 
the “biological eradication of the entire Jewry in Europe” which could be carried out 
either by deportation “or other means of eradication”.285 In January 1942, Hitler saw 
only two options. The war would end either with the annihilation of the Aryan Völker 
or with the disappearance of Jewry from Europe. By May 1942, National Socialist 
Germany had made its decision. According to Heydrich, the “death penalty” had 
been imposed on “all of European Jewry”.286 Thus, the völkisch interpretive frame, 
which had conceptually paved the way from the vision of a ‘Jew-free’ German Volks-
gemeinschaft to a Europe ‘free of Jews’, had set the Jews as the ‘problem’ and initi-
ated a search for solutions.287 When expelling them proved unfeasible German offi-
cials fell back on alternatives to realise this – from a völkisch point of view, impera-
tive – part of the New Order. Inspired by the killing of mentally and physically handi-
capped people in the context of the T4 programme and the mass murders of Jews 
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as the alleged kingpins of Bolshevism,288 they started to kill the Jewish population of 
Europe systematically.  
Overall, the vision of a New Order changed dramatically with the German invasion of 
the Soviet Union. However, in the areas Germany had already ruled before June 
1941, the effects were marginal. Despite setbacks, National Socialist officials clung 
to the idea of creating a racially homogeneous Greater German Reich – forming the 
core of a future ‘Jew-free’ Greater Germanic Reich that comprised all nations of al-
legedly valuable blood. Under German leadership, they would make use of the pri-
mary production of the racially inferior states which surrounded them, including the 
Newly Occupied Eastern Territories. 
There, the impact of Operation Barbarossa on the New Order discourse cannot be 
overestimated. Before June 1941, ‘the East’ denoted the former Poland and ended 
at the Soviet border. Now, the Eastern boundaries of Europe were open to interpre-
tation. Apart from dissolving previous geographical limits, the attack on the Soviet 
Union set up new discursive constraints and nullified others: with respect to the 
Newly Occupied Eastern Territories, the völkisch interpretative frame, particularly the 
völkisch ascriptions that discursively reinforced the need to distinguish between 
‘valuable’ and ‘worthless’ blood, gained a hegemonic position in the discourse. On 
the one hand, this narrowed down the limits of what could be said about the status of 
the East in the New Order: notions of the East as a group of independent countries 
liberated from communism or the imagination of the people of the East constituting 
Völker in their own right – thoughts that Rosenberg for example voiced to some ex-
tent – were marginalised by the discursive mainstream. The völkisch ‘truth’ about the 
East that this mainstream discursively constructed, on the other hand, created sev-
eral new problems und freed the German search for solutions of all boundaries. The 
alleged inferiority of the local population made letting them starve to death seem 
righteous if German interests called for it, justified the deportation of millions of peo-
ple as necessary for the sake of racial and spiritual homogeneity, and provided a 
social-Darwinist and a historic legitimisation for the German claim to additional Le-
bensraum that outweighed the right to live of other Völker. Moreover, National So-
cialist anti-communism, which the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had previously muted, 
now started to come fully into its own, so that the völkisch notion of Bolshevism be-
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ing the rule of Jews over the Slavic masses gained interpretational sovereignty within 
the German discourse. At first, this reading rationalised calls for the elimination of all 
adult male Jews in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories. However, when the fan-
tasies of deporting all European Jews to a territory east of the yet-to-be defined 
Eastern border of Europe dashed against the resistance of the Red Army, the per-
ception of Jews as a threat and the established vision of völkisch homogenous 
Europe set the Jewish population as a dangerous and urgent problem. Again, the 
proposals for a solution pushed the boundaries. The discursively stabilised vision of 
a Europe free of Jews translated into the systematic physical extermination of mil-
lions of people. 
 
3.2.2 Colonisation and Exploitation – Ruling the East 
The result is therefore a great technical preparation, involving economic policy, urban con-
struction and a policy for Volkstum and settlement. […] Inaugurating the whole of this work is 
the inauguration of a century’s work. Over the next years, we can definitely make a big start, 
but it will be our children and our grandchildren that will see the results.
289
 (Alfred Rosenberg, 
October 1941) 
The tasks National Socialist officials saw as pending in the Newly Occupied Eastern 
Territories were not just of a völkisch nature. In order to turn these regions into valu-
able parts of Europe, they had to be reorganised economically. Since there was no 
indispensable industry, but an allegedly inferior population, essential raw materials, 
and huge agricultural potential, National Socialist plans destined the East – with re-
course to trade patterns popularised through Mitteleuropa ideas – to supplement the 
prospective Germanic industrial core of Europe. By de-industrialising the Eastern 
territories and by keeping living standards and wages low, Germany wanted not only 
to shift the focus of the local economy onto the export of foodstuffs, raw materials, 
and labour but also wanted the economy to reflect the alleged inferiority of the local 
population. Integrated into Europe in this way, these European colonies would in-
crease autarky.  
Despite the völkisch interpretive frame gaining momentum, Europe-to-be was still 
also conceptualised as an economic New Order. In a large part, the discursive con-
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struction of Europe kept revolving around the creation and optimisation of a 
Großraumwirtschaft.290 Herbert Backe, who led the Ministry of Nutrition and Agricul-
ture from 1942 onwards,291 for example, published a book in which he called for a 
European economy that freed the continent from its dependence on the liberal world 
economy. 292  In Funk’s public speeches, the Großraumwirtschaft was a constant 
topic.293 Scientists held lectures on Europe’s economic future and its features, or – 
like several German economists – teamed up to “forge the tools that shall help to 
prepare the implementation of the European Großraumwirtschaft.”294 A certain Alfred 
Oesterheld traced the “historical and current foundations of the Großraum-
wirtschaft”295, and the many activities of Werner Daitz’s Gesellschaft für europäische 
Wirtschaftsplanung und Großraumwirtschaft even incurred the disapproval of the 
Ministry of Economics.296 After all, planning and creating the new Europe was still 
considered a matter of politics. Despite having to sustain the German war effort, 
Göring also kept concerning himself with the “organic preparation of the European 
Großwirtschaftsraum”.297 Several German Ministries discussed a new tariff system 
for the “economic reorganisation of Europe”,298 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
appreciated a deal struck between Sweden and Finland on their lumber industry as a 
“contribution to the establishment of a European Großwirtschaftsraum”299. The Ar-
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beitswissenschaftliches Institut of the German Labour Front devised several memo-
randa on Europe, which “today is not a purely geographical concept anymore, but 
already a consistently led political entity that – under Germany’s protection – is about 
to become a Großwirtschaftsraum.”300 Thus, the economic interpretive frame and the 
general principle it had discursively established in the 1930s, the Großraumwirtschaft, 
still informed all economic aspects of the German discourse on Europe.  
This vision shaped the German view of the East and thus its discursive integration 
into the New Order. For many, the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories were to play 
an important part in this Großraumwirtschaft. In July 1941, Hermann Josef Abs, di-
rector of the foreign department and member of the board of directors of the 
Deutsche Bank, gave a speech in which he addressed several aspects of the Euro-
pean economy. He not only talked about expanding multilateral clearing, the com-
mon European market, and his appraisal of post-war international trade, but also 
about how the integration of large parts of the former Soviet Union into Europe would 
bring the continent closer to autarky.301 Otto Bene, a diplomat representing the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs in the German occupation regime in the Netherlands, claimed 
to be echoing Hitler when he specified his version of this idea. He pointed out that it 
was an absurdity that in the  
East of the European continent, there was a large empire with almost inexhaustible natural 
resources and raw materials [...], while in the densely populated Central and Western Euro-
pean countries there was a shortage of raw materials. Thus, it was essential to make the re-
source-rich areas of the European East completely accessible for the populous West.
302
 
Rosenberg took the same line. According to him, the 
Eastern territories are not destined to lead a life on their own; in fact, they are a part of the 
Greater German and European Lebensraum and have their tasks within it. [...] In the context 
of an organic division of labour in the European Großwirtschaftsraum, the occupied territories 
are to provide surpluses of agricultural products and commercial raw materials.
303
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These arguments and thought patterns surface in many other statements on the fu-
ture of the Eastern territories: for Giselher Wirsing, a SS-Sturmbannführer who had 
been an influential journalist in the Conservative Revolutionary movement,304 the 
“German-European and the Russian economic areas notably supplement each 
other”305. Thus, the integration “into Europe’s overall economy”,306 which Hellmut 
Körner, head of the department for nutrition and agriculture in the Reichskommis-
sariat Ukraine, demanded, would finally make Europe economically independent. 
According to the agricultural department of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost, the Caucasus, 
for example, was to supply oil, cotton, manganese, copper, silk, and tea.307 The role 
of the Baltic States, by contrast, was determined by their agricultural character. They 
were supposed to supply foodstuffs.308 In this respect, however, the highest hopes of 
many National Socialist officials rested on the resource-rich and fertile soil of Ukraine 
– “this large foundation for raw materials and food-stuffs”.309 In accordance with the 
expectation that Ukraine, together with Southeastern Europe and France, could 
make up for the European shortage of corn,310 the political guidelines for Ukraine 
declared that the  
ultimate economic objective has to be to naturally develop Ukraine into the granary of Europe. 
On the other hand, the entire Eastern space will become the main sales market for Western 
European industry, whose products will be paid for in agricultural products and raw materi-
als.
311
  
In principle, Erich Koch argued similarly. However, in his version, economic planning 
exhibited its racial hiararchy more plainly:  
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For the post-war period, the Russian space from Chernyshevskoye to Vladivostok will be the 
sole sales market for German industry. Of course, we will not deliver high-quality products, 
but ordinary kitsch is good enough for these people.
312
 
Hence, the prospective role of the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories within the 
European Großraumwirtschaft was clear-cut: the dominant interpretive frame only 
allowed for one way to speak about the future of the East in an economically reor-
ganised Europe. The Newly Occupied Eastern Territories were unanimously envis-
aged as an integral part of the European Großraumwirtschaft that was supposed to 
contribute to the autarky and the prosperity of the continent – in the trade pattern 
deeply engrained in German economic concepts for Europe for decades313 – by sell-
ing foodstuffs and raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods. If the East 
was integrated into intra-European trade in this way, the Reichsbank expected that 
“the German Volk and with it the new Europe will have the Lebensraum which guar-
antees an enduring political and economic upward trend.”314 So – in Hitler’s words – 
ultimately,  
the future did not belong to the ridiculous half-civilized America, but to the newly arisen 
Europe that would also definitely prevail with its people, its economy and its intellectual and 
cultural values, on condition that the East was made to serve the European idea and not work 
against Europe.
315
  
Thus, after June 1941, the economic dimension of the German discourse on the fu-
ture of Europe was still shaped by the well-established repertoire of interpretations 
that had informed German economic thinking for decades. These arguments, mo-
tives, and thought patterns had discursively contructed a New Order that was imag-
ined and expressed as a German-led, autarkic, and powerful Großwirtschaftsraum, 
engaged in a supposedly natural division of labour (see chapter 2.3 and 3.1.2). Due 
to the discursively ascribed qualities of the land and the people in the East, there 
was only one way to integrate the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories into this New 
Order. As suppliers of raw materials and foodstuffs for the Germanic industrialised 
core area, they would contribute to realising the hopes and expectations pinned on 
an economic new European order. 
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This discursively designated role of the occupied Eastern territories, supplying 
Europe with foodstuffs and raw materials, was additonally cemented by the congru-
ence between long-term New Order planning and its war-related short-term needs. 
The agricultural department of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost, for example, argued for redi-
recting their output towards Europe because industry in Belgium, France, and Ger-
many was more important than Russian industry – for the war and the post-war 
economy.316 When Göring specified the main economic tasks in the East, he also 
pointed out the congruencies between German interests during and after the war: 
Agricultural products and oil were to take absolute precedence.317 However, if one 
wanted to maximise German benefits, the Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut of the 
German Labour Front argued, the “primitive exploitation economy” had to make way 
for “a systematic adaptation of the economic structure to the needs of the German 
Volk”318. Ideally, “the creation of the Großwirtschaftsraum Europe in its principal 
points” had to be tackled right away. Because  
under a purposeful economic leadership, a united Europe constitutes a stronghold that is im-
pregnable for any opponent. Even if all measures are tailored to the needs of war for the time 
being – no matter whether the coal mines in Northern France are concerned, or the ore mines 
in the Ukraine –, it is essential, however, that all measures taken due to the war do not im-
pede the upcoming peacetime development, but help to prepare it if possible.
319
 
Even in April 1942, when winning the war had already become his “paramount short-
term objective”, Rosenberg concluded that “overall, the same tasks arise for the war-
time as well as for the more distant future”: the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories 
were to supply foodstuffs and raw materials for Europe.320 Thus, in the East, German 
economic long-term planning and short-term war needs pointed into the same direc-
tion, so that the intention of opening up a rich reservoir of primary production for the 
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European Großraumwirtschaft became a crucial and incontestable aspect of the 
German discourse on the future or Europe. 
This congruence of short-term needs and long-term planning discursively solidified in 
a vision of the East as a de-industrialised agrarian economy that the Reich was or-
chestrating according to its needs. Göring translated this notion into an official objec-
tive: “In the long run, the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories will be exploited from a 
colonial angle and with colonial means.”321 As early as May 1941, the agricultural 
department of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost had suggested giving up all industry in the 
East – except for the one in the Donetsk region – in order to redirect the excess 
foodstuffs to the industrialised West.322 Göring repeatedly confirmed this course. In 
June 1941, he reemphasised that industrial plants were not to be reconstructed 
unless they served the German interest in raw materials and foodstuffs.323 After all, 
the target was to increase war-relevant output – namely corn, oilseed crops, mineral 
oil, light metals, agricultural machinery, and transport – not to generally revive the 
economy, as he informed other Reich authorities a month later.324 In November 1941, 
he issued guidelines for German economic policy in the occupied Eastern territories, 
which characterised the East’s industrial prospects accordingly: 
III. The focus of all economic work is on foodstuffs and raw material output. [...] 
IV. Processing is only considered as far as it is absolutely necessary. [...] 
V. A noteworthy industry for commodities and finished products must not develop in the occu-
pied Eastern territories.
325 
According to Hermann von Hanneken, undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Eco-
nomics and plenipotentiary for the iron and steel industry in the Vierjahresplanbe-
hörde, this stance reflected Hitler’s standpoint. At a meeting that the Ministry for the 
Occupied Eastern territories had arranged to coordinate German planning for the 
East, he told the attendants 
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that the Führer generally did not want any processing industry to be created or to be main-
tained in the Eastern territories. The entire procedure of industrial processing shall take place 
in the Reich, while the Eastern territories would be the reservoir of raw materials for the the 
economy of the Reich.
326
 
Not even after the German offensive had ground to a halt in the Russian winter of 
1941/42 did National Socialist officials alter this course.327 In fact, acting and plan-
ning on this maxim did not change until the so-called Iwan-Programm began in early 
summer 1942. Thus, the discursive dominance of arguments that designated the 
Newly Occupied Eastern Territories as caterer for German needs did not only rest on 
the well-established concept of a Großraumwirtschaft and the congruence between 
short-term necessities and long-term planning. This vision was additionally upheld by 
the official backing it received from leading National Socialist officials.  
Furthermore, with respect to the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories, the economic 
and the völkisch interpretive frame proved highly compatible. Hence, the notion that 
the racial value of a Volk ought to be reflected in its economic tasks within the pro-
jected intra-European division of labour additionally added to the deeper discursive 
entrenchment of visions that saw the East as a reservoir of cheap foodstuffs, raw 
materials, and labour. In Heydrich’s notion of Europe, for example, ‘valuable blood’ 
had to be won over. On the other hand, there were the 
Eastern territories, which are partly populated by Slavs; these are the territories where one 
has to know that kindness is only perceived as weakness, these are the territories where the 
Slav himself does not want to be treated equally, where he is used to the master not associat-
ing with him. Hence, these are the territories we have to lead and to keep in the East. These 
are the territories in which, after the military operations deep into Russia, far up to the Urals, 
once a German upper class has to be established for our purposes in a clear form of leader-
ship as raw material base, as workers, as workers for great, also cultural, tasks, as helots, to 
put it drastically [sic].
328
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While Hitler ultimately envisaged a repetition of what happened after the conquest of 
America,329 many National Socialist officials wanted to cash in on the local popula-
tion in the short-run. Heydrich defended employing Ukrainians as auxiliary police as 
a temporarily sensible measure,330 and Göring wanted to harness the qualification of 
the local workers for hard manual labour for the Reich: “German skilled workers be-
long in armaments production. Shovelling and breaking stones is not their task; that 
is what the Russian is there for.”331 However, assigning work to Russians – he in-
sisted – must not lead to “social aspirations” of any kind in the “Russian colonial terri-
tory”. Accordingly, toiling for Germany was to be rewarded with “sufficient, species-
appropriate nutrition” and “a little pocket money” at most.332 After all, it was Hitler’s 
wish to use the profits yielded in the East compensating for the costs of the war. Ad-
ditionally, this wage differential had the convenient side effect of curbing private con-
sumption, thus countering inflationary tendencies.333 While the Ministry of Economics 
intended to act on this maxim by cutting back German staff in the Ostgesellschaften 
for the sake of higher profits, the Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut elaborated a 
völkisch justification for the difference in price and wage levels.334 The hierarchy of 
Völker defined the economic function of the East in the “Großwirtschaftsraum 
Europe”: While among Germans nobody enriched themselves at the expense of an-
other,  
it is something completely different if National Socialism demands such a surplus value of 
Völker that have proven – due to their cultural backwardness – inferior to the German nation; 
especially because this surplus value is the return service for political protection by the Reich. 
To what extent such a demand is ethically justifiable is not to be analysed here. [...] In plain 
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language, this means that the ruled territories have to deliver more goods to the Reich than 
they receive.
335
 
Thus, German völkisch contempt merged with arguments taken from the economic 
interpretive repertoire and solidified into notions in which the population of the East 
was at best to be the cheap labour force of Europe that supplied foodstuffs and raw 
materials thus yielding enough profits for Germany to pay for the costs of the war.336  
At worst, they were left to starve to death because the German needs trumped the 
right to live of the local population in National Socialist reasoning (see chapter 3.2.1). 
After all, the needs of the German population and of the Wehrmacht were consid-
ered paramount for the time being.337 Hence, “securing the surpluses [was] the ulti-
mate objective”338 of many German officials.339 They abided by this course; just as 
did Göring, who was well aware of the consequences: in the East,  
the urban population can obtain only marginal quantities of foodstuffs. For the large cities 
(Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev) nothing at all can be done for now. The resulting consequences 
are tough, but unavoidable.
340 
Accordingly, the lives of the local population hardly played a role when the question 
of how to “produce as much agricultural products as possible”341 triggered some con-
troversy. Göring was willing to live temporarily with the Kolkhoz, this remnant of the 
detested “Bolshevist system” because he feared that reforms would jeopardise agri-
cultural production.342 Hitler, by contrast, took privatisations for industrious and hard-
working people into consideration, but ruled out any changes if they impeded agricul-
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tural output or concerned prospective German settlement areas.343 While Rosen-
berg’s ministry and parts of the military argued that land ownership could be used as 
an incentive to increase cooperation,344 others objected to the dissolution of the Kol-
khozes: Count Yorck von Wartenburg, an employee of the War Economic Office, for 
example, warned that the “want-less and lazy Ukrainians” would only take care of 
their own land then.345 For Hermann Ebhardt, who worked in the Rasse- und Sied-
lungshauptamt, the Kolkhozes were the ideal form of agriculture in the East.346 And 
Heinrich Schöne, Generalkommissar in Volhynia and Podolia, was fairly content with 
the current results. He saw no need to “tackle such ticklish matters”347. Thus, even 
though the vision of the East as the supplier of foodstuffs, raw materials, and cheap 
labour was discursively stabilised by a number of factors, it exhibited rudiments of 
differing arguments and thought patterns with respect to the question of the Kol-
khozes. Discursively this disagreement was made possible by a sacrosanct and su-
perordinate point of reference: Germany. The German Volk had spearheaded the 
völkisch revolution and championed the allegedly necessary völkisch and economic 
reorganisation of Europe by means of the current war. Thus, the intention to maxi-
mise German benefits, could not be challenged by any argument, motive, or thought 
pattern that the two dominant interpretive frames provided. Nothing that was of det-
riment to Germany and its war effort could claim to be ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘sensible’, or 
‘true’. By being bound to this rule, the German discourse on the future of Europe al-
lowed for disagreement on the appropriate means but not on the ends.  
Overall, after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the economic dimension of German 
discourse on the future of Europe was still shaped by the same interpretive frame 
that had already gained a hegemonic position before June 1941. Its repertoire of ar-
guments, motives, and thought patterns had discursively contructed an economic 
New Order that was imagined and expressed as a German-led, autarkic, and power-
ful Großwirtschaftsraum, engaged in a supposedly natural division of labour. Due to 
the racial and economic qualities ascribed to them, the Newly Occupied Eastern Ter-
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ritories were integrated into this New Order as suppliers of raw materials, foodstuffs, 
and labour for the Germanic industrialised core area of Europe.348 This notion was 
discursively stabilised by its reconciliation of short-term needs and long-term plan-
ning, its backing through leading National Socialist officials, and its compatibility with 
the dominant völkisch vision of a racial hierarchy within Europe that was to be re-
flected in the assigned economic roles. Thus, the economic as well as the völkisch 
interpretive frame constructed a clear-cut, stable, and an almost unassailable New 
Order that set narrow limits for the possible ways of speaking about the future of the 
East: The Eastern territories, as a colony or a surrogate colony,349 were supposed to 
cater for the Wehrmacht, the more valuable population, and its factories in a power-
ful German-led Europe. To live up to this role, the alleged Untermenschen in the 
former Soviet territories did not need any industry, so that the meagre remains of 
what Stalin’s scorched-earth policy had left of the already scanty industry in the East 
were deemed dispensable. In one respect, however, this dominant notion left some 
discursive leeway for legitimate disagreement. The principle itself could not be 
doubted but the best way to realise it was up for discussion. Thus, objections could 
be legitimately voiced, as long as they differed only in means but still subscribed to 
the same paramount aim – getting the most out of the East. 
 
3.2.3 Appeals and Warnings – Winning the Population 
Thus it would not only be completely inconsistent but also very short-sighted to want to treat 
people whom we have liberated from Bolshevism and whom we wish to integrate into the ‘re-
ordering’ of Europe and who moreover are Aryans, like negroes or slaves.
350
 (Alfred Rosen-
berg, November 1941) 
With regard to the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories, the völkisch and the eco-
nomic dimension of the German New Order discourse were very much in line. They 
boiled down to the vision of an inferior colony.351 Politically impotent and subject to 
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German arbitrariness, the population in the East was destined to serve European 
needs. Nevertheless, there were voices that challenged this discursive mainstream 
by means of the arguments and thoughts that the völkisch and economic interpretive 
repertoires provided. Additionally, the military situation and its exigencies opened up 
new argumentative repertoires, which these appeals and warnings utilised as discur-
sive leverage to make their ‘truth’ count.  
One line of reasoning that led to a slightly different vision of the East in the New Or-
der had its starting-point in the discursive distinction between the Jewish-Bolshevist 
regime and the Slavic people it had oppressed (see chapter 3.2.1). Consequently, it 
assumed that the Soviet regime was not very popular among the local population, so 
that Germany had the chance to cash in on its anti-communist stance. The 
Wehrmacht High Command, for example, wanted its campaign against the “Jewish-
Bolshevist regime” depicted as liberation of the population from “the tyranny of the 
Soviets”. However, the rhetoric should stay unspecific enough not to raise every-
one’s hopes.352 A meeting of high-ranking National Socialist officials, including Hitler, 
exhibits the same thought pattern. As “liberators”, one would not make “enemies 
prematurely and unnecessarily.”353 Heydrich, by contrast, did not content himself 
with lulling the population into a false sense of security. He expected that “appropri-
ate propaganda” could win over the population for “active measures against the So-
viet regime”.354 Otto Bräutigam, head of the political department in the Ministry for 
the Occupied Eastern territories, nourished still higher hopes:  
It would run through the entire Soviet Union like an electrical spark, if the word was that the 
Germans dissolved the collectives. The impact on the Red Army could not be overestimated. 
Even to the simplest Red Army soldier it would become clear that fighting against Germany 
meant fighting for the maintenance of the hated collectives and against restoring private prop-
erty.
355
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In September 1941, Karl Megerle, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for 
propaganda abroad, put these topics into a European context. Apart from depicting 
the German invasion as a fight for the future of Europe, he advised the press to em-
phasise that Germany wanted to win “back for Europe enormous spaces which the 
Bolsheviks had alienated from the point of view of nationality, economy, and cul-
ture”.356 Thus, as early as the first month of the war against the Soviet Union, a con-
cept found its way into the German discourse on Europe that took into account the 
hopes and wishes of the local population in the East. Even though it was tailored to 
propagandistic purposes, this idea made it possible to imagine and to speak about a 
different kind of New Order and linked it to military benefits.  
This connection between ‘liberation’ and voluntary cooperation was frequently un-
derpinned by personal experiences. In the early days of its Eastern campaign, the 
Wehrmacht troops were indeed greeted with enthusiasm in many places.357 Accord-
ing to Theodor Oberländer, a Professor and exponent of the German Ostforschung 
who worked in the intelligence corps of the army, the Abwehr, after having been 
drafted in 1939, the Ukrainians pinned high hopes on their liberation by German 
troops.358 And “in the Caucasus Bolshevism has prepared the ground for us in a way 
that could not be better for Germany.” As the people detested Bolshevism, all Ger-
many needed to do to “successfully integrate the Caucasus into the New Europe” 
was introducing an agrarian reform, concede some autonomy, and grant religious 
and cultural freedom.359 A memorandum by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern 
Territories held that the willing cooperation of Ukrainians was even easier to maintain. 
Abstaining from seizing their property and letting them have a minimum of food, 
clothes, and living space would suffice.360 Thus, many German officials were con-
vinced that the unpopularity of the Communist regime played into the hands of the 
National Socialist cause. Even relatively small measures promised to yield enormous 
economic and military benefits. 
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However, by the end of 1941, when many officials noticed that the mood of the popu-
lation was about to turn, this discursive linking of the military prospects to the wellbe-
ing and contentment of the people in the conquered territories created the need to do 
something against this development. In a letter to Field Marshall General von Bock, 
commander-in-chief of the Army Group Centre, a certain Major Ilberg, for example, 
blamed the deteriorating material situation and the retention of state property for this 
development. At the same time, he pointed out that the attitude of the local popula-
tion did matter for Germany, as the war in the East would take longer than previous 
campaigns.361 This fear of wasting a unique opportunity while the urgency to seize it 
grew reverberated in many statements. In order to spare “the most valuable German 
Lebensgut [literally: ‘life-stock’]”, the Army High Command wanted to exhaust all 
possibilities to win over the population and to undermine the will to resist. Therefore, 
the “Russian masses have to be persuaded that the abolition of the uncomfortable 
and detested Bolshevist form of government is of real advantage to them.”362 Ac-
cording to top army staff, there were two measures that would make them see the 
benefits: “Dissolution of the Kolkhoz and the restoration of private property.”363 Other 
officials and institutions also pinned high hopes on tackling these problem areas. The 
agricultural department of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost, for example, argued that “settling 
the Kolkhoz question to the satisfaction of everyone”364 was the only way to restore 
the initially positive attitude of the local population. A document from within the Minis-
try for the Occupied Eastern Territories identified the gap between German words 
and deeds as the fundamental problem. Even though the Reich was claiming to 
wage this war for the sake of “European culture”, it hesitated to restore one “charac-
teristic cornerstone of European life”: private property.365  Thus, by the winter of 
1941/42, the notion of an inferior population supplying foodstuffs, raw materials, and 
labour – discursively shaped and enthroned by the dominant völkisch and economic 
interpretive frames – started to be cast into doubt. Several institutions and officials 
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voiced concerns that referred to the gap between the official National Socialist claim 
to liberate the people in the East from the clutches of Bolshevism and actual German 
Eastern policy. 
However, this line of reasoning was not the only available starting-point for criticism 
of the current German occupation policy in the Eastern territories and its premises. A 
different reading of the racial qualities of the European Völker also arrived at a differ-
ent vision of a New Order. Rosenberg, for example, brought forward völkisch argu-
ments and called for a differentiated view on the Völker of the former Soviet Un-
ion.366 In his eyes, the Ukrainians stood out: “The Ukrainians belong to the European 
family of people and are heavily interspersed with Germanic blood. They have pro-
duced remarkable cultural and scientific achievements.”367 Accordingly, he and his 
Ministry assigned a special role to Ukraine. In this war, which “held a new concept of 
our continent and decisively advanced Europe eastwards”,368 Ukraine – as a country 
traditionally opposed to the rule of Russia – was to join the fight. After the war, an 
economically and culturally thriving Ukraine could become a European stronghold 
against the Russian pan-Slavic idea.369 Hence, Rosenberg pictured Ukraine as “an 
inextricable part of Europe-to-be” and wanted “its population educated by us to this 
European community of destiny.”370 However, as noted earlier, this appreciation of 
Ukrainians did not gain ground. Only von Reichenau shared the criticism that “one 
could not treat an important European country that matched the Balkans in terms of 
history and culture like an object of colonial exploitation and at the same time try to 
win it as an ally”.371 The disagreement of others with the discursively established 
völkisch course amounted to nothing more than the demand to treat Russians “like 
fully-fledged human beings.”372 Thus, the völkisch interpretive frame allowed for dif-
fering racial appraisals of the East that arrived at different notions of a völkisch 
Europe. These thoughts and arguments could be voiced, but since their claim to 
                                            
366
 See Bormann’s record of a meeting on National Socialist aims in Eastern Europe, 16 July 1941, 
printed in Lipgens, Documents on the History of European Integration, 1985, pp. 85-86. 
367
 Rosenberg on the treatment of Ukrainians, 22 November 1941, BArch, R 6, 69, pp. 126-128. 
368
 Rosenberg’s instructions for the Reichskommissar in Ukraine, 18 November 1941, BArch, R 6, 69, 
pp. 103-116. 
369
 See notes on Ukraine policy, 20 September 1941, BArch, R 6, 69, pp. 23-24. 
370
 Rosenberg’s notes on the psychological treatment of the population in the occupied Eastern territo-
ries, 23 March 1942, BArch, R 3101, 31.142, pp.15-21. 
371
 Von Reichenau’s memorandum on the ‘Ukraine question’, 26 January 1942, BArch MA, RW 31, 
203, unnumbered. 
372
 Von Unruh’s report for the Army High Command, 23 November 1941, printed in Schumann and 
Nestler, Okkupationspolitik Sowjetunion, pp. 226-228. 
 152 
 
‘truth’ could not stand up to the discursively constructed and widely accepted ‘knowl-
edge’ about the inferiority of Ukrainians, this reinterpretation could not seriously con-
test the thought patterns and beliefs that were underpinning German considerations 
on how to rule in the East.  
The economic knowledge and belief system also allowed for a different line of rea-
soning. Given the German war effort, these economic arguments carried more 
weight within the discourse. One of the proponents of this line of criticism was Theo-
dor Oberländer, who emphasised how important the oil deposits in the Caucasus 
region were for Germany. Since voluntary cooperation by the locals would make it 
much easier to conquer and run the wells, he suggested winning the population over 
by agrarian reforms and abstaining from “colonial rhetoric”.373 With regard to Ukraine, 
he suggested unleashing the initiative of the population by setting incentives, grant-
ing credits, and creating a form of agricultural self-administration.374 Many others 
voiced similar arguments and thoughts. Rosenberg expected “voluntary cooperation, 
not draconian punishments”375 to yield the best results in Ukraine. Ilberg suggested 
distributing farmland and granting economic freedom because he deemed the pros-
pect of wealth to be the best incentive for hard work.376 Colonel Ernst-Anton von 
Krosigk, chief of staff of the I. Army Corps, even let Göring know about the absurdity 
of German policy: Even though German authorities depended on the cooperation of 
the locals, German officials kept mistreating and disappointing them.377 The German 
failure to restore private property carried particular weight. In addition to curbing pri-
vate initiative, it – according to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories – 
also undermined German credibility as “declared champion of abendländisch [occi-
dental] culture and legal standards”.378 Wirsing claimed that there was an obvious 
solution: Germany was interested in increasing agricultural output, and the Russians 
– in their “striking primitive joy over property and possession of any kind”379 – wanted 
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exactly the same as long as it paid off for them. In addition to fostering the war effort, 
a certain Paul Heuss argued that the distribution of land would channel the will to 
work into the right sectors, thereby creating the agrarian and de-industrialised terri-
tory that was to be integrated “into the large European economic process”.380 Thus, 
the economic interpretive frame, particularly the will to maximise output and German 
benefits, opened up the possibility to differ from the course that had discursively 
been set as ‘right’ and ‘good’. Since these calls for a rethink demanded a different 
treatment of the local population in the East, they implicitly challenged the völkisch 
dimension of the New Order for the sake of its economic optimisation. Due to this 
rootedness in the predominant economic knowledge and belief system, this kind of 
thoughts and arguments were at least partly ‘true’ and ‘right’, thus carrying discursive 
weight.  
Another line of argument which also questioned the political course in the East util-
ised a different interpretive repertoire. Instead of referring to the völkisch and eco-
nomic foundations of the envisaged New Order, it argued with military benefits and 
necessities. It claimed that a different, more ‘sensible’, policy would weaken the mo-
rale of the Red Army, minimise the death toll of the Wehrmacht, pacify the areas be-
hind the front line, and secure German supply routes – appealing prospects for a 
country at war. Even though Bräutigam’s optimism, already mentioned, that the 
promise of land ownership would quickly thin out the Red Army’s ranks did not meet 
with a broad positive response, the thought that a more considerate policy would 
benefit the war effort was widely held.381 Oberländer hoped for less problematic 
maintenance of supplies if one fed the local population decently, while General Wal-
ter von Unruh expected the promise of a bright future to weaken the support for par-
tisans.382 The Army High Command also wanted to focus on the front, not the rear: 
In the occupied territories, it is essential to maintain peace and order with a minimum of secu-
rity forces, despite the deteriorating economic situation. Winning over the population in the 
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occupied territory and undermining the will to resist in the Soviet area has to be targeted by all 
means.
383
 
Hans Stieler von Heydekampf, head of the Wirtschaftsinspektion Süd,384 warned that 
Germany was running out of time. The issue of the Kolkhozes had to be tackled and 
exploited propagandistically right away. To support his argument, he quoted the 
views of a captured Russian officer, who had told him that  
[i]n case of a satisfactory solution of the land question a German victory is certain; the solution 
will quickly become known beyond the frontlines. In case Germany fails to present a solution, 
there will be so many partisans in Russia next year that Germany will not be able to help it-
self.
385
  
Similar fears and warnings reverberated in Krosigk’s letter to Göring, a report by the 
head of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost to Herbert Backe, a memorandum by von Reichenau, 
and several other statements, including a circular Rosenberg sent to the Reich’s 
highest authorities.386 In June 1942, even the head of the Eastern department in the 
Ministry of Propaganda, Eberhard Taubert, joined these calls for a change in occu-
pation policy: “To me it seems that the undoubted [negative] effect of our policy in 
the East on the mood in Europe is another argument for changing this policy.”387 
Oberländer took the same line when he postulated:  
It is still possible to win areas and Völker which are absolutely essential for the viability of 
Europe in a blood-saving way with the aid of external forces. However, in this respect, the po-
litical necessities have to be adjusted to the military necessities.
388
 
At the turn of the year 1942/43, an employee of the Ministry for the Occupied East-
ern Territories summed up the stance of the Wehrmacht Commanders. For them, a 
change in policy “has become a categorical demand and its fulfilment is decisive for 
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victory.”389 Thus, the beneficial effects these appeals and warnings expected from a 
more considerate German occupation policy in the East were no longer linked to the 
two dominant interpretive frames. The repertoire of arguments did contain some 
economic considerations but stripped them of their long-term perspective. And even 
though this thought pattern did not fit into the discursively constructed völkisch ‘truth’, 
its short-term horizon and the urgency that Wehrmacht experts ascribed to it made it 
increasingly militarily ‘sensible’. The longer the war went on, the more discursive 
weight this line of reasoning gained: What started out as a matter of making the 
tasks of the Wehrmacht easier was turned into an absolutely vital question for Na-
tional Socialist Germany. 
Overall, the imagination of the East as a crucial part of the future Großwirtschafts-
raum, whose allegedly inferior population was to supply foodstuffs, raw materials, 
and labour, still dominated the German discourse on the future of Europe. However, 
by the end of 1941, a set of arguments and thought patterns was already starting to 
emerge that cast doubt on the reasonableness of ruthlessly subjugating and exploit-
ing the East and its people. These appeals and warnings took into account the 
hopes and wishes of the local population, thus implicitly and explicitly challenging a 
core element of the New Order that had been discursively shaped and stabilised by 
the dominant völkisch and economic interpretive frames (see chapter 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2). Depending on the underlying knowledge and belief system, the discursive 
weight of these deviating lines of reasoning varied. While a reinterpretation of the 
racial value of Ukrainians – as suggested by Rosenberg – was too far away from the 
established ‘truth’ to gain ground, the intent to maximise output and German benefits 
was already endowing many aspects of the New Order with meaning. Accordingly, 
the question of how best to achieve this aim was legitimate even if it contemplated 
treating allegedly inferior people more considerately. German propaganda had 
opened that door, when it had picked up the idea of cashing in on the widespread 
rejection of the Bolshevist system and made the hopes, expectations, and favourable 
attitudes of the local population a valid and expressible category of thinking. The dis-
cursively most powerful line of reasoning took its thoughts and arguments from a 
different interpretive repertoire: A more considerate policy promised short-term mili-
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tary benefits. Even though the pursuit of such a policy boiled down to a different New 
Order, its rationale became more ‘true’, ‘right’ and ‘sensible’ the longer the war 
dragged on. In this way, numerous appeals and warnings emerged that were rooted 
in different knowledge and belief systems. They established a new way of speaking 
about the local populations within the discourse on the future of Europe. However, 
these arguments and thought patterns were not yet powerful enough to dethrone the 
currently dominant New Order. After all, the two dominant interpretive frames had 
discursively shaped and stabilised a concept that not only promised to reconcile 
German short-term needs with its long-term objectives but also völkisch with eco-
nomic necessities. Hence, it took a different development to reconfigure the New 
Order discourse – the prospect of losing the war.  
 
3.3 The Impending Defeat Curtailing Nazi Dreams (1943-1945) 
And just as the National Socialist movement around Adolf Hitler stepped up to fight the red 
front and the reactionaries, so today the whole of Germany is in the forefront of the struggle 
for Germany and Europe that has been forced upon us, as a united block of fanatical fighters. 
‘Germany, awake!’ has become ‘Europe, awake!’ and Europe is waking up and rubbing its 
eyes as if after a deep sleep. It is mobilising its forces and joining the ranks of a common de-
fensive front, in profound acknowledgement that it is not just about Germany, but about every-
thing, about the life of the peoples of this continent [...].
390
 (Anton Reinthaller, June 1944) 
By 1943, the quick victories of the Wehrmacht were a thing of the past. Soviet Rus-
sia had halted its advance, had started to win battles and seized the military initiative 
more and more. In the German corridors of power, officials responded to the deterio-
rating military situation by exhausting all possibilities of increasing the war effort. 
Step by step all spheres of life were tailored to all-out war. 
Being convinced that Germany and Europe would be doomed if the Allies were victo-
rious, German officials increasingly subordinated everything to the war effort. While 
the German discourse on the future of Europe had been shaped by völkisch and 
economic thoughts and arguments, this process of “Getting Priorities Straight” (3.3.1) 
narrowed down all considerations to one rationale: winning the war. Since the Reich 
alone would not stand a chance, the economic dimension of the New Order gained 
ground. German officials increasingly resorted to the immobilised war-economic po-
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tential in Europe and “Europeanising the War Economy” (3.3.2) became the order of 
the day. This reconfiguration of the discourse left German officials with two options: 
Forcing Europe into compliance within the desired European community, which 
jointly fought ‘Jewish-plutocracy’ and ‘Jewish-Bolshevism’, or giving the European 
states something worth fighting for. Hence, as appealing concepts for Europe-to-be 
promised to make the German cause a European one, drafting more considerate 
notions of Europe became one way of “Keeping the Dream Alive” (3.3.3). Alterna-
tively, the initially envisaged New Order could be retained by condoning the sug-
gested concessions as temporary means to the actual end. In this way, the allied 
armies, which were cutting the German sphere of influence down to size, kept 
broadening the spectrum of the New Order discourse; until ultimately the German 
struggle for a new Europe became an unrealistic dream again. 
 
3.3.1 War and its Necessities – Getting Priorities Straight 
Total war is thus the order of the day. We have to put an end to bourgeois squeamishness 
[…]. The threat confronting us is gigantic. Our struggle against this threat must therefore also 
be gigantic. The hour is now upon us to remove the kid gloves and bandage the fists. A cur-
sory and superficial exploitation of the rich war potential of our own country but also of the 
significant areas of Europe that are at our disposal, is no longer acceptable.
391
 (Joseph 
Goebbels, February 1943) 
In his infamous Sportpalast speech in February 1943, Minister of Propaganda Josef 
Goebbels called for all-out war and the handpicked audience responded with frenetic 
exultation. They cheered at the prospect of exhausting all possibilities to achieve the 
victory in this decisive war. The calls for a more considerate policy for the sake of the 
war effort, which had been voiced by numerous appeals and warnings (chapter 3.2.3) 
a few months earlier, had found considerably less favour. Since victory was long in 
coming, however, their thoughts and arguments increasingly gained ground. Ulti-
mately, war necessities outweighed all other lines of reasoning, so that the course of 
the war brought National Socialist Germany back from discretionary post-war plan-
ning along völkisch and economic lines to the here and now of practical politics. The 
New Order still played a role, as one means to the end of winning the war. 
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Germany’s defeat in Stalingrad was not a major turning-point in regards to the New 
Order. The critical voices which had accompanied German occupation policy for 
years still tried to make themselves heard. They continued to bring forward the same 
arguments and justified their opposition in the same ways as previously. For “impera-
tive military reasons”, the High Command of the Army Group South, for example, 
called for an occupation policy that was able to “maintain peace and security”392. 
Riecke demanded a reconsideration because it was “urgently required to conserve 
and to increase the will to work among the fremdvölkisch [alien] rural population.”393 
And a certain Zimmermann394 reported a broad agreement on “the thought that the 
power of Bolshevism can only be broken by the active engagement of the local 
population.”395 However, instead of casting doubt on the validity of the dominant 
völkisch and economic interpretive repertoires, the need for a rethink was regularly 
passed off as “most valuable assistance to the German war effort”396 that would 
“shorten the war and spare German blood”397. This line of reasoning gained ground 
within the discourse as more and more officials reiterated these thoughts and argu-
ments that linked the military prospects of success to the idea of attracting the sup-
port of the population in the occupied territories. Governor General Hans Frank, for 
example, concluded a memorandum in which he argued for a different political 
course in the General Government, with the pledge: “My Führer, please understand 
my remarks as the vehement desire to bring about an important assistance for the 
German Volk in this hardest time of its struggle for existence.”398 Like him, numerous 
others were now willing to be “more considerate towards the mentalities and wishes 
of the European Völker”,399 if that was the price to pay for a German victory. Thus, 
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German occupation policy – delineated by the discursively hegemonic combination 
of the völkisch and the economic interpretive frame (see chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) – 
was increasingly considered counterproductive. Instead of ruthlessly exploiting the 
inferior populations of Europe, taking their wellbeing into account seemed more and 
more ‘right’ and ‘reasonable’. After all, this approach promised to save valuable 
German blood by shortening the war. 
To dethrone a vision that was not only discursively stabilised by the two dominant 
interpretive frames, but also deeply rooted in long-standing traditions of German 
thinking, it needed a powerful alternative. The more the military situation deteriorated, 
the more power one specific fear wielded over the discourse: the doomsday scenario 
of losing the war. Its starting-point was a conviction that Hitler shared: “if this war 
were to be lost, a restoration of Europe would be impossible”, “because the best 
races of the world would be annihilated at one blow.”400 Amidst a war in which both 
enemies supposedly were bent on exterminating Europe and its uniqueness, this 
assessment became powerful. Oberländer saw Germany defending the ‘Occident’ 
(Abendland) against the “anti-cultural military machine of Bolshevism”401 and against 
the Americans, the other “deadly threat” whose victory would bring “materialism and 
völkisch decomposition”402. The Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut shared this fear:  
In the fight against plutocracy and Bolshevism, the German Reich is the shield bearer of our 
continent. The fate of the continent depends on its victory; its victory will decide on the princi-
ples by which the European Völker will live. It is clear what plutocracy and Bolshevism will 
bring: A plutocratic victory means the rule of trust capital over the European Völker; a Bolshe-
vist victory inevitably means the annihilation of European culture.
403 
Others painted similar pictures of horror scenarios in case of a German defeat. Rich-
ard Riedl,404 an Austrian diplomat, economic politician, and advocate of European 
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economic integration, feared the dependence on alien ideologies, 405  while SS-
Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger 406  and the publications of the SS-Hauptamt, 
which he headed, emphasised the role of Jewry in this attempt to destroy “the entire 
abendländische culture” 407 , “2500 years of cultural unity”, and “völkisch self-
assertion”.408 Less völkisch in his tone, but equally sure of the devastating conse-
quences of defeat, Walter Labs, who worked in the main department administration 
of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, saw Europe threatened in its 
very existence.409 Hence, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, a SS-Hauptamt since June 
1941, virtually put the National Socialist perception of this war into a nutshell when it 
concluded: “Germany will be victorious together with Europe, or Europe will be anni-
hilated together with Germany.”410 Thus, the war and its perception in Germany dis-
cursively created an all-or-nothing situation: At the end of the war, either Germany 
and its New Order would be standing tall or Germany and its New Order would be no 
more. Since this dichotomy also heavily tapped into the völkisch interpretive reser-
voir by translating the current war into a fight between the German Volk and Jewry, it 
knew no middle ground. In this way, the discourse was bound to one means and one 
conceivable end: The future of Europe could only be the German New Order and 
there was only one way it could come true: by winning the war. 
The unconditional objective of winning the war instituted a new powerful interpretive 
frame. It provided meaningful thought patterns and arguments that justified an analy-
sis of all aspects of German policy to see if it stood up to close scrutiny from a war-
economic angle. Measured by this new discursively established yardstick, the expe-
diency of German occupation policy in the Eastern territories seemed particularly 
doubtful. A collection of statements gathered by Ernst Köstring, the General leading 
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the Osttruppen,411 suggested a complete turnaround: the Reich should officially re-
nounce its colonial aims to allay the fear of the local population that “their coopera-
tion contributed to the enslavement of their people”,412 install a committee as the fu-
ture Russian government, and muster an army of Russians that fought side by side 
with the Wehrmacht. Otherwise, it was illusory to hope for the support of the Russian 
population.413 Rosenberg also expected National Committees and the promise of 
some autonomy to “bolster the front by creating and deploying native military forma-
tions”,414 and many military commanders believed that a “complete renunciation of 
previous methods” was “of war-deciding importance”.415 Others did not go quite as 
far. The Wannsee Institut, a research institution within the foreign intelligence service 
of the Reich Security Main Office (SD-Ausland), was in agreement with Riedl when it 
expected that a “just solution of the agrarian question, which accommodated the de-
sires of the population”,416 would suffice to win them over. And Goebbels, naturally 
more concerned with German rhetoric, tried “to spare German blood and to achieve 
victory”417 by making German officials aware of a contradiction: “One cannot call the 
people of the Ostvölker, which hoped for their liberation through us, beasts, barbari-
ans etc. and then expect them to take an interest in our victory.”418 Thus, the neces-
sities of war started to reshape the New Order discourse by fuelling and legitimising 
considerations of alternative political courses in the East. The voiced thoughts, ar-
guments, and conclusions were far from unanimous, but the wellbeing of the local 
population started to count for something. Due to the new interpretive frame defined 
by the war effort, the former Slavic Untermenschen had become valuable enough to 
be worth being won over. 
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The growing importance of the necessities of war left their mark on the New Order 
discourse in a second way. It made possible new ways of speaking by separating 
means and ends. Hans Frank, for example, spelled out this distinction very clearly. 
He wanted his memorandum on the treatment of the Polish Volkstum to be under-
stood solely as a means to foster the war effort: 
In my remarks, I have not commented on the long-term objectives which the German leader-
ship will realise after the victorious end of the struggle for existence. However, it seems to me 
that a lot of harm has been done by trying to realise short-term and long-term objectives either 
at the same time or without appropriate coordination and without soberly weighing the realistic 
possibilities.
419
 
In January 1944, he depicted this differentiation between the current necessities and 
the prospective German policy even more explicitly: 
Once we have won the war, I do not care if mincemeat is made out of the Poles and the 
Ukrainians and everything that roves about here; it does not matter what happens. However, 
at this point, the only important thing is that we succeed in keeping almost 15 million people of 
a Volk that is turning against us in peace, order, work, and discipline.
420
 
This distinction between long-term goals and necessary short-term adjustments re-
verberated in numerous statements. Oberländer, for example, highlighted that his 
suggestions could be realised without “the frequently feared and undesired final de-
cision on German Eastern policy”.421 Riecke’s defence of the privatisation of farm-
land argued with the “utmost performance for the duration of the war” and the set-
tlement space, which could “always be vacated after the war”.422 Because one had to 
distinguish “between ideal objectives, which cannot be achieved immediately, and 
the steps which lead to these ideal objectives”, Martin Bormann, head of the NSDAP 
Chancellery and as his personal secretary a gatekeeper regulating access to Hit-
ler,423 wanted to see the occupied territories calmed and treated decently. After all, 
they should “not keep military forces busy but, on the contrary, contribute to increas-
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ing our military potential.” 424 And Alfred Frauenfeld, the former General Commissar 
for Crimea,425 criticised the policy of his superior Erich Koch. He argued that if one 
had the choice between antagonising the people by politically following one’s true 
intentions or taking a slight detour that promised positive effects on propaganda and 
the course of the war, there was no doubt that one had to choose the latter.426 Thus, 
the war effort made it possible to bring forward arguments against the current Ger-
man political course without getting a reputation for doubting the valid knowledge 
and belief systems and the long-term New Order notions they had produced. Any-
thing that promised short-term benefits for the war effort could now be voiced. This 
focus on the here and now profoundly changed the German New Order discourse. 
Not only did it increase the discursive value of short-term considerations at the ex-
pense of long-term planning but it also opened up new possibilities of speaking 
about Europe. 
These new ways of speaking about Europe also altered the way the future of Europe 
could be imagined and expressed. Because of the increasing invalidation of long-
term considerations, the New Order was no longer on everyone’s lips. And due to 
the predominance of the war effort paradigm, potentially counter-productive long-
term schemes were hardly justifiable anymore, while thoughts and arguments gained 
ground that transformed the New Order from what was a nightmare for the subju-
gated peoples into something they could support, or at least live with. While some – 
Erich Köstring for example – saw the need to counter the “white negroes” theme of 
Soviet propaganda with a German acknowledgement of the people in the East “as 
equal part of the European population under self-government”,427 the High Com-
mand of Army Group South expected a successful framing of the expectations of the 
local populations to be a decisive step towards victory.428 Hans Frank argued that “if 
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the Polish Volk is supposed to adopt the war aims of the Axis as its own in the fateful 
struggle of Europe”, one had to convince them that compared to Russia, “the Ger-
mans will apply a bright and better principle for Europe.”429 The diplomat Rudolf 
Rahn, who represented the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris and Rome, made a 
similar point. He deemed the promotion of an appealing vision for the future “a politi-
cal and propagandistic tactic, which would spare blood”. After all, “nice gestures are 
cheap and can be extremely effective.”430 Melitta Wiedemann, a journalist and editor 
of the journal Die Aktion – Kampfblatt für das Neue Europa, worried that the German 
“silence on the future shape of the new Europe is interpreted as absolute proof of our 
ill-will”. Therefore, she demanded, “we now have to seize the idea of Paneuropa 
[Paneuropean Union], realise it with our means, and guarantee the German lead in a 
contented Europe.”431  
Melitta Wiedemann was neither the first nor the only one for whom actions spoke 
louder than words. In several instances, concrete planning reflected the integrative 
effects German officials expected from realising an acceptable New Order. One 
memorandum, for example, demanded the creation of a customs and currency union 
with semi-autonomous Baltic States.  
Regarding foreign affairs and in the interests of a new Europe, this European solution will 
have tremendous propagandistic effects and appeal; and it will be the foreign policy figure-
head of Greater Germany for the North and East. With great immediate effects we can now 
anticipate the later development, practically demonstrate a part of the new Europe, and at the 
same time solidify our anti-Bolshevist mission [...].
432
 
Several other memoranda – mainly originating in the Ministry for the Occupied East-
ern Territories – contributed to this reinterpretation of the New Order. They argued 
for self-administration in Estonia because “it would spare much German blood and 
demonstrate to the world how the Reich practically wants to and does lead the new 
Europe”,433 or wanted to declare Estonia’s and Latvia’s independence as an ac-
knowledgement of their merits and “at the same time as an incentive for even greater 
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dedication to the common struggle against Bolshevism.” 434  However, Bräutigam 
added, generosity was crucial in this context. If German attempts fell short, they 
would neither mobilise additional potential for the war effort, nor send a signal. They 
would only be interpreted “as a tactical concession, as weakness”.435 Thus, the in-
terpretive repertoire that the war effort offered reshaped the German discourse on 
the future of Europe. The New Order was not freed of its roots in the völkisch inter-
pretive frame entirely – as the focus on the Baltic States, which were considered 
relatively racially sound (see chapter 3.2.1), reveals –, but it was now increasingly 
tailored to its anticipated perception. Europe-to-be was now considered ‘right’ and 
‘sensible’ if it promised to shorten the war by attracting support.  
In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, similar considerations led Ribbentrop and Cécil von 
Renthe-Fink – former Plenipotentiary in Denmark and 1943/44 envoy in Vichy 
France – to develop the idea of proclaiming a European federation after the next ma-
jor military victory. Apart from allaying fears among allies and neutrals, the prospect 
of a united Europe would also weaken the combat power of the United States and 
Russia, while facilitating the recruiting of volunteers.436 Hence, this European federa-
tion would help to mobilise all “European forces as much as possible for our victory 
and create a situation that disencumbers us internally and strengthens us exter-
nally”437 without barring the way to a “Greater Germanic Reich at the end of the 
war”438. However, these thoughts faced a fundamental dilemma: a New Order that 
cemented the German hegemony could hardly be passed off as a fair one. Thus, the 
only prospect that could be offered was “that every Volk would have its due status in 
Europe-to-be”.439 Thus, New Order planning in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not 
only exhibits all aspects of the changes the discourse underwent after 1943 it also 
reveals the discursive constraints that still limited what could be said about Europe. 
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The German claim to leadership and the völkisch interpretive frame still made it im-
possible to promote Europe as union of free and equal nations.  
However, all these discursive developments met prominent opposition by a different 
line of reasoning. It also took its arguments and thoughts from the interpretive frame 
that the war effort had endowed with meaning, but arrived at different conclusions. 
For the time being, Hitler, for example, considered promises useless, as even “the 
best declaration would fail to win over the population and would not force them to 
see reason”440. At the moment, one could not even win over the Germanic Völker 
due to the war. Therefore, it would be misguided to be considerate, just as it would 
be wrong to proclaim the “United States of Europe” as a “New Order manoeuvre”.441 
Göring adopted this stance as his own and spread the word:  
It is a fundamental mistake to assume that we would be able to win over the population by 
treating them leniently. We cannot win the population over for the aims of the reorganisation 
of Europe before the end of the war.
442
 
Both clung to the idea that the “aim of our fighting has to remain the creation of a 
unified Europe” and that “Europe [...] can only be clearly organised by the Ger-
mans”,443 but they deemed it impossible to reconcile German short-term needs with 
its long-term aims. Therefore, the current credo had to be that  
all measures have to be seen from the perspective of bearing the burden of war. Every step 
that ensures easing this burden is right, and every step that endangers an easement is 
wrong.
444
 
Thus, the war effort had gained a hegemonic position in the German discourse on 
Europe. All German officials shared the common ground of winning the war. How-
ever, this rationale allowed for a broad spectrum of arguments and thoughts. And 
despite the efforts of Hitler and Göring to seize the interpretational sovereignty over 
what was ‘useless’, ‘misguided’, ‘wrong’, or a ‘mistake’, the discursive mainstream 
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established a different ‘truth’. It stipulated that the support of the subjugated people 
might help to win the war, so that attempts at winning them over were ‘sensible’ and 
‘right’. 
Overall, the ‘truth’ that winning over the local population would improve the military 
prospects of success, which the appeals and warnings had constructed already be-
fore 1943 (see chapter 3.2.3), started to change the German discourse on Europe 
profoundly. Together with and reinforced by the all-or-nothing dichotomy between 
victory or doom that increasingly gained ground, it gave additional meaning to 
thoughts and arguments that favoured a more considerate course, while it discarded 
the complete disregard of the local populations, which the pursuit of the established 
völkisch and economic long-term objectives entailed. By separating short-term ne-
cessities and long-term objectives, which the previously dominant vision of a New 
Order had promised to reconcile, this reconfiguration of the discourse was addition-
ally facilitated. In this way, it became possible not only to criticise the current German 
occupation policies in Europe but also to advocate New Order concepts that offered 
a brighter future to the subjugated people; even if they had earlier been classified as 
racially inferior Untermenschen. Arguments and thought patterns that previously 
would have counted as challenges of the established knowledge and belief system 
could now be brought forward as long as they claimed to serve the war effort. Never-
theless, the discourse on Europe and its future was still subject to restrictions. The 
German claim to European leadership and the völkisch truth of the inequality of 
races could still not be defied. Hitler’s and Göring’s attempts to set the definitions for 
what was ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ with respect to the war effort, however, did not prove 
binding within the discourse.445 Both refused to rely on the diffuse hope that loosen-
ing the reins might make Europe see reason. In their eyes, Europe had to be forged 
into the desired war-economic block by force. 
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3.3.2 Carrots and Sticks – Europeanising the War Economy 
In the context of the tasks assigned to the planning office, it is necessary to focus to a greater 
degree than before on the entire economic area available to us. Where Großraum planning 
promises war-economic benefits, the planning has to be expanded from the Reich territory to 
the German sphere of influence to the economic spheres of our allies as well as of neutral 
states. The limits and the sequence of this expansion is determined by their value for the 
achievement of victory. There is no room for any planning that does not bring us closer to vic-
tory.
446
 (Hans Kehrl, December 1943) 
Three and a half years after Schlotterer had called for an expansion of National So-
cialist economic principles concerning Germany’s sphere of influence (see chapter 
3.1.2), Kehrl – now head of the Planning and Raw Materials Office in the Ministry for 
Armaments and War Production – reiterated the demand. At the end of the year 
1943, he and other German officials were dissatisfied with the functioning of the 
Großraumwirtschaft. However, given the appraisal of the war (see chapter 3.3.1) and 
the deteriorating military situation, intensifying European economic cooperation had 
discursively been translated into a matter of survival. This reorientation towards the 
short-term necessities of the war allowed for two different lines of reasoning: For the 
war effort’s sake, one could either speak out for concessions to the subjugated peo-
ples that promised voluntary cooperation, or one could call for an even more uncom-
promising course that was meant to force Europe into compliance.  
The war, which was allegedly fought for the very existence of Germany, Europe, and 
the Aryan race, reinforced the point of leaving no stone unturned in order to achieve 
victory. Unlocking the war-economic potential of Europe, however, was a stone not 
far to seek. Within the German discourse on Europe, economic cooperation had al-
ways figured as a means to turn Europe into a global power that would be capable of 
standing up to any other Großraum (see chapter 2 and 3.1.2). Accordingly, German 
officials not only advocated streamlining the entire German economy but also spoke 
out in favour of roping in the European economies for war. In February 1943, Goeb-
bels, for example, instructed leading officials accordingly:  
For victory, we not only have to mobilise all somehow available forces of the German Volk but 
also those of the Völker that inhabit the countries we have occupied and conquered in the 
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course of the war. All forces of the European continent, particularly those of the Eastern 
Völker, have to be employed in the fight against Jewish-Bolshevism.
447 
He was not the only one who turned to Europe as a last resort. The Reichsbank 
pointed out that “the Reich depends on utilising the economies of the European 
countries as much as possible to meet the war requirements.”448 The planning office 
(Planungsamt) in the Ministry of Armament and War Production emphasised that, 
given Allied military pressure, it was crucial “to obtain all somehow available goods 
from occupied and allied countries.”449 Despite the new heights in armaments output, 
which Albert Speer, Minister of Armament and War Production, repeatedly pro-
claimed,450 the Hauptabteilung III in the Ministry of Economics demanded further in-
creases. Apart from other measures, it recommended the complete exhaustion of all 
reserves that still existed in the occupied territories.451 Thus, the long-standing dis-
cursive link between European power and economic cooperation now came fully into 
its own. Germany faced a war-economic problem, the economic superiority of its 
enemies, and in search for a solution, it resorted to existing knowledge and belief 
systems. Apart from being a discursively established long-term objective, the align-
ment of the European economies in a Großraumwirtschaft now also figured as a 
pressing short-term necessity within the German discourse on Europe.  
However, the Großraumwirtschaft still left a lot to be desired. A look around Europe 
left some National Socialist officials disillusioned. According to Hitler, the occupied 
territories had not yet realised the gravity of the situation.452 With regard to the 
Southeastern states, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle underlined this view. There still 
were  
governments that would not be in power anymore if it were not for the Reich, but which have 
mobilised merely a fraction of the production of their countries. Governments which either out 
of a lack of will or humble capabilities, abstain from sparing no effort to help feed and supply 
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Europe’s central home front, namely Germany’s, Europe’s most diligent workers, namely 
Germany’s, the Volk that paid the highest price in blood in Europe, namely the Germany’s 
[...].
453
 
The Planungsstab Europa (planning staff Europe) in the Ministry of Armaments and 
War Production, newly created to advance Europe-wide economic planning and 
headed by Arnold Köster, arrived at the same conclusion, but found that Germany 
had to take at least part of the blame: 
In the occupied territories, an active willingness to aid Germany in its fight for the freedom of 
Europe exists only on a very limited scale. This observation shows that Germany has not 
managed to lead the occupied territories in the sense of a European economic order but has, 
with more or less skill or success, administered them as an occupation force! [...] Germany 
has not been able to unite the European states in a war-economic fighting community in ac-
cordance with the tough necessities of war.
454 
Hence, Arnold Köster spoke for many National Socialist officials when he took the 
view that “Germany still bore the brunt of the war” while one could observe “an al-
most peacetime life and a peacetime economy in other European countries.”455 
There was another side to this coin though: The lack of mobilisation of the European 
economies offered enormous potential, which many National Socialist officials were 
determined to put into the service of the German war effort. Convinced that many 
occupied Völker still enjoyed a carefree life, Hitler intended to let them feel the hard-
ships of the war by squeezing out more workers and deliveries.456 Kehrl was also 
convinced that there were plenty of goods; they just trickled out into the hidden 
economy. Accordingly, he called on the Reichsbeauftragte to move in on the existing 
black markets that were seen as a decisive hindrance to “sustainably utilising the 
occupied countries’ economies”.457 And Fritz Sauckel, appointed General Plenipo-
tentiary for Labour Deployment in March 1942, demanded that “the European Völker 
have to provide manpower for the Reich”, to the degree that Germany sent soldiers 
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into “Europe’s struggle for freedom”.458 After a journey through the occupied Western 
territories, a certain Bauer also highlighted the existence of “considerable free ca-
pacities” and the widespread “willingness to take on German contracts”,459 which the 
Hauptabteilung III in the Ministry of Economics’ was eager to use by generally in-
creasing the outsourcing of German production.460 Thus, the perception became es-
tablished that Europe did not yet live up to its potential and could do much more to 
satisfy the war economy’s insatiable hunger for workers, goods, and money. How-
ever, the different appraisals of who had to answer for this shortcoming of the 
Großraumwirtschaft were crucial because they constituted a discursive watershed: if 
one blamed the unwillingness of the respective country for the refusal to take part in 
this allegedly decisive struggle, force seemed a viable and ‘sensible’ option to in-
crease ‘cooperation’. If one ascribed the insufficient mobilisation of the European 
economies to German failures, organisational improvements and suitable incentives 
suggested themselves as remedies. 
For Speer, the necessary Europeanization of the war economy was a matter of co-
ordination and organisation. Being in charge of “exhausting all possibilities to in-
crease armaments capacities in the occupied countries”, he pinned his hopes on 
standardisation, simplifying administration, and streamlining. In the case of France, 
he was confident of having created “the organisational preconditions for an exhaus-
tive and systematic utilisation of the war-relevant capacities” by attuning the French 
to the German economy and by integrating France into a “European overall plan-
ning”.461 In a memorandum on European economic planning, by contrast, the author 
– probably Arnold Köster – lamented that an “organisation for practical European 
economic planning does not exist yet, just as a European economic policy is miss-
ing.”462 However,  
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[the] mobilisation of the economic powers calls for European economic planning under Ger-
man leadership!  
The willingness of the European states (occupied, allied, and neutral countries) to make major 
sacrifices for the common struggle for existence can only be achieved by drawing on all loyal 
and well-meaning forces and by a planning that also takes into account non-German con-
cerns.
463 
For both purposes, the planning office in the Ministry of Armaments and War Produc-
tion created a ‘Planungsstab Europa’. By manning it with German officials and for-
eign figures, Köster hoped to get suggestions on how to better utilise the respective 
countries in the “overall interest of Europe”, hints where hidden synergies could lie, 
and promotional effects for the idea of a “European economic community”.464 Kehrl’s 
intention to cash in on the war-economic benefits that the German sphere of influ-
ence offered found its expression in the creation of a Europakränzchen.465 Consist-
ing of the staff of the planning office and German industrialists, this informal commit-
tee was supposed to be a platform for socialising and an international exchange of 
ideas which promised to foster cooperation in the medium-term and ultimately to 
lead to “common planning for war and peace” in the long run.466 Thus, the leading 
officials in the Ministry of Armaments and War Production exemplify one line of rea-
soning that the discourse on Europe produced under the growing pressure of the war 
effort. It subscribed to the short-term horizon established by the dichotomy of victory 
or doom and expected organisational improvement and thoughtfulness to yield the 
desired effects. 
A second line of reasoning declared Europe’s meagre contribution to the war effort a 
matter of trade policy. By abolishing most trade barriers, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories intended to increase the flow of 
goods and to make trade more efficient.467 Additionally backed by the Ministry of Nu-
trition and Agriculture, the Ministry of Economics, and Göring, Ludwig Imhoff, an un-
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dersecretary in the Ministry of Economics, revived his plans for optimising European 
tariffs in December 1943. Explicitly picking up the ideas of a memorandum from Sep-
tember 1941,468 he advocated reforms that were supposed to 
bring about a preferably unimpeded exchange of the respective products; they serve the pur-
pose of mobilising and pooling the economic forces of Europe and therefore are war-relevant; 
The expectation that these measures – particularly the preferential tariffs – will have a positive 
effect in the post-war period does not change this.
469
 
However, a certain Wucher, whom the Reich Chancellery had consulted in this mat-
ter, denied Imhoff’s claim to war-relevance outright. In his eyes, post-war planning 
was inappropriate at the moment and nothing was hampering German trade.470  
Given that Germany’s staggering clearing deficits evolved into a major obstacle to 
intensifying trade, others did not subscribe to this appraisal. Slovakia, for example, 
refused to take on contracts as long as they were to be paid in Reichsmark. Since 
political reasons obstructed one possible solution to this problem, the creation of a 
customs and currency union,471 the Ministry of Economics saw two alternatives re-
maining: One could either sell shares in German companies to Slovakia, or do with-
out the country’s exports.472 For the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, this reluctance was a 
matter of trust. For this reason, “faith in Adolf Hitler has to be transferred bit by bit 
even to the small producers.”473 Concretely, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle proposed 
substituting cash payments with vouchers. With the help of “colourfully illustrated 
catalogues”, these promises for the future would inspire the producers with the con-
fidence that working for Germany paid off. In this way, these coupons would become 
a “weapon of the European home front”.474 Kehrl also blamed the waning faith in 
Germany’s victory for the growing reluctance of sovereign states to supply their ex-
ports on credit. On the one hand, he wanted to increase German creditworthiness by 
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redefining the clearing deficit. It was “not a German, but a European debt”, as the 
war was “not fought solely for Germany, but for all European states”475. However, 
since there was no way around paying allied and neutral states in foreign currency, 
on the other hand, he promoted the idea of selling the shares of German companies 
abroad. Apart from generating convertible currency, this measure would increase the 
buyers’ interest in and support for Germany.476 The Reichsbank, however, saw intra-
European trade hamstrung by an unsolvable problem:  
The fundamental reasons for the economic difficulties in the occupied territories are the result 
of the European countries being largely cut off from their natural foreign trade relations, while 
being very intensively harnessed by Germany for the sake of strengthening its war potential. 
Hence, major tensions of the supply situation necessarily arose. As long as these causes 
cannot be remedied, one cannot expect a fundamental improvement.
477
  
Despite this pessimistic diagnosis, the Reichsbank saw no cause for concern. The 
deliveries of the occupied countries had increased every year and they still would if 
one kept carrying on as before.478 Thus, the well-established economic interpretative 
frame still shaped the way German officials spoke about Europe. Barriers to its inter-
nal trade, had been identified as a crucial problem decades ago. Now, overcoming 
them posed the same challenges – customs issues and monetary questions – but 
became increasingly pressing. The traditional concept of a European customs and 
currency union served as a theoretical benchmark when the clearing system, estab-
lished as a panacea in 1940, was problematised as a two-edged sword: it allowed 
more exploitation the less autonomy a territory enjoyed,479 but linked the willingness 
to export to the confidence in a German victory. Hence, in the discourse, short-term 
necessity and the long-term objective of creating a functioning European Großraum-
wirtschaft now depended on the support of the other European nations. 
The same thought pattern becomes apparent in statements about the insufficient 
output of the European economies. After all, before Germany could get its hands on 
goods, they had to be produced. In this respect, many officials blamed German oc-
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cupation policy for having contributed to a lower economic output than was possible, 
particularly in the Eastern territories. While Germany increasingly depended on the 
support of the local population, German policy undermined its cooperativeness, in-
stead of inciting the “will to work and productivity”.480 Oberländer brought forward 
similar arguments and criticised German shortsightedness in Ukraine: Even though 
“the New Europe cannot be established without the voluntary cooperation of the 
Slavs”,481  he argued that Koch was attempting to “degenerate a European Volk 
forcefully”, and the “boundless settlement plans” thwarted “the achievement of war-
relevant short-term objectives” 482  because they “give rise to partisans and cost 
blood”483. In the words of Rosenberg this line of reasoning sounded even more 
pragmatic:  
If the political interest of the German Volk commandingly calls for an activation of the potential 
that lies idle in the Ukrainian Volk, and for roping them in for the shortening of the war and the 
safeguarding of the leading position of the Reich in the new Europe, then strengthening the 
Ukrainian Volk has to be promoted by all means up to the desired degree.
484 
In a letter to SS-Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner, since January 1943 head of 
Reich Security Main Office, Hans Frank expressed a similar thought with regard to 
the General Government. If the “interests of the Greater German Reich” called for it, 
he was willing to pursue a “productive policy towards the Polish Volksgruppe; that is 
a policy that mobilises them, preferably, entirely for our tasks and causes.”485 When 
commenting on Frank’s suggestions to Himmler, Kaltenbrunner partly sided with this 
standpoint. He spoke out in favour of a “firm but fair” policy which refrained from de-
famatory propaganda and victimisation and kept the long-term objectives in mind.486 
In this sense, the economic interpretive frame gave additional meaning to the 
thoughts and arguments that the critics of the German occupation policy in East had 
voiced since 1941. With respect to the war effort and the functioning of the Groß-
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raumwirtschaft, the policy of ruthlessness, particularly in the East, seemed even 
more ‘wrong’, ‘unreasonable’, and self-defeating.  
In this way, the war effort now underscored the criticisms that had accompanied 
German occupation policy in the East from the outset (see chapter 3.2.3). Conse-
quently, the calls for reforms grew louder within the discourse. They were voiced in 
different variations, with slightly differing emphases, but with growing vehemence. 
There was hardly a memorandum, note, or letter that did not stress the importance of 
pushing on with agrarian reforms and privatisation and of improving the lot of the 
local population and Eastern workers.487 Without rectifying the nutrition and the legal 
security of the people, higher outputs were deemed illusory. Additionally, German 
social and cultural policy fanned fears, as the Wirtschaftsstab Ost explained: 
the fatal phrase of the ‘white negro’ can be heard even from simple peasants. As a conse-
quence of the lacking political vision, all German measures that have a burdening effect on 
the individual are interpreted by the population in the context of a colonial idea.
488
 
One of these measures was the German practice of simply rounding up people and 
deporting them in order to fill the gaps drafted Germans had left in factories and on 
farms. While the High Command of Army Group A suggested putting the entire proc-
ess on a voluntary or at least legal basis, Rosenberg condoned the necessary vio-
lence to achieve the set quotas, but wanted the Eastern workers to be treated in a 
manner that created “a feeling of security”.489 Gottlob Berger argued analogously 
because “the German Reich will be reliant upon the cooperation of the inhabitants of 
these territories later on” and if they came back “with the utmost esteem for Germany 
and the German nature”, they would “willingly work for us and will become propa-
gandists of our cause”.490 A certain Härlin promoted a similar idea. When he ad-
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dressed the executive officers of a tank army, he pointed out that the behaviour of 
the occupation forces was an essential part of integrating the Southeastern states 
into “the common efforts of the European defensive war”:491 
The reorganisation of Europe, for which we fight, [...] starts with us, starts with the German 
Wehrmacht, which is the primary representative of the Reich everywhere. We have to set an 
example of the New Order in a way that it seems desirable. How can we demand that they 
believe in the new Europe, that they take a stand for it, and that they vigorously embrace it, if 
we do not demonstrate it to them, if we do not succeed in showing them its principles, its style 
quite plainly by virtue of our conviction and our faith?
492
 
Thus, the ‘usual suspects’ kept calling for a change in German occupation policy in 
order to activate the people’s will to work. However, under the pressure of an in-
creasingly threatening war, more and more voices joined this chorus, so that their 
thoughts and arguments entrenched themselves firmly in German discourse on 
Europe. In this line of reasoning, the possibility of gaining war-economic benefits 
outweighed völkisch objections and made a policy based on incentives ‘sensible’. 
However, the carrot was not the means of choice of all National Socialist officials. 
Some decided in favour of the stick. For Ernst Leyser, Commissioner General of the 
district Zhytomyr, for example, there was no alternative to “utmost rigidity” because 
Germany simply was not able to pacify the occupied territories through higher ra-
tions.493 Hitler’s line of argument exhibited a similar rationale. He declared that a 
more considerate policy and the hopes pinned on such a rethink were “foolish and 
unrealistic”. Without drastic measures,  
every possibility to muster workers for the Reich would cease, every export of foodstuffs to 
the Reich would cease as well as any enforced delivery quota. On the other hand, we have to 
be aware that force is the only way to get deliveries because we cannot offer goods in return, 
as we do not produce commodities like that anymore. [...] We are subject to the harsh princi-
ple of war; this principle demands that we get foodstuffs and labour out of the Ukraine. Only 
puny generals can believe that we could win workers with nice phrases.
494 
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In his eyes, the harsh principle of war had stretched the German Volk to the limit and, 
after all, “we do not want to treat the Ukrainians better than our own Volk.”495 Koch’s 
opposition to a more considerate policy was particularly directed at new guidelines, 
which were to improve the treatment of Eastern Workers. For him, the NSDAP was 
“still the leading order of the German Volk”. Therefore, nobody could expect it to 
“treat the Fremdvölkischen [members of an alien race] courteously”.496 Thus, the war 
effort also provided a different set of arguments and thoughts that translated into 
forcing Europe into living up to the war-economic requirements by an even harsher 
treatment of the subjugated people. In this line of reasoning, Germany could not af-
ford to show any material or verbal good will. In the völkisch knowledge and belief 
system, concessions were uncalled-for anyway.  
The growing dominance of the war effort in the German discourse on Europe also 
made itself felt at home. A few years ago, Europe was, as “Germany’s front yard”497 
(see chapter. 3.1.2), at the disposal of private companies. Now, German businesses 
were called upon to abandon all concerns about post-war competition or competitive 
advantages. Addressing the self-administration of German businesses, Walther 
Schieber, deputy to Speer in the Ministry of Armaments and War Production, de-
nounced “egoistic aims or post-war intentions” and promised to take actions against 
that kind of behaviour, but to reward selfless engagement.498 Kehrl also prioritised 
war-economic benefits over concerns about potential future competition,499 but it was 
Köster who formulated this demand the plainest: 
The reluctance that our industry imposes on itself towards other countries with regard to po-
tential competition in peacetime, has to be broken. By handing over inventions, experiences, 
and licences, productive forces have to be encouraged and developed [...]. Generally, the ob-
jective has to be to do our utmost to promote the economic interlocking of the Reich and other 
continental countries – for example through shareholding – as well as between third countries 
because the reciprocity of cooperation will result in a higher output.
500 
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In this way, the dominance of the war effort in the German discourse on Europe also 
affected German private business. Its short-term horizon and its unconditionality ran 
contrary to the long-term hopes and wishes they had pinned on the New Order (see 
chapter 3.1.3). This contradiction undermined their arguments and thoughts, si-
lenced them in the discourse, and turned them into a hindrance to a powerful 
Großwirtschaftsraum that had to be forced to compliance.  
Overall, German discourse on Europe was increasingly dominated by thought pat-
terns and arguments that were rooted in the war-economic interpretive frame. In-
stead of revolving around an ever more distant Europe-to-be, statements on Europe 
increasingly exhibit a focus on the here and now and the unconditional objective of 
winning the war (see chapter 3.3.1). European economic cooperation had figured as 
a promise of power within the discourse for decades, before it was specified in the 
idea of a Großwirtschaftsraum in the 1930s (see chapter 2.3), which was elevated to 
the dominant economic guiding principle in 1940 (see chapter 3.1.2). However, the 
European Großraumwirtschaft had not yet kept this promise. Hence, the economic 
interpretive frame defined the problem, the lack of European cooperation, and stipu-
lated the solution, advancing European output and trade, while the war effort ren-
dered this purpose discursively incontestable. Being bound to this end, the limits of 
what could be said about Europe were narrowed down to the discursive negotiation 
of the ‘right’ and ‘sensible’ means. This discursive practice produced a two-pronged 
carrot-and-stick rhetoric. On the one hand, it allowed for calls for a more considerate 
policy, thereby turning the wishes and expectations of the population in the occupied 
territories into a meaningful category. The demand to treat the subjugated people 
decently was now far more than the peculiar idea of a few scaremongers. Its promise 
of war-economic short-term benefits made it the ‘right’ and ‘sensible’ move. On the 
other hand, the discursively hegemonic war effort could also classify this course as 
“foolish and unrealistic”. Partly still inspired by the völkisch interpretive frame, it also 
gave meaning to arguments in favour of an even more uncompromising course, 
thereby radicalising German policy all over Europe. 
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3.3.3 Hubris and Hindsight – Keeping the Dream Alive 
Dear Richard, 
I acknowledge the receipt of your letter from 20 November. I regret that you have written it. If 
the problem of this ridiculous re-drawing of borders proves one day to be the most important 
issue, I will send for you. In the meantime, there are – you may not believe it – more pressing 
matters.
501
 (Heinrich Himmler, November 1944) 
This reply of Himmler’s – his entire written reply – to Richard Wendler’s thoughts on 
Europe-to-be502  speaks volumes: He cut his brother-in-law, a SS-Gruppenführer, 
short because by the end of 1944 even to him the particulars of Europe’s Völker and 
their borderlines seemed of “laughable” importance. Given that the Allies were push-
ing back the Wehrmacht everywhere, there were more pressing problems. However, 
just like Wendler, many German officials continued planning the reorganisation of 
Europe. In addition to völkisch and economic notions, new understandings of Europe 
emerged in the German discourse on Europe as the discursively hegemonic war ef-
fort broadened the spectrum of justifiable long-term concepts. In short, as impending 
defeat brought National Socialist Germany back down to earth, many still dreamt of a 
new German-led Europe. 
Just as before, the thoughts patterns and arguments, provided by the völkisch inter-
pretive frame, shaped the New Order discourse. The “Volkstums-strategic impor-
tance in a reorganised Europe”503 and the “racial and völkisch composition”504 of a 
country still informed appraisals on its belonging to Europe. In the eyes of Seyß-
Inquart, Europe was entirely defined by its Völker. In the East, it ended where the 
steppe began and a “Volkstum of Aryan nature” could not thrive. Internally, völkisch 
qualities determined  
the natural hierarchy, in which every nation occupies the place in the community which was 
due to it because of its economic performance, its biological vitality, its martial strength, and 
its cultural capability. All these are qualities that are rooted in the racial strength of a Volk, in 
its richness of healthy substance, and on whose sum true power rests. The Reich is leading 
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the way for the European community; its importance exerts the decisive influence on the 
European order. There is no need for an explanation or justification anymore.
505 
A certain Gallmeier also held that “the German Volk was called to lead Europe”. In 
Latvia, this mission consisted in making the valuable population see and “hammer it 
into their souls, what we actually want in the Reich.”506 However, the hammer, espe-
cially the sledgehammer, which Germany’s policy in the East relied on heavily, was 
counterproductive in the eyes of Frauenfeld. He argued that in history, “a Volk on the 
anvil has often been hammered hard as steel, instead of being smashed.”507 If the 
future of the German Volk called for it, one could naturally let hundreds of thousands 
die, but one should be mute about it and pursue long-term aims in a tactical manner 
and with some suppleness.508 Even though his expanded settlement schemes509 fell 
victim to this new course of shelving policies that potentially aroused resistance (see 
chapter 4.3.1), Himmler still clung to his idea of a völkisch New Order:  
The program is unalterable. It is unalterable that we will push back the Volkstum-border by 
500km; that we will settle here. It is unalterable that we will found a Germanic Reich. It is unal-
terable that 30 millions will join the other 90 million Germanics so that we will enlarge our 
Blutsbasis [blood basis] to 120 million Germanics. It is unalterable that we will be the ordering 
power in the Balkans and the rest of Europe; that we will politically, economically, and militar-
ily align and order this entire Volk. It is unalterable that we will fill this settlement area; that we 
will establish a blooming garden of Germanic blood in the East.
510
 
Thus, the völkisch interpretive frame kept shaping the long-term perspective within 
the German discourse on Europe until the end of the war. Its core element, the al-
leged racial superiority of Germanic blood, still justified the war, informed German 
New Order planning, and assigned the leading role in Europe to the German Volk. 
Under the discursive hegemony of the short-term oriented war effort, however, the 
value of Germanic blood simultaneously became the starting-point for a different line 
of reasoning. Anatol von der Milwe-Schroeden, deputy head of the Department of 
Cultural Policy at the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, warned that the 
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war and antagonistic policy were weakening the German Volk. If one managed to 
win “over the Slavic Völker for the intended New Order” by granting them formal 
equality, however, it would be nothing to install a “Nordic leading class above all 
member states”.511 Wiedemann also promoted the creation of autonomous states in 
the East because she feared that “our Volk, which had been bled dry,” would end up 
“winning depopulated areas in the East as settlement areas for our non-existent 
blood”.512 Alexander Dolezalek, a SS-Hauptsturmführer with a leading role in the SS 
Race and Settlement Main Office, came up with the idea of a European Eidgenos-
senschaft. Appealingly named after the Swiss Confederation, it revolved even closer 
around the value of Germanic blood.513 At the core of this “German-shaped and 
Germanic-oriented” notion stood “Germania, the Germanic Reich of the German na-
tion”.514 The Waffen-SS was to be its spearhead, as it not only united the “Germanic-
Nordic blood of the other European Völker” but also embodied the three integrative 
European forces: National Socialism as the antithesis to Bolshevism, the yearning 
for peace, and Germanentum (Germanicness). Accordingly, it linked the Völker and 
transcended nationalism because it added a European and Germanic belonging to a 
völkisch one.515 Thus, the völkisch interpretive frame did not necessarily culminate in 
settlement fantasies and ruthless concepts of starvation and mass murder. It also 
allowed for a more moderate line of reasoning that made do with transferring the al-
leged racial hierarchy into a political one by installing a Germanic leading class pre-
siding over formally equal Völker. However, these alternative long-term notions did 
not gain ground before the allegedly superior Germanic blood was being shed on a 
huge scale all over Europe. 
The second constant in the German New Order discourse were the thought patterns 
and arguments taken from the economic interpretive repertoire. The basic principles 
of a European economic cooperation – as established in the discourse – had long 
been in place by 1943. They still boiled down to a powerful, German-led, coherently 
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planned, and autarkic European economy with a common market.516 Its creation was 
not only the order of the day in an “epoch of great empires and continental agglom-
erations”.517 Under the discursive pressure of the war effort, it had gained additional 
meaning as short-term necessity. According to the Wirtschaftspolitischer Auslands-
dienst, this was the alternative that Germany offered to the “bleak prospect” of re-
turning to the pre-war modus of international trade.518 Thus, the well-established mo-
tives that had shaped the economic long-term dimension of the New Order discourse 
persisted: Europe was to become an independent, powerful, and German-led eco-
nomic entity with intensified but state-orchestrated internal trade. 
The distribution of roles within the New Order, which the völkisch and the economic 
interpretive frame had specified (see chapter 3.1.2 and 3.2.2), was equally stable 
because they were defined by the alleged superiority of the German Volk and of its 
needs and wishes. For the Ministry of Economics, for example, an industrialisation of 
the “agrarian countries of the Southeast” was still out of the question, even if it might 
“seem to meet the current needs during the war and to be economically profitable”519. 
According to the Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost – the organisation led by the 
Wirtschaftsstab Ost – southern Russia, as “Europe’s granary”,520 was to cater for 
Europe, while Germany would skim off the profits the low price level promised.521 
Apparently, this concept still carried enough discursive weight to let Riecke justify his 
agrarian reforms with the post-war prospect of a “colonial usage of the land”.522 In 
April 1944, when the issue had already become a hypothetical one, Körner still clung 
to this thought pattern, when he explained what Germany expected from Ukraine 
after its reoccupation:  
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The Ukraine is the most fertile agrarian area of Europe. It has the task to provide the new 
Europe with foodstuffs and raw materials from its fertile soil. All political, administrative, and 
economic measures have to serve solely this purpose.
523
 
Thus, within the German discourse on the Europe, the economic interpretive frame 
had solidified a long-term notion of European economic cooperation to a point that it 
could even survive major military setbacks. It lasted until the end of the war. Since it 
was still borne by the same thoughts and arguments, it perpetuated the same func-
tioning principles. The European economies were to engage in an intra-European 
division of labour in which the dominating völkisch and economic knowledge and 
belief systems assigned the roles. 
However, the discursive dominance of the war effort and its short-term orientation 
towards remedying the shortcomings of the Großraumwirtschaft (see chapter 3.3.2) 
also made it possible for alternative notions to (re-)emerge. In 1943, Ferdinand Frie-
densburg, a liberal and former member of the German Democratic Party (DDP), who 
had spoken up for a democratic European customs union as early as 1926, publicly 
envisaged a “European Economic Community” based on “comradely cooperation”.524 
The Ministry of Foreign affairs discussed the idea of holding “European economic 
conferences” which would prepare and implement Europe-wide standards – an idea 
that came close to Köster’s intention to rely on the “voluntary willingness” and the 
“well-meaning forces” in Europe.525 Even though these considerations aimed at solv-
ing German short-term problems, some of them had long-term implications. Köster’s 
memorandum on European planning, for example, expressed the hope that the pre-
sidium of the planning committee would evolve into an “intergovernmental organ, in 
which official representatives of the single countries have a seat.”526 Kehrl nurtured 
similar hopes for his Europakränzchen. Its European planning was intended to out-
live the war and continue in peacetime.527 Moreover, the Planungsstab Europa dis-
cussed what it considered “the precondition for a European post-war programme 
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under German leadership”: a “German concept of a continental European idea”528 
that was supposed to allay the “inferiority complexes of economically weaker part-
ners”.529 In a detailed memorandum, Richard Riedl, who had also advocated a de-
mocratic United States of Europe in the interwar period,530 also presented a different 
reading of the European Großraum:  
The ‘new Europe’ cannot be the transfer of outdated colonial methods to our soil. Its creation 
cannot result in a single state or a single Volk reaching new heights of wealth and power. The 
concept of a European community of states has to come true. Not subjugation and exploita-
tion must be its aim, but the common good and the organic affiliation of the European family 
of Völker [...].
531
 
Shortly after Riedl’s death, Erich Welter – a German economics professor, economic 
journalist, and member of the Planungsstab Europa532 – raised the issue of publish-
ing this memorandum as the “legacy of a great European”. Despite Funk’s approval, 
the Planungsstab decided against a publication. Not because demands like freedom 
and autonomy as well as the explicit rejection of exploitation and enslavement re-
vealed the liberal and democratic imprint of the document, but because its focus on 
the Southeast would not make clear enough that the “new European Großraum” 
would entail the “entire European continent”. After thorough revision, however, this 
“well-considered German plan for a European Großwirtschaftsraum” could form the 
basis of the discussion after a German victory.533 In a letter to Köster, Hugo Stinnes, 
a German industrialist and member of the Planungsstab Europa, also advocated a 
different form of economic community. European cooperation would not work out 
unless “other Völker enjoy life in the European space under more or less felt German 
tutelage”.534 He therefore advised a subtle economic policy that would result in their 
voluntary reorientation towards Germany. Once Europe was economically interlinked 
and grown together, the other participants would “gladly conform with Germany po-
litically and not perceive it as rape anymore.”535 Thus, by turning the voluntary co-
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operativeness of the subjugated countries into a crucial category of the New Order 
discourse, the war effort opened up a considerable discursive leeway. As the idea of 
attracting support ruled out force as a ‘sensible’ and ‘pertinent’ means to foster 
Europe economic cooperation, the war effort made it possible to fall back on a differ-
ent kind of reasoning. In this way, ideas like the ‘comradely cooperation’ of “free na-
tions”536 – categories which the powerful combination of the völkisch and economic 
interpretive frame had previously discursively discarded (see chapter 2.1.2 and 2.3) 
– found their way back into the German discourse on Europe. 
While the New Order had been discursively constructed primarily along völkisch and 
economic lines for years, it did gain a new dimension in 1943. Europe was now fre-
quently referred to as a cultural community. For the diplomat Hans Frohwein, for ex-
ample, a National Socialist new Europe had to be deeply rooted in Europe’s history, 
particularly in its culture. On this basis, an organic order which was structured along 
völkisch lines, the merits of a Volk in the war, and the Führer principle, could be 
erected.537 According to a detailed memorandum on Europe-to-be, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs intended to preserve European cultural diversity because it was the 
source of the power of the continent. If cultural differences were levelled, Europe 
would forfeit the advantages that arose out of the varying strength and talents of its 
Völker.538 Otto Bräutigam, by contrast, emphasised the bonding effects of European 
culture. In his considerations on the future of the Baltic States, their cultural belong-
ing to Europe was mentioned in the same breath as their racial qualities.539 In the 
eyes of Riedl, preserving these bonds was the purpose of the new Europe: 
In this war, we have raised the flag of Europe and set our sights on turning the thousands-of-
years old cultural community which girdles the Völker of our part of the world into a commu-
nity of states and an economic community. On its basis and under its protection, our cultural 
community will find itself safeguarded in its existence and its future against external dan-
gers.
540
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For the SS Hauptamt, Europe’s inner unity also rested on its culture. It named sev-
eral prominent examples stretching from Goethe to Michelangelo to Shakespeare, 
and emphasised that “these significant men are the common property of all Europe.” 
However, in the understanding of the SS Hauptamt, Europe was the home of all 
“Nordic-Germanic people”. Currently, the Germanics, the traditional “wall against 
foreign rule in Europe”, fought off “Jewish capitalism”.541 Dolezalek voiced similar 
thoughts in his definition of Europe. In his eyes, Europe was a racial family of Völker, 
a cultural community, and an economic community of destiny.542 Thus, after 1943, 
cultural aspects started to gain ground in the German New Order discourse. How-
ever, they did not substantiate new lines of reasoning and thus did not produce dif-
ferent notions of the future of Europe. As culture was – in the traditional völkisch 
reading – often understood as the visible expression of racial qualities (see chapter 
2.3), Europe as a cultural community almost exclusively served as a second-order 
argument to underscore the dominating völkisch and economic interpretive repertoire. 
Deliberations on the future political system of Europe were the second novelty in the 
German New Order discourse after 1943. While Hitler’s only concern seems to have 
been to replace the “set-up of states as it existed before the war” with a new “form of 
organisation” that would be strong enough to stop the prospective Oststürme (East-
ern storms),543 others, like Seyß-Inquart, already saw the New Order looming. He 
was convinced that “the form of the new Europe [...], the legal expression of the rela-
tionship between the Reich and Europe is already clearly visible today”544. For Hans 
Peter Ipsen, a law professor who worked for the Ministry of Justice, the existing ad-
ministrative structures were “essentially already the foundation for the implementa-
tion and fulfilment of the future European Großraum-order”,545 which the Reich was 
striving for.  
Others developed specific notions of a new European political order. In the Ministry 
of Foreign affairs, Ribbentrop wanted to proclaim a European federation in which all 
member states would enjoy sovereignty and mutually guarantee each other’s free-
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dom and political independence.546 The Europe Committee, which he had estab-
lished, also acted on the assumption that the result of the current European war of 
unification would be a federation of sovereign states led by Germany. Its “loyal, 
Europe-affirming members of the European community” would ensure peace, secu-
rity, and prosperity.547 However, elaborating a more concrete “political structure of 
Europe-to-be was out of the question” because the complicated völkisch structure of 
Europe did not allow for generalisations, and the promise of independence and 
autonomy ran contrary to the necessities of war.548 Nevertheless, Frohwein’s version 
of Germany being the epicentre of a community of sovereign and autonomous Euro-
pean states stipulated a European court to settle conflicts peacefully. Getting rid of 
Jews and bringing the borders in line with the völkisch structure of Europe, however, 
was essential to its pacification.549  
A certain Mentzel550 in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and Renthe-
Fink also suggested a community of sovereign European states, in which the Reich 
would be the primus inter pares, but they excluded the Eastern territories. While 
Mentzel wanted Germany to take them under its wing by taking over crucial parts of 
their policies and duties, Renthe-Fink accepted a “certain autonomy, or at least the 
illusion of sovereignty”, in the West, but found even puppet governments in the Gen-
eral Government and the occupied Eastern territories unacceptable.551 Others in the 
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories envisaged a similar future for Estonia 
and Latvia. Bräutigam was willing to give them a degree of autonomy they would 
perceive as freedom to honour their “Germanic imprint”.552 Rosenberg even drafted a 
declaration for Estonia, in which the German Reich, in its striving for a “völkisch fu-
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ture and social justice”, promised to “respect Volkstum, language, and culture”.553 In 
Walter Labs’ notion of a hierarchically ordered and German-led New Order, the 
Eastern territories had earned their right to be part of it by defying the attempt to 
press them down to the status of a colonial people.554 Hans Heinrich Lammers, the 
influential head of the Reich chancellery, however, felt the need to weigh in. He 
pointed out that the right to decide on the elaboration of the “basic principles of a 
reorganisation of Europe” resided with Hitler. Until then, Lammers wanted to see 
every man-hour dedicated to total war, not New Order planning.555 Nevertheless, this 
collection of statements makes clear that the political dimension of the discourse on 
the future of Europe was still bound by the völkisch interpretive frame and its rejec-
tion of freedom, equality, and democracy. For the allegedly inferior population of the 
occupied Eastern territories nothing but a kind of pseudo-autonomy was conceivable 
and for the rest of the European states the status quo of a German dominance pre-
figured the future.  
The longer the total war dragged on, the more contributions to the German discourse 
on Europe started with a big “wenn” – a word which in German combines the mean-
ings of ‘when’ and ‘if’. Frauenfeld, for example, demanded that many aspects of 
German occupation policy had to change fundamentally, “wenn the further course of 
the war and the victorious end of the war put theses spaces into our care again.”556 
On behalf of Göring, Körner dealt with the question “What does the Reich want after 
a reoccupation of the Ukraine?”557 He called for a coherent policy which was also in 
accordance with the status of Ukraine as “a member of the European community of 
Völker”.558 Despite picking up Rosenberg’s previously isolated appraisal of Ukraine 
as European (see chapter 3.2.3), his thoughts apparently found Backe’s approval. 
After having spoken to Hitler, he authorised Körner to start planning and preparing 
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for a reoccupation of Ukraine. 559  For Otto Stapf, General and the head of the 
Wirtschaftsstab Ost, the “exploitation of the land for the fighting troops and the war 
economy” still took precedence, but this time basic supplies, effective propaganda, 
and an attractive political vision should win reliable support from the population.560 If 
this vision implied turning “the Ukraine into an equal part of the European Großraum”, 
another document of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost concluded that, “a corresponding land 
policy” and a kind of autonomy – somewhere between the Protectorate and the 
General Government – had to be the consequence.561 After having lost Lithuania, an 
unsigned note from the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories demanded a 
“clear political line”. Wenn (when/if) the country had been re-conquered, “[w]e do not 
want to simply exploit Lithuania during the war, but integrate it into the European 
economy of tomorrow.”562 SS-Obergruppenführer Curt von Gottberg, who had ruled 
Weißruthenien as Commissioner General from October 1943 until it was lost, was 
convinced that the re-establishment of German authorities could achieve much bet-
ter results if they steered a more considerate course. 563  SS-Untersturmführer 
Joachim Nehring, who took care of Ukrainian nationalists who fled from the Red 
Army, also favoured a different approach to ultimately secure the leadership in the 
Ukrainian space, which “will be won back by the sword one day.” And then,  
in the interest of our European conception, the Reich has to grant the Ukrainians the right to 
their own state. The Ukrainians will, out of their natural opposition to Russia and due to their 
inability to lead and administer themselves, look for support from the Reich anyway. Not how 
we lead Ukraine, but that we do is the only thing that counts.
564 
Thus, once the German rule over the object of the New Order discourse had been 
lost, National Socialist officials claimed that they had learned their lesson. The next 
time the East came under German rule, occupation authorities would steer a coher-
ent course of treating the local population more decently, of granting them at least a 
modicum of self-administration, and of making them a part of the New Europe. How-
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ever, this redefinition of the means – in accordance with the thoughts and arguments 
initially established by the appeals and warnings (see chapter 3.2.3) – did not 
change the goal of getting the most out of the East. Hence, these displays of ‘re-
pentance’ attest to the continued rootedness of German discourse in the völkisch 
and economic knowledge and belief systems. 
Himmler’s notion of the New Order had not changed. In July 1944, when he con-
cerned himself with the question of “how we want to rule and pacify Russia wenn we 
have conquered large areas of the Russian land once again”,565 property, autonomy, 
and freedom only existed at the Eastern border, where Cossacks constituted the last 
line between the German Ostwall (Eastern wall) and Bolshevism. The rest of the 
East had to be pacified and disarmed by means of religion: “We have to support 
every form of religion and cult that has a pacifying effect. For the Turkic Völker, the 
doctrine of Buddhism comes into question, for the others the doctrine of the Bible 
student movement.”566 In Himmler’s eyes, the merits of the latter were particularly 
valuable: They refused to fight, were anti-Semitic and against the Catholic Church. 
Furthermore, they did not smoke or drink, but were industrious.567 By the end of No-
vember 1944, however, Himmler had been jolted out of his dreams. Given the mili-
tary situation, considerations on future frontiers, like the one he had sketched out in 
detail, seemed “laughable”.568 
Overall, despite the deteriorating military situation and repeated official requests to 
end all post-war planning, the German New Order discourse kept its long-term per-
spective and continued after 1943. Its defining elements were still the völkisch and 
the economic interpretive frame. In conjunction with the now discursively hegemonic 
but short-term oriented war effort, these established knowledge and belief systems 
widened the limits of what could be said about Europe. The völkisch set of thoughts 
and arguments still determined the borderlines of Europe and its internal hierarchy. 
However, the concern for valuable German blood and the growing reluctance to aid 
the Reich, gave meaning to minimising the bloodshed through war and resistance 
and to pondering less intrusive ways to realise the German will. Economically, 
Europe was still imagined as a powerful, autarkic, German-led Großwirtschaftsraum 
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that engaged in a divsion of labour. However, the realisation of this notion was now 
increasingly linked to winning the voluntary cooperation of the other European na-
tions instead of solely relying on German power. Ultimately, even previously margin-
alised notions of Europe that had their roots in democratic traditions of European 
thinking or Mitteleuropa ideas could legitimately make themselves heard, as they 
promised to bolster the war economy.569 Furthermore, the dominance of the war ef-
fort added new categories to the New Order discourse. Even though these political 
and cultural understandings of Europe-to-be were not variations of existing concepts, 
they did not go beyond the coordinate system that unfolded between völkisch and 
economic beliefs. They could be voiced because they promised to contribute to the 
war effort by allaying widespread fears of Germany’s ill will and because they were 
still rooted in the völkisch and economic ‘truth’ that the position on top of the Euro-
pean hierarchy was indisputably Germany’s. Allegedly, its racial value surpassed 
that of all other Völker, there was no match for its industrial capacities, its cultural 
achievements were unsurpassed, and its political system constituted the exemplary 
role model. Thus, by increasingly binding the German discourse on Europe to its 
short-term orientation (see chapters 3.3.1 and 3.3.2), the war effort at the same time 
widened the scope of what could be said about Europe. Now, German discourse 
allowed for broader spectrum of thoughts and arguments concerning the means, so 
that the scope of conceivable and expressible long-term conceptions widened. How-
ever, still being constrained by the völkisch and economic knowledge and beliefs 
systems, this development did not produce fundamental contestations of the end of a 
German ruled Europe. Therefore, until the very end of the war, all German dreams of 
a new Europe order emanated from the conviction of German supremacy and 
headed for its völkisch, economic, and political implementation. In fact, concepts of 
Europe-to-be that did not put the Reich first could not be voiced by German officials 
until something unthinkable – and of course unspeakable – happened: National So-
cialist Germany was defeated. 
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 4. Creating a New Order 
In the middle of the war, Europe’s political leadership has, out of the necessity of the situation 
and the expedience of things, step by step started to reorganise Europe in all areas of political, 
economic, and cultural life; in the same evolutionary organic way in which the inner reorgani-
sation of the two leading powers, Germany and Italy, has been begun and carried out.
1
 
(Deutsches Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung, 1943) 
While many contemporaries claimed that Germany had already started to create the 
New Order during the war, many historians see nothing but ideological delusion and 
the war effort at work in National Socialist European policy (see chapter 1.1). After 
having shown that the New Order was not a single notion but a constantly changing 
discursive negotiation process, in which the future of Europe was defined along well-
established völkisch and economic knowledge and belief systems, a reassessment 
seems justified. By contrasting the discursive construction of Europe to the policies 
of German occupation authorities and of private companies, the factual relevance of 
the New Order will become clear. As explained in the chapter on methodology (see 
chapter 1.2), the power of the discourse becomes apparent in a twofold manner. The 
knowledge and ‘truth’ it produces gives meaning to statements, thoughts, and prac-
tices, while participating in this production warrants the ‘voluntary subordination’ to 
its binding rules.  
This chapter demonstrates that the New Order discourse informed German Euro-
pean policy and the activities of private businesses during the Second World War. It 
started out as a predominantly economic vision which promised “Peace and Prosper-
ity” (4.1) through a reorganisation of the economies and Völker of Europe, before the 
attack on the Soviet Union gave rise to more marked völkisch lines of reasoning. To-
gether with the economic interpretive frame, this perspective boiled down to a notion 
of Europe as a “German Continent and its Colonies” (4.2). The longer the war 
dragged on, the more the fear of going under in this war of extermination gained 
ground and transformed the ways of speaking about Europe. Now, ways of mobilis-
ing the continent, as “A European Community Fighting Bolshevism” (4.3) were pon-
dered. Instead of rallying Europe around the German cause, however, this New Or-
der lost its integrative power and sank into insignificance. 
                                            
1
 Deutsches Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung, ‘Einleitung’, in Deutsches Institut für Außenpoliti-
sche Forschung (ed.), Europa - Handbuch der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Entwick-
lung des neuen Europa, Leipzig, Heling, 1943, pp. 1-6, here p. 4. 
 194 
 
4.1 A Promise of Peace and Prosperity (1939-1941) 
In response to England’s desire for power we offer: a contented, pacified Europe unified in 
close economic cooperation which can open its doors to world trade for the benefit of all 
Völker of the world!
2
 (Friedrich Landfried, September 1940) 
During the twenty-one months of waging war between the German attack on Poland 
and Operation Barbarossa, many German officials paid considerable attention to the 
future of Europe. In this New Order, they envisaged Germany to be in charge of se-
curing peace and prosperity for the continent. By reorganising Europe along völkisch 
lines, Germany would finally bring peace to the war-torn continent. And by introduc-
ing its own successful mode of economic activity in a common European market, 
Germany would create a prosperous Europe that would be on a par with other 
Großräume (see chapter 3.1). 
These concepts were more than just propagandistic weapons in Germany’s struggle 
for European supremacy: German occupation policy and the activities of German 
companies clearly reflect in fact that the New Order discourse endowed their actions 
with meaning. The discursively constructed need to reorganise European “Industry, 
Currency, and Trade” (chapter 4.1.1) materialised in major political steps as well as 
in the individual measures of German occupation authorities. The “European Expan-
sion” (chapter 4.1.2) of German companies, on the other hand, demonstrates that 
the discursively constructed new European order served as an important frame of 
reference. 
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4.1.1 Industry, Currency, and Trade – An Economic New Order 
According to Friedrich Nietzsche, wars are the great instructors of fundamental philosophical 
doctrines, in whose name the struggle for the reorganisation of the world is conducted. It is 
precisely our enemies that arrogate to themselves the right to be sole representatives of such 
philosophies. However, we have already created a very real new world. And in this world the 
new economic order is already in place; the economic order of the new Europe.
3
 (Walther 
Funk, 1941) 
These words concluded a speech that Walther Funk gave on Europe’s new eco-
nomic order in June 1941. A printed version of his speech was sent to National So-
cialist officials, relevant organisations, and individuals, including every Gauleiter, 
every Reichstatthalter, all Preußische Oberpräsidenten, the Gauwirtschaftsberater, 
the presidents of the chambers of industry and commerce, all professors of econom-
ics, all the editors of economic newspapers and journals, and the Reichsbank.4 
Thus, shortly before National Socialist Germany attacked the Soviet Union, a multi-
tude of German officials learned that today “the European New Order is already 
largely reality”5, a reality that was to be finalised after the war. Indeed, Funk had 
good reasons to believe in what he said: The foundations of a National Socialist New 
Order had already been laid at all levels of German policy.  
One major step on the way to a National Socialist New Order was the introduction of 
a European central clearing system. As pointed out in chapter 2.1.2, the idea of con-
verting bilateral clearing agreements into a multilateral payment system had pre-
vailed in the considerations on how to establish a largely autarkic, Reichsmark-
based Großraumwirtschaft, in which Germany would pull the strings. In contrast to a 
long-standing and well-established idea of a customs and currency union, it prom-
ised to perpetuate a hierarchy in Europe that the völkisch as well as the economic 
interpretive frame prescribed. By the end of 1941, this part of the New Order, the 
central clearing according to the plans of the Minister of Economics, has become a reality. All 
countries within the German sphere of influence and the occupied territories [...] are inte-
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 W. Funk, Wirtschaftsordnung im Neuen Europa. Rede gehalten vor der Südosteuropa Gesellschaft 
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5
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grated. Technically, the central clearing works satisfactorily. Of course, balancing the ac-
counts is impossible as long as Germany keeps running up bills.
6
  
Indeed, “the centrepiece of the National Socialist New Order”7 seemed to have lived 
up to expectations: Germany’s imports boomed and more transactions than before 
were processed on clearing accounts.8 At the same time, overseas trade practically 
ceased and intra-European trade between third countries declined sharply.9 How-
ever, due to the German war effort, Europe did not – as tradtionally envisaged in the 
economic interpretive frame – become a huge sales market for German goods, but a 
community of Germany’s creditors. Instead of exporting them into agrarian countries, 
the Reich increasingly imported finished and semi-finished goods, thus piling up 
huge debts on the German clearing accounts until the end of the war.10 Despite this 
failure, the introduction of a European central clearing system manifests the rele-
vance of the New Order discourse for actual policies. Even though the clearing sys-
tem did advance the German war effort by facilitating necessary imports, its genesis 
and its characteristics reveal that it was not primarily tailored to the needs of war. 
Whilst the spiritual fathers of the central clearing system in the Reichsbank and the 
Ministry of Economics scarcely relied on war-economic thoughts and arguments, 
their prime concerns revolved around the European post-war order.11 By restoring 
the standing of the Reichsmark and by granting Germany influence on European 
trade, these officials wanted to establish a monetary long-term alternative to the lib-
eral gold standard and to enable the Reich to orchestrate the European economies 
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systematically.12 Additionally, the founders of the central clearing system were well 
aware of the problems a constant one-sided German demand would cause.13 How-
ever, they rebutted these objections with arguments that depicted the war as a tem-
porary and exceptional circumstance. The imminent victory would nullify this problem 
because peace treaty agreements would bring monetary gains and the restoration of 
Germany’s profitable pre-war export pattern.14 Of course, it was necessary for every 
concept to ensure benefits for the war effort if it was to prevail. Nevertheless, the 
argumentative value of the necessities of war was not sufficient. Thus, the decision 
for and implementation of the central clearing system was informed by the discur-
sively constructed notion of the future of Europe. It was rationalised as the ‘sensible’ 
foundation of the future German-led Großraumwirtschaft that also ensured the sup-
ply for the German war effort for the time being. 
Apart from the primarily monetary side of European cooperation, National Socialist 
Germany also tackled specific trade political problems of Europe-to-be. The tasks 
Göring had delegated to Funk  
in the context of preparing a German-led European Großwirtschaftsraum also comprised the 
adaptation of the tariff system to the necessity of intensifying the movement of goods and to 
the necessity of cooperation in the fields of industry, raw materials, and agriculture.
15
 
Accordingly, in September 1940 an “inter-ministerial committee was set up to pre-
pare the Großwirtschaftsraum tariff-wise”16. Delegates from the Ministry of Econom-
ics, the Ministry of Finances, and the Ministry of Nutrition and Agriculture discussed 
the possibilities of raising, lowering or abolishing tariffs where necessary.17 “In the 
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context of reorganising Europe”18, the committee sought to Europeanise the interna-
tional agreement on the simplification of tariff formalities – developed by the League 
of Nations in the 1920s19 – and pondered initiating a European tariff conference after 
the war. A success in this respect would demonstrate the solidarity of Europe and 
could – “in the sense of the idea of a Großraumwirtschaft – become the prelude to 
further economic collective agreements for the purpose of reorganising Europe.”20 
Furthermore, the committee analysed the German tariff schedule to see if it “fits the 
requirements of a European continental economy.”21 Even though European tariffs 
were not harmonised during the war, this Inter-Ministerial Tariffs Committee clearly 
indicates that the New Order shaped German policy: Firstly, the creation of the 
committee shows already that the question of reorganising Europe economically was 
meaningful enough to institutionalise regular meetings of high-ranking officials. Sec-
ondly, imports from occupied territories were already exempt from tariffs.22 Thus, 
these meetings did not serve the war effort by maximising exploitation, but solely the 
purpose of actually preparing the discursively constructed New Order. Finally, every 
available document from the meetings of this committee attests to the paramount 
relevance of the New Order discourse. The arguments and thought patterns that 
were expressed there tied in with the dominating economic interpretive frame and 
the Großraumwirtschaft it discursively produced.  
In addition to these top-level developments, the occupation policy of National Social-
ist Germany also reflected the New Order discourse. In the Netherlands, the policy of 
Reichskommissar Seyß-Inquart was geared towards a new Europe. In his first 
speech, he announced his political course:  
This is what I wanted to tell the Dutch people on the occasion of taking over power in the 
Netherlands. We did not enjoy coming here at gunpoint. We want to be protectors and pa-
trons in order to stay friends; but all this in the sense of the superior tasks which we have as 
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Europeans. Because the point is the creation of a new Europe which follows basic principles 
as lodestars: national honour and common work.
23
 
In these basic principles, the two dominating interpretive frames of the National So-
cialist discursive construction of a New Order again come to the fore: Europe had to 
be restructured in its völkisch composition and its economic organisation. Since the 
Dutch were considered to have “good blood”,24 Seyß-Inquart wanted them to partici-
pate in the reorganisation of Europe “as an equal and efficient partner”.25 However, it 
was their behaviour that would ultimately determine the role of the Netherlands in a 
new Europe. Accordingly, German policy gave the Dutch a chance to recollect their 
Germanic blood: hoping that the Netherlands would find a way to form their political 
will in correspondence with the “indissoluble Greater-Germanic community of des-
tiny”,26 the occupation authorities contented themselves with supervising and direct-
ing the existing administration and demanded that Germans in the Netherlands be-
haved decently.27 Instead of imposing one of the Dutch fascist movements as puppet 
government, the German authorities endorsed the Nederlandse Unie, a popular 
Dutch nationalist movement.28 Furthermore, the Dutch were allowed to join the chap-
ter Westland of the SS-Division Wiking which also took on Belgian and Scandinavian 
Germanic volunteers.29 Even after a strike by workers, which followed the deporta-
tion of Jewish citizens, had shown the Dutch unwillingness to join forces with Ger-
many, Seyß-Inquart still held on to the hope of winning over the Dutch for a National 
Socialist Europe.30 He blamed the Jewish population – “elements alien to Volk and 
country” – for the insurgency and emphasised the historical bonds between the two 
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countries as well as the privileged position the Dutch enjoyed and concluded that the 
German historical mission would ultimately be accomplished:  
Adolf Hitler, the leader of the Greater German Reich, the leader of all Germanic people in the 
new order of the Abendland, has given us this mission. We formed up; we may fall; he will tri-
umph!
31
  
The political attempt to win over the Germanic Dutch was accompanied by an eco-
nomic policy that tried to align Dutch interests with Germany’s. The extent of pillag-
ing was considerably lower than in other countries and very soon after the occupa-
tion Seyß-Inquart opened up the opportunity to outsource production to the Nether-
lands. By September 1940, the Dutch economy had received orders worth 740 mil-
lion guilders – about 11.5% of its social product – and started to boom.32 Seyß-
Inquart’s political calculation behind this policy was “to win over the Dutch for a Ger-
man future”.33 Furthermore, from autumn 1940 onwards, Hans Fischböck, who was 
in charge of economic and financial matters in the occupied Netherlands, realised 
Funk’s directive to reorganise the Dutch economy into the organisational forms prac-
tised in Germany.34 Since he did so in cooperation with Dutch economic and political 
officials, he considered this measure to be a step towards the desired voluntary Na-
zification of the Netherlands.35 The loosening of the border between the Netherlands 
and the Reich also has to be seen as a part of German New Order policy. Because 
the efforts to integrate the European economies had not yet yielded the expected 
results, Göring decreed – against the advice of Ribbentrop, Seyß-Inquart, and others 
– that the foreign currency border between the Netherlands and the Reich was to be 
loosened in order to further mutual economic interlocking.36 By October 1941 Lam-
mers, head of the Reich Chancellery, could state: 
With the abolition of the customs border and the ensuing elimination of all foreign currency 
regulations, the German administration in the Netherlands has taken the necessary measures 
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and fulfilled its task of integrating the Dutch territories into the economy of the Reich. The 
alignment of the measures of economic planning, in form and content, with the German order 
has been carried out to an extent that, economically, treating the Netherlands like a German 
territory would not encounter any obstacle.
37
 
Overall, the discursively constructed New Order served as a guiding principle of 
German policy In the Netherlands during the first year of occupation. Seyß-Inquart 
not only picked up the permissible ways of speaking about Europe, he also abided 
by its defining interpretive frames. The völkisch and the economic knowledge and 
belief systems had discursively established a New Order that featured an industrial-
ised Germanic core area to which the Dutch belonged. As a frame of reference, this 
discursively constructed future not only gave meaning to anti-Semitic measures but 
also granted the racially valuable Dutch some leeway. Ultimately, the völkisch hope 
was that, the true nature of the ‘Germanic brothers’ would assert itself and lead to 
their voluntary accession to the new Europe. Additionally, this guiding principle gave 
meaning to measures that aimed at strengthening the Dutch economy and at align-
ing and interlocking it with the German one.  
In other countries, whose inhabitants National Socialist officials considered racially 
valuable, Germany pursued a similar occupation policy. In Denmark, the hope that 
the country might voluntarily join the German cause even informed the collaboration 
with a democratically elected government.38 Economically, its output of foodstuffs 
and favourable reactions to the New Order rhetoric launched negotiations about a 
currency and customs union which ultimately broke down.39 Nevertheless, Danish 
foodstuffs mitigated German shortages, while the Reich arranged for the vital imports 
of Denmark.40 In Belgium, the military administration pursued a spirit of friendship 
after an initial period of plundering.41 Furthermore, Belgians still had access to higher 
education, they could choose to work in Germany until March 1942, and join the SS, 
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while Germany advanced economic interlocking and increased its influence on the 
modern industry in Belgium by restructuring the organisational system of the econ-
omy on the German model.42 In Norway, German occupation authorities also acted 
on the maxim of the New Order (see chapter 4.2.1). Overall, it seems that even a 
cursory glance at German occupation policy in the allegedly racially valuable coun-
tries reveals the significance of discursively constructed vision of a New Order. Ger-
man occupation authorities took measures that were informed by, and were sup-
posed to realise the vision of a European Großraumwirtschaft with its industrialised 
Germanic core area.  
By contrast, German occupation policy in Poland reflected the alleged racial inferior-
ity of the Poles from the start. The terror the Wehrmacht and the Einsatzgruppen 
unleashed from the outset of the September campaign were a foretaste of what was 
to follow.43 Poland’s agrarian economy and its non-Germanic population led to com-
paratively unscrupulous warfare and a ruthless occupation policy. In its striving for 
racially homogenous nations – a discursively established cornerstone of the New 
Order –, National Socialist Germany annexed Western regions of Poland as Reichs-
gaue – Danzig-West Prussia and Posen – and pursued a policy of Germanisation 
there.44 In the eyes of Hitler, the rest of former Poland, the General Government, 
was the ‘rubbish heap’ on which Germany could dump the by-products of this “tough 
Volkstumskampf”: “Jews and Polacks”.45 Ruled by Governor General Hans Frank, 
this pool of unwanted people should be subject to a policy of 
ruthless exploitation, evacuation of all war-economically relevant stock, raw materials, ma-
chines, plants etc., utilisation of the entire labour force in the Reich, reducing the whole Polish 
economy to the minimum for the makeshift survival of the population, closing of all educa-
tional establishments [...] to prevent a Polish intelligentsia from growing again. Poland shall be 
treated like a colony; the Poles are to be the slaves of the Greater German world empire.
46
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This colonial notion in German occupation policy was endowed with meaning by two 
purposes. On the one hand, German policy aimed at relieving some of the German 
war-economic shortages. On the other hand, it was tailored to the future of Europe: 
by destroying Polish industry, its rebuilding after the war will be hampered or precluded, thus 
reforming Poland to its actual status as an agrarian country which depends on imports of 
German goods.
47
 
Accordingly, industry and stocks in the the General Government were plundered, 
schools and universities closed, intellectuals were shot or arrested, and workers 
were recruited – at first voluntarily, but from spring 1940 onwards by force.48 How-
ever, by summer 1940, when the German victory in the West fuelled National Social-
ist ambitions for a new Europe, the projected status of the General Government 
partly changed. It was now considered a Nebenland (auxiliary country) of the Reich 
that had to serve Germany and would ultimately become German.49 Accordingly, its 
Jewish population was to be deported in the long run. In this context, Hans Frank 
pinned his hopes on Africa, before the invasion of the Soviet Union promised to 
make a territory further in the East available.50 In the short run, the Haupttreuhand-
stelle Ost pursued the policy of Germanisation by giving away seized property pri-
marily according to völkisch considerations.51 And in the summer of 1942, German 
settlement schemes were set in motion.52 Economically, German occupation policy 
reflected the wish to turn the General Government into a pool of cheap labour and a 
supplier of foodstuffs from the outset. The occupation authorities tried to increase 
agricultural output by renewing agricultural machinery, supporting livestock farming, 
ensuring that high quality seeds were employed, and by carrying out meliorations.53 
The German need for cheap labour, however, found its expression in different 
measures: Despite Frank’s efforts to integrate the General Government into the 
                                            
47
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 See C. Madajczyk, Die Okkupationspolitik Nazideutschlands in Polen 1939-1945, Berlin, Akademie-
Verlag, 1987, p. 580. 
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German economic area, it had to stay an independent economic sphere, a kind of 
“dominion”,54 because low living standards were an essential incentive for poor Pol-
ish workers to earn good money in the prosperous Reich.55 Additionally, the reopen-
ing of some types of schools is telling: confined to elementary schools as well as 
technical and medical schools, the German liberalisation of education policy was 
clearly aimed at an intellectually inferior Polish population which would nevertheless 
be economically useful for Germany.56 Overall, German occupation policy in the 
General Government aimed for a German Herrenvolk ruling over a racially inferior, 
uneducated, and ‘Jew-free’ population in an agrarian economy from which the Reich 
could draw foodstuffs and cheap labour.57 This policy has therefore to be seen as an 
attempt to forcefully lower the region and its population to the level that the New Or-
der discourse delineated. The envisaged division of labour between industrialised 
and racially valuable countries on the one side, and racially inferior agrarian states 
on the other gave meaning to this course. It seems that Frank would have preferred 
a different future for his Frank-Reich.58 However, a system of checks and balances, 
within which meetings with Hitler proved to be the most effective, repeatedly restored 
the discursively assigned role as guiding principle.59 The result was a policy – borne 
by Frank, the Vierjahresplanbehörde, and Himmler’s staff – that was in accordance 
with the New Order discourse and its defining völkisch and economic elements.  
While the Dutch case could be compared to Germany’s occupation policy in other 
territories which National Socialists considered to be Germanic, German treatment of 
Poland is singular. Its fate differs not only because its population was considered 
inferior, but also because Germany had annexed its economically most relevant 
parts. In the eyes of Karl Hermann Frank, Secretary of State under Reich Protector 
von Neurath, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia belonged to the German po-
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litical and völkisch Lebensraum – just like Poland. Accordingly, he called for “the 
complete Germanisation of this area and its people”, but realised that the contribu-
tion of the Protectorate to the war effort forbade “any attack on the Czech Volkstum” 
for now.60 Hence, National Socialist Germany prioritised the economic integration of 
the Protectorate. The Reich acquired – by means of the Reichswerke – the most im-
portant Czech companies, modelled the order of the economy on the German sys-
tem, installed Germans in crucial positions, and abolished the customs borders.61 
Politically however, it was essential to postpone the Volkstumskampf and to keep up 
the appearances of an autonomous Czech government in order to keep the industry 
working. Thus, in the case of the Protectorate, the economic dimension of the New 
Order discourse gave meaning to integrative measures but its völkisch dimension 
apparently did not outweigh the reasonableness of avoiding the detriments to the 
war effort that were to be expected in the course of the unavoidable Volkstum-
skampf. In this way, the needs of war spared the Czechs most of the Polish ordeal. 
Overall, German European policy before the attack on the Soviet Union was strik-
ingly consistent with the notion of Europe constructed within the New Order dis-
course. National Socialist Germany actually introduced the European central clearing 
system as a monetary system based on the Reichsmark and as an alternative to lib-
eral trade system. And preparatory work for the European post-war order was institu-
tionalised in the department VO – Vorbereitung und Ordnung (preparation and order-
ing)62 – and an Inter-Ministerial Tariffs Committee. Moreover, German occupation 
policies were in line with the discursively established vision of the future of Europe as 
well. The German efforts to degrade Poland to a source of cheap labour, for exam-
ple, corresponded to its projected völkisch and economic status. German attempts to 
win over the local population in Germanic countries, in contrast, were in accordance 
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with the völkisch knowledge and belief system which predicted that racial kinship 
would ultimately assert itself in similar ways of thinking. Hence, German officials ex-
pected the Germanic countries to contribute to the New Order by undergoing their 
own völkisch revolution. These policies were accompanied by a proactive economic 
approach. All the occupied territories were incorporated into the clearing system, the 
organisational orders of the economy were remodelled to German standards,63 pro-
duction was outsourced, takeovers were supported, investments were made, and the 
output of the respective countries was aligned with the needs of the Reich while 
Germany tried to cater for their vital demands. Thus, within a few months, Germany 
had not only secured its influence on the European economies but also had become 
the most important trading partner of many European countries. Of course, all these 
measures did foster the war effort, but this policy also realised central aspects of the 
discursively constructed New Order. Since some of these policies were not dictated 
by the needs of war – takeovers and long-term investments for example64 – it seems 
safe to conclude that during the first years of the war, the New Order was clearly 
more than propaganda. It informed and gave meaning to German policies in the oc-
cupied territories. 
 
4.1.2 ‘Buy, when there is Blood on the Streets’ – European Expansion 
Being at heart convinced of the justification of our struggle for German political, economic, 
and cultural freedom, we focus our entire abilities on the creation of the means for our Volk, 
our army and victory. And, with our trust in the Führer, we are looking forward to the future 
tasks which industry in Greater Germany will then support just as much as it now supports the 
necessities of war.
65
 (Wilhelm Zangen, February 1941) 
In his position as head of the Reichsgruppe Industrie, Wilhelm Zangen’s66 word car-
ried weight. However, his claim that the war was all that mattered to German industry 
at the moment seems to be a deviation from the truth. Many German companies 
were actually preparing for peace and the anticipated European post-war order. 
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They therefore sought to benefit from the current German dominance by improving 
their market position. 
When summing up the progress of interlocking the European economies, a meeting 
of representatives of German ministries, occupations authorities, and other institu-
tions in September 1941 seemed to reflect a good degree of contentment. Even 
though their efforts to bring Shell, Philips, and Unilever under their control had failed, 
they had managed to integrate these companies into the German war effort. Moreo-
ver, the Dutch Algemeene Kunstzijde Unie had successfully been taken over and, by 
means of ‘Aryanisation’, the four largest department stores in the Netherlands had 
fallen into German hands – a fate that another 130 companies were to share. Addi-
tionally, German companies had acquired considerable shareholdings in Dutch 
heavy industry, its machine works, and its armament plants. All in all, private nego-
tiations had led to the purchases of shares amounting to 65 million Reichsmark in 
the Netherlands. In Belgium, where Germany still strove for control over Arbed and 
where another 130 processes of ‘Aryanisation’ were pending, Germans had spent 
about 15 million Reichsmark on shares.67 A mere 27 million went into French com-
panies, but through French owners Germany managed to buy shares of companies 
in Southeastern Europe worth 100 million Reichsmark, including the majority of 
Mines de Bor in Yugoslavia. Overall, German acquisitions in Europe – endowed with 
meaning by the intent to realise the discursively constructed New Order – amounted 
to 270-280 million.68 
In its striving for more and longer lasting economic influence in the New Order, Na-
tional Socialist Germany pursued several strategies of promoting economic interlock-
ing (see chapter 3.1.3). However, since German eagerness to acquire shares in for-
eign companies often faced resistance, the process of ‘Aryanisation’ gained in impor-
tance.69 The idea of dispossessing the Jewish in favour of the ‘Aryan’ population 
emerged from the völkisch movement during the 1920s.70 The National Socialist re-
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gime put it into practice. At first, many Jewish companies were slowly driven out of 
business by discrimination and boycotts.71 After the November pogrom 1938, Na-
tional Socialist Germany officially passed a law that prohibited any entrepreneurial 
activity by Jews. From then on, the economic marginalisation of the Jewish popula-
tion evolved into an essential part of German rule. After the rather uncoordinated 
process of ‘Aryanisation’ in Austria, Germany systematized its anti-Jewish measures 
in the following years.72 In every annexed or occupied territory, National Socialist 
officials dispossessed the Jewish population, shut down many of their businesses 
and distributed the rest to supposedly more valuable Germanic people.73  
This course of action was not only in accordance with the völkisch imagination of a 
‘Jew-free’ Europe (see chapter 3.2.1) but also with the central demands of the dis-
cursively constructed economic New Order.74 On the one hand, this becomes appar-
ent in German prioritisaion. In the allegedly Germanic territories anti-Semitic meas-
ures and the process of ‘Aryanisation’ were pushed on more forcefully and carried 
out more thoroughly than in other countries, like France for example.75 On the other 
hand, German officials repeatedly emphasised the opportunities that the solution to 
the ‘Jewish Question’ in the occupied territories offered for the furthering of German 
economic dominance in Europe.76 Since the penetration of the occupied economies 
was supposed to last far beyond the end of the war, German officials tried to keep up 
the appearance of legal transactions instead of simply seizing property.  
The case of the Erste Prager Malzfabrik Reiser & Söhne is a telling example in this 
respect. From the many potential buyers, the Bebca, a subsidiary of the Dresdner 
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Bank which carried out the processes of ‘Aryanisation’ in the Protectorate, chose the 
Malzfabrik Niedersedlitz because it promised to shift its banking operations to the 
Dresdner Bank in the future. However, the Erste Prager Malzfabrik, worth some 18 
million koruna, turned down the initial offers of two, later three, million koruna and the 
Reichsprotektor did not comply with the request of the Bebca to initiate a forced 
‘Aryanisation’. Ultimately, the Jewish owners were forced to sell for about eight mil-
lion koruna because the Malzfabrik Niedersedlitz had founded a new company, also 
called Erste Prager Malzfabrik, and prohibited the original company from using its 
name.77 In this and other perfidious ways, German officials and companies managed 
to drive all Jews out of business in the Protectorate and by the end of 1942 posses-
sions of more than six billion koruna had been transferred; mostly into German 
hands.78 In other occupied territories, German officials pursued the same policies.79 
In this way, thousands of businesses changed hands or were closed down for the 
sake of local or German competitors.80 The economic marginalisation of the Jewish 
population of Europe served two purposes: It was considered an important step to-
wards a Europe free of Jewish influence and towards a German dominated Euro-
pean Großraumwirtschaft at the same time. Thus, the New Order, discursively con-
strued by means of the two dominant völkisch and economic knowledge and belief 
systems, gave meaning to German anti-Jewish measures that extended beyond ra-
cial anti-Semitism.  
Banks played a major role in the process of ‘Aryanisation’ and in increasing German 
economic influence.81 On the one hand, banks were eager to expand into the occu-
pied territories themselves and they seized the opportunities that German domina-
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tion of Europe offered.82 The Dresdner Bank pursued this policy of expansion with 
the “future New Order in case of a final German victory in mind”. 83  As to the 
Deutsche Bank, statements by its management board member Hermann Josef Abs 
suggest that the European Großraumwirtschaft had become a category in his and 
the bank’s considerations as well:  
Today, the European area of our political sphere of influence offers rich and rewarding oppor-
tunities to fully use our capacities. [...] In particular, the cooperation with our European 
neighbours that are possible exporters of capital will contribute to a quicker development of 
the forces of the European Großraumwirtschaft for the good of all.
84
 
On the other hand, German banks initiated and carried out the expansion of other 
German companies. Many German banks were allowed to purchase stocks – for 
their own accounts and on customers’ orders.85  Sensing lucrative business, the 
banks became proactive and promoted the idea of a reorganised Europe to their 
customers. One telling example is a letter from the Dresdner Bank to the Frottierwe-
berei Lustnau, a medium-sized company in the textile industry. The bank announced 
that “military and political developments have led to an acute interest in an economic 
penetration of the Western occupied territories.”86 The letter continued by stressing 
that businesses willing to expand into Alsace, Lorraine, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
occupied France, Norway, or Denmark would probably receive political support. Ad-
ditionally, the bank promised that “our headquarters in Berlin have made all provi-
sions possible to initiate and carry out such transactions”87, before expressing the 
hope that the Frottierweberei Lustnau might consult the bank in case of expansion. 
Thus, German banks did not only explicitly have the anticipated New Order in mind, 
when they expanded into occupied territories and tried to open up new markets, they 
also relayed their knowledge about how the discursively costructed New Order was 
supposed to be realised and about how far it was to reach. 
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In other cases, customers approached their banks of their own accord. In November 
1940, for example, the Centralverwaltung für Secundairbahnen Hermann Bachstein 
GmbH, a transportation company, got in touch with the Dresdner Bank. Explicitly 
referring to “the wishes of the Ministry of Economics”,88 the German company was 
wanting to take over a local railway in Belgium or the Netherlands, ideally the 
Westlandsche Stroomtram Maatschappij. After the Dresdner Bank forwarded a 
negative reply to its enquiries from its Amsterdam office, the Handelstrust West,89 
the Bachstein GmbH insisted that 
[a]s the leading company in public transportation it is – in the interest of the guidelines issued 
by the Reich government – our task to seek influence in the newly-won territories. As men-
tioned [...], our interest is not confined to the Netherlands. All newly-won territories are of in-
terest to us. However, the West, including Alsace-Lorraine, seems more favourable to us than 
the East [...].
90
 
After another negative reply, the Bachstein GmbH widened the scope of its expan-
sionist ambitions again: Luxembourg would also be an option. And since there were 
no profitable local railways there, the Bachstein GmbH offered to take over bus 
routes. However, the Dresdner Bank had to inform the Bachstein GmbH that the lo-
cal bus routes were run by either the Reichsbahn or the Reichspost. Even after suf-
fering yet another setback, the Bachstein GmbH did not abandon its plans of expan-
sion. Emphasising its tradition in the building and construction industry, it entrusted 
the Dresdner Bank with finding a construction company in which it could acquire an 
interest amounting to 200.000 Reichsmark. Only then did another negative reply ap-
parently end the correspondence.91 Thus, the Bachstein GmbH was clearly aware of 
the political desire to increase German economic influence in the occupied territories 
and it was eager to help fulfilling this demand by expansion. Even though the antici-
pated Europe-to-be is not explicitly mentioned as a point of reference, it becomes 
clear that the company adopted the discursively established meaningfulness of the 
means to realise the New Order as its own.  
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Other companies were more successful in their efforts to expand. According to Neil 
Gregor: 
From summer and autumn 1940 on, the Daimler-Benz concern took over the control over 
many factories in the occupied territories, expanded its sales and repair network over entire 
Europe, and licensed the production of its aircraft engines in numerous plants in the East and 
West.
92
 
The discursively constructed New Order did play a part in this expansion. Even 
though the European post-war market was not explicitly the prime point of reference 
at board meetings in 1940, expansion was a constant topic. On the one hand, the 
Daimler-Benz AG projected big investments in Genshagen, a plant south of Berlin. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of Aviation called for an integration of French plants 
for aircraft engines. Seeming to supplement its existing sites, Hispano-Suiza and one 
of its plants in Tarbes aroused the interest of Daimler-Benz.93 While Wilhelm Kissel, 
CEO of Daimler-Benz, countered the wish of the Ministry of Economics to create Eu-
ropean cartels with the objection that “the circumstances in the European 
Großwirtschaftsraum” were currently too uneven for “a uniform European regulative 
body”94, he kept steering an expansionist course: he officially registered the interest 
of the company in the steel works Hagendingen in Lorraine and instructed inspec-
tions of several plants in Alsace which produced parts for aircraft engines.95 Ulti-
mately, Daimler-Benz acquired a production facility in Colmar and initiated consider-
able investments there. For Neil Gregor, this and other measures in Alsace-Lorraine 
were tailored to the needs of the anticipated post-war market.96 With respect to au-
tomobile manufacturing, Daimler-Benz not only studied models of Peugeot and Re-
nault, but also took a close interest in Bugatti, Unic, Latil, and Saurer. In the cases of 
Unic and Latil, the directors decided to pursue the acquisition of shares to obtain a 
dominant position in the field of truck manufacturing.97 Eager to tread the right path 
between the guidelines of the the Vierjahresplan-behörde and those of the Ministry 
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of Economics, Daimler-Benz pointed out the German interests associated with its 
“closer bonding” with Unic.98 After a few months’ efforts, all Daimler-Benz needed to 
finalise the acquisition of 40% of Unic, was the consent of the Ministry of Economics. 
Trying to get this, Kissel addressed himself to Schlotterer and put the efforts of 
Daimler-Benz in perspective:  
As you know, we entertain commercial relations with the Société Nouvelle des Automobiles 
Unic because they are licensed to build our truck diesel engines. Thus, we have in due time 
notified the Plenipotentiary for Motor Transport, General von Schell, that – in the context of 
the reorganisation of French-German cooperation that is taking place at the moment – we 
would like to expand this cooperation and that we accordingly intend to acquire shares in the 
company from the former ownership of Baron Rothschild. [...] We think that by buying these 
shares we are particularly serving general German interests; for if we – as a major company 
in automobile and engine manufacturing – own a share of the Société Nouvelle des Automo-
biles Unic, we will, despite the seemingly confined influence, be able to stay up-to-date on all 
activities in France and, furthermore, we will be able to have a say.
99
 
With the help of these references to prominent categories of the New Order dis-
course – the supremacy of German interests, anti-Semitism, economic interlocking, 
expanding German influence, aligning the European economies – the plans of Daim-
ler-Benz initially found the approval of the Ministry of Economics. However, the ac-
quisition of these shares did not in the end take place, because the aspirations of 
Daimler-Benz had lost political support.100 Even repeated affirmations that its inten-
tions were not monetary ones were of no help.101 Thus, the discursively constructed 
New Order informed the policies of Daimler-Benz. It not gave meaning to expansion 
in general and long-term investments in Alsace-Lorraine in particular but was also 
reflected in the ‘voluntary subordination’ of the company to the ways of speaking that 
the defining elements of the discourse had produced. Officially, Daimler-Benz in-
tended to acquire shares of Unic not because the investment would pay off in Eu-
rope-to-be but because it advanced German interests.  
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The cases depicted here are not isolated deviations. 102  Documents of the IG 
Farbenindustrie AG, for example, also clearly reflect the New Order discourse. The 
IG rhetorically forged its projected plant near Auschwitz into a weapon for the Ger-
many Volkstumskampf: Otto Ambros, a member of its management board, portrayed 
it as a “bulwark of Germandom” and as a “nucleus for the expansion of the Volk in 
the reconquered East”.103 And in the efforts of the IG to close the Francolor contract, 
which was designed to grant the IG decisive influence over the French dyestuffs in-
dustry, the motive of a reorganisation of Europe kept recurring:104  
Note that, set in the framework of our programme of European reorganisation, these propos-
als are economically very advantageous for you. They are in your interest. They are in the in-
terest of the IG. They are above all in the interest of Europe, since, essentially, it is a question 
of reorganising the continent of Europe.
105
 
Moreover, the IG Farben did not stop at words alone. Overall, they took over seven 
companies in Europe and erected another seven new plants to sustain the war ma-
chine and “to develop a continental-wide organization to serve its commercial inter-
ests”.106 Thus, the discursively constructed New Order informed the activities of the 
IG Farbenindustrie AG. The company explicitily referred to a reorganised Europe as 
the foreseeable future, substantiated and prepared for it by expanding into the occu-
pied territories, and adpoted the established ways of speaking about Europe – taken 
particularly from the völkisch interpretive repertoire – as its own. 
The rhetoric of German heavy industry, however, was in some ways strangely timid 
(see also chapter 3.1.3). When they tried to justify expansion and takeovers, they 
relied on a different set of thoughts and arguments than the New Order: Friedrich 
Flick, for example, argued that one of his companies, the Harpener Gesellschaft, 
“indeed had an ethical claim” to either Arbed, the centrepiece of the Luxembourgian 
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heavy industry, or the Rombacher Hüttenwerke.107 And the Hoesch AG addressed 
the Vierjahresplanbehörde with its – “purely production-related”108 – wish to take 
over Arbed. Considering the gains of other companies in the West, going away 
empty-handed would seriously impede Hoesch’s competitiveness. Hermann Röch-
ling vented his anger over the distribution of the Lorraine plants by contrasting the 
profit seeking of Flick to his own loyalty and merits during the French occupation and 
the founding of the Reichswerke.109 Zangen’s speech on the occasion of Mannes-
mann’s 50-year jubilee, by contrast, indicates that the New Order played a role in the 
post-war planning of German heavy industry. After recapping the history of the com-
pany, he hinted at its future:  
Finally, a Großraumwirtschaft is looming in Europe. It is essential to be prepared for it. At this 
stage, one can see the task the future presages. At Mannesmann, we are convinced that the 
concern in its current structure will not only be able to assist, but will be able and destined to 
contribute significantly to the inner and outer development of Germany.
110 
However, the official restraint of German heavy industry in terms of expansion con-
trasted with its real activities. In the context of the defeat of Poland, the industry in 
Upper-Silesia aroused the interest of Röchling and Krupp.111 In the case of Norway, 
undersecretary Waldemar Ludwig in the Ministry of Economics stated: “On the part 
of the industry, particularly heavy industry, plenty of special wishes are available to 
the Ministry of Economics which [...] would ultimately result in a sell-out of Nor-
way.”112 In the West, several German industrialists also tried to get hold of the cream 
of the crop, even before the Ministry of Economics officially encouraged the compa-
nies to register their interests in September 1940.113 Herman von Hanneken, under-
secretary of state in the Ministry of Economics and plenipotentiary for the iron and 
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steel industry in the Vierjahresplanbehörde, asserted that "[e]verybody is scrambling 
after Rombach, Hayingen, and Differdingen”114 – some of the most attractive plants 
in the West. Thus, despite expansionist ambitions, there is no sign of German heavy 
industry subordinating to the repertoire of thought patterns and arguments that 
dominated the New Order discourse. The Reichswerke Hermann Göring might be a 
plausible explanation for this. Embodying the primacy of the völkisch-political will 
over economic rationality, the very existence of Reichswerke made it impossible for 
private heavy industrial companies to resort to the predominant argumentative pat-
terns: after the successful expansion of the Reichswerke into Austria and the Protec-
torate, they could neither claim to be indispensable for the realisation of the New Or-
der nor credibly claim to prioritise national over self-interests after having initiated the 
founding of the Reichswerke by refusing to take up the uneconomical processing of 
low quality German iron ore for the sake of autarky in 1936. Nevertheless, German 
heavy industry was eager to expand into the occupied territories in order to be pre-
pared for the coming Großraumwirtschaft. As a discursively constructed vision of the 
future, the New Order might not have shaped their rhetoric but it gave meaning to 
their current expansionist entrepreneurial activities.  
This eagerness to take advantage of German dominance in Europe, to contribute to 
and to prepare for the creation of a common European market seems to have 
shaped the activities of most companies in many economic sectors. The Allianz AG, 
a leading insurance company, made efforts to expand into the occupied territories 
and to harmonise the European insurance industry “not only with regard to current 
business”, but also with respect to “the future in the greater European space.”115 
When Bosch took over a seized machine factory in Alsace, it secured for itself the 
option-to-buy – a step which only makes sense, if its officials believed in a German 
victory.116 The engineering company Werner und Pfleiderer did not expand by taking 
over companies, but by outsourcing production into Belgium, France, the Nether-
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lands, Denmark, and the Protectorate.117 Otto Fahr, chairman of the executive board, 
expected this “well-practised economic cooperation” to prove helpful in the “prospec-
tive European economic order”.118 Thus, existing business-historical studies suggest 
that the discursively constructed New Order became a future scenario which Ger-
man companies factored in when planning their own future. 
Overall, the discursively constructed New Order found its way into business life. As 
the most likely post-war scenario, it became meaningful in the decision-making proc-
esses of private companies. And the concept itself, as well as its constitutive argu-
ments and thought patterns reverberated in business correspondences and letters 
by officials, so that the Großraumwirtschaft, völkisch issues, German post-war inter-
ests, or at least political demands, served as motives and justifications for company 
policies. However, beyond this rhetorical compliance, German private businesses 
also started to realise the New Order on the ground. They seized the opportunity for 
European expansion that National Socialist military victories and policies had opened 
up. They bought or staffed companies, set up market agreements, and contributed to 
the alignment of the German sphere of influence. So even without answering the 
question of why exactly German companies did what they did, two valuable conclu-
sions can be drawn. Firstly, the rhetoric of German companies clearly shows that 
they stabilised the New Order by accepting the basic rules of the discourse on 
Europe: Speaking about Europe meant speaking about German benefits. Secondly, 
for some – if not all – private companies the discursively constructed National Social-
ist Europe became a category of their thinking, a matter that had to be taken into 
account; thus: a reality. 
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4.2 A German Continent and its Colonies (1941-1943) 
The other extreme involves the exclusively economic exploitation of the occupied territories 
while at the same time preventing any autonomous state building. For compelling political 
reasons, this will apply in the majority of the Eastern territories.
119
 (Arbeitswissenschaftliches 
Institut of the German Labour Front, December 1941) 
After June 1941, Europe grew. To the extent that the Wehrmacht pushed eastwards, 
the geographical scope of German New Order planning expanded. This eastward 
enlargement had a far-reaching impact on the National Socialist New Order. On the 
one hand, the allegedly inferior population that had come under German rule gave 
additional significance to the völkisch interpretive frame within the discourse. The 
German expectation of fertile soils and of an abundance of natural resources, on the 
other hand, nurtured the economic notion of putting the industrial core of Europe on 
a broader and sounder basis. Accordingly, both the völkisch and the economic di-
mension of the discourse amalgamated into a stable vision of a subordinated, serv-
ing role for the East, the vision of a colony.  
This chapter shows that after June 1941, the discursively constructed National So-
cialist New Order had lost little of its relevance. In fact, German occupation policy 
and the actions of German companies still reflected anticipations of a new Europe. 
While National Socialist officials kept working on the emerging Großraumwirtschaft, 
their efforts to integrate the occupied Eastern territories led the way to “A Völkisch 
New Order” (chapter 4.2.1). German companies, in contrast, focused on the Western 
economies because they were not allowed to spring into action in the East right 
away. However, as soon as the ever-growing war needs made it seem expedient to 
harness the expertise and initiative of private businesses, they lived up to political 
expectations in the East, in the hope that it might pay off in the long run (chapter 
4.2.2). 
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4.2.1 Volk, Race, and Lebensraum – A Völkisch New Order 
One day, history will note – soberly, as is its wont - that this war lasted three, four, five years. 
This is the way it spoke about the First World War and it will be the way it speaks about the 
Second World War. All the sorrows, the blood, the responsibility, all the misery and grief, that 
occured over these months and years and which primarily also lay heavily on the shoulders of 
the Führer, will not be noted and mentioned. After all, history records what happened and 
what was achieved. After the war it will note that a Greater Germanic Reich has been 
founded, primarily encompassing the East.
120
 (Heinrich Himmler, September 1942) 
Even though Himmler’s vision of a Greater Germanic Empire might not have been 
the focal point for all German officials, German occupation authorities did set the re-
organisation of Europe in motion. Economically, the basic principles of the projected 
Großraumwirtschaft remained unaffected by the German attack on the Soviet Union. 
Since National Socialist officials saw the most remarkable feature of the Newly Oc-
cupied Eastern Territories in their abundance of raw materials and their fertile soils, 
they saw them as destined it to become Europe’s suppliers of cheap foodstuffs and 
natural resources. Together with the conviction that Slavs were inferior, this 
amounted to a colonial perspective on the newly occupied territories. The policies of 
National Socialist Germany reflected this discursively established concept of Europe-
to-be. 
In December 1942, Josef Terboven predicted a bright future for Norway in the New 
Order: “Among the Germanic countries I know none whose economic prospects and 
developmental possibilities are as extraordinary as those of Norway in the case of a 
German victory.”121 Its richness of raw materials, its significant shipping industry, the 
aptitude of its people for and inclination to seafaring, and above all its unrivalled 
cost-effective hydro-electric power not only destined the country for a close eco-
nomic confederation with the highly industrialised Germany but also constituted the 
strengths that Norway could contribute to the “prospective Greater European mar-
ket”.122 Even though Terboven’s words might have also been aimed at further mobi-
lising the Norwegian economy, they were not empty phrases. The discursively con-
structed idea of a Großraumwirtschaft and the role of Norway in it did shape German 
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occupation policy. Shortly after the invasion, Germany integrated Norway into the 
central clearing system, manipulated Norwegian prices, and – in order to foster mu-
tual exchange and to increase German influence – set up a German chamber of 
commerce.123  
However, German policy did not leave it at these elementary steps of integrating 
Norway into the German-led Großraumwirtschaft. During the occupation, National 
Socialist officials took measures to turn Norway into the economy it was to be in a 
reorganised Europe. Being integrated “into a large-scale European fishery”, Norway 
“would play an outstanding role in the feeding of the whole of Europe”.124 Accord-
ingly, Germany invested in freezing plants and decreed a rise in fish prices. Never-
theless, these efforts amounted to nothing more than a larger part of the declining 
fish catch in Norway being shipped fresh to Germany. Norway did not become the 
main source of fish for Europe but merely for Germany. Unsafe fishing grounds and 
the shortage of oil diminished the overall yield. And this yield was shipped to Ger-
many.125 
There was another, much larger project which similarly failed to live up to ambitious 
German planning: the so-called Leichtmetallausbau (expansion of light metal output). 
Shortly after the German invasion, Terboven pinned high hopes on Norwegian hy-
dro-electric power. He intended to expand the power plants in a way that “these 
sources of energy fit purposefully into the context of the new European economy.”126 
Under the auspices of Heinrich Koppenberg, CEO of the Junkers Flugzeug- und Mo-
torenwerke AG, these ambitions merged with the military wish to expand the Luft-
waffe and the vision of Norway as Europe’s prime source of energy and energy-
intensive goods into a detailed plan which Göring approved in October 1940.127 By 
July 1941, the plan had undergone a few revisions and stipulated a tenfold increase 
of Norwegian alumina output, a rise of aluminium production from 40,000 to 243,000 
tons per year, and an electricity output of 700,000 kilowatts to sustain this growth. 
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Overall, the bill totalled 1.2 billion Reichsmark.128 Since alumina production in Nor-
way would not suffice for an industry of this scale, further investments in France, 
Croatia, and Greece were to fill the gap.129 During the further course of the war, 
these plans were progressively cut down to size, but never completely aban-
doned.130 Judging the outcome against the background of Germany’s grand plans, 
the verdicts of historians are unanimous: The programme was a failure.131 However, 
there is also broad agreement that the Leichtmetallausbau “was not really a plan for 
Norway [...] but a plan for Europe”132; for the “Großwirtschaftsraum”133. Thus, despite 
not living up to the enormous expectations, German economic policy in Norway 
clearly attests to the significance of the discursively constructed New Order. While 
the völkisch interpretive frame defined the alleged nature of Norwegians, the eco-
nomic arguments and thought patterns translated this appraisal into a clear-cut role 
within the envisaged European division of labour. As a Volk of fishers and seafarers 
that lived in a natural environment predestined for hydro-energy generation, Norway 
would focus on its strengths and supply the Großwirtschaftsraum of the future with 
energy, fish, and maritime means of transport. National Socialist officials not only 
frequently and explicitly mentioned this aspect of the New Order but it also endowed 
their massive investments in these sectors with meaning.  
The discursively constructed New Order does not only become apparent in the eco-
nomic policies of German occupation authorities though. As a supposedly Germanic 
country, Norway was expected to adopt National Socialist values voluntarily.134 In 
order to help make this happen, Terboven promoted the Norwegian fascist party, the 
Nasjonal Samling, as “the way for the Norwegian Volk to win back their freedom and 
autonomy”.135 To speed up this process, German authorities granted the Nasjonal 
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Samling every kind of support. Monetary contributions, strategic advice, and privi-
leged access to the media were supposed to strengthen their position within Norwe-
gian politics.136 The cultural propaganda of Goebbels flanked these efforts, while 
Himmler’s conviction of shared Germanic blood expressed itself in the SS regiment 
Nordland, whose members were supposed to become “champions of the Greater 
Germanic idea”137 by learning German and receiving German citizenship after two 
years of service.138 Not even political setbacks deterred Germany from this course. 
Instead, National Socialist officials were willing to risk the consequences “because 
otherwise achieving the political objective will be jeopardised.”139 This political objec-
tive was still the same:  
I know that, when I am speaking of the necessity of a Germanic community and of an asso-
ciation of the Germanic Völker, wide sections of the Norwegians are convinced that it might 
be some of my racial and relational feelings talking in my formulations, but that they ultimately 
serve to cloak a plain German imperialism. However, one has to be a National Socialist to re-
alise that the awareness of the unconditional common bond between the Germanic people is 
really a cornerstone of our entire worldview.
140
 
German occupation policy certainly raised doubts among Norwegians, but internally, 
National Socialist officials clung to the idea of winning them over for a Greater Ger-
manic Empire. According to Terboven, Hitler’s “irreversible will” in September 1943 
was still – once the war was won – to create “a national and socialist Norway in free-
dom and autonomy which would only delegate those functions into the higher level of 
a European community that are essential for Europe’s protection for all time”.141 
Thus, German occupation policy in Norway was also informed by the völkisch di-
mension of the New Order discourse. It provided the thoughts and arguments that 
made it seem sensible to promote and to wait for a völkisch revolution in Norway 
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which would reveal the true Germanic nature of the Norwegians and make these 
‘blood brothers’ a faithful part of the Germanic core of Europe. 
In other parts of the projected Germanic core area of Europe, National Socialist au-
thorities steered a similar course. The SS, and in the Dutch case even the Wehr-
macht, took on volunteers from Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands.142 While 
Seyß-Inquart also increasingly groomed the Dutch National Socialists to spark a na-
tional revolution, Hitler’s general discontent with the Danish attitude resulted in the 
dismissal of Renthe-Fink, but not of the general objective – the “inner conquest of 
the country”.143 Apart from the war effort, the Großraumwirtschaft remained the sec-
ond economic guiding principle on which German officials acted.144 In Belgium, oc-
cupation authorities reorganised the economy according to German standards and 
kept pushing for further economic interlocking.145 In Denmark, the Ministry of Eco-
nomics objected to the erection of a steel mill because it ran contrary to the envis-
aged Großraumwirtschaft.146 Generally, however, Renthe-Fink was confident that the 
Reich would get what it had to demand, “having the objective of integrating Denmark 
into the new Europe in mind”.147 Thus, the discursively constructed New Order and 
its völkisch and economic specifications still guided German occupation policies in 
the allegedly Germanic countries. 
The idea of a Germanic community also manifested itself more widely: Germanic 
nations were allowed to participate “in economically opening up the Eastern 
space”.148 For Clodius the pending tasks in the East offered the opportunity to live up 
to the promise of European economic solidarity which Germany had preached since 
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the beginning of the war. Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes could be deployed in 
their respective fields of expertise.149 In a meeting on this matter, the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, the Ministry of Nutrition and Agriculture, the Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht, and the Vierjahresplanbehörde unanimously and “without any reserva-
tion affirmed the need to enlist foreign countries for the fulfilment of the economic 
tasks in the East.” 150  Expanding the demand of Clodius by including Belgium, 
Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, and Switzerland, they wanted the focus to remain 
on foodstuffs and raw materials because “there is no room for a constructive policy 
[Aufbaupolitik] like in Western Europe.”151 
Rosenberg, however, voiced racial concerns. In his eyes, employing non-Germanic 
people might make sense economically, but for biological reasons they should not be 
sent to prospective German settlement regions. 152  Racially valuable Dutchmen, 
Flemings, Norwegians, Danes, or Swiss, in contrast, could even join the German 
administration in the East.153 This stance was not only in line with Himmler’s en-
dorsement of redirecting Scandinavian emigration into the Eastern territories154 but 
was also a reverberation of Hitler’s point of view: 
We must not let go any Germanic people from Europe to America anymore. We have to 
channel all the Norwegians, Swedes, Danes, and Dutchmen into the Eastern territories. They 
will become parts of the Reich. We are confronted with the big task of pursuing systematic ra-
cial policy.
155
 
This policy was actually set in motion. Danish companies took over firms in the 
East.156  After having worked in the Ostland, fifty Dutch craftsmen transferred to 
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Kharkov in April 1942; another 750 were to follow.157 In order to “activate and har-
ness the Germanic Europe for the East” – particularly the “racially related Dutch 
Volk”158 – the Nederlandsche Ost-Compagnie was founded to coordinate the Dutch 
engagements.159 By tailoring its employment “to the peace-time goal of a European 
Großraumwirtschaft”, National Socialist officials sought to increase the attractiveness 
of the Compagnie. 160  This policy of promoting Germanic participation continued 
throughout the war.161 In May 1944, German officials were still concerned with the 
problems of these settlers; probably because they were still aware of the big picture 
and clung to it: These “pioneers of opening up the East”, which preferably had large 
families, settled there for good, thereby “dispersing the Eastern space with Germanic 
people.”162 Thus, despite being occupied themselves, the Dutch were allowed to join 
in on the Eastern policy of National Socialist Germany. It was the völkisch dimension 
of the New Order that granted them this privilege, while the economic dimension 
specified the tasks. In the envisaged New Order, the East was a colony of and Le-
bensraum for the Germanic core of Europe.  
The Reichskommissariat Ostland was part of this Lebensraum – at least for Rosen-
berg. In his eyes, the region was “predominantly Germanic” because of a “constant 
inflow of German blood” and of “some Swedish elements”. Accordingly, it was al-
ready “mainly oriented towards Europe” and, as a part of the “Greater Germanic Le-
bensraum”, it was to be developed into a “mighty German borderland”.163 On the one 
hand, this appraisal resulted in the demand to turn “this territory into a part of the 
Greater German Reich”164 by settling 250,000 Germans there, as the Generalplan 
Ost stipulated. Shortly after the German invasion, the Einsatzgruppe A, which oper-
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ated in the Baltic States, had already prepared the ground for the projected Ger-
manisation. In contrast to the other Einsatzgruppen, it killed not only male adult Jews 
but aimed at “eliminating the Jews as completely as possible”.165 In the end, the 
30,000 relocated German settlers fell far short of the set objective, but these settle-
ments projects and the activities of the Einsatzgruppe A attest to the potency of the 
völkisch New Order to endow even inhumane policies with meaning, before the war 
effort prevailed in the German conflict of aims.166 On the other hand, the appraisal of 
the Ostland as Germanic Lebensraum manifested itself in a less punitive occupation 
policy. The admission of autonomous institutions with advisory functions, the survival 
of local courts, the school system, the less intrusive raids for labour, all set the 
Ostland apart from other regions of the occupied Eastern territories.167 In compari-
son, these small concessions seem like privileges and they indicate the different sta-
tus of the Ostland in the discursively constructed New Order. 
German economic policy also reflected the prospective status of the Ostland. Göring 
had exempted those parts of it which were “designated for Germanisation” from the 
economic exploitation “from a colonial point of view and with colonial means”.168 
Hence, National Socialist officials made sure that the price level in the Ostland was 
higher than in the rest of the occupied Eastern territories.169 Additionally, the Ostland 
was spared the German policy of de-industrialisation. Instead, the authorities started 
to privatise the economy again. However, due to many exceptions, only a few people 
actually got their former property back.170 For war-economic and völkisch reasons, 
larger industries, wholesalers, banks, insurance and shipping companies were ex-
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empt, as were companies that had been owned by Jews, the state, or foreigners.171 
In case someone applied for a company that did not fall into one of these categories, 
the decision of the German authorities depended on the “general attitude of the pop-
ulation”172 and the “political and economic merits”173 of the applicant. Thus, apart 
from rewarding collaboration, German economic policy in the Ostland promoted 
völkisch aims by prioritising German interests and aimed at establishing the völkisch 
and economic hierarchy within Europe that the New Order discourse had produced. 
However, a third thought pattern – besides the war effort and völkisch interests – 
kept recurring: the need to free the Ostland from the clutches of Bolshevism and to 
reintegrate it into Europe, where it belonged. Without even mentioning the war effort, 
the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories justified re-privatisations as an as-
pect of “winning over the [...] people for Germandom.”174 As long as German officials 
claimed “to have come to restore and save European culture”, while failing to re-
establish “the characteristic cornerstone of European life, private property”175, “the 
moral credit of the Reich as the champion of abendländisch [occidental] culture and 
laws is drawn into doubt”.176 Göring also wanted to see the “European economic sys-
tem” restored because it “guarantees top performance”.177  German policy of re-
privatisations has therefore to be seen in an anti-communist and European context, 
as the Zentral-Handelsgesellschaft Ost, in charge of purchasing and transferring 
foodstuffs from the East,178 did:  
In the General Districts Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, private property has been restored in 
consistent continuation of the policy of liquidating the Bolshevist System and of reintroducing 
European legal relationships, which the Greater German Reich had started after liberating the 
occupied Eastern territories.
179 
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On the part of the new owners, the nexus with the German striving for a new Euro-
pean order became even more apparent. In the paperwork they had to sign in the 
process of taking over property, they found a form that obliged them to cooperate on 
“the reorganisation of Europe under the leadership of the Reich chancellor and the 
German Volk”180. Thus, the process of restoring private property in the Ostland was 
not only a measure of Volkstumspolitik and an attempt at mobilising the region for 
the war effort by politically living up to the expectations of the population. It was also 
endowed with meaning by the discursively constructed New Order. As a region with 
a clear Germanic imprint, the Ostland belonged to Europe. Therefore, it made sense 
to National Socialist officials to pursue a policy of Europeanization. 
In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, by contrast, National Socialist occupation policy 
followed different rationales: While Rosenberg considered it a part of the “European 
family of Völker”181 and fit for an autonomous state,182 Reichskommissar Erich Koch 
found it “nonsensical [...] to absorb the Ukraine into the European family of nations. 
The Ukraine has never belonged to Europe.”183 Despite formally being his superior, 
Rosenberg failed to align Koch with his aims because the racial contempt of the 
Reichskommissar was in line with discursively constructed ‘truth’ about Ukraine.184 
Accordingly, German policy in Ukraine did not seek to Europeanize the country. In-
stead, Koch declared: 
The aim of our work has to be that the Ukrainians work for Germany; not that we please the 
Volk here. Ukraine has to deliver what Germany lacks. This task has to be carried out at any 
sacrifice.
185
 
What Germany lacked most, in the eyes of Koch, was bread. “The missing quantities 
of grain have to be acquired from Ukraine. [...] In the face of this task, the nourish-
ment of the civilian population is completely irrelevant.”186 After all, he considered 
every German “racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the lo-
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cal population”.187 Accordingly, Koch put the preparatory planning in motion that en-
visaged a famine in the East and approved the “tough but unavoidable conse-
quences” Göring had anticipated.188 The local population ranked lowest in the official 
allocation formula for foodstuffs because – as Riecke put it – it was better Ukrainians 
starved than Germans.189 While city dwellers officially received 300 grams of bread 
per person a day in September 1941, National Socialist officials expected the rural 
population to manage without any rations.190 At the same time, the discursively con-
structed long-term vision, in which there was no need for any “noteworthy industry 
for commodities and finished products”191 in the occupied Eastern territories, trans-
lated into a policy of inaction at first. Stalin’s scorched-earth policy had already 
stripped Ukraine of most of its industry, and German officials made no efforts to undo 
the harm done.192 In the industrially important region of Stalino, for example, occupa-
tion authorities watched the people starve to death instead of getting the former 
workforce of the factories back into their jobs to get production going again.193 Given 
that National Socialist officials also closed all but the four-year primary schools and 
deported 1.5 million Ukrainians – two thirds of all Eastern workers – to Germany, it 
becomes clear that German policy in Ukraine did not aim at Europeanization but at 
colonisation.194 Thus, the German notion of Ukrainians being inferior and of Ukraine 
being a resource-rich and fertile land – deeply rooted in the dominant völkisch and 
economic knowledge and belief systems – informed National Socialist occupation 
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policies.195 German officials deemed it necessary and sensible to ruthlessly squeeze 
the country into the economic role it was supposed to play in Europe-to-be. 
Overall, German occupation policy between 1941 and 1943 reflected the discursively 
constructed New Order. German officials frequently resorted to this vision and its 
repertoire of thoughts and arguments, and the political measures they actually took 
can be read as steps towards realising the völkisch and economic dimension of the 
New Order. 
National Socialist officials still pursued the idea of creating a völkisch homogeneous 
Europe around a Germanic core. They still hoped that the Norwegian, Danish, 
Dutch, and Flemish people bethought themselves of their Nordic blood and would 
ultimately join the German cause. Hence, they not only made efforts to lead the re-
spective local fascist movement to success but also let their ‘blood brothers’ partici-
pate in the opening up of the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories. In the East, the 
völkisch dimension of the New Order discourse informed a different occupation pol-
icy: Some regions ranked below the Germanic states, but still enjoyed certain privi-
leges over other territories due to their alleged racial value. However, where the 
people were considered racially inferior, National Socialist rule largely disregarded 
the population.  
German economic policy in the occupied territories illustrates even more plainly the 
endowment of meaning by means of the New Order. The idea of a European division 
of labour, for example, channelled German investments into Norwegian hydro-
electric energy and aluminium production. Being ideally autarkic, the discursively 
constructed European Großraumwirtschaft also justified a ruthless policy in Ukraine 
and led to a focus on raw materials and foodstuffs. Together with the simultaneous 
policy of deindustrialisation,196 this political course served the purpose of establishing 
a trade pattern in which the East was to export its primary production and to import 
the industrial output of Central Europe. The Ostland was not exempt from this con-
ception that had shaped the German discourse on Europe for decades and found its 
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way into the New Order. However, its alleged völkisch value and its status as Ger-
man Lebensraum led National Socialist officials to strive for economic reforms which 
were explicitly marked as the reintroduction of European standards. 
Of course, many of the political measures that the German occupation authorities 
took were also meaningful from a war-economic angle. Extracting as much foodstuff 
as possible from the occupied Eastern territories facilitated feeding the Wehrmacht, 
just as the rising aluminium production in Norway was supposed to reinforce the 
Luftwaffe. National Socialist efforts to expand the Norwegian fishing industry were 
aimed at compensating for the loss of other animal protein, and the engagement of 
other Germanic states in the occupied Eastern territories can be blamed on a short-
age of manpower. However, German policy seems to have followed a long-term ra-
tionale at the same time: creating the discursively established New Order. Even 
though National Socialist Germany tried to get hold of as much industrial output as 
possible elsewhere – for example by still pushing for economic integration in the 
West –, it refused to rebuild, or even dismantled industry in the East. This might have 
been a matter of priorities, but it also served the purpose of arriving at the economic 
structure envisaged in the future New Order. This is also true of German policy in 
Norway: The investments there were not only tailored to short-term considerations 
but were accompanied by thoughts and arguments that revolved around the New 
Order, they were borne by companies which had the post-war market in mind,197 and 
they triggered a Europe-wide planning of the production chain. Concerning the par-
ticipation of Dutch and Danes in the occupied Eastern territories, the meaningfulness 
of the discursively constructed New Order not only became apparent in the associ-
ated internal discussion but also determined which countries were allowed to send 
people to the East as well as where and how they were to be employed. Moreover, 
the German policy of re-privatisation in the Reichskommissariat Ostland was cer-
tainly supposed to alleviate the fears of the local population, but the internal docu-
ments attest to the intention of making the Ostland European. Thus, the reconcilia-
tion of short-term needs with long-term objectives and of the völkisch interpretive 
frame with economic lines of reasoning apparently was not only a feature of the New 
Order discourse (see chapter 3.2.2) but also of German efforts to realise it. 
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4.2.2 ‘The Trend is Your Friend’ – Eastwards 
For Germany’s economic future, the Occupied Eastern Territories will have an importance 
that can hardly be overestimated. There, the German Volk will find the Lebensraum [living 
space], for the sake of which this war has to be fought. The transformation of the economy in 
these territories, and moreover its expansion, demand extraordinary efforts [...]. Germany’s 
big branch banks collectively place themselves at your disposal, Herr Reichsminister [Funk], 
for the fulfilment of this great task.
198
 (Joint letter of four major German banks to Walther 
Funk, January 1942) 
Even though not all German companies expressed their willingness to embrace polit-
ical wishes as commands as openly as the major German banks in this joint letter, 
most of them followed the German thrust eastwards. The attack on the Soviet Union 
may have taken some of them by surprise, but soon many of them started to focus 
on the opportunities the East offered. In accordance with the New Order discourse, 
businessmen – just like political institutions – pondered on how to integrate the New-
ly Occupied Eastern Territories into the new Europe. For them, this meant opening 
up a market and getting hold of the plants and factories whose former owner, the 
Soviet state, was about to vanish. 
Shortly after the German attack on the Soviet Union, private companies already 
showed an interest in the economic values of the East and started to eye up facilities 
in the East.199 This is hardly surprising, given that publicly owned plants and factories 
could now fall to the Reich and that German businessmen were well aware of what 
the East had to offer in their operating area. While some of them had embedded 
skilled personnel into the Wehrmacht, others relied on the overviews that the Reichs- 
and Wirtschaftsgruppen compiled and circulated from May 1941 onwards.200 One 
such analysis bore the title “Großraumwirtschaft”,201 while others concerned them-
selves with questions of privatisations and the rationalisation of the metal industries 
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for the “Greater European Economic Area”.202 Thus, German companies and their 
self-administrative bodies were eager to seize the opportunities the newly won East 
offered. Within their considerations, the discursively constructed New Order was a 
crucial point of reference. 
However, most German companies were well aware that their prospects of gaining a 
foothold in the East were limited for the time being. The foundation of several Ostge-
sellschaften indicated a different course than in the West. Reciprocal shareholdings 
and takeovers were not broadly promoted and it seemed doubtful whether the local 
industry had any future at all. Odilo Burkart, chief representative of the Flick concern, 
interpreted the Ostgesellschaften as an attempt to temporarily prevent competition 
for the best industrial plants in the East, but he expected a wave of privatisations 
after the war.203 The Ostverbindungstelle of the IG Farben also characterised the 
Ostgesellschaften as temporary bodies, whose function of linking the Germany 
economy with the East was to be taken over by private companies after the war.204 
Nevertheless, the Ostverbindungstelle advised the board of directors to act with re-
straint, because  
concerning the possibilities of participating in the build-up in the Eastern territories, once 
again the basic principle should be mentioned that the East is to be seen as a purely agricul-
tural and raw materials territory. The guidelines for the measures to be taken in the future 
stipulate an indiscriminate evacuation of the industrial cities in the South, and an evacuation 
of all industrially usable machinery [...]. All efforts shall exclusively focus on agriculture and 
mineral oil.
205
 
Nevertheless, several German companies already tried to get hold of interesting 
plants. AEG (General Electricity Company), for example, took over a plant for electric 
motors in Latvia, while the Reichskommissar’s staff attempted to undo this sei-
zure.206 Other companies, by contrast, confined themselves to placing personnel at 
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the disposal of the Ostgesellschaften.207 Thus, most German businesses were aware 
of what future the discursively constructed New Order stipulated for the East and 
complied with it. They had to be patient: As long as the Russian bear was not shot, 
the fur was not to be sold. 
One company that showed an interest in the Eastern industry but refrained from tak-
ing actions that violated political guidelines, was the Mannesmann AG. The company 
had already expanded into Alsace-Lorraine, France, and the General Government 
before June 1941.208 Additionally, and explicitly with their future European market 
shares in mind, Mannesmann thought about purchasing van Leer – a company ear-
marked for ‘Aryanisation’209 – in the Netherlands and took an interest in Titan Nadrag 
Calan, the only profitable Romanian heavy industrial complex, not least because of 
“the tendency for a European economic interconnection”.210 This expansionist course 
was partly driven by the wish to vertically integrate the production of the concern, 
partly by the intent to regain former sales markets, and partly by the ambition to open 
up new operating areas.211 And of course, it was a response to “the European condi-
tions altered by the military and political situation”.212 In fact, German efforts to real-
ise the New Order in the West offered promising investment opportunities: Mannes-
mann was to deliver the lion’s share of pipes for an oil pipeline which was under 
construction in Southeastern Europe, while the expansion of Norwegian hydropower 
plants and of its aluminium industry increased demand for steel pipes, the core 
product of the company. Consequently, Mannesmann sought to safeguard its own 
supply. This thought, for example, justified the purchase of stocks of a Slovakian 
company that produced asbestos – essential for asbestos cement tubes.213 
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Since being prepared for the post-war market of the New Order seems to have been 
a constant of the business strategy of Mannesmann, the German attack on the So-
viet Union also left its mark. The company promptly established a Russian depart-
ment, got an overview of all pipe mills on Russian soil, and placed staff at the dis-
posal of the Ostgesellschaften, hoping that this might prove advantageous.214 Even 
though Wilhelm Zangen, head of the Reichgruppe Industrie, chairman of the Man-
nesmann-Röhrenwerke AG and managing director of the Mannesmann concern, 
would have preferred a solution in which entire factories were assigned to German 
companies, Mannesmann played along and accepted that the East was barred for 
private initiative for the moment.215 However, after assuring the supervisory board 
that “we attentively keep an eye on possible interests of our concern in the Newly 
Occupied Eastern Territories”216, Mannesmann did indeed found a subsidiary in Riga 
– the very first non-state-related company registered there, as was noted.217 Already 
in May 1942, another subsidiary was founded in Rivne because “it cannot be a mis-
take to have a base in an area that stretches across 700 km from North to South and 
200 to 400 km from West to East”.218 Subsidiaries in Kiev and Kharkiv soon fol-
lowed.219  
Subsequent to the political turnaround of summer 1942, the considerations of the 
management of Mannesmann started to extend beyond expanding the trade network 
of the company eastwards. Now, the opportunity arose to take over factories in the 
East.220 One potential candidate for a takeover was a plant in Dnepropetrovsk in 
Ukraine. 221  However, Mannesmann settled for a smaller plant in Taganrog and 
wanted to rebuild it as fast as possible.222 Even though the contracts under which 
Mannesmann had to operate the plant contained “clauses that would normally be 
unacceptable”, the board decided to sign them in November 1942. After all, the plant 
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was conveniently located by the Sea of Azov, contained a modern pipe mill, other 
companies – Krupp and the Vereinigte Stahlwerke for example – pursued similar 
interests in the East, and a refusal might be “unfavourably interpreted” and carried 
the risk that the company “would lose touch”.223 Thus, despite its concerns, Man-
nesmann participated in the “officially promoted enlisting of the Eastern territories for 
industrial war- and peacetime tasks”224.  
Even though Mannesmann sought to “focus on its very own fields” instead of lapsing 
into “an unsystematic expansion”,225 the company grew considerably during the war: 
In 1938, an internal overview showed that Mannesmann maintained 53 companies in 
Europe, excluding the Reich territory.226 A similar compilation of July 1945, by con-
trast, reported 127 non-German European subsidiaries for the year 1944. At that 
time, Mannesmann commanded a network reaching from Paris in the West to Dne-
propetrovsk in the East and from Narvik in the North to Sarajevo and Belgrade in the 
Southeast. 227  Even though many of these additional subsidiaries were newly-
founded trading companies, this expansion has to be seen as an adaptation to the 
anticipated Europe-to-be. As early as the summer of 1940, Zangen had spoken of a 
Großraumwirtschaft for which Mannesmann had to prepare (see chapter 4.1.2)228 
and in the wake of the war economy usurping the New Order discourse, he depicted 
the armaments industry as “the forges of the abendländisch continent free of any 
foreign rule”. Moreover, he emphasised that 
in his last speech, the Führer has said that the war we are waging is being fought for Europe. 
German industry has to draw the corresponding lesson from this. It has to expand in a geopo-
litical respect. It has to take a stand for Europe more than ever before and of its own ac-
cord.
229
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Thus, in the case of Mannesmann, the discursively constructed New Order did 
shape business policy. Even though the concern pursued its own agenda, it did so 
within the boundaries set by the German sphere of influence. The intensity and the 
geographical thrust of its growth during the war were not only in accordance with, but 
also helped to realise, this New Order. Among the broad spectrum of motives that 
drove the expansion of the concern, the expected Europe-to-be constituted an im-
portant point of reference. 
Within German heavy industry, Mannesmann was by no means an exception. Flick, 
for example, took on a trusteeship over the Rombacher Hüttenwerke in Lorraine 
which would have become a part of his concern once the peace treaties had been 
signed.230 And in the East, one of Flick’s companies, the Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke 
teamed up with the Reichswerke in the Dnjepr Stahl GmbH. This joint venture oper-
ated all industrial facilities along the Dnieper River.231 Furthermore, Flick competed 
with Krupp for Vairogs, a factory for carriages in Riga, and prevailed in the end.232 
According to Priemel, this interest in Vairogs rested upon post-war considerations.233 
Friedrich Krupp AG also seized opportunities that German dominance offered: in 
Silesia, Krupp administered the Bismarckhütte, it extracted molybdenum in Norway, 
chromium in Southeastern Europe, and, together with IG Farben and the Metallge-
sellschaft, it exploited Finnish nickel deposits.234 Additionally, Krupp took an interest 
in coalmines in the Netherlands, the manganese ore mines of Azagour near Mar-
rakesh, and the Greek mining industry.235 In the occupied Eastern territories, Krupp 
controlled the Azovstal in Mariupol, a mechanical engineering company in Krama-
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torsk, and a tractor factory in Berdyansk.236 Even though the existing literature on the 
history of Krupp does not name the motives behind this expansion,237 its pattern re-
sembles that of other German heavy industrial companies. It suggests that the New 
Order gave meaning to expansion as an improvement of the market position and to 
horizontal integration in anticipation of the expected autarkic European economy.  
Expansion was not only the order of the day for heavy industry. The Reemtsma con-
cern, the biggest German producer of cigarettes, also expanded during the war. Hav-
ing been cut off from its vital tobacco imports, the company elected the Caucasus 
and the Crimea to fill this gap. In its “European tobacco plan”, these regions figured 
as the cornerstones to “secure the future supply of the German cigarette industry 
from any danger and allow for an increase in production.”238 However, due to the 
anti-smoking stance of the NSDAP, the current business model of Reemtsma 
seemed to be in jeopardy. Accordingly, the company simultaneously pursued a 
course of diversification in order to prepare for a National Socialist Europe. Between 
1938 and 1942, Reemtsma became involved in the fishing and the timber industries, 
frozen foods, mineral oil, and ocean shipping in Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
the Protectorate, Slovakia, and Southeastern Europe.239  Thus, the expansion of 
Reemtsma can be characterised as an anticipation of the discursively constructed 
New Order: the interest in the tobacco-growing regions in the East was the answer of 
the company to autarky and the diversification was not only a response to political 
tendencies but also focussed on branches that promised growth in the new 
Europe.240 
Other non-heavy industrial companies also pursued an expansionist course in antici-
pation of Europe-to-be and were well aware of its defining arguments and thought 
patterns. In search of a weaving mill that it could take over, the medium sized Ger-
man textile enterprise Conze & Colsmann contacted the Dresdner Bank. Being 
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aware of the political priorities in the Warthegau, the advice of the Dresdner Bank 
was to tailor any application to Volkstumspolitik.241 The Universum Film AG (UFA), a 
motion picture production company, also referred to political wishes when it mus-
tered ten million Reichsmark to take over French cinemas and theatres in the context 
of founding the Continental Film.242 The Bremer Baumwoll Aktiengesellschaft, in con-
trast, willingly administered all cotton-related enterprises in Ukraine, Crimea, and the 
Rostov region because it wanted to avoid people being put in charge who might fol-
low the political priorities of the party instead of economic ones.243 The trading com-
pany Alfred C. Toepfer, not only expanded into Krakow and Lviv but its CEO also 
joined an Ostgesellschaft for six months in order to ensure the company “a field of 
operation in the grain trade of Russia for the post-war era.”244 In Gerlach’s eyes, 
these efforts were not part of a “temporary evasion”, but of a “long-term reorienta-
tion”.245 Thus, the discursively constructed New Order as the most likely future sce-
nario provided German companies with a reason to expand and with suitable argu-
ments to justify this expansion. 
Overall, German companies kept expanding after the attack on the Soviet Union. 
They did so in various forms, following different strategies, and for a broad spectrum 
of reasons, but the significance of the discursively constructed New Order becomes 
apparent in all of them. It geographically defined the planning horizon for German 
companies. For the time being, German political power facilitated expansion in 
Europe, but barred the rest of the world in general and the occupied Eastern territo-
ries for almost a year. The prospect of a largely autarkic European economy, how-
ever, necessitated adjustments for the future. Thus, Krupp, Reemtsma, and the 
Bremer Baumwoll Aktiengesellschaft, for example, sought to substitute previous im-
ports by sources that lay within the German sphere of influence. Moreover, the New 
Order promoted these expansionist steps by the demand it created. Mannesmann 
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and Reemtsma, for instance, responded to the demand that the reorganisation of 
Europe gave reason to expect. The power industry of Norway and its fishing grounds, 
for example, were bound to gain in importance. Of course, these steps already prom-
ised profits during the war, but the strategy of most companies tried to reconcile the 
current demand with their long-term considerations. Priemel ascertained this in the 
case of Flick, Gerlach did so in regard to Alfred C. Toepfer, the records of the man-
aging board of Mannesmann point in that direction, and the general interest of Ger-
man companies in ownership claims show that the order of the day was not only ad-
justing to the needs of war but also to the expected Europe-to-be. In addition to abid-
ing by, taking advantage of, responding to, and preparing for the New Order, the 
rhetoric of German companies reflected their awareness of political concepts. They 
tailored their correspondence to political priorities, as advised by the Dresdner Bank, 
they toed the official political line, like Mannesmann chairman Wilhelm Zangen, or 
they offered National Socialist officials their services in the course of creating a new 
Europe, like the major German banks. Thus, even the few exemplary German com-
panies whose actions and motives have been sketched out here, indicate that the 
discursively constructed New Order became an essential point of reference in the 
decision-making processes of German companies: As a framework it set boundaries, 
as a German sphere of influence it facilitated expansion, as a factual policy it created 
demand, as a future scenario it called for preparation, and as a political dictum it 
gave reason to rhetorical and de facto compliance. 
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4.3 A European Community Fighting the Bolshevist Threat (1943-1945) 
Our programme is the salvation of Europe from the barbarians in the East and the West; they 
are about to eradicate the achievements of European culture, to brutally destroy the most 
sublime works of a spirit that has enlightened the world for centuries and given it the entire 
wealth of human progress.
246
 (Otto Dietrich, December 1944) 
When Otto Dietrich, a SS-Obergruppenführer and state secretary in the Ministry of 
Propaganda, reiterated the omnipresent dichotomy between a German victory and 
Europe’s doom in December 1944, his depiction of Europe as a cultural community 
fitted the mould. During the last years of the war, ramping up armaments output and 
freeing workers for the fronts had increasingly become the maxim of German policy, 
so that notions of Europe had gained ground which promised to win over the people 
in occupied Europe for the German cause (see chapter 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). However, 
the intention to turn Europe into a war-economic community did not only manifest 
itself in rhetoric of National Socialist Germany but it also resulted in a policy geared 
towards streamlining the European economies for war. 
After 1943, the increasing priorisation of the war effort did not silence the New Order 
discourse, nor did it reduce Europe to a solely propagandistic term. In fact, National 
Socialist officials took measures to turn Europe into a “Fighting New Order” (4.3.1). 
They offered larger incentives for cooperation and stepped in more harshly against 
resistance, they tried to mitigate obstacles and to avoid steps that could antagonise 
the subjugated people. For some time, German companies kept backing this policy 
because the idea of intensified European cooperation still attracted the support of 
private business. However, as soon as they realised that the war was lost, they 
started “Post-War Preparations” (4.3.2). The Europe they prepared for was not the 
discursively constructed National Socialist New Order any more, but the diffuse hope 
of a Western, market-based economy.  
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4.3.1 War, War, and War – A Fighting New Order 
You will, just like me, deem it unlikely that emigrant committees will be able to significantly 
weaken the fighting morale of the troops, flushed as the Russians are with victory, or to initi-
ate any internal subversive political activity. 
Furthermore, a Russian soldier who has not yet joined the ranks of the Vlassov troops, would 
have to be bonkers to join them now.
247
 (Heinz-Georg Neumann, February 1945) 
By February 1945, a certain Heinz-Georg Neumann apparently had abandoned all 
hope of winning over Russians to the German cause. To Fritz Arlt, who was respon-
sible for foreign volunteers in the Waffen-SS, he admitted that neither Rosenberg’s 
idea of establishing national committees, nor the so-called Russian Liberation Army 
under General Vlasov248 could change tack. It was too late. Before then, however, 
numerous German officials explored and partly exhausted all possibilities to win the 
war. Within the New Order discourse, this process of “Getting Priorities Straight” 
(chapter 3.3.1) had initiated a reconfiguration that established the war effort and the 
economic interpretive frame as the dominant elements (see chapter 3.3.2). This war-
economic turn shifted the German focus away from long-term planning to short-term 
benefits, thus curbing those aspects of German policy that carried the risk of thwart-
ing the war effort, while substantiating those that promised to be of avail.  
Efforts to realise aspects of the discursively constructed New Order that were irrec-
oncilable with the new paradigm – streamlining Europe for war – had a hard time: 
Even Himmler, one of the most powerful men of the ‘Third Reich’, had to yield to the 
loss of discursive significance of the völkisch interpretive frame and had to abstain 
from realising his version of Europe-to-be. At the end of 1942, he had initiated first 
steps to realise the vision of a völkisch New Order in the Eastern territories. In 
Ukraine, he ordered the deportation of almost 15,000 Ukrainians from the Zhytomyr 
region in order to settle Volksdeutsche there, and in the General Government, Ger-
man forces evacuated 300 villages around Zamość, where 100,000 people had to 
make room for German settlers.249 Additionally, Himmler instructed Konrad Meyer250 
to extend the Generalsiedlungsplan.251  
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However, while Himmler and Meyer kept advancing their planning and started to re-
alise it, the resettlement measures created controversy; particularly the one in 
Zamość. Given the shortage of means of production, Riecke argued that everything 
that undermined the will to work – “as might happen to a considerable extent through 
resettlement processes” – had to be avoided. Generally, one had to come to a deci-
sion “whether the settlement measures are absolutely essential at the moment”, or if 
it were not advisable to focus on the war effort.252 With regard to Zhytomyr, Körner 
also acknowledged the “major importance the resettlement measures have in the 
long run”, but urged to “refrain from anything which might impair agricultural output 
particularly in the Eastern territories.”253 For Ernst Zörner, the Governor of the Lublin 
district, the resettlement measures around Zamość had yielded nothing but trouble. 
He reported that parts of the rural population had fled and in some cases joined the 
partisans so that agricultural output had declined drastically. Hence, he called for an 
immediate end of all resettlement measures because they were “irresponsible in the 
current state of total war”.254 Himmler, however, denied any negative effects.255 On 
the contrary, picking up the völkisch beliefs of racial superiority, he argued that the 
new “reliable German peasants” showed even higher crop yields. Just like Lammers, 
he blamed Frank for the shortcomings of General Government.256 Frank, in turn, ac-
knowledged the long-term objectives, but called for a priorisation of the short-term 
benefits. He declared that it was  
one of the most honourable and most pressing tasks of the German leadership to turn the 
Eastern territories that the German sword and blood have conquered into a home for the 
Volksdeutschen which had retreated from the formerly volksfremd [alien] spaces. However, 
for me it seems necessary to weigh up whether this objective should be realised in the middle 
of the German Volk’s struggle for existence and despite its serious disadvantages in the field 
of economics and in other areas; or if it was not more appropriate to postpone the implemen-
tation of these measures to a time, in which the necessary fundamental preparations for the 
resettlement of Volksdeutsche are possible without interferences through war-related difficul-
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ties and without the loss of significant economic contributions of the respective territory to the 
detriment of the German war economy.
257
 
In a memorandum on the treatment of the Polish Volkstum which Frank prepared a 
month later, he even suggested concessions. Given the military situation, he empha-
sised that this was not a “matter of the heart or of feelings, but an act of hard-headed 
reason.”258 Ultimately, Himmler largely fell into line. In his official responses to the 
complaints of Frank, Riecke, and Körner, he stood by his settlement plans, but ac-
knowledged the paramount importance of the war effort. Even though he warned 
Frank that one must not be “overanxious” and had to “risk short-term difficulties”,259 
he also subscribed to “the view that during the war, resettlements may of course only 
take place in a way that in no way260 impairs the economic performance of the Gen-
eral Government, particularly its agricultural output.”261  Accordingly, Zamość and 
Zhytomyr were the first and last large-scale resettlement measures that Himmler was 
able to realise in the German-occupied East. His planning continued until August 
1944,262 but for the time being, the reconfiguration of the discourse ended his policy 
of germanising the East. Thus, one of the most powerful men of the ‘Third Reich’ 
was not able to assert himself because his völkisch thoughts and arguments were 
not as ‘true’ and ‘sensible’ as the distinction between short-term needs and long-term 
objectives that dominated the New Order discourse and the statements of his me-
dium-level opponents. Zörner, Körner, Frank, and Riecke prevailed because they did 
not doubt the völkisch arguments in general but followed the discursively constructed 
knowledge and belief system: in the end, a völkisch New Order would be realised, 
but for this purpose, everything, even steps towards this völkisch reorganisation, had 
to take a backseat to the war effort.  
The growing discursive dominance of the necessities of war also becomes apparent 
in German occupation policies elsewhere. For an unknown head of a district in the 
Protectorate, the war effort justified harsher responses to the stiffening resistance: 
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If hundreds of thousands and millions of our best German men give their lives for the exis-
tence of the Reich and thus the German Volk in its struggle against Bolshevism, it is only just 
and reasonable if all elements which want to fight a battle against the front and for Bolshevism 
at home, are mercilessly annihilated.
263 
This statement partly echoed Karl Hermann Frank’s view. After he had become the 
de facto head of the Protectorate following the death of Heydrich, he pursued a pol-
icy that was supposed to lure the cooperative parts of the population into collabora-
tion and to deter the rest from resistance.264 In this way, he wanted to “squeeze the 
utmost out of the rich human and economic resources of the area”265 in order to 
avoid delivering “Europe to Bolshevism, meaning to its annihilation and to its deletion 
from history”.266 However, this purpose demanded sacrifices. In his case, it was 
postponing the Germanisation of the Protectorate in favour of the more pragmatic 
policy that “the war dictates”:  
Often we had to suppress resentments and we put political feelings and ideologies aside for 
the duration of the war. We have become sober, interest-driven political realists in order to 
achieve the maximum for the greater, for the Reich.
267 
Thus, the policies of Karl Hermann Frank virtually embodied the reconfiguration of 
the New Order discourse after 1943. Not only did he subscribe to the victory-or-
doom dichotomy that justified stopping at nothing to increase the war-economic out-
put of the Protectorate (see chapter 3.3.1). He also kept the völkisch long-term aims 
in mind (see chapter 3.3.3), but for the time being abstained from putting them into 
effect and did everything in his power – setting incentives and resorting to violence – 
to maximise the contribution of the Protectorate to the war economy (see chapter 
3.2). 
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In Denmark, Best had to give precedence to the war effort in a completely different 
situation. In May 1943, he was still positive that  
the Danes will find their way into the new European order, just like the Icelanders into Chris-
tendom: not forced by violence and not won over by propaganda, but out of the level-headed 
insight that this way is unavoidable and beneficial for the Danes in the long run.
268
  
Even when the military setbacks in the East gave rise to strikes, sabotage, and upris-
ings, Best stuck to his course. He intended to meet the war-economic demands, 
without losing sight of the “Germanic future tasks”. By abstaining from harsh meas-
ures, he hoped to avoid any bitterness which might keep the Danes from joining the 
Germanic community.269 However, despite Best’s warning to the Danish government 
that any “impairment of German military interests” jeopardised the autonomy of the 
country, the strikes and acts of sabotage continued in August 1943.270 This gave 
General von Hanneken, since September 1942 supreme commander of the German 
forces in Denmark, the opportunity to declare the state of emergency he had been 
pressing for. One of the reasons he gave for this step was to ensure that “the situa-
tion here stays as calm as possible in order to maintain the will to export which is 
necessary to feed the Reich”.271 The state of emergency lasted until October and 
saw the disarming of the Danish army, the dismissal of the Danish government, and 
German efforts to deport Danish Jews.272 Even though Best tried to stick to his 
course subsequently, this episode turned out to be the prelude to a much harsher 
occupation policy. As many other occupied territories, the allegedly Germanic Danes 
now suffered from the terror that the newly installed higher SS- and police leader 
unleashed. Without relying on courts anymore, German officials responded to acts of 
resistance with ‘clearing murders’, counter-sabotage, and counter-terror.273  Thus, 
Best’s strategy of winning over the Danes had to give way to a policy that sought to 
end the impairments of Danish output by means of force. In accordance with the 
war-economic turn of the New Order discourse, German occupation policy now pri-
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oritised war-economic gains over purposes deduced from the völkisch knowledge 
and belief system. This shift did not only make itself felt in territories where carrying 
out völkisch policies potentially fomented trouble but also in countries with an alleg-
edly Germanic population. The need to win the war by streamlining the European 
economies now overrode the intent to win over the Danish ‘blood brothers’ for the 
New Order. 
In the occupied Eastern territories, Erich Koch and Alfred Rosenberg embodied two 
conflicting stances within the National Socialist regime.274 While Ukraine had “never 
belonged to Europe”275 in the eyes of the Reichskommissar, Rosenberg considered 
the Ukrainians a part of the “European family of nations”.276 Their differences be-
came apparent in most policy measures. Koch thwarted the attempt of Rosenberg to 
live up to the expectations of the local population by reforming the Kolkhoz by means 
of the New Agrarian Order from February 1942.277 He had all but primary schools 
closed in Ukraine, despite Rosenberg’s intention to keep educating skilled workers 
which Ukraine would need for its prospective role in Europe-to-be. 278  While 
Rosenberg rejected flogging as “unworthy of a German”279 and reminded all German 
officials to choose their words and deeds carefully as they represented the Reich in 
the East, Koch continued to speak of the ‘German Master Race’ and Slavic Unter-
menschen.280 He even declared that if he ever found a Ukrainian who was worthy of 
sitting at the same table with him, he would have to shoot him.281 As the policies of 
the other local occupation authorities lay inbetween these two extremes, German 
occupation policy in the East remained incoherent.282 In the light of this uncoordi-
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nated German policy in the area over which Rosenberg was supposed to preside, it 
becomes clear why historians have arrived at withering assessments. Mazower calls 
the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories “something of a joke”,283 and Mulli-
gan characterises its policy as “Cha-ostpolitik”.284 However, the continuous cacoph-
ony and incoherence signify more than political incompetence amidst a polycratic 
power structure. They are the result of a collision between the two main versions of 
the place of the East in Europe-to-be. Embodied by Rosenberg and Koch, these dif-
ferent concepts turned every political matter into a proxy war. 
While Rosenberg had not been able to assert himself in this struggle, the war-
economic turn of the New Order discourse and its focus on short-term considerations 
increasingly removed the ground from under Koch’s völkisch thought patterns and 
arguments and played into the hands of Rosenberg, whose calls for a more consid-
erate course promised higher outputs without having to put a “soldier behind every 
peasant”.285 Backed by a growing number of institutions and with the interpretive 
repertoire of the war effort on his side, Rosenberg revived the concepts he had pro-
moted before June 1941 and partly realised them:286  a free Ukraine and semi-
autonomous Baltic States as a cordon sanitaire against Russia. While National 
Committees in Ukraine and the area of the army group were to “be a sign for the 
named territories that they would somehow be developed into separate administra-
tive areas”,287 the territories of the Reichskommissariat Ostland were to become 
semi-autonomous Protectorates or Gaue – a measure that was supposed to demon-
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strate their belonging to the Reich.288 According to Körner, the bottom line was “to 
abandon the previously pursued course and to win over the population of the occu-
pied Eastern territories for the active fight against Bolshevism.”289 For this purpose, 
Rosenberg intended to exhaust all possibilities.290 In May 1943, he officially initiated 
the reprivatisation of farmland. In November, the Cossacks were granted autonomy 
and private property.291 In December, he drafted a declaration for the independence 
of Estonia.292 In April 1944, he instructed propaganda to focus on the antagonism 
between Ukraine and Russia and to promise Ukraine safety and security in “a united 
and free Europe”.293 In July 1944, he decreed that all Estonians and Latvians who 
fought for Germany were to be rewarded with a farm.294 And in February 1945, 
Rosenberg finally could order the establishment of the first National Committee in 
Ukraine. Similar committees were to be created in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.295  
Of course, most of Rosenberg’s efforts were too little and too late. However, they are 
remarkable in several respects. Even though Hitler had clearly sided with Koch and 
his völkisch thoughts and arguments when he had weighed into the dispute between 
the Minister and the Reichskommissar in July 1943, Rosenberg pursued his version 
of Europe-to-be and partially implemented it, sometimes even against Koch’s will.296 
This would not have been possible without the support of other institutions and party 
bigwigs. Their rethinking, however, often was not the result of a fundamental change 
of mind but the effect of the discursively established distinction between war-
economic short-term pragmatism and actual long-term New Order planning (see 
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chapter 3.3.1).297 In this way, the growing discursive significance of the war effort 
made it possible to voice different notions of Europe-to-be. While Rosenberg might 
have believed in his, condoning it was a means to an end to others. Without the mili-
tary setbacks and their discursive repercussions, this notion of Europe – and similar 
more considerate plans for a New Order (see chapter 4.3.3) –could not have been 
revived, and in case of a German victory, it most likely would not have prevailed. As 
a last resort, however, a New Order that promised to benefit the war effort attracted 
support. 
The priorisation of the need to streamline Europe for total war in the New Order dis-
course did not only make it seem reasonable to postpone potentially antagonising 
long-term measures but also gave significance to an intensification of European 
economic cooperation. Among the many institutions that were created to serve this 
purpose,298 the Planungs-Stab Europa in Speer’s Ministry for Armaments and War 
Production carried most weight. Its head, Arnold Köster, identified several deficien-
cies that were causing Europe’s meagre contribution to the German war effort: the 
lack of systematic Europe-wide planning, the reluctance to support “Germany in its 
fight for European freedom”, 299  and Germany’s policy of importing unproductive 
workers instead of outsourcing work.300 Accordingly, he encouraged the promotion of 
the “spirit of a European economy”, 301  whereby the prospect of a “continental-
European economic area”, in which “all European nations cooperate closely”,302 
would play an important role. Apart from this attempt to alleviate fears by specifying 
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a promising European future, German officials took concrete measures to European-
ize the war economy. As before, these harmonisation measures modelled the or-
ganisation of occupied economies on the restructured German framework and aimed 
at increasing and centralising German influence. The system of the Ausschüsse 
(committees) and Ringe (rings) undertook the coordination of outsourcing and new 
armament and procurement offices assumed the responsibilities of several institu-
tions.303  Additionally, Germany exported its domestic rationalisation measures. 304 
While companies that were not war-relevant were shut down, production which was 
crucial enjoyed a privileged position.305 In addition to exempting them from Sauckel’s 
labour raids, Speer made sure that they were given priority in the allocation of raw 
materials.306 In this way, he wanted to integrate the European economies in a Euro-
pean system of overall planning to achieve the highest possible output.307 After all, 
every additional worker who worked for or in Germany freed up a German for the 
Eastern front. This was what he expected from France and other occupied countries 
to contribute to “the fight for a better Europe.”308 However, his measures yielded 
mixed results – in Belgium some of the measures never materialised, whereas out-
sourcing to the French and the Italian economies increased.309 Nevertheless, these 
steps illustrate the way that the economic interpretive frame still endowed policy 
measures with meaning. In the German discourse on Europe, European economic 
cooperation had always been a promise of power. This thought pattern had con-
stantly shaped the New Order discourse (see chapter 3.1.2) and after the war-
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economic turn, it suggested harnessing the economic potential of the German 
sphere of influence even more to avoid the expected doom of Europe. In this way, 
the National Socialist ideal of a German-led autarkic European Großraumwirtschaft 
engaged in an internal division of labour not only continued to constitute a discur-
sively constructed war aim but also gave meaning to the continued harmonisation of 
Europe and the intensification of European cooperation as a means to this end. 
Overall, Germany’s attempts to turn the war-economic tide in its favour transformed 
the New Order discourse and German European policy. Völkisch long-term visions 
stayed valid and justified pragmatic adjustments, but they increasingly lost their im-
pact on everyday policies in favour of the promise of immediate war-economic bene-
fits. No matter if pragmatic or heart-felt considerations caused this rethinking, the 
discursively constructed threat of a German defeat and Europe’s downfall (see chap-
ter 3.3.1) gave rise to alternative concepts of Europe and meaning to corresponding 
policies. In the East, this tendency turned the hopes and wishes of the local popula-
tion into a significant discursive category and materialised in a less punitive policy 
which abstained from resettlements and cut back the most antagonising excesses of 
the German Herrenmenschen standpoint. In the West, by contrast, the precedence 
of the war effort eclipsed the völkisch intent to win over the allegedly Germanic popu-
lation. The military setbacks National Socialist Germany started to suffer spurred and 
stiffened resistance, while German attempts to mobilise the European economies for 
war became more desperate. Thus, two opposing developments – the rising de-
pendence of Germany on smoothly working European economies and the growing 
confidence of its opponents in the impending end of German rule – increasingly 
clashed. Together with the discursive dominance of the war effort which justified all 
means due to the inscribed victory-or-doom dichotomy, the German efforts to 
streamline the German-led Großraumwirtschaft – now often labelled European war 
economy – resulted in a more radical occupation policy. Accordingly, the differences 
between German occupation regimes started to vanish. Towards the end of the war, 
National Socialist Germany’s policy of terror and violence was as European in scope 
as the economic community it held together. 
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4.3.2 ‘Never Catch a Falling Knife’ – Post-War Preparations 
Director Werthmann (of Wintershall AG) had openly told her (a certain Frau Halfmann) that 
National Socialism was ruined, that the Führer could no longer have an overview of the situa-
tion, that business leaders considered the war lost and that the current state would doubtless 
collapse. Business leaders were thus already making efforts to establish links to their coun-
terparts abroad, for it was clear that in future only representatives of the economy would be 
able to ensure that Germany could still play a part among the peoples of the world.
310
 (Alfred 
Backhaus, August 1944) 
The increasing post-war orientation of German companies alarmed SS-man Back-
haus and in his eyes bordered upon high treason.311 Even though Speer had teamed 
up with Himmler to nip the emerging defeatism and resignation in the bud,312 Ger-
man companies started to lose faith in a German victory from 1943 onwards and 
acted accordingly. This turning away from National Socialism did not necessarily 
manifest itself in decreasing war-economic output, but in a growing reluctance to 
sacrifice long-term interests for the short-term necessities of the war effort. Thus, 
German companies did not follow the war-economic turn of the New Order discourse 
and its reorientation towards short-term needs. They kept their long-term perspective. 
However, instead of preparing for the discursively constructed European Großraum-
wirtschaft, they now prepared for the post-war order that they expected after the 
downfall of National Socialism.  
Germany’s leading company in the sector of precision engineering and optics, Carl 
Zeiss, had taken a lively interest in German New Order planning from the outset. 
Due to its superior products and its production capacities, the company expected to 
be able to supply and to dominate the future European market as long as no tariffs or 
subsidies distorted competition.313 Being primarily interested in preventing serious 
competition from arising in Europe-to-be, Zeiss largely abstained from taking over 
plants abroad and ruled out intensifying European cooperation to avoid disseminat-
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ing its expert knowledge.314 This intention also shaped the policy of the company 
towards its only takeover, the Polskie Zaklady Optyczne (PZO) in Warsaw. Zeiss had 
sought to acquire this plant since 1929.315 However, it did not succeed until the pos-
sibility of a lease arose in the wake of the German attack on Poland.316 Even though 
the PZO was “without doubt the most efficient precision engineering and optical plant 
in Poland”,317 Zeiss officials chose its production with regard to the current uncer-
tainty: By letting the PZO carry out only unsophisticated production processes, Zeiss 
wanted to make sure that the PZO would not keep “too much German know-how in 
case of eventual political changes”.318  
Despite attempts to increase the output of the plant – its machine park was aug-
mented in May 1941, and in February 1942 Heinz Küppenbender, a member of the 
executive office of Zeiss, had suggested higher food rations and more German 
staff319 – the Rüstungsinspektion,320 a local occupation authority, accused Zeiss of 
not backing the PZO fully in 1943. Defending his company policy, Küppenbender 
claimed that Zeiss tried to achieve German production standards in Warsaw.321 In 
fact, however, the German staff were not supposed to teach the local workers, but to 
lead and to supervise them.322 And a few weeks later, when the head of the PZO 
approached Küppenbender with the idea of rewarding a leading Polish worker with a 
tour through a German Zeiss plant, his concerns about giving away too many in-
sights led him to hesitate. Ultimately, the Polish worker was shown around, but only 
in selected parts of the production facilities.323 Even though the leading personnel of 
Zeiss claimed to always have “thought and acted National Socialist”,324 their loyalty 
apparently ended where the interests of the company were at stake. By the end of 
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1944, National Socialism and its war effort seem to have lost all relevance to them. 
Paul Henrichs, since August 1941 representative of the Carl Zeiss Foundation, which 
owned the company, started to prepare for the post-war period. He instructed Zeiss 
subsidiaries in Sweden and Switzerland to fill up their stocks325 and got in touch with 
the manager of the German-American Trade Association in December 1944: 
It is refreshing that you are addressing the post-war period in your letter and that you are em-
phasising the importance of not falling behind then. So you are convinced that after the end of 
the war relations to the USA will be resumed. I will openly admit that my considerations on the 
future are also guided by the thought that particularly the Americans, with their predominantly 
economic attitude, will come to realise that an economically languishing Europe would be of 
enormous detriment, and that conversely a healthy Europe is unthinkable without a healthy 
Germany.
326
 
Thus, in the case of Zeiss, the interests of the company increasingly clashed with the 
political intention to increase the war effort. At the beginning of the war, Zeiss had 
welcomed the opportunities and prospects that the National Socialist regime offered 
and, trying to help shape the future of Europe, had adopted the dominant thought 
patterns and arguments of the New Order discourse. During the period of total war, 
however, the company did not subscribe to the discursively constructed dichotomy of 
victory or doom but pinned its hopes to the ‘predominantly economic attitude’ of the 
United States. Giving away expert knowledge might have advanced German military 
potential, but at the expense of the future competitiveness of the company. Hence, 
instead of sacrificing its own long-term interests for a National Socialist future, Zeiss 
looked after its own.  
The Mannesmann concern also had seized some of the opportunities the war offered 
and expanded into many European countries (see chapter 4.2.2). Late in 1942, the 
company still kept its eyes open for further promising opportunities.327 In the occu-
pied Eastern territories, plants in Taganrog and Dnepropetrovsk caught the interest 
of leading officials. They founded a separate company to run the smelting works in 
Taganrog on behalf of the Berg- und Hüttenwerksgesellschaft Ost at the beginning of 
1943 and took over the plant Krsni Wessowtschik in Dnepropetrovsk a few weeks 
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later.328 However, the engagement of Mannesmann in the “build-up in the occupied 
Eastern territories”329 – as the executive board labelled it in accordance with the offi-
cial slogan – demonstrated goodwill, but did not come to fruition.330 By August, it was 
clear that the takeover of Taganrog “would remain in name only”.331 All one could do 
was to deport its machinery, materials, and work force to Dnepropetrovsk.332 In Sep-
tember 1943, however, Mannesmann’s subsidiary in Kiev reported that “the devel-
opment of the situation in the East” was anything but good and it advised the halting 
of all deliveries.333 By the end of the year, the most eastern branch of the company 
was its trading company in Kraków, to where the other subsidiaries had retreated.334 
While the official publications called these steps temporary evacuations, internal 
memos spoke of abandonment.335  
Even though the deteriorating military situation made itself felt considerably in the 
rest of the European market as well, the activities of Mannesmann abroad contin-
ued.336 At the beginning of 1944, Mannesmann not only founded a subsidiary in 
Paris, the SA de Constructions en Toles d’Acier, but its executive board also pro-
jected investments at the Prager Eisenindustrie Gesellschaft (PEG) in the Protector-
ate.337 Although this step was in accordance with the tendency to increase industrial 
capacities where they were safe from Allied bombings, the necessities of war were 
not the only reason the board gave. According to its members, the modernisation of 
the facilities of PEG was necessary to secure supplies for the Mannesmann plant in 
Chomutov, and inevitable if the PEG was ever to yield profits in the future.338 In Au-
gust 1944, months after the Allies had landed in France, the international activities of 
Mannesmann still did not cease. The machine factory Seiffert & Co – a part of the 
Mannesmann concern – gave patents, licences, and expert support to the Société de 
Constructions des Tuyauteries in Clichy in exchange for the right to acquire 35% of 
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its shares.339 Unfortunately, the internal documents remain silent on the rationale 
behind this move. However, given the point in time, it seems unlikely that this course 
of action was a response to the political demand of sacrificing competitive advan-
tages for the sake of the war effort (see chapter 3.3.2). Against the background of 
the realistic appraisal of the situation in the East and the long-term considerations 
that drove the company policy towards the PEG, it seems plausible to assume that 
this was an attempt at bringing parts of valuable know-how into safety. Thus, Man-
nesmann – just like many other German heavy industrial companies – willingly en-
gaged in the German Eastern expansion until the Red Army started to push back the 
Wehrmacht. Financially, the risks were modest, but, in the case of a German victory 
and the finalisation of the discursively constructed New Order, the reward would in 
the long run have been a highly profitable market.340 While the activities of Mannes-
mann were still accompanied by a rhetoric that reflected the established discursive 
standards in the summer of 1943, the company apparently abandoned the National 
Socialist New Order together with its subsidiaries in the occupied Eastern territories. 
Nevertheless, Mannesmann seems to have kept its long-term orientation until the 
end of the war. Its point of reference, however, was not a German-led Großraum-
wirtschaft anymore, but the hope that the US-American part of occupied Europe 
would offer a brighter future for private businesses.341 
The Daimler-Benz AG also kept a very close eye on the current developments and 
their potential ramifications for the future. From November 1943 onwards, Wilhelm 
Haspel, successor of Wilhelm Kissel as CEO, received frequent reports from a cer-
tain Felix Lauscher. The job he seems to have had in Berlin was to keep his ears 
open with regard to the military situation and in respect of “what will come after-
wards”.342 Without mentioning the unspeakable – a possible German defeat –, he 
reported his insights into German post-war planning as well as what he had learned 
about Allied concepts.343 In case of a German victory, he presumed that “the autarky 
of the European space (with or without Russia)” would shape post-war policy, while 
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the Western Allies would conquer Europe as a sales market for their industrial over-
capacity.344 Irrespective of the victor, however, he predicted a general turn towards 
more state control.345 Given the shape of the numerous German cities levelled by 
Allied bombs, the building sector would boom, while private demand would not re-
cover immediately.346 In the Daimler-Benz headquarters this market prospect was 
translated into a strategy that prioritised lorry production sites over other lines of 
business and liquid assets over inflation-proof investments. After all, the demand for 
cars and aircraft would be negligible after the war, while lorries would be in high de-
mand. And the cash would be needed to overhaul the respective facilities and ma-
chinery. Thus, Daimler-Benz also kept its long-term perspective and did not join in on 
the discursive turn towards short-term necessities. While this focus on future markets 
had led Daimler-Benz to participate in Germany’s European expansion during the 
first years of the war, it kept the company from unreservedly following the regime into 
total war. Instead, Daimler-Benz started preparing for ‘what will come afterwards’, 
peacetime after German defeat.347 
By being perceived as less and less likely future scenario, the discursively con-
structed New Order lost its integrative power. The resulting divergence between the 
demands of the National Socialist regime and the behaviour of private companies 
was not confined to Daimler-Benz, Mannesmann, and Zeiss. In fact, these cases 
exemplify a widespread development. Despite several Hitler decrees that forbade all 
post-war planning in January 1942, in January 1943, and in July 1944,348 German 
companies kept meeting war-economic demands, but with more than a half an eye 
aimed at the expected post-war period. In June 1944, leading officials of IG Farben 
pondered on a split-up of the company because they expected an Allied victory to be 
the end for large German concerns.349 The Hohner GmbH, a medium-sized manu-
facturer of musical instruments, had adjusted to the wartime market by taking up ar-
maments production and by advertising its famous harmonicas as an essential part 
of soldierly life. In March 1944, however, the company started to hoard supplies and 
informed one of its branches that there was “no need to pursue the plan of producing 
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armaments anymore”.350 Instead, the branch was supposed to take care of its work-
force, its liquid assets, and those parts of its stocks that promised to sell well in 
peacetime.351 The Dr. August Oetker KG pursued a different strategy. From 1943 
onwards, Germany’s leading producer of baking ingredients and processed food-
stuffs struggled to get enough raw materials for its core product, baking soda. In re-
action, the company tried to bring about a political solution. In a memorandum for the 
Ministry of Economics, Dr. Oetker joined the calls for rationalisation and applied it to 
its own branch. Since its own plants were among the most efficient, this demand 
would have put many competitors out of business, thus enabling Dr. Oetker to sur-
vive the war and to get off on the right foot after its end.352 However, the plans of the 
company did not come to fruition, so that it monetized its stocks, hid most of the 
yields, and invested the rest in alcoholic spirits.353 In Hamburg, the shipyard Blohm & 
Voss started to prepare for an Allied invasion in November 1944. All documents that 
were essential for the resumption of production were shipped into supposed safety in 
Magdeburg. Furthermore, post-war considerations led company officials to thwart 
official orders that demanded that nothing but scorched earth be left for the Allies.354 
Thus, for most German companies the New Order had lost its relevance as a future 
scenario and therefore as meaningful category in negotiation and decision-making 
processes. They took a third path between the two discursively constructed options 
of victory or doom.355 Instead of making sacrifices for a lost war, they planned for a 
defeat which would not be their end. Accordingly, they prepared for peacetime by 
trying to minimise risks, bringing valuable materials and documents into safety, and 
safeguarding expert staff and knowledge.356  
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In light of the broadly shifting priorities among German companies, it is not surprising 
that the Reichsgruppe Industrie, Germany’s industrial association, also concerned 
itself with the end of the war. For this purpose, it had founded the Institut für Indust-
rieforschung which coordinated scientific work on the most problematic issues of the 
expected transition.357 According to Ludwig Erhard, the head of this research facility 
who later became Minister of Economics and Chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, by November 1944 this planning had been going on “for quite some time” 
and was supposed to prepare the Reichsgruppe “for the upcoming tasks at least 
mentally”.358 Apart from financial and monetary questions, the studies addressed 
trade relations, tariffs, cartels, and international cooperation. 359  Additionally, the 
Reichsgruppe Industrie enquired about what kind of problems the industry expected 
“during the conversion to peacetime”.360 In its answer, the Wirtschaftsgruppe of the 
Iron Producing Industry expressed guarded optimism, but emphasised that the pre-
condition for a smooth transition was a return to a free-enterprise economy.361 Thus, 
by the end of 1944, the National Socialist prosecution of defeatists still made it im-
possible to call a spade a spade. Even though large parts of German industry had 
not only already turned their back on the promises of a National Socialist New Order 
but also on the National Socialist notion of an economic system, the impending 
German defeat remained unexpressible.  
Overall, most German companies still complied with the wishes of the regime. They 
kept the war machine going, they took charge of facilities in the Eastern territories, 
they outsourced production, and they exported goods, thereby facilitating imports by 
reducing German clearing debts. However, this compliance was less and less the 
result of their support for National Socialist war aims but increasingly of the lack of 
alternatives. While the discursively constructed New Order had shaped the thoughts, 
arguments, and activities of German companies for years, it was no longer either on 
everyone’s lips or a meaningful point of reference. The necessities of total war for a 
lost cause demanded sacrifices they were not willing to make. Accordingly, private 
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businesses worked to rule and occasionally succumbed to pressure exerted by the 
state, but their actual focus was still the future. Hence, they gathered information on 
the future market and avoided jeopardising their competitive advantages by keeping 
on essential staff, a jealous watch over their know-how, and supplies hoarded. The 
National Socialist New Order had lost its integrative effect. 
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5. ‘Anti-Europe’ Revisited 
Having analysed the discursive construction of the National Socialist New Order and 
having traced its correlation with the words and deeds of occupation authorities and 
private companies, it is time to recapitulate the main findings and to evaluate them 
against the background of existing research. A preliminary reflection on our methodi-
cal approach shows that analysing the New Order as a German discourse on the fu-
ture of Europe has indeed mitigated the problems identified and yielded new insights 
(5.1). It has led to an understanding of the New Order as a process of social con-
struction of reality which was decisively shaped by völkisch and economic knowledge 
and belief systems (5.2). The result, the discursively constructed New Order, did not 
only give meaning to the actions of National Socialist occupation authorities in 
Europe (5.3). The prospect of a German-dominated European market also became 
an important point of reference in the decision-making processes of private compa-
nies: taking advantage of the German dominance in Europe and preparing for the 
discursively constructed future of the continent seemed sensible until it became clear 
that the future of Europe would not be a National Socialist one (5.4). The concluding 
remarks, finally, argue that the National Socialist New Order fits in with previous and 
later German notions of Europe (5.5). 
 
5.1 A Discourse – The Nature of the New Order 
This study has been shaped by its discourse-analytical approach: By gathering all 
source material that attests to German interest in Europe-to-be or a European post-
war order, the scope of the study grew larger. And by taking these primary sources at 
face value, the epistemological task changed. Instead of gauging the intentions of the 
respective originator, the ‘conditions of emergence of statements’ (see chapter 1.2) 
or documents and the patterns that these statements revealed became the founda-
tion of conclusions and insights. This focus on recurring arguments, images, motives, 
and phrases that condensed into notions of Europe proved worthwhile.  
The analysis made clear that two interpretive frames and their underlying knowledge 
and beliefs dominated the New Order discourse from 1939 until the defeat of National 
Socialist Germany in 1945: soon after 1933, National Socialist terror and control nar-
rowed down the possible ways of speaking about Europe to a völkisch line of reason-
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ing, which had its starting-point in the Völker of Europe and their racial value, and an 
economic repertoire of interpretations (see chapter 2.3).1 Since both were reconcil-
able during the Second World War as long as a German victory seemed likely,2 the 
New Order discourse produced and solidified the vision of a racially graded German 
dominated European Großwirtschaftsraum, which, after June 1941, was augmented 
by a colonial Lebensraum in the East. The isolated appeals and warnings, which re-
sorted to the same interpretive repertoire of völkisch and economic arguments, did 
not fundamentally change the ways the future of Europe was spoken about until an-
other rationale weighed in. The objective of winning the war, discursively established 
as the sine qua non for Europe to have any future at all, provided a set of incontest-
able arguments and thoughts. This new centre of gravity transformed the New Order 
discourse. Its economic dimension was increasingly bound to the vision of a war-
economically streamlined Großraumwirtschaft, the European war economy, while the 
völkisch interpretive repertoire only kept fitting in by distinguishing between ideal 
long-term objectives and necessary short-term deviations from this course. Addition-
ally, alternative ways of speaking about and imagining the future of Europe mush-
roomed in the wake of the interpretive repertoire of the war effort gaining weight. Still 
being rooted in the same knowledge and beliefs system, they continued to be com-
mitted to German economic and völkisch superiority in Europe, but advocated less 
brutal means to this end. Thus, a discourse analysis of the New Order does not only 
accurately account for the interplay of the two core elements of the discourse, 
völkisch and economic knowledge and belief systems. It also confirms and specifies 
the close connection of the war to the internal shifts of the discourse. Furthermore, it 
suggests that the war-economic turn in the New Order discourse was not the result of 
a single event or decision,3 but a slow process of reinterpreting ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
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1999, pp. 303-338, here p. 330. 
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European policies, which started at the end of 1941 and picked up speed, the more 
the war effort gained discursive weight.4  
Together with the intrinsic logic of the discourse, the participants changed. The pre-
dominantly economic reasoning before the German attack on the Soviet Union was 
borne by different protagonists than the völkisch thoughts and arguments about the 
Eastern territories. With the war-economic turn, yet another group of speakers domi-
nated the New Order discourse. From a discourse-analytical perspective, this is the 
result of the changing rules of the discourse and of its inherent power relations. As 
long as the discursive construction of the New Order had not produced a single ‘right’ 
and ‘good’ notion of Europe-to-be, being able to inscribe thought patterns and argu-
ments meant shaping the future. Additionally, the economic and völkisch interpretive 
frames spanned a coordinate system that permitted a wide range of ‘true’ and ‘sensi-
ble’ lines of reasoning.5 The growing discursive weight of the war effort, however, 
narrowed this spectrum down and devaluated the discourse itself. Since all thoughts 
and arguments, which were still bound to the economic and völkisch knowledge and 
belief systems,6 were now additionally dependent on a war-economic rationale and 
its short-term focus, this shift took the ground from under certain arguments and 
partly turned the New Order into a tool “to forge one more weapon in their [the Na-
tional Socialist] struggle to win the war”7. Consequently, this development led to with-
drawals, called for adjustments, or created the opportunity to voice certain ideas in 
the first place. This explains the declining participation of private companies, as their 
intrinsic logic and their future-oriented perspective increasingly clashed with the new 
                                            
4
 Unfortunately, this makes it hard to pin down an exact time. Most authors take the defeat in Stalin-
grad and a subsequent circular of Goebbels as the starting-point of this rethinking (e.g. Schilmar, Eu-
ropadiskurs, p. 117). A discourse-analytical reading, however, suggests that Goebbels’ rethinking was 
the result of this process.  
5
 In the documents analysed, there is no evidence of an intention to keep the New Order indistinct for 
the sake of benefitting from its integrative effects. So instead of assuming a purposeful vagueness 
(Elvert, Mitteleuropa, p. 301; Kletzin, Rasse und Raum, p. 4), it seems more plausible that the many 
meanings of the New Order were the result of the broad interest it attracted as an open projection 
surface for the wishes and objectives of its participants. In Das Amt und die Vergangenheit, a telling 
example can be found: Bargen, who was the envoy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Northern 
France and Belgium, tried to win Belgium over for the New Order. Interrogated after the war, however, 
he could not specify what the New Order stood for. See E. Conze et al., Das Amt und die 
Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, Munich, Pantheon, 
2012, pp. 241-242.  
6
 Weißbecker also found that any striving for a change had to be wrapped in an ideologically accept-
able way. Weißbecker, ‘Rußlandbild’, p. 47. 
7
 Herzstein, Nazi Blueprint for Europe, p. 3. However, in contrast to Herzstein’s appraisal, it seems 
that the New Order discussion increasingly spawned these kinds of concepts, instead of having been 
tailored to this purpose from the outset. 
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course of total war,8 and accounts for the (re-)emergence of previously silent voices 
and ideas (see chapter 3.3.3).9 Together with the growing influence of Speer’s war-
economic institutions, this development might be read as a shift of power within the 
National Socialist regime, but given the receding impact of Himmler’s long-term plans 
for Germanisation and settlements (see chapter 4.3.1),10 as well as Hitler’s futile at-
tempts to ban all post-war planning,11 it seems that the discursive construction of 
Europe-to-be defied political power. Instead, influence on the New Order discourse 
was a question of compliance. Europe-to-be gained its initial integrative effects 
through its openness,12 while the totalisation of the war effort changed the access 
modalities to the discourse as it narrowed down the range of legitimate contributions 
to thoughts and arguments that claimed to serve the short-term needs of the war. 
Therefore, an approach taking into account all relevant source material, irrespective 
of the assumed political power of its originator, leads to a broader and thus more ac-
curate understanding of the New Order. However, the potential remoteness of these 
statements from the corridors of power lends additional weight to the question of the 
factual relevance of the discourse. 
The discourse-analytical approach has proved suitable for tracing the significance of 
the New Order for German occupation and business policies. Theoretically, the New 
Order discourse was supposed to shape social reality by giving meaning to actions 
and by resulting in what has been called ‘voluntary subordination’. In practice, the 
former became apparent in form of consistencies between factual policies and the 
reconstructed German notions of Europe, whereas the latter manifested itself in rhe-
                                            
8
 This reading confirms the observations of Marxist historians but offers a different explanation. Ger-
man companies indeed turned away from the New Order. However, they did not do so because the 
National Socialist regime had failed as the vehicle to their imperialist aims, but because the total war 
abandoned all economic rationality. For the Marxist reading, see e.g. W. Schumann, ‘Nachkriegs-
planungen der Reichsgruppe Industrie im Herbst 1944’, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 13, 
no. 3, 1972, pp. 259-296, here p. 260; Drechsler, Dress and Hass, ‘Europapläne’, p. 919. 
9
 In this reading, the increasing presence of alternative völkisch drafts during the last years of the war 
is not ascribed solely to the growing dissatisfaction with German policy, but to the intrinsic logic of the 
discourse. Critics of the current course needed the war effort argument to legitimise their thoughts and 
arguments as ‘true’ and ‘sensible’. Rosenberg’s inconstancy (see chapter 4.3.1) or Dolezalek’s drafts 
(Neulen, Europa und das 3. Reich, pp. 61-66) are prime examples for this. For the two different 
völkisch camps, see Loock, ‘Großgermanische Politik’; Elvert, ‘Germanen und Imperialisten’, pp. 182-
183; Mazower, Nazi Rule, p. 245. 
10
 However, scarcely anybody contested the ultimate völkisch objective of a Germanic Reich. In fact, 
many alternative drafts assured their long-term commitment to this aim. 
11
 See Boelcke, ‘Europäische Wirtschaftspolitik’, p. 229; Herbst, Ordnung der Wirtschaft, pp. 179, 389. 
12
 According to Kershaw, the same holds true for National Socialist racial concepts. See I. Kershaw, 
‘Adolf Hitler und die Realisierung der nationalsozialistischen Rasseutopie’, in W. Hardtwig (ed.), Utopie 
und politische Herrschaft im Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2003, pp. 133-144, 
here p. 133.  
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torical overlaps between the discourse and the thought patterns and arguments 
voiced by German officials or companies. In this respect, it does not matter whether 
they actually adopted the discursively constructed New Order as their own, or instru-
mentalised it for their own ends. Ultimately, such behaviour stabilised the discourse 
and, more importantly, helped produce its content. The hermeneutic perspective 
adopted in chapter four showed that on the micro level thoughts, arguments, and ac-
tions indeed reflected the New Order. Thus, the analysis of the New Order as a dis-
course and the understanding of its effects as power relations, provide a plausible 
link between words and deeds. Even though it does not exhaustively explain the ac-
tivities of companies and occupation authorities, it adds a new angle which is tell-
ing. 13  Unfortunately, the more the war effort dominated the discourse the more 
blurred these links become (see chapter 4.3).14 
However, the discourse-analytical approach falls short in another respect. Even 
though German officials were often explicit in their inhumane planning, concerning 
the starvation of millions of Russians for example, this study has not paid enough 
attention to one of the central aspects of the National Socialist New Europe, the mass 
murder of its Jewish population.15 In this respect, taking primary sources at face 
value backfires. Even though the anti-Semitic stance of National Socialism resonates 
in many statements and activities – reaching from the well-established and omni-
present connection of Jewry with plutocracy and Bolshevism to the murderous policy 
of Germanisation –, German officials fell increasingly silent on the matter. “For years 
they had no inhibition against yelling in public from every rooftop about the extermi-
nation of the Jews, but when it actually happened, they refrained from putting it into 
words”.16 This analysis and its focus on statements reflected the importance of the 
Volksgemeinschaft and the inherent idea of a Germany without Jews. It showed that 
together with the National Socialist sphere of influence, the scope of this notion grew 
and that, in the context of a völkisch renewal of Europe, the Jewish population was 
                                            
13
 Numerous historians have called for an integration of cultural studies approaches into economic 
history. See e.g. H. Berghoff and J. Vogel, ‘Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte. Ansätze zur 
Bergung transdisziplinärer Synergiepotentiale’, in H. Berghoff and J. Vogel (eds.), Wirtschaftsge-
schichte als Kulturgeschichte, Frankfurt a.M., Campus, 2004, pp. 9-41, here p. 13; J. Kocka, Histori-
sche Sozialwissenschaft, Oldenburg, Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem der Universität Oldenburg, 
2007, p. 183. However, economic-historical studies hardly live up to this demand. 
14
 For that reason, Overy emphasises those New Order measures which “were not dictated by the 
war“. Overy, ‘New Order’, p. 23. 
15
 For an analysis of the nexus between New Order planning and the anti-Jewish measures of National 
Socialist Germany, see Aly and Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung. 
16
 Confino, A World Without Jews, p. 197. 
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declared incompatible, so that imagining a ‘Jew-free’ Europe led to concrete planning 
for a territorial solution to the ‘Jewish Question’. However, the more this idea of ex-
pelling the European Jewish population shifted into their systematic physical extermi-
nation, the more the primary sources remain silent. This might be due to “a certain 
sense of transgression”,17 but within the New Order discourse this silence also indi-
cates that it was already far beyond dispute that the new Europe, just like the new 
Germany, had to be rid of Jews.18 Nevertheless, this void is not a downside of dis-
course-analytical approaches in general.19  On the contrary, a discourse analysis 
based on different primary sources might even demonstrate how anti-Semitic convic-
tions gained ground in Germany, how they merged with anti-capitalist and anti-
communist resentments, how deeply ingrained these ideas were in German thinking, 
and how their premises became taken for granted to a degree that they provided the 
basis for a radical reinterpretation of fundamental values. In his Posen speeches, 
Himmler could speak of the German massmurder as an unsung “glorious chapter of 
our history”20 that was morally right and justified by the duty to the German Volk.21 
Overall, the discourse-analytical approach lived up to the expectations formulated at 
the beginning. It has allowed for a precise reconstruction of National Socialist notions 
of Europe by by exhibiting and explaining the patterns within the New Order dis-
course. Despite its minor shortcomings, this new perspective on the New Order has 
proved worthwhile because it provides new insights into the National Socialist notions 
of Europe and their implementation.  
 
 
 
                                            
17
 Ibid. 
18
 The National Socialist euthanasia programm (Aktion T4), by contrast, was contested. Even though 
the protests did not entirely end the killing of handicapped people, the arguments apparently carried 
weight and decreased the scale of the murders. See e.g. Thamer, Verführung und Gewalt, pp. 697-
700. 
19
 For a generally sceptical stance towards poststructuralist approaches in history, see Evans, De-
fence of History; Wehler, Herausforderung der Kulturgeschichte. For an argument in favour of analys-
ing the discursive construction of reality, see P. Schöttler, ‘Wer hat Angst vor dem “linguistic turn”?’, 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol. 23, 1997, pp. 134-151.  
20
 Speech by Himmler, 4 October 1943, printed in Michalka, Deutsche Geschichte, pp. 277-278. 
21
 See Burleigh, Nationalsozialismus, p. 767. 
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5.2 A Völkisch and Economic Dream – The Cornerstones of the New Order  
The German New Order discourse during the Second World War was a struggle for 
interpretational sovereignty over German war aims and the future of Europe. It mainly 
fed on two interpretive frames: long-standing, well-established völkisch ideas and 
economic knowledge and beliefs. Apart from the General Government and the Pro-
tectorate, Europe seemed racially largely unproblematic until its Eastern boundaries 
dissolved with the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, economic 
thought patterns and arguments dominated the discourse on Europe-to-be during the 
period from May 1940 to June 1941. The result, the vision of a powerful, autarkic, 
and German-led European Großwirtschaftsraum, remained valid until the end of the 
war and incorporated the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories as colonial Er-
gänzungsraum (supplemental area). Being highly compatible with the völkisch inter-
pretive frame, which deemed Slavs inferior and which claimed large tracts of their 
land as Lebensraum for Europe’s Germanic core area, this reading of the East in 
Europe-to-be became a stable and deeply ingrained aspect of the New Order dis-
course. Despite appeals and warnings, this vision gained a hegemonic position in the 
discourse until the necessities of war increasingly drove back thoughts and argu-
ments that threatened to thwart immediate economic benefits by promoting poten-
tially antagonising long-term concepts. Accordingly, the European Großraum-
wirtschaft gained in importance as an armoury, while the still valid, but discursively 
receding völkisch vision gave way to alternative notions of Europe that invoked soli-
darity with the German cause. Thus, the ambiguity of the National Socialist New Or-
der was inversely proportional to German power: What started out as a powerless 
country’s conglomeration of European dreams in 1933 evolved into a clear-cut notion 
of German-dominated continent, before the growing pressure of the war effort shat-
tered this temporarily stable vision and ultimately all National Socialist hopes for a 
New Order. 
The vision of Europe as a Großwirtschaftsraum, which dominated the New Order dis-
course before the attack on the Soviet Union, was more to National Socialists than a 
“thin propagandistic cloak”22 glossing over their claim to power. Europe was neither 
“primarily a propaganda term”23, nor a “merely political-propagandistic”24 instrument 
                                            
22
 Kluke, ‘Europaideologie’, p. 274. 
23
 Loth, ‘Rettungsanker Europa’, p. 201. 
24
 Salewski, ‘Europa’, p. 102; Salewski, ‘Ideas’, p. 48. 
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to allay suspicions in the rest of Europe.25 Indeed, National Socialist Germany did 
exploit the appeal of a new Europe propagandistically without ever turning this rheto-
ric into action.26 Thus, the divergence between the public fuss and actual policies – 
instead of making concrete political offers, Germany subjugated and ruled large parts 
of the continent by force –, suggests a lack of interest in Europe.27 Yet, within Ger-
man institutions, officials pondered over Europe and its prospective Großraum-
wirtschaft. Often without even mentioning its propagandistic value, their thoughts and 
arguments – informed by the dominant völkisch and economic interpretive frames – 
produced concepts for a globally competitive German-led Großraum. These notions 
of a united European non-capitalist economy orchestrated by the Reich and engaged 
in a natural division of labour promised a broadly autarkic Europe that would be a 
match for all the other large entities in the world. Thus, the considerations of German 
officials28 were not driven by the intent to cash in propagandistically on the wide-
spread yearning for a unification of Europe but by long-standing and well-established 
lines of reasoning that declared a powerful German-led Europe the order of the day 
(see chapter 2.3). Being aware of the reluctance of the other European states to ac-
cept a German hegemony, they did not search for a widely acceptable New Order but 
for silent and discreet ways to deepen and perpetuate the current predominance.  
The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 indeed marks a turning-point in 
the National Socialist New Order discourse. However, its prime significance lies nei-
ther in the new – apparently appealing29 – anti-communist connotation of the New 
Order, nor in the fact that National Socialist Germany now “began to consider the 
idea of European unity with any seriousness”.30 It was the enlarged geographical 
                                            
25
 See also Krüger, ‘Europapolitik’, p. 124; Kletzin, Rasse und Raum, pp. 210-216. 
26
 Moll, ‘Deutsche Propaganda’, p. 239; Loock, ‘Großgermanische Politik’, p. 37. 
27
 See e.g. Raphael, ‘Radikales Ordnungsdenken’, p. 263, B. Piotrowski, ‘Konzeptionen und Vorstel-
lungen von Europäischer Integration im Totalitarismus des Dritten Reiches’, in P. Delvaux and J. 
Papiór (ed.), Eurovisionen. Vorstellungen von Europa in Literatur und Philosophie, Amsterdam, 
Rodopi, 1996, pp. 151-160, here p. 160. 
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 The officials and businessmen of other countries also took German New Order planning seriously. 
See e.g. M. Fioravanzo, ‘Die Europakonzeptionen von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus (1939-
1943)’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 58, no. 4, 2010, pp. 509-541; Balcar and Kučera, 
Rüstkammer des Reiches, p. 308. 
29
 The phrase of ‘Europe’s crusade against Bolshevism’ seems to have mobilised thousands of volun-
teers. See R. Gerwarth and S. Malinowski, ‘Europeanization through Violence? War Experiences and 
the Making of Modern Europe’, in M. Conway and K. Patel (eds.), Europeanization in the Twentieth 
Century. Historical Approaches, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 189-209, here p. 201; 
Neulen, Eurofaschismus, p. 105. 
30
 Salewski, ‘Ideas’, p. 48; see also M. Salewski, ‘Wie und warum Deutschland nach 1945 europäisch 
wurde’, in J. Elvert and J. Nielsen-Sikora (ed.), Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkungen in 
der Neuzeit, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2009, pp. 143-155, here p. 143. 
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scope of Europe-to-be and the hugely expanded area of application for the völkisch 
interpretive frame which most affected the voiced thoughts and arguments on Europe. 
While German propaganda tried to take advantage of the fear of communism,31 in-
ternally National Socialist officials focused on the economic and völkisch integration 
of the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories into the New Order. From a völkisch per-
spective, they deemed the local population inferior, while the fertile soils and raw ma-
terial reserves seemed a welcome economic supplement to the industrial core of the 
Großwirtschaftsraum. Thus, the two dominant interpretive frames within the New Or-
der discourse boiled down to a consistent concept: In order to maximise European 
supply, local consumers had to disappear.32 Economically, this translated into down-
grading the economy to the level of primary production by dismantling industry, while 
the völkisch visions stipulated the death of millions and the settlement of a Germanic 
upper class which was to become the nucleus for Germanisation.  
Isolated voices argued that ruling a country in complete disregard of the population 
was economically counterproductive, militarily dangerous, and often unjustified in a 
völkisch sense. However, their arguments did not carry enough discursive weight to 
alter the discourse profoundly. In the eyes of most scholars, this changed with the 
defeat of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad.33 In its aftermath, Goebbels gave his infamous 
Sportpalast speech, which called for a Europeanization of the war effort, and he is-
sued a circular that demanded a rethinking of German occupation policy.34 However, 
this alleged turning-point in fact seems to have been part of a longer lasting and 
gradual process. The arguments and thoughts behind the appeals and warnings car-
ried the more discursive weight, the more precious one of their central promises, war-
                                            
31
 See e.g. G. Koenen, Der Russland-Komplex. Die Deutschen und der Osten 1900-1945, Munich, 
Beck, 2005, p. 424; Child, New Order, p. 50. 
32
 Dlugoborski/Madajczyk argue that National Socialist Germany never distinguished between long-
term and short-term objectives. See W. Dlugoborski and C. Madajczyk, ‘Ausbeutungssysteme in den 
besetzten Gebieten Polens und der UdSSR’, in F. Forstmeier and H. Volkmann (eds.), Kriegswirt-
schaft und Rüstung, 1939-1945, Düsseldorf, Droste, 1977, pp. 375-416, here p. 376. In the Eastern 
territories, however, both initially pointed into the same direction (Chapter 3.2.2). Lund has found that 
the same holds true in the Danish case. See Lund, ‘Denmark and the New Order’, p. 321. 
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 See e.g. Schilmar, Europadiskurs, p. 117; Elvert, Mitteleuropa, p. 379; Neulen, ‘Deutschland’, p. 38; 
Salewski, ‘Ideas’, p. 52; Child, ‘New Order’, p. 53.  
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 See O. Oexle, ‘Leitbegriffe - Deutungsmuster - Paradigmenkämpfe. Über Vorstellungen vom “Neuen 
Europa” in Deutschland 1944’, in H. Lehmann and O. Oexle (eds.), Nationalsozialismus in den Kultur-
wissenschaften. Vol. 2: Leitbegriffe - Deutungsmuster - Paradigmenkämpfe. Erfahrungen und Trans-
formationen im Exil, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004, pp. 13-40, here p. 18. Weißbecker, 
‘Rußlandbild’, p. 46; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik in Polen, p. 110 
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economic benefits, became.35 Accordingly, they gained ground in the New Order dis-
course thanks to and by means of, the deteriorating military situation. Thus, it is no 
wonder that the concepts they promoted sounded more “reasonable”36 as they were 
tailored to the German need for military and economic support.37 However, the grow-
ing importance of the war effort did not invalidate the previous notions of Europe, nor 
did it lead to a new common ground. Being incontestable, the war effort and its inter-
pretive repertoire produced a broad spectrum of possible European solutions for the 
current problems. What most of them had in common – apart from promising to pro-
mote the war effort – was the adherence to the defining elements of the New Order 
discourse: Under the auspices of Germany, Europe had to be reorganised along 
völkisch and economic lines in order to have a future.38 
Against the background of the development of the New Order discourse, a large void 
becomes apparent. While many German officials pondered on the economic and 
völkisch future of Europe, their internal statements remained silent about its political 
organisation.39 On the one hand, this explains why so many historians have seized 
on the plans of European Federations which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt drafted during the last years of the war.40 Accounting for 
the absence of political concepts, on the other hand, is difficult. It might be that Hit-
ler’s reluctance to settle matters already during the war caused the silence in this re-
spect.41 However, his disinterest did not stop New Order planning in other policy 
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 Baranowski states that these voices, which were informed by pragmatic considerations not moral 
concerns, “grew louder as the progress of Barbarossa slowed”. Baranowski, Nazi Empire, p. 287. 
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 Krüger, ‘Europapolitik’, p. 129. 
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 Kahrs’ statement that all Germany planning from 1943 on assumed a German defeat seems highly 
doubtful. See H. Kahrs, ‘Von der “Großraumwirtschaft” zur “Neuen Ordnung”’, in G. Aly et al. (eds.), 
Modelle für ein deutsches Europa. Ökonomie und Herrschaft im Großwirtschaftsraum, Berlin, 
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European war economy’” seems problematic. Milward, New Order, p. 269. Even though the short-term 
orientation of the war effort sidelined völkisch long-term thoughts and arguments, the two dominant 
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of economics, not politics”. Mazower, Dark Continent, pp. 150-151. However, there were many publi-
cations, which revolved around the political and legal framework of Europe-to-be. Kletzin, Rasse und 
Raum, pp. 110-167. The most important work in this respect was probably Carl Schmitt’s ‘Völkerrecht-
liche Grossraumordnung’ from 1939 (C. Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, Berlin, 
Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1941). For the influence of this theory on public debate, see M. Schmoeckel, 
Die Großraumtheorie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Völkerrechtswissenschaft im Dritten Reich, ins-
besondere der Kriegszeit, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1994, pp. 152-161. 
40
 For Neulen one of these drafts is an “impressive document, which all powers belonging to or being 
inclined towards the Axis powers could have signed”. Neulen, ‘Deutschland’, p. 41. He generally gives 
much of his attention to the concepts of the SS. See Neulen, ibid., pp. 61-68; Neulen, Eurofaschismus. 
41
 See e.g. Umbreit, ‘Besatzungsverwaltung’, p. 718; Hoensch, ‘Europapläne’, p. 324. 
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fields. Therefore, it seems more plausible to assume that the National Socialist un-
derstanding of politics 42  together with the dominance of economic and völkisch 
thoughts and arguments limited what could be said. Internally, political suggestions 
could not go beyond authoritarian concepts without questioning the Führer principle. 
Externally, neither this form of rule nor the envisaged völkisch and economic hierar-
chy in Europe could expect to find favour. Thus, there was no ground on which con-
siderations on the political foundation of the New Order could take place and there 
was no reason to reflect about it.43 Accordingly, the political future which Germany 
could promise, increasingly boiled down to one official version. Every Volk would 
“take the place in the new Europe which it deserves”44. 
In the light of this incompatibility between German intentions and the hopes and 
wishes of the rest of Europe, several historians have concluded that there was noth-
ing European about the New Order. In their eyes, these concepts were the most radi-
cal expression of nationalism, and thus actually a scheme for Germany.45 However, 
even if one rejects – as these standpoints do – the idea that every notion of Europe is 
European because Europe itself is a social construct,46 the New Order did in fact 
transcend the nation-state. Apart from the geographical scope of National Socialist 
planning and policy, neither its völkisch nor its economic dimension were linked to 
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 In Thamer’s eyes, the National Socialist tendency to erode state structures in favour of a personal 
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questions of nationality:47 The alleged racial value and the supposed economic profi-
ciency decided on the place of a Volk in the hierarchically graded Europe-to-be. Fur-
thermore, the New Order gave rise to transnational cooperation, integrated Europe 
economically, and did so without the intent to Germanise all of Europe.48 Of course, 
Germany would have stood on top of this order, the reorganisation of Europe would 
have benefited Germany the most, and German attempts at harmonisation modelled 
Europe on the German system. However, all this was driven by notions of Europe. 
Convinced that spiritual and racial degeneration had caused the decline of Europe, 
Germany declared its own non-liberal, non-communist formula for success, the Na-
tional Revolution and its results, the role model for a more powerful and pacified new 
Europe.49 Together with the dominant economic and völkisch knowledge and belief 
system, this vision culminated in a policy of exploitation and violence.50 However, this 
rule of terror was not purely the result of an uncurbed thirst for power but also of the 
National Socialist notions of Europe.51 
One might object that reinterpreting the National Socialist reign of terror as the strug-
gle for a new Europe simply subsumes the driving forces behind National Socialist 
expansion – its ideology – under a European label, thus boosting the significance of 
the New Order. This is partly true. National Socialist concepts for Europe-to-be do 
bear a close resemblance to the defining elements of National Socialist ideology. 
However, this is not the result of an ex-post perspective, but of contemporary devel-
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opments. The discourse on Europe became the arena in which ideational struggles 
took place; “the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power 
which is to be seized.”52 As the prize to be awarded to the victor was the future of 
Europe, most German notions of Europe entered the ring hoping to gain interpreta-
tional sovereignty despite. However, National Socialist officials dominated this ring 
and, additionally, National Socialist beliefs laid down the basic rules. Consequently, 
their knowledges and beliefs won the upper hand and bound the New Order to their 
convictions. Thus, the New Order was not imposed on National Socialist beliefs as an 
umbrella term. National Socialist Germany had started a war in the name of its ideol-
ogy and, during the war, this ideology produced concrete plans:53 the New Order.  
  
5.3 A World Set on Fire – The Forge of the New Order  
German occupation policy during the war reflected the National Socialist New Order 
discourse and its predominant völkisch and economic interpretive frames. Before the 
attack on the Soviet Union, the economic vision of a Großwirtschaftsraum and the 
objective of a völkisch harmonised Europe endowed German policies with meaning. 
In territories that they considered German Lebensraum, German authorities fought 
what they called a Volkstumskampf by deporting non-German people and by 
resettling Germanic people. In the hope that their ‘Germanic brothers’ would 
voluntarily join the German cause, occupation authorities in the allegedly Germanic 
countries steered a more lenient course. Economically the Reich instigated the 
integration of all these territories into a European market. While the supreme Reich 
authorities brought the European central clearing system into being and promoted 
economic interlocking, the local occupation authorities aligned the economic 
organisations of the occupied countries with the German system. In this way, 
National Socialist Germany pulled the economic strings in Europe.  
This general course was not affected by the attack on the Soviet Union. However, the 
völkisch kowledge and belief system came fully into its own with the conquest of 
large agrarian areas inhabited by allegedly inferior people. The discourse produced 
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notions of Europe in which these territories in the East were to supplement the rest of 
Europe in terms of labour, raw materials, and foodstuffs. From the outset, German 
officials pursued this vision. The scorched earth the Red Army had left behind was 
tilled again, but plants and factories were left to rot if they were not relevant for 
primary production. In order to maximise the desired exports, German officials 
caused or condoned the death of millions of people they considered superfluous.54 
Conversely, several thousand alleged Germanics from all over Europe, the 
prospective rulers over the uneducated and poor local workforce, were brought to the 
East. Thus, the National Socialist concept of a Europe graded along völkisch lines 
coalesced with the vision of an autarkic European Großwirtschaftsraum and 
translated into an inhumane policy of “exploitation, resettlement, mass murder”.55  
However, there were voices calling for a different policy and they grew louder the less 
likely a quick victory became.56 German occupation policy in Europe reflected this 
war-economic turn of the New Order discourse – not in the form of a “generous 
gesture for the subjugated Völker”57 but in a two-pronged carrot and stick policy. 
Since winning the war was the necessary precondition for realising any New Order, 
National Socialist Germany rewarded collaboration more generously and moved in 
on non-compliance more harshly. In the East, where the attempt to rule solely by 
force and oppression had not yielded the expected results, this led to a less ruthless 
course. National Socialist officials stopped the antagonising settlement measures, 
pushed on with agrarian reforms, and tried to win over the people they had 
considered irrelevant ‘Untermenschen’ before. In the West, the more lenient course 
of the Reich had failed to cash in on the supposed blood ties. Since none of the 
allegedly Germanic states had come to support the German war wholeheartedly, the 
National Socialist efforts to get more out of these territories resulted in an in-
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creasingly radical occupation policy that neglected their supposed racial value. In this 
way, the growing discursive weight of the war effort started to level the National 
Socialist völkisch hierarchy for the sake of war-economic output.58 The German in-
tention to optimise Europe as a war-economic community entailed similar tendencies. 
By rebuilding industry in the East, by intensified outsourcing into occupied territories, 
and by sacrificing the competitive advantages of German companies, National So-
cialist officials followed the increasing short-term orientation of the New Order 
discourse and backed away from previously hegemonic long-term concepts. Thus, 
the discursively constructed New Order, as a long-term vision, lost its direct influence 
on factual German occupation policy to the extent that the war effort became the only 
yardstick of reasonableness. However, the future of Europe still mattered. As a 
central theme of German propaganda, it was supposed to rally Europe around the 
German cause. For some German officials, long-term New Order plans justified the 
short-term adjustments to the necessities of war. For others, the war effort opened up 
a discursive loophole through which their version of Europe-to-be could finally be 
voiced and realised.  
Thus, the New Order discourse guided German occupation policy. Even though the 
paramount importance of the war effort increasingly curbed its power, the discursively 
constructed Europe-to-be was a powerful vision until then. Numerous political 
measures transformed the German sphere of influence towards the ideal defined 
along economic and völkisch lines. The expulsion of thousands of people, the 
resettlement of Volksdeutsche, the leeway enjoyed by the allegedly Germanic 
countries, and the welcome activities of foreign Germanic people in the East attest to 
the factual relevance of the völkisch dimension of the New Order.59 Economically, 
National Socialist Germany started to build the European Großraumwirtschaft. The 
Reich orchestrated its production, rechanneled its trade, and imposed the Reichs-
mark as the key currency, while local occupation authorities remodelled the occupied 
economies and cut down or expanded economic sectors in accordance with the en-
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 Other scholars have noted this development. See e.g. Loock, ‘Großgermanische Politik’, p. 50; 
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visaged continental division of labour.60 Hence the New Order was more than just 
“looming”61. It was a “major source of inspiration”62 for National Socialist officials, who 
did not only “mull over the long-term shape of the continent’s peace-time New 
Order”,63 but also set up the “foundations and much of the scaffolding”64 with “con-
crete efforts to integrate Europe economically”65. Even though the war effort and the 
short time span66 blur the picture of the factual impact of the New Order on German 
European policies, it was definitely not just propaganda. In fact, the predominantly 
European rhetoric that surrounded many of the major steps towards this economic 
reorganisation of Europe suggests that German policy was geared towards more 
than exploitation for the sake of the war.67 The New Order was realised largely in 
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accordance with – and sometimes even in contradiction to68 – war-economic reason, 
until the pressing short-term necessities of war started to overshadow all German 
long-term planning.  
 
5.4 A Common Market – The Profiteers of the New Order 
Private companies69  played an important role in the construction of the National 
Socialist New Order. In the initial stage, their voices were heard in the discursive 
construction of its economic shape and they were expected to breathe life into these 
plans for a new Europe. They lived up to this expectation. Under the patronage of 
German military dominance, many German companies70 expanded into the occupied 
territories, took over competitors, bought seized Jewish businesses, acquired shares, 
outsourced production, or led companies provisionally. Thus, private businesses 
substantiated the German dominance in Europe. In the hope of also getting a chance 
in the conquered Soviet territories, German companies shifted their focus eastwards 
with the Wehrmacht. They gathered information on the local facilities and made their 
expertise available to the army by embedding experts in military units. However, they 
were in for a disappointment. For the time being, the National Socialist regime barred 
the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories for the activities of private businesses. That 
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led German companies to continue to consolidate their position in the rest of Europe 
and kept a close eye on the East.  
When the military situation led German officials to change their mind and to call on 
the support private businesses in the summer of 1942, private companies were 
ready. They were willing to take over and rebuild factories in the East. By the time 
many of the respective contracts were ready to be signed, however, the tide had 
already turned and many German companies did not take a German victory for 
granted anymore.71 Nevertheless, they carried on because it demonstrated goodwill 
and the risk-reward ratio was favourable. Thus, private businesses kept backing the 
regime and its New Order as long as a German victory did not seem impossible. 
However, as the military situation kept deteriorating National Socialist officials tried to 
brace themselves against the impending defeat by streamlining the European 
economies for the immediate needs of total war, but the activities of German 
companies started to exhibit features of defiance. While private businesses kept 
cashing in on the demand the war effort created, they prepared for the time after a 
German defeat. They tried to safeguard their expert knowledge, hoarded supplies, 
and probed the prospective post-war market.  
Until then the National Socialist New Order had played an important role in the 
activities of private companies. As mentioned above, their policies substantiated the 
discursively constructed New Order and their statements reveal a ‘voluntary 
subordination’ to the discursively hegemonic ways of speaking. The latter has led 
Hayes to conclude – with respect to the IG Farben – that German industry “learned to 
clothe its objectives in appeals to military necessity or the Party's goals”72. According 
to Feldman, they did so irrespective of whether they sympathized with the ideas or 
not.73 Indeed, much of the analysed material suggests that German businessmen 
were well aware of what the National Socialist regime expected and tailored their 
official correspondence, memoranda, and speeches to it.74 However, for German 
companies, the New Order was more than a means to their own ends. On the one 
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hand, being prepared for the anticipated European market became one of the goals 
they aimed for.75 On the other hand, the New Order policy of the regime determined 
the circumstances of their activities. The German sphere of influence set the geo-
graphical boundaries, the dominance and the policies of the Reich facilitated ex-
pansion, and the economic reorganisation of Europe created or altered demand. 
Thus, it did not need executives who wholeheartedly supported National Socialism to 
align the activities of a company with the New Order.76 Economic rationality sufficed 
as long as the discursively constructed National Socialist New Order seemed the 
most likely future scenario.  
Accordingly, when the German victory failed to materialise quickly and first military 
setbacks started to raise general doubts German companies found themselves in 
limbo. They still complied but increasingly avoided taking risks. This becomes clear in 
the expansion of German companies into the occupied Eastern territories. The initial 
interest to expand by incorporating former Soviet companies made way for dutiful 
signs of goodwill shown by taking over low-risk trusteeships. However, while com-
panies tried to minimise risks because of their uncertainty about the future, the 
regime shifted its focus to the here and now, calling for sacrifices for the sake of the 
war effort. This widening gap between the constant long-term considerations of 
German companies and the entirely short-term focused necessities of war resulted in 
frictions but also in efforts to re-establish a future prospect to which companies could 
subscribe.77 However, the National Socialist New Order ceased to be a decisive point 
of reference. German companies prepared for a different future. 
Overall, the National Socialist New Order depended on private businesses and pri-
vate businesses supported the New Order discursively and on the ground as long as 
it seemed to shape their future circumstances. To the degree that this future scenario 
faded, they reorientated themselves. Neither the increasing pressure that state insti-
tutions exerted, nor the attempts to get the companies back on board succeeded in 
realigning private businesses. They refrained from investments that would be unprof-
itable in peacetime, they defied pressures to give away expert knowledge to potential 
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post-war competitors, and they tried to bring their important staff, machinery, and raw 
materials into safety instead of sacrificing them for total war. Thus, the interplay be-
tween private companies and the National Socialist New Order suggests that eco-
nomic rationality prevailed in the activities of German businesses until the end.78 It 
also shows – and this is the more disturbing finding – that it was not ideological con-
viction or political coercion but economic rationality which led German companies to 
voluntarily sustain the inhumane New Order policies of the National Socialist re-
gime.79 They participated in and capitalised on war and mass murder because it 
promised to pay off.80  
 
5.5 A German Europe – The Place of the New Order in German Thinking 
The National Socialist New Order is often excluded from the History of European in-
tegration because of its supposedly anti-European nature. At the same time, the 
German war aims during the First World War are frequently portrayed as its spiritual 
origin. Hence, historiography constructs two major continuities in German thinking: 
On the one hand, a good one, in which the German role in the post-war integration 
process is traced back to a European spirit that timidly started to sprout during the 
interwar period;81 and, on the other hand, a dark side which made millions of German 
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soldiers trample on this delicate little plant on their way to establishing a German rule 
over Europe. By keeping these continuities separate, however, historians present the 
German role in the post-war process of European integration in a ‘proper light’ and 
block the view of commonalities that might link these traditions. Accordingly, this final 
section will briefly contextualise the National Socialist New Order within the German 
tradition of European thinking. 
After the initial victories of the German troops in the First World War, German officials 
started to ponder on the future of Europe. For many, the Reich fought this war for the 
“ideas of 1914”, which were to replace the “ideas of 1789” – liberalism, individualism, 
democracy, and human rights. 82  Accordingly, German planning revolved around 
“weakening France in a way that it cannot rise again as a great power” 83 in the West, 
and aimed at freeing itself from the “pressure of the Russian colossus”84 in the East. 
As a result, Germany would preside over a Europe pacified by a stable equilibrium.85 
Germany’s newly gained power also revived the ideas of a reorganised European 
economy that had shaped the German discourse on Europe since the middle of the 
19th century. 86  By additionally curbing British influence, leading officials intended 
letting German economic dominance in Europe come into its own, thereby 
establishing an informal political hegemony.87 Thus, imperial Germany wanted to 
seize the opportunity the war offered and to enforce an economically unified 
Mitteleuropa despite the concerns of other states. The result was to be a powerful, 
prosperous, and stable German-led Europe which would be a match for the growing 
Anglo-Saxon and Russian economies.88 
The result of the First World War, however, was not a Europe reorganised by 
Germany, but a fragmented and crisis-ridden continent which felt increasingly mar-
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ginalised by the growing power of the United States and the Societ Union. Against 
this background, many Germans considered a reorganisation of Europe more neces-
sary than ever and continued to dream about a different, a peaceful, united and 
cooperating Europe.89 In all but the socialist political camp, a European Großraum-
wirtschaft was supposed to be the economic foundation of this bright future.90 Only in 
this way would Europe be able to hold its ground in a world shaped by large inte-
grated areas and to restore its former power and glory.91 For conservative and right-
wing circles, however, to achieve all this, Europe also needed a new unifying and 
genuinely European idea to replace the detested Western values.92 Their belief that 
Germany was destined to institute such an idea was fuelled by the ‘National Revolu-
tion’, by its label as ‘Third Reich’,93 and by the völkisch spirit it promoted. Even 
though the concrete shape of German interwar notions of Europe produced many 
different concepts, they all shared one starting-point and promised the same results. 
No matter if it was the often unnamed socialist Europe-to-be, the United States of 
Europe, Mitteleuropa, the Reich, or a Pan-Germanic-League, Europe was the way 
out of misery and the promise of power, peace, and prosperity. 
When National Socialist Germany set out to conquer the Lebensraum the German 
Volk supposedly needed, it did not have a clear-cut idea of Europe-to-be, but advo-
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cated völkisch and economic knowledge and belief systems. After the first major 
victories, these perspectives on Europe and their interpretive reservoires produced 
constructs of ideas, thus launching the New Order discourse. Its völkisch dimension 
was understood as a way of pacifying the continent in a renunciation of the spiritual 
aberrations that both the East and the West had imposed or wanted to enforce on 
Europe. The idea of treading a third way also shaped the concepts for an economic 
reorganisation, which was envisaged as a more natural alternative to a liberal market, 
or a state economy. Hierarchically graded along völkisch lines and engaged in a 
division of labour that emphasised strengths, invalidated weaknesses, and reflected 
the supposed racial value of each Volk, this new Europe would thrive and not only 
defy ‘Jewish capitalism’ and ‘Jewish bolshevism’ but become the world’s political and 
economic powerhouse again. 
After the Second World War, the continent lay in ashes while the United States and 
Soviet Russia were more powerful than ever and divided the world between them.94 
Nevertheless, Germany still pinned its hopes on Europe. If they wanted to preserve 
themselves and their uniqueness, the European states had to make use of the 
potentials that economic and political integration promised. On its own, no country 
would stand a chance amidst the world powers.95 Even though the idea of a third – 
genuinely European – way between the two dominating ideologies was still powerful, 
the West offered more compatible values and seemed much less threatening than 
communism in the East, whose dangerousness National Socialist propaganda had 
tried to hammer home to all Europeans since 1941.96 Additionally, the expansion of 
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Russia rendered Mitteleuropa illusory by factually and rhetorically barring the way 
into the economies Germany had eyed up for more than a century, and the havoc 
wrought in the name of the Third Reich not only prohibited calls for a fourth Reich but 
also discredited any claim to a German hegemony in Europe. 97  Thus, Western 
Germany reoriented itself westwards because there was no other choice, advocated 
a peaceful reinvigoration of Europe through integration, and meant to save “the 
Christian Abendland [occident]”98 from sinking into insignificance. 
Of course, condensed in this way, the commonalities between decades of German 
notions of Europe cover up some undeniable fundamental differences. National 
Socialism committed countless crimes and atrocities in the name of the New Order it 
wanted to enforce,99 whereas the post-war integration process was borne by equality, 
mutual agreement and cooperation. Nevertheless, the focus on the commonalities 
reveals some remarkable common ground: For decades, the United States and 
Soviet Russia were large integrated entities whose military and economic power were 
perceived as a threat, while Europe was fragmented, quarrelling, poor, and 
powerless. In this context, a new European order seemed the only remedy for the 
loss of political weight, cultural influence, and economic relevance, as it promised 
peace, prosperity and power. Thus, Europe constantly faced the same, genuinely 
European, problems, and for many Germans, including the National Socialists, it 
remained the best answer. Only a pacified, cooperating, and economically thriving 
Europe, organised in a genuinely European manner, would safeguard the survival of 
whatever they held dear. From this perspective, Mazower’s verdict that National 
Socialism in general fits “into the mainstream not only of German but also of 
European history far more comfortably than most people like to admit”100, also holds 
true for the National Socialist European policy. The New Order was the inhumane 
and violent attempt to realise a National Socialist solution to European problems. 
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